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The March 2011 events at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant represented a radioactivity
release of a similar "global severity" as the Chernobyl accident. Following the multiple reactor
unit explosions that occurred, a total of 146,520 residents from across Fukushima Prefecture
were evacuated from their homes. Today, with many years having passed since the event, there
exists a greater commitment than ever to allow for those formerly displaced to return. Central
to this resettlement is the combined remediation of the extensive swathe of contaminated land,
but also a detailed understanding of the physiochemical nature and associated environmental
affinity of the released radionuclides.
Regional radiation monitoring was first undertaken using newly-devised aerial and ground-based
radiation mapping platforms. From this, it was observed that from an initially quasi-uniform
radiocesium distribution in contaminated areas, that significant redistribution of contamination
had occurred. For sites that had experienced recent remediation, contamination "hot-spots" were
observed to quickly re-establish across such localities, occurring at positions where mobilised
particulate would become readily trapped. At locations where no remediation had been performed,
contamination was observed to be similarly mobile. These contamination transport results
correlate with earlier works examining Cs sorption onto fine-scale clay and mica-type mineral
particulates, which forms a ubiquitous and significant component of the Fukushima soil. This
mobility is heightened by the regions sub-tropical climate with periodic typhoon events.
Alongside the Cs-sorbed material, the coarser particulate contributing to the radioactivity
measured during this site-wide monitoring was examined. This material was classified into
two groups; (i) particulate on the micron/sub-micron scale obtained from distances of up to 70 km
from the site, and (ii) a grouping of larger particles (100’s of µm in diameter), isolated from soils on
the boundary of the facility (<2 km). The smaller particulate, found adhered to organic surfaces,
was observed to be characteristically angular in form. Sub-micron U composition ejecta, as well
as exhibiting a complex internal microstructure, also contained a determinable Cs component.
The larger Si-rich particulate, in contrast, was characterised by a variable surface and internal
form - in some instances being highly-porous. As well as occurrences of fragments of cement and
iron, some of this material also contained micron-scale 235U-enriched particles.
These results provide evidence that correlate with earlier studies, indicating that core material
from Unit 2 was released in the accident as well as for the first time reporting the emission of U
from the core of reactor Unit 1. The potential environmental implications of such fine and large
particulate are investigated and discussed as part of this work, with recommendations detailed
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THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AND
ACCIDENT
The incident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (FDNPP) represents one of the
greatest ever radioactive release events to occur at a nuclear power generation facility. Classified
as severe as the events that occurred at the Chernobyl facility 25 years earlier [1, 2], the
radioactivity released from the Fukushima plant was rapidly detected as far away as Russia
and mainland Europe [3, 4]. Alongside the development and application of radiation monitoring
techniques to investigate the evolving distribution of contamination, this thesis presents a
forensic examination of particulate samples (released into the environment) to attain a more
detailed technical insight into events that occurred following the earthquake and ensuing tsunami,
responsible for the catastrophic chain of events that occurred at the Japanese coastal facility.
This initial chapter provides an overview on each of the reactor units at the FDNPP, as well
as an account of the on-site events that ensued from the afternoon of the 11th March 2011. A
description of the monitoring activities performed to quantify the radioactive release(s) from the
site is subsequently provided in Chapter 2.
Information on the plant is obtained from various sources, including the plant’s operators -
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) [5–7], International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
[2, 8], Japanese Nuclear Regulators (NRA) [9] and World Nuclear Association [10, 11] as well as
the reactor manufacturers - a consortium of General Electric (GE), Hitachi and Toshiba [12].
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1.1 The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (FDNPP)
Facing an increasing drive to become energy self-reliant, nuclear power was anticipated to account
for 41% of Japan’s domestic supply by 2019, with many new plants under construction (or in the
planning stages) as of March 2011 [13, 14]. Home to some of the oldest reactors in Japan, the
FDNPP consisted of six power-generating units, located on Japan’s eastern Pacific coast, 225 km
north-east of Tokyo. The complex was operated by the country’s largest utility company, TEPCO.
Combined, the total peak output of the FDNPP was 46 GWe - constituting 6 of the 54 reactors
operational across the country at the time [8].
An annotated aerial photograph detailing the relative location of each of the reactors at the site
is shown in Figure 1.1, with all of the units positioned several hundred metres back from the
coastline at an elevation of 10 m ordnance datum (OD). Where it bordered the Pacific Ocean,
the plant was protected by a concrete seawall, 5.7 m OD, that extended around its seaward
perimeter - a consideration typical of the entirety of Japan’s coastal nuclear plants [15]. This
regulatory requirement was invoked as a result of the 1960 Chilean earthquake and tsunami
- where a 3.1 m high protective seawall was recommended. A subsequent revision in 2002 saw
the required height of the wall raised by 2.6 m, to 5.7 m. In addition to this, the seawater
pumps that served to provide cool seawater for the main and auxiliary (emergency) condenser
circuits, were environmentally-sealed to protect them against any tsunamis that could impact
the site and reactor operations. These pumps were also relocated to a position 4 m above sea level.
With an estimated 20% of nuclear facilities worldwide operating in areas with "significant"
seismic activity [8, 16], protection from earthquakes forms part of standard reactor design
protocols. However, owing to the heightened seismic activity that occurs across Japan as a result
of its proximity to the subducting "Japan Trench" (part of the larger "Pacific Rim of Fire") [17],
seismic considerations are a significant component of Japanese reactor design [16].
Prior to March 2011, a number of earthquakes had occurred in close proximity to Japanese
power reactors - the largest of which being the moment magnitude (MW) 7.8 earthquake that
occurred off the coast of Hokkaido in July 1993 [16]. Despite this large episode of seismic activity,
the nearby Tomari 1 and 2 reactors (located 95 km from the epicentre), continued normal
operation having not recorded ground accelerations necessary to "trip" the reactors and cause an
automated shutdown. A lesser MW 6.2 earthquake occurred offshore of Fukushima Prefecture on
13th June 2010 [18], however, the nearby Fukushima Daiichi, Fukushima Daini and Onagawa
facilities were all unaffected. It was only in October 2004, however, following a MW 5.2 earthquake
with an epicentre 250 km north of Tokyo, that the first-ever "trip" (and automated shutdown) at
a Japanese reactor occurred at Unit 7 of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear plant [19]. Despite the
regular seismic activity, no facilities had ever been inundated by tsunamis [16].
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Figure 1.1: Annotated aerial photograph of the FDNPP - the location of its reactors is shown, set
behind the protective seawall 5.7 m high and offshore perimeter breakwater. From [2].
As was typical of reactors within Japan, the units at the FDNPP were all of Boiling Water
Reactor (BWR) design (a schematic of which is shown in Figure 1.2), each achieving criticality
and entering into power generation over a ten year period between 1970 and 1979. All of the
reactors were of GE design - supplied through a consortium of GE, alongside both Toshiba and
Hitachi. A breakdown of the key attributes for each of the six reactors at the FDNPP, as well as
the plant’s central fuel storage facility, is shown in Table 1.1. Further details on the composition
and state of the fuel, alongside other core properties, are shown in Table 1.2. Although features
differed slightly between each reactor, the general construction and operation of each were
near-identical. At the core of each reactor were a number of fuel assemblies (400 in the smallest
Unit 1, with 764 in the largest Unit 6), each 4 m in length, with each assembly bundle containing
60 fuel rods - into these the fissile fuel (typically UO2) was loaded.
To contain this fuel, it was encased within a high-purity (low Hf content) and low neutron-
absorbing zirconium alloy (Zircaloy-4™) cladding. BWRs are the simplest light water reactor
design by which to generate power - with the heat and resultant steam directed out of the
top of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV), where it drives a number of turbines. The steam is
then condensed via a heat exchanger (using seawater supplied by the seawater pumps) before
being returned to the reactor in a single (closed) loop. Control of the neutron flux, and hence
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Figure 1.2: Illustrative schematic of the components within a light water BWR unit. From [8].
the reactor’s power output, is performed via control rods composed of a high neutron-absorbing
material (B4C at Fukushima), with fine adjustments to operations undertaken by changes in
the water recirculation flow rate. Water in these reactors also serves as a neutron moderator,
producing "thermal" neutrons capable of fissioning U nuclei by slowing down "fast" neutrons,
otherwise unable to induce fissions. Unlike the now favoured Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR)
designs, the steam generated through the fission process is used to directly drive the turbines,
whereas a secondary boiler loop is found within PWR systems.
Based around the "free-standing bulb-shape" design, five of the reactors (Units 1 - 5), including
all those involved in the 2011 accident (Section 1.3) featured the older style of Mark-I Primary
Containment (PC), a schematic of which is shown in Figure 1.3. Unit 6 conversely, employed
a slightly different Mark-II Primary Containment. Contained within the reactors Dry Well
(known also as the Primary Containment Vessel, or PCV), is the RPV. Connected below to
the Dry Well is the torus-shaped Wet Well (or Suppression Chamber) - where water contained
within a Suppression Pool acts as an energy absorbing medium in the event of a severe loss
of coolant incident (LOCI); whereby excess heat is produced within the core-containing RPV
[12]. Further details regarding the design and operation of nuclear reactors are detailed in
Glasstone (1994) [20], and summarised with respect to the FDNPP in literature provided by the
World Nuclear Association [11]. An illustrative schematic of a typical BWR is shown in Figure 1.2.
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After its use within a reactor, nuclear fuel is both thermally as well as radiologically "hot" [21].
When removed from the core, a fuel assembly is routinely stored underwater for a period of
around 3 years in dedicated fuel storage ponds (FSP), where it can be actively cooled and the
ionising radiation that it emits safely shielded (whilst outside of the RPV) [20, 21]. To facilitate
this, operations require an uninterrupted power supply to drive the recirculation pumps that
distribute water and remove the considerable decay heat through the numerous heat exchangers.
Typical of Japanese reactor designs and apparent from those at the FDNPP site, was the location
of these fuel storage ponds (each maintained at specific chemical/pH conditions to allow for the
safe long-term storage of the fuel [22]), positioned directly above each RPV (Figure 1.3). Their
position allowed for the logistically simple routine transfer of fuel both in and out of the RPV
while fully underwater. Both fresh (unirradiated) and spent (irradiated) fuel assemblies were
stored in these ponds, above each of the reactors (a breakdown is presented in Table 1.1) - with
additional material housed at the facilities central (wet) storage facility (before being transferred
into long-term dry storage after sufficient cooling).
If a LOCI event were to occur at such a facility; with fuel still located within the RPV, the
principal priority is to rapidly cool the fuel back to a safe temperature. As stated above, despite
being shut down, a large amount of residual decay heat remains (approximately 1.5% of normal
thermal output, or 3.0 MW [23, 24]). For the FDNPP reactors, this would be performed using a
Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system and an Emergency Core Cooling (ECC) system - in the
form of either an Isolation Condenser (IC) system, as in Unit 1, or a Reactor Core Isolation Unit
(RCIU), for Units 2 - 6 [25]. These systems required only a limited amount of external power to
recirculate cooling water, drawn by the coastal seawater pumps, through the reactors extensive
heat exchanger network. In the case of Fukushima, this power was provided through a number of
external high-voltage supply lines that ran to the site, in addition to several backup generators
and batteries (located in the basement of each of the turbine halls). A number of unpowered
systems also existed within each of the reactors to provide a "last chance" for emergency core-
cooling in the event of powered systems failing.
1.1.1 Units 1, 2 and 3
As shown in Table 1.1, these were the first reactors to come into service, between 1970 and
1975 - with the first, Unit 1, being the smallest at the site. At the time of the accident, all three
reactors were in power generation mode, with the cores of both Units 1 and 2 operating with a
"standard" low-enriched (≈3.5 wt% 235U [25]) uranium dioxide (UO2) loading. The neighbouring
Unit 3 was, however, operating with a core composed of a mixture of both low-enriched UO2
(total: 512 assemblies) and a plutonium-uranium mixed-oxide (or MOX) fuel (total: 32 assemblies)
[25, 26]. MOX fuels represent a method through which to recycle Pu that had ingrown via the
transmutation of fertile 238U during neutron irradiation.
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Figure 1.3: Schematic of BWR Mark-I Primary Containment (Units 1 - 5). Modified from [2].





460 784 784 784 784 1100 -
First power 1970 1973 1974 1978 1977 1979 -
Fuel type UO2 UO2 UO2 / MOX UO2 UO2 UO2 UO2
Reactor fuel
assemblies
400 587 548 0 548 764 0
Stored fuel
assemblies
292 578 514 1331 946 876 6375
Table 1.1: Operational parameters and fuel loadings at the six FDNPP reactors (and their
associated fuel storage ponds) as well as the central fuel storage facility, at the time of the
accident. From [5, 11].
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Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3
U mass (kg) 68 94 93
U enrichment (wt% 235U) 3.4 - 3.6 3.8 1.1 - 3.8*
U burn-up - averaged (GWD/t) 39.5 45.0 45.0
U burn-up - maximum (GWD/t) 55.0 55.0 55.0
Cladding material Zircaloy-4™
Control material B4C
Table 1.2: Core parameters for FDNPP reactor Units 1, 2 and 3 at the time of the incident on the
11th March 2011. (*Unit 3 at the FDNPP also contained MOX fuel assemblies (32 in total), with
1.1 wt% - 1.3 wt% 235U and 2.7 wt% - 5.3 wt% 239Pu - the enrichment of the standard UO2 fuel
assemblies (516 in total), was 3.8 wt% 235U). From [25].
Due to limited space available at the sites central fuel storage facility, the above-reactor fuel
storage pond in Unit 2 was abnormally full, resulting in a greater than normal thermal-loading
on its heat-removal system.
1.1.2 Unit 4
Unlike Units 1, 2 and 3, the neighbouring Unit 4 was undergoing a planned outage at the time of
the accident, prior to its refuelling and eventual restarting. As a result, the entirety of the core
had been moved into the reactors FSP. Like Unit 2, this resulted in the facility being abnormally
full, with a similarly high (but within tolerable limits) thermal-loading on both the recirculation
and thermal extraction systems. Despite being much later in its construction than the earlier
three reactor Units, a number of ventilation pipework connections were shared between it and
the neighbouring Unit 3 - with similar pipework links existing between both Units 2 and 3.
1.1.3 Units 5 and 6
The northern-most and newest units at the FDNPP, Units 5 and 6, were in a period of prolonged
"cold shutdown" at the time of the incident (Unit 5 had been shut down on 3rd January 2011,
with Unit 6 on 14th August 2010) [25]. Contrary to Unit 4, where all of the nuclear material from
the core had been removed into the above-reactor FSPs, the nuclear material from these reactor
Units remained in its RPV and FSPs (as at the time of operation). Owing to the long period of
time that these reactors had been in shutdown, its core material was not as thermally hot as the
other Units [25]. As no events or radioactive releases occurred from either of these reactor units,
they are not further discussed in this thesis.
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1.1.4 Central fuel storage facility
Located close to Unit 4 (towards the southern-most part of the site), the plant’s central fuel storage
facility was near-full at the time of the accident, containing 6375 fuel assemblies (maximum:
6840, although reduced slightly due to some damaged assemblies being stored in this facility)
[5]. The storage facility inventory comprised predominantly older fuel (with considerably less
decay heat and radioactivity) and sustained no major damage during the March 2011 events.
This facility did not contribute to any radiation emission and is not further discussed.
1.1.5 Site infrastructure
Like any electricity generating facility, significant infrastructure is required to connect it to the
wider power distribution network, with the Fukushima Daiichi site being no exception to this.
These extensive high-voltage lines transmit energy produced on the site out, to the national grid
using a number of additional high-voltage lines supplying power to the facility, more importantly,
should the need arise. In contrast to the majority of other countries, due to the extensive seismic
activity typical of Japan [18], electricity (and other services) are transmitted above ground rather
than buried at shallow depths [14]. Such a system allows for not only greater damage tolerance
during earthquake events, but also a more efficient repair to infrastructure in such an aftermath.
1.2 The Great Eastern Japan Earthquake and Tsunami
At 14:46 on Friday 11th March 2011, a MW 9.0 earthquake occurred 130 km offshore of the nearby
city of Sendai, 100 km north of the FDNPP [27]. Resulting from the 20 m lateral movement of the
sea-floor that occurred, the eastern part of Japan’s main island, Honshu, shifted horizontally by
several meters, and vertically by approximately half a meter [28]. The magnitude of this seismic
event was unprecedented in modern human history and greater than almost all earthquakes
formerly recorded in Japan - comparable to the MW 9.1 Indian Ocean Earthquake in 2004 [29].
As a result of the earthquake’s magnitude, the total amount of energy released was considerable.
Estimates placed the total Joule equivalent at 3.0 EJ (×1018 J), or the equivalent of 800 megatons
of TNT (sixteen times the energy released from the worlds largest ever thermonuclear weapon,
the "Tsar Bomba", tested in 1961 by the Soviet Union) [18].
Arsing from this vast vertical displacement, 41 and 50 minutes after the main earthquake (and
during the hundreds of significant aftershocks), two tsunami waves up to 33 m high, inundated
an area of coastline totalling over 560 km2 (including that occupied by the FDNPP) - causing the
loss of 19,000 lives, with many more reported missing [30].
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Figure 1.4: Map of north-eastern Japan nuclear facilities, with the 11th March 2011 tsunami
inundation height and the location of the earthquake epicentre shown. From [2].
1.3 The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident
The FDNPP was just one of a number of Japanese nuclear facilities impacted by the tsunami
(Figure 1.4). However, all others (some impacted by greater inundations of up to 31 m) were better
protected and able to successfully prevent any radioactive releases. Due to the extensive seismic
monitoring network that exists across Japan, both the location and intensity of the earthquake
were known instantly [17], and applicable tsunami warnings were issued - including to the area
surrounding the FDNPP site [31].
This chronology of events is sourced from a number of official accounts, documents and press
releases, shown graphically also in Figures 1.5 and 1.6. These were reported by the operators
(TEPCO) [7, 32, 33] as well as detailed extensively within the IAEA 2015 Fukushima Report [2]
alongside being further summarised by the World Nuclear Association (WNA) report on the event
[34]. All times stated are Japan Standard Time (JST) (UTC +09:00).
1.3.1 11th March 2011
14:46. Immediately after the detection of the first seismic episode at the FDNPP (as well as many
other reactors across the country), the operational reactors (Units 1 - 3) "tripped", entering into
an immediate shutdown (or "SCRAM") with full insertion of control rods and initiation of the
ECC systems. (N.B. later analysis concluded that the earthquake itself did not cause any serious
structural damage to the reactors). Almost instantly after this emergency shutdown and ECC
system initiation, the external power to the plant was lost as a result of the earthquake - with
supply instead drawn from generators located in the neighbouring turbine halls basements.
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Figure 1.5: Variation in air dose-rate over the main release period as recorded at the FDNPP
Main Gate. Data obtained from [33].
15:27 and 15:36. Less than an hour after the main seismic event, two tsunami waves (4 and
15 m respectively) arrived at the site, causing damage which resulted in a station-wide power
blackout. The tsunami waters flooded the basements where the back-up generators were housed;
also destroying the seawater pumps (central to the heat-exchanger network), the RHR system
and the electrical switchgear used to control and report on the condition of each of the reactors.
Several backup batteries located in the basements of Units 1 and 2 were also flooded, leaving
both without lighting or basic instrumentation. The batteries within Unit 3 survived, however,
allowing readouts from limited instrumentation for a period of approximately 30 hours.
Following the tsunamis, all but 1 of the 24 static on-site radiation monitoring points were disabled,
leaving the authorities with little or no knowledge as to the levels or spread of radioactivity. The
only operating monitoring point was located at the plants Main Gate (to the far west of the site),
with the variation in air dose-rate over the main 72 hour release period recorded by this monitor
shown in Figure 1.5.
18:00. Without heat removal by circulation to an outside heat exchanger, extensive steam was
produced (later directed into the PCV) - with the water-level in Unit 1 dropping below the top of
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Figure 1.6: Chronology of events at the FDNPP. Modified from the 2015 IAEA Fukushima
Accident Report [2]. A list of the acronyms contained within this schematic is provided.
the fuel, and by 19:30, to below the bottom of the fuel assemblies. As a result, the fuel in the RPV
began to increase in surface temperature and was estimated to have reached in-excess of 2800°C.
19:03. In light of the situation, the Government of Japan declared a Nuclear Emergency at
the FDNPP site. At 20:50, a 2 km evacuation order was issued for those living closest to the plant.
This zone was extended to 3 km at 21:03 by the then Prime Minister, Mr Naoto Kan.
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In the absence of adequate core-cooling, a large volume of steam was produced in each Units RPVs.
This pressure of steam, as well as hydrogen gas, (produced as a result of the highly-exothermic
oxidation of the zirconium (Zircaloy-4™) cladding at elevated temperatures in the presence of
steam [35]), was subsequently released by venting the RPVs of reactor Units 1 and 2 into their
respective Dry Wells (or PCVs).
However, during the incident, the pressure and temperature of each of the RPVs continued
to rise, with reactor core water injection commencing through the various design mechanisms (as
described in Section 1.1). Over time, each of these systems failed - with eventual decisions made
for each of the reactors to be vented into their respective Wet Wells (Suppression Pools) to further
relieve reactor pressure build-up and initiate seawater injection as a final core-cooling attempt.
1.3.2 12th March 2011
05:44. The estimated risk and likelihood of a radiation release was considered sufficiently high
that under mounting pressure, Prime Minister Kan extended the mandatory evacuation zone to
a 10 km radius from the sites western-most boundary.
07:00. Core melting in Unit 1 was estimated to have reached completion, with nearly all of
the core having fallen to the base of the RPV and PCV before partly melting into the 5 m
thick concrete pedestal below. (N.B. quartz and other mineral components of concrete melt at
temperatures of ≈1000°C [35–37] - well below the 2900°C melting point of UO2 [35]).
After earlier attempts failed at around 10:20, the venting of the Unit 1 PCV through an external
vent stack was again attempted at 14:30. This vent, however, failed with a portion of the vented
combustible gas flowing back into the service area, around the fuel storage ponds and other
regions surrounding the reactor structure (Figure 1.3).
11:00. With the primary backup core cooling and water injection system having failed, as well
as the secondary system (using the high-pressure return of condensed steam) in reactor Unit 3,
the water level in the reactor had significantly dropped - alongside an associated increase in the
reactors core temperature.
15:36. Following the failed venting of Unit 1 an hour earlier, an explosion occurred in the
Unit 1 reactor building, producing large volumes of thick white smoke.
18:25 After visiting the plant, Prime Minister Kan further revised the evacuation radius,
increasing it up to 20 km around the plant.
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19:00. Seawater injection began into Unit 1 against the instructions of the Japanese Government
(who shortly after, however, redacted this instruction).
The unknown whereabouts and condition of two TEPCO workers were reported by the company.
Kazuhiko Kokubo and Yoshiki Terashima were in the basement of the Unit 4 turbine building
undertaking an inspection for potential leaks caused by the earthquake when the tsunami hit. It
was not until the 3rd April 2011 that the news of their deaths was finally released. These deaths,
to date, are the only ones to have occurred as a direct result of events at the FDNPP [30].
1.3.3 13th March 2011
05:30. At this time, the melting of core material within reactor Unit 3 was believed to have
initiated, with most of the core having undergone complete melting by 12:00 on the same day. As
a result, like reactor Unit 1, most of the core material was believed to have fallen to the base of
the RPV.
09:50. The RPV of Unit 3 was successfully vented into the Wet Well (Suppression Pool) to
yield a reduction in the overall reactor core pressure. This venting was not through the PCV, but
directly into the Wet Well through a dedicated vent line out of the top of the RPV.
10:15. Following high-pressure readings from Unit 2, a decision was made to vent the RPV
into the PCV through the use of a small portable generator to open the required valves.
13:12. The RPV of Unit 3 was, again, successfully vented into the Wet Well (Suppression Pool),
allowing for seawater injection (using a fire pump), to begin.
1.3.4 14th March 2011
11:01. Further attempted venting of the pressure that had subsequently built-up within Unit 3
was performed. However, shortly after, an explosion similar to that of Unit 1 occurred, demolishing
the top portion of the reactor building. This venting effort was believed to have similarly failed as
a result of the ignition of hydrogen that had accumulated/back-flown into the reactors service area.
The large amount of debris from the Unit 3 explosion, aside from being highly-radioactive,
caused extensive damage to the other Units cooling systems, principally the neighbouring Unit 2.
13:00. The steam-driven systems that had provided cooling to the Unit 2 reactor, as a final
back-up, eventually failed. From this time, there occurred a resultant rise in reactor pressure
and a lowering of the RPV water level.
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To avoid a repetition of the hydrogen explosion that had occurred at Unit 1 two days earlier, from
18:00, the vent panels in the roof of the Unit 2 reactor building were opened.
19:05. Seawater injection into Unit 2 began after pressure was relieved via the venting of
the PCV into the reactors Wet Well (Suppression Pool).
At approximately 20:00 on Monday 14th March, core damage to Unit 2 was likely to have
begun, following the seven-hour break in cooling.
1.3.5 15th March 2011
00:01. Shortly after midnight, further venting of the Unit 2 RPV was performed, following an
initial venting two days earlier on the morning of the 13th March.
06:14. An explosion was witnessed to have occurred from the top of Unit 4. The explosion
caused extensive damage to the reactor building but also resulted in further damage to the
neighbouring Unit 3. This explosion was believed to be the result of an explosive hydrogen gas
mixture originating from Unit 3, that travelled into Unit 4 through the shared ducts from the
venting process that had occurred earlier.
At around 09:00 on Tuesday 15th March, the highest levels of radiation since the start of
the accident were detected. A dose-rate of 11,930 µSv hr-1 (0.1193 Sv hr-1) was recorded at the
radiation monitoring point at the Main Gate. Later analysis subsequently suggested that this
spike in radioactivity was the result of a leak in the PCV of Unit 2. This release represented the
largest to come from the site, and did not result from a physical reactor building explosion.
At around midnight on the 15th March, the reactor Unit 3 Wet Well was vented through an
external stack into the atmosphere. Unlike the venting episodes that had occurred at reactor
Units 1 and 2, the hot reactor gases had not passed through/contacted with the PCV (Dry Well)
before leaving the reactor building.
Following the earlier explosion in reactor Unit 4, TEPCO began the injection of seawater into the
Unit 4 FSP in an attempt to reduce its temperature. Later in the day, active cooling was started
to the other reactor Units FSPs. Initial samples taken from the cooling waters in these ponds
suggested that a number of fuel assemblies may have been damaged [38].
1.3.6 Beyond 16th March 2011
This timeline of events during the initial five days represents the most substantive releases from
the site, with large mushroom-cloud style explosions from Units 1 and 3 and the believed PCV
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breach from Unit 2. Over the period that followed, further, but less considerable releases occurred
[33], with periodic and significant radiation releases occurring until the 31th March 2011 [39],
and a further release occurring during August 2013 [40]. These emissions have been invoked to
represent remediation and debris retrieval operations that were occurring on the site [40].
1.3.7 Meteoric conditions
Located on the countries border with the Pacific Ocean, as with any such coastal site, the meteoric
(wind) conditions associated with the FDNPP site were highly-variable. The conditions measured
at the plant over the twenty days from the 11th March 2011 are shown in the rose diagrams
presented in Figure 1.7. From these plots, the predominant wind direction is observed as flowing
from the plant in the west, out eastwards into the neighbouring Pacific Ocean. An additional
(although less prominent) northerly wind direction is also apparent.
As shown by the rose diagram of Figure 1.7 depicting wind conditions on 12th March, at the time
of the Unit 1 release (15:36), the wind conditions were such that radioactive material would be
transported in a northerly direction. The wind conditions two days later, during the second site
release from Unit 3 on the 14th March were, however, contrasting. During this contamination
release at 11:01 JST, wind conditions resulted in emissions being transported towards the south.
Conditions subsequently changed from mid-afternoon, with winds blowing offshore to the east.
The penultimate (and largest) radioactive release from the FDNPP site resulted from a believed
leak of the reactor Unit 2 PCV. Invoked to have commenced at approximately 20:00 on the 14th
March, the seaward wind direction from the afternoon through to the early evening meant that
radiation released over this period was dispersed over the neighbouring Pacific Ocean. A change
in the wind direction several hours later resulted in a component of this release being directed
back onshore (westwards), towards the Chiba, Tsukuba and Tokyo Metropolitan areas - hundreds
of km’s to the south. However, a further change in the wind-direction within the Kantō Region
overnight (into the morning of the 15th March), resulted in the transportation of air northwards -
back towards the cities of Nihonmatsu and Fukushima. At the same time (morning of the 15th
March), a light onshore wind occurred, alongside a more prevalent northerly wind - transporting
material both on-land, but predominantly southwards and out to sea. With multiple contaminated
air-masses now dispersed across the Japanese mainland, for the first time since the start of
the incident on the 11th March, widespread precipitation occurred from 12:00 until 20:00 on
the 15th March, across both the Kantō and Tōhoku Regions. This resulted in the deposition of
once-airborne radioactive material across a large expanse of the Fukushima Prefecture [42].
As previously discussed, at 06:14 JST on the 15th March, during the explosion at the FDNPP
Unit 4 reactor building (due to the inflow of highly-flammable Unit 3-derived hydrogen as a result
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Figure 1.7: Schematic summary of wind fields during each day at the FDNPP. Red lines
represent the wind directions (from the plant), with their length depicting the velocity. From [41].
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Figure 1.8: Time-resolved 137Cs depositional concentrations monitored at three localities (A -
Hamadori, Sendai; B - Fukushima, Fukushima City and C - TMA, Tokyo Metropolitan Area) over
the ten day release period. Blue shaded areas illustrate the periods of precipitation that occurred
at each geographically-distinct site. From [43], with data from [42].
of shared pipework), the prevailing wind direction was northerly - transporting contamination
southwards, and out to sea. A light onshore wind also occurred early in the day.
A summary of the total 137Cs depositional concentration releases that occurred over the initial
ten-day emission phase is shown graphically in Figure 1.8. Also included in this plot from Snow et
al., (2016) [43] (with data derived from Tsuruta et al., (2014) [42]) are illustrated; (i) the periods
of prolonged precipitation that occurred at two of the sites (Fukushima (Fukushima City) and
the Tokyo Metropolitan Area (TMA)) in addition to, (ii) the specific reactor Unit release event
contributions attributed to have occurred.
1.4 Post-accident reactor assessment
1.4.1 International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES)
Owing to the "major release of radioactive material with widespread health and environmental
effects requiring implementation of planned and extended countermeasures" [1], the events at the
FDNPP were classified on the 12th April 2011 at Level 7 (the most severe) on the International
Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) [44].
Representing the most significant of nuclear release scenarios, the only other event to be rated
equally highly was that which occurred at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in 1986.
1.4.2 Reactor inventory modelling
To better inform the distribution of contamination arising from the different reactor sources at
the FDNPP, reactor core inventory modelling for each of the reactors (Units 1 - 3) and associated
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Table 1.3: Characteristic 134Cs/137Cs activity ratios for reactor Units 1 - 3 and FSPs 1 - 4. As
determined by [50].
FSPs (Units 1 - 4) involved/potentially influenced by the accident was undertaken. Owing to
the differing ages and degrees of burn-up of the fuel within each of the reactors and FSP a
specific radiocesium activity ratio (134Cs/137Cs), for each potential source was derived. Other
activity ratios (e.g. 110mAg/137Cs) or isotope ratios (134Cs/137Cs or 240Pu/239Pu), are each similarly
indicative of a specific reactor source (or release scenario) [45–47]. These radionuclide ratios have
formerly been utilised for the attribution of other contamination sources (e.g. Three Mile Island
and Chernobyl) [48, 49].
This work after Fukushima was undertaken by Nishihara et al. [50], of Japan Atomic Energy
Agency (JAEA), using ORIGEN code for calculating the nuclide compositions and characteristics
of nuclear materials [51]. The 134Cs/137Cs activity ratio results obtained from this work are shown
in Table 1.3. As is apparent, all fuelled reactor Units possessed a 134Cs/137 Cs ratio averaging 1.
In each of the fuel storage ponds, however, owing to the age of the material and resultant decay
of the shorter-lived 134Cs (t1/2 = 2.065 years [52]), ratios were less - varying from 0.54 to 0.74.
These values, however, only represent an average for the entire fuel volume of that source, as
within a fuel assembly, this Cs activity and atomic ratios are observed to vary considerably with
height in a typical BWR fuel element [53]. The application of these activity ratios to fingerprint
individual releases is utilised in later portions of this work (Section 2.2.5).
1.4.3 Core behaviour
Since the accident in March 2011, the plant’s operators TEPCO, in collaboration with Japan’s
International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID), have employed the highly
penetrating properties of naturally-occurring sub-atomic muons to investigate the state of each
of the three damaged reactor cores. Beginning with Unit 1 in 2015 [54], before Unit 2 in 2016
[55] and most recently Unit 3 in 2017 [56], the state of each of the cores (structure and location of
fuel material) has been imaged and for the first time, assessed.
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Figure 1.9: Photographs of the above-reactor spent fuel storage pond in Unit 4 obtained using a
remotely-operated underwater vehicle by TEPCO. From [59].
Within Unit 1, the majority of the fuel material has been observed to no-longer exist in the
RPV but is inferred to have melted to form a "corium" material and fallen onto the base of the
PCV. Little material subsequently remains in the original core position. A similar scenario is
apparent in Unit 3, however, more core material than Unit 1 has been shown to be located in its
original position within the RPV (although collected at its base). Unit 2 on the other hand, whilst
showing some core melting had occurred and escaped to the underlying PCV, most of the fuel
material still remains within the RPV (also located towards its base). Only a limited amount of
"corium" is believed to have reached the base of the PCV. This melting and relocation of material
outside of the RPV has resulted in significant issues for the decommissioning of the FDNPP
reactors and the efforts to retrieve this material for its final disposal are ongoing at the time of
writing this thesis [57].
1.4.4 Fuel Storage Ponds
Over the months following the accident, the cooling facility to each of the Unit’s FSPs was
restored. Despite showing early signs of physical damage (Figure 1.9), after analysis of the
material recovered from the storage pond in the most heavily-loaded (and thermally active) Unit
4, the fuel was observed to have suffered from no significant deformation or corrosion and has
since all been removed [58]. Plans are currently set to commence with work to remove the stored
fuel from Unit 3 in mid-2018 [56].
1.5 Background summary
As detailed within this chapter, the FDNPP accident of March 2011, caused by the MW 9.0 Great
Eastern Japan Earthquake and resultant tsunami, represents one of the most severe radiological
releases to ever occur from a power generation facility. Whereas the 1986 Chernobyl accident
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resulted in the emission of radioactive material from a single reactor, the releases from the
FDNPP occurred from numerous reactor Units/FSPs - containing different composition fuel
material over a week-long period, under changing meteoric conditions into a topographically
extensive environment. Therefore, understanding; (i) the chain of events, (ii) the current form of
the contamination, and (iii) the distribution of this radiological contamination associated with
the Fukushima accident, represents a far greater analytical challenge than was the case formerly
at Chernobyl. It is hence the aim of this thesis to attain a better understanding of the accident










RESPONSE, CONTAMINATION AND RELEASE ESTIMATES
With the earthquake and subsequent tsunami crippling all but one of the static radiation monitors
on the site, there existed little knowledge as to the extent of the numerous radiation releases,
detailed formerly in Section 1.3. Immediately after the incident, operations were driven to
attain data to aid in the establishment of suitable evacuation zones (Section 2.2.4). In the years
after the accident, however, the focus has shifted to monitoring the spread and environmental
transportation of radioactivity, its decline due to radioactive decay and the impact of the extensive
remediation works [60–62]. A summary of these monitoring studies was presented within the
Japanese Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) Comprehensive Monitoring Plan [63], and in Saito
and Onda (2015) [64].
2.1 Radiation monitoring
In the immediate aftermath of a large-scale radiological release incident such as at Fukushima,
with limited (or no) knowledge as to the distribution of radionuclides, the first monitoring
surveys are typically undertaken using manned aircraft at the greatest altitudes and velocities
to characterise the greatest land areas in the shortest time possible. Any number of subsequent
survey types then follow - the fundamentals of each as well as their role after the FDNPP incident
are hereby discussed, with a comparison detailed in Appendix A. The underlying principles
behind various radiation interaction mechanisms and its detection are detailed in Chapter 3.
2.1.1 Airborne
Gamma-ray (γ-ray) intensity from an infinite source is observed to reduce rapidly via attenuation
with the air through which it propagates. This attenuation of an infinite source by a homogeneous
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Figure 2.1: Attenuation slopes derived from previous airborne studies, detailing the exponential
reduction in radiation intensity with altitude over a large area (planar geometry) source.
absorber can be described by Equation 2.1, where I0 and I represent the initial radiation intensity
and the attenuated intensity respectively. The attenuation is a function of µ - the mass attenuation
coefficient, ρ - the density of the material and, x - the thickness through which it propagates. The
mass attenuation coefficient (cm2 g-1) is a combination of both the linear attenuation coefficient
(cm-1) [65, 66] and the density of the material (g cm-3), with attenuation occurring as a result of
the different energy and material dependent interaction mechanisms (detailed in Section 3.1.1).
I = I0e−µρx (2.1)
Apparent from Figure 2.1, is the rapid decline in radiation intensity as a consequence of detector
altitude from such an infinite source, with results from a number of prior studies plotted (each
employing a different experimental setup) [67–71], as well as from theoretical calculations
(derived from Equation 2.1). Therefore, airborne surveys should not only contour topography as
closely as possible but also maintain as low an altitude as safely achievable to attain the best
possible sensitivity and on-ground spatial resolution [71, 72].
A number of calibration and review studies have concluded that airborne monitoring should
ideally be performed at altitudes of less than 100 m - with sampling at altitudes of 600 m
or greater representing data without "significant" ground influence [71–73]. Such rationale is
consistent with the known half-distance (distance at which 50% attenuation occurs) of a 137Cs
γ-ray photon in air of ≈70 m, based on values presented within Grodstein (1957) [66] and Hubbell
(1969), [74]. With the earth constantly bombarded by cosmic (solar) radiation, despite being
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shielded from the vast majority of these strongly-ionising electromagnetic (EM) waves by our
protective (ozone) atmosphere, a small proportion of this radiation is not attenuated and is
incident onto the Earth’s surface [75]. As such, at higher aerial survey altitudes (e.g. 600 m) - a
greater proportion of cosmic background radiation would be detected than at lower survey heights
(where increased interception and radiative attenuation would result [72]), significantly masking
any underlying terrestrial radioactive signal [72]. Intuitively, if an aerial vehicle were to fly into
an airborne radioactive plume, this represents a very different radiological situation (opposed
to where radiation exists on the ground) and is resultantly not addressed in this discussion.
While the works of Minty (1997), Pitkin and Duval (1980) and Sanderson et al., (1995) [71–
73] described above concluded that a 100 m survey altitude is the maximum height at which to
undertake radiological mapping, this presents difficulties under current aviation guidelines. For
nearly all countries, Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) regulations strictly prohibit manned aircraft
from operating at less than 400 feet (122 m) OD [76], therefore, a special dispensation must be
sought prior to such surveys (at 100 m) being undertaken.
To normalise for the effects of survey altitude back to a representative and meaningful air
dose-rate (µSv hr-1) 1 m above ground level, the equation for the slope of a calibration line (from
Figure 2.1) is applied to the (at) altitude-derived data [71, 77].
In addition to the influence survey height has on the measured radiation intensity (via attenuation),
the height at which the survey is performed further influences the "solid angle" (also termed the
"field of view") between the detector and the ground; representing sampling from a larger on-
ground region at greater survey altitudes [71, 73, 78]. This relationship is represented graphically
in Figure 2.2 - derived through Equation 2.2, as presented within the work by Duval et al., (1971)
[78]. In this equation, Y = radiation yield (or intensity), θ = half-angle of cone of incidence
from detector to ground, H = height of the detector, A = a constant dependent upon the setup
parameters, µe = linear attenuation coefficient of the ground within which activity is located, µa =
linear attenuation coefficient of air, λ = Euler’s constant (0.5772157), and x = ratio of the product
of µa and height (H), to cos θ.













Two further (user influenced) factors on the spatial resolution airborne surveys can attain
are; (i) the velocity at which these surveys are conducted and, (ii) their grid-spacing (survey
line separation). While flight velocity is highly-variable for manned helicopter surveys, fixed-
wing (light aircraft) monitoring is typically performed at velocities of 50 ms-1 - 60 ms-1 [72],
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Figure 2.2: Estimated on-ground spatial resolution as a function of detector altitude
(source-detector separation). Modified from [78].
with unmanned aerial methods operating at lower velocities (typically 10 ms-1 - 25 ms-1) [79].
Therefore, the frequency at which data sampling occurs strongly dictates the spatial resolution
through the total number of data points collected and the level (if any) of measurement overlap.
Grid-spacing, in contrast to flight velocity, is one variable that can be readily-controlled (albeit at
cost, especially in the case of manned aircraft monitoring), to directly influence the on-ground
resolution attained [72]. With tighter grid-spacing, there occurs a greater inherent degree of data
point overlap (between the sampling radii), as such - less inter-point inferencing and smoothing
is required, hence improving the data accuracy and spatial resolution. The impact of these factors
on spatial resolution for a number of previous environmental surveys are detailed in the review
study by Sanderson et al., (1995) [73].
Between the numerous types of radiometric survey described in this chapter, the detector
composition, but principally the volume of the solid-state detector varies considerably - and
therefore influences its sensitivity for locating and mapping radioactive sources (the underlying
physics of which are discussed in Section 3.1.1). Larger survey platforms (helicopters, light
aircraft and also cars) are able to carry detector volumes of up to 45 L [72], whilst smaller
unmanned systems are capable, however, of only transporting detectors with volumes typically
less than 1 L [80, 81]. With larger detector volumes, a better ability to detect smaller (and less
active) sources exists, owing to an increased overall detector sensitivity [82].
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To obtain more than a basic "gross count-rate" from the data, an integration of specific regions
of the spectrum (termed "windows") is performed. By analysing the number of counts (or
relative proportions) in each of these discrete portions of the γ-ray energy spectrum, an isotopic
composition of the radioactivity can be determined, as well as activity concentrations (Bq m-3),
with knowledge of the detectors basic characteristics [70, 71, 83, 84].
A number of additional, yet less significant, corrections to aerially-derived data are also routinely
applied - including the removal of cosmic-ray background, anthropogenic sources that surround
the detector (e.g. the aircraft and its occupants) and naturally-occurring radon, in addition to
performing "spectral stripping". This "spectral stripping" serves to remove any contributions
from elements that occur within the "windows" of others (most applicable during surveys of
natural ore bodies with signals originating from Th, U and K γ-rays, and to a much lesser-extent
from anthropogenic sources) [71]. Owing to this thesis, in-part, focusing on the mapping of these
anthropogenically (nuclear) derived anomalies, the application of such "spectral stripping" is not
considered, nor are other forms of minor data correction.
2.1.1.1 Manned airborne
The use of manned aircraft (helicopter and light aircraft) for radiological mapping was first
employed, not in response to radiological release incidents, but for the geological mapping of
radioactive mineral resources during the 1960’s [77]. These early airborne surveys employed
gas-filled Geiger-Muller (GM) detectors to rapidly gather information on the total "gross count-
rate" in a survey area (without any spectroscopic data) to guide further analysis and ground
sampling. Now, γ-ray spectrometers are used in-place of GM-based systems, providing the ability
for isotopic differentiation formerly unattainable.
Following the earthquake and tsunami on the 11th March 2011 and the numerous radiation
releases that occurred, it was not for six days until the first insight into the distribution and
magnitude of radioactive contamination released from the plant was known - with full survey
results not completed until the 5th April 2011 [85]. Prior to this, the only indication of the likely
extent/transport of radionuclides and regions affected came from wind data recorded at the time
[33], as well as a number of international monitoring projects [4].
Using a manned aircraft equipped with a high-volume NaI solid-state γ-ray detector (Figure 2.3),
the first survey flight was performed directly over the plant and to its north in a joint exercise
between the United States National Nuclear Security Administration (US NNSA)/United States
Department of Energy (US DoE) and the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science
and Technology (MEXT) [85, 86]. From this initial flight, high levels of radiation (>100 µSv hr-1
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Figure 2.3: High-altitude (C12) manned aircraft (top), and radiation detection system (bottom),
used during initial aerial surveys in March and April 2011 around the FDNPP. From [86].
as height corrected dose-rate) above the reactors were observed (shown in the maps of Figure
2.4). During the following three weeks, improved coverage was attained as a result of additional
survey flights (42 in total), culminating in an 80 km landward radius from the FDNPP being
mapped. This mapping highlighted the dominant NW-trending plume [85]. Operating at altitudes
of 150 m - 700 m OD (due to considerable topographic variations across the region [62]), the
resultant on-ground spatial resolution varied, with 300 m - 1500 m radius data points [85].
Further manned airborne studies over Fukushima Prefecture were regularly undertaken as part
of the Comprehensive Monitoring Plan (CMP) introduced by the Japanese Nuclear Regulation
Authority (NRA) [63], over the same 80 km radius from the plant [87, 88]. These surveys still
continue on an annual basis under the CMP [89], with the results from all surveys to-date made
publicly available via an online interactive platform [61]. It was this work that allowed for the
full extent of both the contamination and resulting evacuation zone to be defined (Section 2.2.4).
26
2.1. RADIATION MONITORING
Figure 2.4: Initial height-corrected air dose-rate maps surrounding the FDNPP from 17th March
2011 (top), and 4th April 2011 (bottom). From [86].
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2.1.1.2 Unmanned helicopter and fixed-wing
After the higher-altitude and rapid/large area coverage afforded by manned airborne surveys
are performed, an additional survey type (and one that has been performed extensively in the
region surrounding the FDNPP) is provided by unmanned helicopter or fixed-wing radiological
surveys. Being unmanned, such surveys do not expose the operators to potentially significant
doses of ionising radiation.
Accelerated greatly in their development as a consequence of the Fukushima accident, the
current operational parameters of these platforms are detailed in Appendix A, with a number of
such systems pictured in Figure 2.5. The first instances of radiological monitoring using these
platforms (formerly used by hobbyists) were in the monitoring of legacy US nuclear facilities
during the 1990’s [90, 91]. Further advancements and development of these unmanned platforms
were performed by Okuyama et al, (2014) [80] and Towler et al., (2012) [92], with the airframe
employed by Okuyama and colleagues used formerly in agricultural crop-dusting [93].
The more common helicopter-style mapping platforms consist of a remotely operated airframe
weighing approximately 70 kg, onto their underside a range of detector options are mounted
[80, 90]. In contrast to their manned survey equivalents, these platforms are exempt for standard
aviation laws and can operate autonomously at reduced altitudes (typically 50 m - 100 m) as long
as they remain within the operators line-of-sight [76]. These systems also operate at both lower
flight velocities (8 - 15 ms-1) and tighter grid-spacings (less variance between transects). Whilst
being able to attain greater spatial resolution, a number of a trade-offs are made, including the
area it is possible to cover during one survey flight (3 km - 5 km of total flight distance), the size
of the detector (<1 L) and also the requirement for operator training ahead of their operation [94].
The use of these systems in the wake of the Fukushima accident was pioneered by Sanada
and co-authors [67, 95]. The autonomous unmanned helicopter (AUH) developed by the JAEA
group attained an on-ground spatial resolution of 25 m2 - and hence a more detailed visualisation
of the contamination distribution when deployed to the region in the immediate vicinity of the
plant. A comparison of the results obtained with this AUH platform and initial manned surveys
are shown in Figures 2.6 (a) - (c). Whereas the monitoring results from manned aircraft shown
in Figure 2.6 (a) (with 1.8 km grid spacing and average altitude of 300 m) depicts a single
NW-trending emission plume, at lower altitudes and tighter grid-spacings, both of 80 m (Figure




Figure 2.5: Images of various unmanned helicopter and fixed-wing platforms employed for
radiation mapping. From (clockwise from top left); Kurvinen et al., (2015), Towler et al., (2012),
Pollanen et al., (2009), and Okuyama et al., (2014) [80, 92, 96, 97].
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2.1.1.3 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
A low-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) represents an additional survey tool alongside the
previously discussed manned survey platforms (Section 2.1.1.1) and unmanned helicopter/fixed-
wing systems (Section 2.1.1.2), capable of achieving spatial resolutions comparable to traditional
ground-based surveys (Section 2.1.2). These platforms consist of a lightweight airframe with
multiple counter-rotating propellers onto which the radiation detection payload is mounted. The
entire platform is controlled autonomously using pre-programmed geo-referenced waypoints and
altitudes. One of the first radiation mapping systems was developed by Boudergui et al., (2011)
[98], on the airframe and flight control systems devised by Guenard et al., (2006) [99]. Like the
unmanned helicopter/fixed-wing platforms, it was not until the accident at Fukushima, however,
that advancements in this survey method rapidly accelerated as a consequence of the increased
requirements for such a system.
The first of the "post-Fukushima" systems was developed at the University of Bristol by MacFarlane
et al., (2014) [100]. This platform used a commercially-available Mikrokopter™ of a "hex"
configuration - consisting of six counter-rotating propellers to transport the radiation detection
payload. A similar design was later produced by Aleotti et al., (2015) [101]. Both systems used a
lightweight CdZnTe (CZT) miniaturised γ-ray spectrometer carried at survey heights of less than
15 m and variable flight velocities (less than 5 ms-1). Typical parameters for UAV systems are
presented in the comparison shown in Appendix A.
While capable of maintaining lower altitudes as well as conducting surveys at lower flight
velocities - therefore achieving a much greater spatial-resolution as a result (typically sub-meter),
these systems present with several limitations. The greatest of these is the total area possible
to survey at this resolution - as current battery technology severely restricts the total area that
may be covered on a single charge. In addition, whereas higher-altitude airborne surveys were
able to navigate around obstacles (e.g. trees and buildings), such features present a significant
hindrance to these smaller, lower-altitude systems.
Whereas limitations exist owing to the low spatial extent that is it possible to analyse using these
UAV platforms, they do benefit, however, from a manoeuvrability and low operational altitude not
possible with other aforementioned systems. Because of this, these systems have found extensive
application across the fallout-affected Fukushima Prefecture for quantifying both remediation
effectiveness and contaminant mobility [102, 103].
2.1.2 Ground-based
Without the need to devise an aerial mechanism through which to transport the detector setup,
ground-based methods represent a simplistic means of capturing radiometric data. Shortly after
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Figure 2.7: Images of typical low-altitude multi-rotor UAV systems employed for high spatial
resolution radiation mapping. From (top to bottom) MacFarlane et al., (2014), Aleotti et al., (2015),
and FlyCamUAV Ltd (2017) [100, 101, 104].
the FDNPP accident, the volunteer-based Safecast organisation was established, with the goal
of crowd-sourcing radiometric data using a large number of portable GM-based GPS-enabled
mapping units [105]. These units would be transported by citizens to generate a time-resolved
dataset of radiological contamination. Being GM-based, however, spectroscopic data could not be
obtained through this device.
Although a basic study using simple hand-held device allowing for spectroscopic analysis of
the contamination was carried in a vehicle across Fukushima Prefecture by Imanaka et al.,
(2012) [108], it was the work of Ikuta et al., (2012) [106], and Tsuda et al., (2013) [107], that
implemented and developed specific vehicle-based units. The former (larger) platform employed a
cryogenically-cooled High-Purity Germanium (HPGe) detector, while the latter briefcase-sized
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Figure 2.8: Vehicular-based radiation mapping platforms deployed across Fukushima Prefecture;
(a) Car-borne cryogenically-cooled HPGe semiconductor-based detection system and, (b) CsI(Tl)
detector based KURAMA-II survey platform. From [106, 107].
unit (termed KURAMA and later KURAMA-II), consisted of a small single-crystal CsI(Tl) detector
that did not require active low-temperature cooling [109]. In both instances, the detector was
connected to a GPS unit that allowed for its position to be paired with the corresponding radiation
levels.
While simplistic in their nature, the limitations of vehicular-based systems are numerous; (i) their
inability to deviate away from the road network significantly limits their overall coverage, (ii)
the potentially complex shielding effects that differing vehicles and human occupants introduce
on the results [82, 106], (iii) the varying impacts of topography (hills, trees and valleys) that
surround the vehicle during such surveys [110] and, (iv) the potential contamination risk to the
vehicle owing to material re-suspension and its entrapment [111, 112].
Conversely, using humans to perform on-ground manual radiation monitoring does allow for
areas inaccessible to vehicles to otherwise be examined. However, this approach presents its own
set of limitations - with some locations still being inaccessible due to challenging terrain and
topography. As well as being slower than vehicular-based monitoring, the impacts of radiation
attenuation by the human operator (as for vehicles) needs to be considered, quantified and
corrected for [113, 114], in addition to dose considerations for the operator. As for low-altitude
unmanned airborne surveys, the volume (and therefore the sensitivity) of the detector used in
manned surveys is small in comparison to other monitoring methods. Despite these considerations,
numerous ground-based surveys have been conducted around Fukushima Prefecture as a result of
the March 2011 accident, often coinciding with physical sample collection for laboratory analysis
[62, 115, 116].
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Table 2.1: Principal "short-lived" radionuclides of greatest environmental concern released as a
result of a LOCI alongside their associated half-lives. From [52, 127].
2.1.3 Oceanic
As it bordered the Pacific Ocean, extensive radiation monitoring campaigns were performed at
sea. To examine the concentration of radionuclide species within the seawater, as well as its
uptake by aquatic organisms, various water sampling campaigns were undertaken [117, 118].
Due to the focus of this thesis being in the study of terrestrial radionuclides, the analysis and
results of aquatic sampling are not discussed (but it is not to say that the topic is not important).
2.2 Contamination
2.2.1 Contaminant species
The principal radionuclides released from the reactors fuel rods at elevated temperatures
following a LOCI scenario are the various noble gases and volatile fission product species (Table
2.1) [119].
Thankfully, the incidents to date from which such species have been released are rare, with those
emitted by the Chernobyl accident having been extensively examined [120, 121]. However, to
yield more/well-controlled data through which to understand releases from other severe and
high-ranking INES level events - extensive empirical studies have been performed to simulate
radioactive releases from nuclear facilities, including the French-led "VERCORS" programme
[122–125], that followed from the successful "PHEBUS" fission product project [126]. Both studies
utilised specially-constructed high-activity "hot cells" to subject previously irradiated UO2 fuel
assemblies to conditions representative of LOCI conditions.
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Krypton. The majority of Kr isotopes are very short-lived (<1 day) - with the exception of 85Kr,
with a half-life of 10.76 years [52]. Due to Kr being chemically inert with a low fission product
yield (0.286%) [128], and low energy γ-emission (being primarily a β-emitter), it presents a very
limited contribution to external dose, becoming insignificant upon its rapid atmospheric dilution.
Strontium. In comparison to Kr, radio-Sr (89Sr and 90Sr) is produced in considerably greater
fission product yields (4.9% and 5.9% respectively) [128]. Like Kr, however, Sr isotopes are both
strong β-emitters and are undetectable via γ-ray spectroscopy. With 89Sr having a short half-life
of only 50 days [52], 90Sr is the species of most environmental concern, is readily incorporated
into the bone structure and hence representing a "risk over longer periods" after an accident if
accumulated within the food chain [129].
Tellurium. The main isotope of Te, 132Te, is produced with abundances just below 89Sr, at
4.28% [128]. With a short half-life of 3.204 days, the isotope rapidly decays though β-emission
into the unstable nucleus of 132I, which itself decays within hours into the stable noble gas 132Xe
- with the ejection of four γ-rays.
Iodine. The two principal fission product isotopes of I are 131I and 133I, with yields of 2.88% and
6.59%, and half-lives of 8.02 days and 20.8 hours respectively [52, 128]. Both species decay via
β-emission (with γ-ray emission as an intermediary step). As a species, I presents a health risk
due to its uptake by the thyroid gland and resulting internal radiation exposure. Detectable via
γ-ray spectroscopy, its short half-life results in its rapid decay and high activity - but associated
rapid decline from the environment. Following a radioiodine release, it is currently best practice
to disseminate non-radioactive I pills to affected populations to prevent the accumulation of
radioiodine in the thyroid gland [75].
Xenon. Xe occurs with fission product yields close to 12% [128], and is therefore produced
in the greatest quantities of all elements during reactor operation. As a noble gas, like Kr, Xe is
also chemically inert and similarly decays principally through strong β-emission (alongside a
low-energy γ-ray). Combined with a half-life of under a week, the radiological hazard posed by
Xe, like Kr, is limited.
Cesium. The fission products of 134Cs and 137Cs are each produced with yields of ≈6% [128],
and combined represent a significant contaminating radionuclide. The other fission product
isotopes 135Cs and 136Cs are, however, produced with considerably less abundance. With the main
isotopes of Cs decaying through γ-ray emission and each possessing moderate half-lives (Table
2.1), Cs represents a significant contaminant species. This is accentuated by its high solubility
and capacity for bodily uptake, where it possesses no biological role [130].
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With the noble gases of Kr and Xe not representing a radiological hazard once rapidly dispersed,
and with both Sr and Te decaying through β-emission (with only limited γ-ray release), it is I and
Cs that together contribute significantly to the ionising radiation hazard in the weeks, months
and years after an accident [131]. Resulting from the shorter half-lives of I over Cs isotopes, it is
Cs that is of the greatest concern with regards to external radiation dose exposure over periods
beyond several weeks following such a release [132]. (N.B. direct physical contact with β-emitting
substances also represents a significant, yet acute, health concern).
Low-volatility elements. The aforementioned radioisotope species represent the near entirety
of the activity resulting from a release event, where elevated temperatures have caused full (or
partial) fuel melting. Whilst their extensive release can be attributed predominantly to their
high-volatility (low boiling-point), such an abundance can also be attributed to their fission
product yield. Although other (less volatile) elements are produced at abundances equal to
the highly-volatile species (e.g. Zr, Ru and Pd) [125, 133], their low volatility is considered to
significantly limit the total amount of such elements released during a LOCI [125].
Also termed refractory elements, those species not fully-released at fuel-melt temperatures
(≈2400°C) are termed semi-volatile, low-volatile or non-volatile elements after the VERCORS
classification study [125]. Whilst volatile species are released almost entirely from the fuel, these
elements occur with release fractions ranging from 50% - 100%, 3% - 10% and «1% respectively
(although variations in the exact reactor conditions at the time strongly influence these values).
Elements classified as semi-volatile include Mo, Rh, Ba and Pd; whilst those in the low-volatile
group include Ru, Nb, Sr, Y, La, Ce and Eu, with the non-volatile classification comprising Zr, Nd
and Pr.
Actinides. Classified also as refractory elements, as a result of the VERCORS study, actinides
can be subdivided into either of two groups based on their behaviour following fuel-melting
associated with a LOCI. Owing to their low degrees of volatility (whereby high temperatures
are required for their release) - both U and Np are emitted at fractions of up to 10%, with Pu in
contrast, released at fractions of significantly less than 1%. Unlike the aforementioned fission
products elements, actinides such as these decay initially through the emission of α-particles
before subsequent γ-ray release from decay chain progeny.
Reactor materials. Work by Zinkle and Was (2013) [35], detailed the extensive suite of highly-
specialised materials used in a BWR - including various forms of stainless steel and other bulk
materials (e.g. concrete, thermal insulation and radiation shielding), to metals with specific
in-reactor applications (e.g. B, Cd, Zr and Hf). With the high temperatures and energy densities
associated with a LOCI, these materials are also readily-released during such an explosive
event. This fragmentation and emission may also extend to the fuel elements, cladding material,
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control rods and the reactors vast piping/heat-exchanger network [24, 127]. The extent of the
release of such materials from the FDNPP reactors/reactor-building explosions is currently poorly
constrained - with only minimal insight existing as to both the location and mass of residual core
material in each of the RPVs (qualitatively ascribed via muon-scattering experiments of each
reactor building) [54–56].
2.2.2 Fukushima release species
Due to the nature of the accident - with releases from numerous sources over a week-long period,
estimates as to the total/individual reactor unit activity and species released vary considerably.
Approximations by Steinhauser et al., (2014) [119], placed the total release at ≈520 PBq, or
one-tenth of that from Chernobyl [134]. Estimates for the total release of the short-lived 131I
were first published by Chino et al., (2011) [135], at 150 PBq (or 8% of the Chernobyl value [136]),
with estimates of 134Cs and 137Cs at 12 PBq each by both Steinhauser et al., (2014) [119], and
Chino et al., (2011) [135] - (25% and 7% of Chernobyl values respectively [136]).
While the release from Fukushima can be characterised by a greater emission of 133Xe [137], the
Chernobyl accident, on the other hand, can be described by a more significant contribution of
all other species [136] - as summarised in the work by Steinhauser et al., (2014) [119]. In the
comparison of the FDNPP release with other documented radioactive emissions by Friese et al.,
(2013) [138], the absence of low-volatility species (including Zr, Ru, Nb, Ce and Mo) and actinides
(U, Pu, Np and Am) emitted from Fukushima, at the time of writing, was attributed to a core
temperature below that required to cause any degree of fuel melting. The differing incident and
emission characteristics of Chernobyl and Fukushima have more recently been detailed in the
comparison by Imanaka et al., (2015) [139]. Whereby the Chernobyl accident was the result of a
power-surge in the graphite-moderated RBMK-1000 reactor (that instantly destroyed both the
reactor and building), the FDNPP accident (as previously described in Section 1.3), resulted from
a number of LOCI - leading to fuel melting, and a series of hydrogen explosions/PCV containment
breaches/emergency venting scenarios.
Alongside the work of Friese et al., (2013) [138], other studies (employing mass spectrometry
methods) have concluded that no U (via 235U/238U atomic ratios) was released from the FDNPP
[140, 141] - or that any U composition material existed within the environment below detection
limits of current Thermal Ionisation Mass Spectrometry (TIMS) instrumentation. In other studies,
however, the existence of anthropogenic, Fukushima-derived U and/or Pu has been observed at
sites across Fukushima Prefecture [142–144], identified using Inductively Coupled Plasma-Mass
Spectrometry (ICP-MS) and Accelerator Mass Spectrometry (AMS). Owing to a combination of
their inability to be detected using γ-ray spectroscopy, their long half-lives (low activity) and
complicated/lengthy analytical procedures to be separated and subsequently quantified, these
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actinide species are termed by Steinhauser et al., (2014) [145], as the "frequently forgotten"
radionuclides. Whilst not representing as severe a radiological hazard as other fission products,
such actinide elements represent an alternate and substantial hazard as a consequence of their
substantially greater chemotoxicity [146, 147].
2.2.3 Distribution
As formerly discussed in Section 1.3.7, and illustrated in Figures 2.4 and 2.6, the main contamination
plume extended to the north-west from the FDNPP for approximately 60 km, terminating shortly
before the population centre of Fukushima City. The airborne radiological survey depicting the
total height-corrected 134 + 137Cs ground deposition from April 2011 is shown in Figure 2.9. At
this time, a month after the accident, nearly all of the 131I contribution would have decayed into
the stable 131Xe. Not readily evident within Figure 2.9 are the smaller plumes of differing trend
identified in the low-altitude UAH studies of Sanada et al., (2015) [67], shown in Figure 2.6.
Unlike the Chernobyl releases which dispersed radioactive fallout across large portions of
mainland Europe [148, 149], following the Fukushima accident, estimates placed 80% of the total
radiation release as having been deposited into the neighbouring Pacific Ocean [39, 150]. Also
contrary to the 1986 accident is the topography that surrounds the Japanese site. Unlike the
flat and heavily forested Pripyat region, at a distance of 5 km from the FDNPP lies a band of
north/south trending mountains - which from the airborne surveys, were seen to significantly
influence the distribution of contamination by capturing a large proportion of the airborne species
[62]. This extensive topography is synonymous of the entirety of Fukushima Prefecture [151, 152].
2.2.4 Evacuation zones
Owing to the lack of static monitoring points to aid in the establishment of evacuation zones, a
number of arbitrary radii of increasing size were introduced from the 12th March 2011 by the
then Japanese Prime Minister Mr Naoto Kan (as detailed in Section 1.3). Following the results of
early monitoring studies, this zone was subsequently redefined and enlarged to cover the severely
contaminated Iitate Village area on the main north-westerly trending plume [154]. This revision
of areas to which evacuation orders were issued came prior to the instigation of The Act on
Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Radioactive Pollution, introduced by the Japanese
national government [155]. Alongside a number of other topics concerning the remediation and
associated handling of radioactively contaminated materials, this policy detailed the provision
for radiological monitoring and establishment of specific zones surrounding the FDNPP.
Arising from this act, two land categories were defined based on the radiation level determined
principally using aerial methods, combined with ground and vehicular-based surveys. The main
zone was termed the Special Decontamination Area, and included the originally evacuated 20 km
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Figure 2.9: Total radiocesium (134 + 137Cs) activity ground deposition within an 80 km radius of
the FDNPP. The results were obtained during the first airborne (manned-aircraft) surveys of
mid-April 2011. The primary (60 km) north-westerly trending contaminant plume (later
attributed to reactor Unit 2 [69, 153]) is observed, as is a smaller (30 km) south-westerly area of
radiological contamination. From [85].
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radius (Restricted Zone) around the plant, as well as the additional 30 km north-westerly region
including Iitate Village (hence termed the Deliberate Evacuation Zone). Within this entirely
evacuated area, national government-lead remediation activities would be undertaken (Section
2.4) [154, 155]. This Deliberate Evacuation Zone consisted of land where a cumulative dose would
(at the time) exceed 20 mSv yr-1 [154, 155].
The second region defined under the The Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling
of Radioactive Pollution were Intensive Contamination Survey Areas. Covering large areas of
western and central Japan where no evacuation orders were issued, this land presented an
annual dose of less than 20 mSv. Any decontamination works in this area would be conducted
under the direction of local municipality governance.
As shown by the assignment of these zones, it was determined by the Government of Japan
that an acceptable annual radiation dose was 20 mSv yr-1 - with areas showing levels greater
than this being evacuated and the subject of decontamination efforts (Section 2.4). This Special
Decontamination Area is sub-divided into three areas; Area 1: 1 mSv yr-1 - 20 mSv yr-1, Area 2:
20 mSv yr-1 - 50 mSv yr-1 and Area 3: >50 mSv yr-1. The dose-rates in Area 1 are now below those
deemed safe by the Japanese Government and are shortly set to have evacuation orders revoked.
For Area 3, it has been deemed that people will have "difficultly returning for some time" [156].
Due to the accident, a total of 146,520 people were evacuated from their homes. Published
in a report by the Japanese bicameral legislature, The National Diet (or Kokkai), concluded
that to-date, no deaths could be attributed due to radiation exposure as a result of the FDNPP
accident. However, a total of 60 deaths had been deemed to have been caused by the evacuation
of citizens out of the affected areas - brought about by increased stress and anxiety [30]. Such
a figure is greater than might otherwise have resulted, owing to the age of those evacuated -
with the majority being senior citizens, of an average age of 72 [157]. Through the mathematical
assessment of the event, recent work by Waddington et al., (2017) [158], concluded that the
greatest impact to human life was not the radiation exposure to populations - but the trauma
caused by the evacuation itself.
By October 2014, following extensive monitoring and only limited remediation, both northern
and southern portions of the original 20 km radius evacuation zone that surrounded the plant
(introduced on the 12th March 2011) had been revoked (following earlier rescinding of orders in
Naraha Town to the south). This removal permitted people who once resided less than 10 km
north and south of the FDNPP to return. Despite the lifting of evacuation orders, however, very
few of those once-displaced have returned [30]. This slow return of those rehoused following the
incident is likely the result of both the age of the evacuees, but also the considerable mistrust
that still exists towards the Japanese Government over the handling of the incident [159].
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Figure 2.10: Distribution map of 134 + 137Cs activity ratio surrounding the FDNPP, determined
using an AUH. Modified from [69].
2.2.5 Source attribution
Resulting from radiation mapping and laboratory analysis (of physical samples), several studies
have invoked specific reactor Unit sources to the different plumes observed in the radiation maps
shown in Figures 2.6 and 2.9. Such attributions are based on comparisons to the modelling-
derived 134Cs/137Cs activity ratio inventory results for each reactor Unit and associated FSP
presented by Nishihara et al., (2012) [50] - shown in Table 1.3.
Environmental sampling from across Fukushima Prefecture and the subsequent γ-ray spectroscopy
analysis by Yamamoto et al., (2014) [160], detailed slight, but notable variations in the measured
134Cs/137Cs activity ratios. After applying a decay-correction (to the time of the accident), the
main north-west trending plume was shown to exhibit 134Cs/137Cs activity ratios >1.00 (average
1.06), with a smaller northerly-trending plume displaying contrasting 134Cs/137Cs activity ratios
of <1.0 (average 0.94). By applying the inventory estimates of Nishihara et al., (2012) [50], these
two plumes; north-westerly and northerly, were ascribed to reactor Units 2 ± 3 and 1 respectively.
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The use of an AUH radiation mapping system by Nishizawa et al., (2015) [69], produced similar
results. A short, northerly-trending plume was observed to display a 134Cs/137Cs activity ratio
of less than 1.00 (average 0.95), whilst the remainder of the 2 km survey radius out from the
FDNPP site displayed a 134Cs/137Cs activity ratio ≥1.00. Both studies were further compounded
by the combination of radiometric sample analysis and an AUH survey by Chino et al., (2016)
[153], who also identified a contrasting northerly-trending 134Cs/137Cs ratio plume - similarly
invoking its provenance also to Unit 1, following the predicted core inventories from Nishihara et
al., (2012) [50]. The radiocesium mapping results of Nishizawa et al., (2015) [69], are shown in
Figure 2.10.
A number of additional studies have employed mass spectrometric analysis of physical samples
to more accurately quantify the radiocesium distribution via the 135Cs/137Cs atomic (isotopic)
ratio across the region. Like the activity ratios, these studies all reported the same contaminant
distribution and likely source attribution [43, 161–163].
While the prevailing wind direction at the time of the Unit 2 release (Section 1.3.7) supports
this contamination of a large region to the north-west of the facility on the 15th March; owing
to the similarity between both the inventory modelled radiocesium activity ratios and the mass
spectrometry-derived atomic (isotopic) ratios for both Units 2 and 3 (Table 1.3 and Figure 2.11) -
it has not been possible to unequivocally discriminate land contaminated to a component sourced
from Unit 3. As a result, the region to the west-north-west of the facility (Figure 2.10) has been
ascribed to have resulted from contamination originating from both release events (but primarily
from reactor Unit 2).
Stemming from the differences in the cooling histories [7], and the known/estimated time of
contamination release from each of the reactor Units - the use of environmental 110mAg/137Cs
activity ratios have also been utilised in an attempt to potentially attribute the primary plume (or
regions thereof), to differing release events (Unit 2 from 3) [164]. The application of this activity
ratio centres on the higher volatilisation temperature of Ag (2212°C), in contrast to Cs (678°C)
[165]. Therefore, earlier core release events (where a high level of decay heat existed) would
comprise a greater component of the γ-ray emitting 110mAg.
As the first release to occur; 110mAg/137Cs values (decay corrected) of approximately 0.01 were
attributed to the (shorter) northern-most contamination plume produced by the Unit 1 hydrogen
explosion on the 12th March by Satou (2016) [164], following distribution measurements by Saito
et al., (2014) [116] and Mikami et al., (2015) [166]. Through the application of this ratio, however,
Satou (2016) [164], invoked that a thin, southerly portion of the main north-west trending plume
was the result of contamination derived for Unit 3 - alongside the more extensive release from
Unit 2. With both the Unit 2 and 3 release events occurring later on the 15th March 2011 and
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Figure 2.11: Comparison of the calculated 134Cs/137Cs activity (black circles) and isotopic ratios
(red squares) for reactor Units 1 - 3 and associated FSPs 1 - 4. Data obtained from [50]. The
134Cs/137Cs activity ratios corresponding to both the north and north-west trending plumes are
additionally shown. Values from [69, 153].
14th March 2011, 110mAg/137Cs values were determined to average 0.0060 and 0.0023 for both
reactor Units respectively.
Whereas this Ag-based plume sub-division has yet to achieve widespread acceptance, and owing
to the radiocesium releases from Units 2 and 3 not allowing for Unit-specific contamination areas
to be attributed in contrast to that arising from Unit 1, a source of the material from the FSPs
can be excluded based upon a comparison to the estimated radiocesium ratios published in the
work of Nishihara et al., (2012) [50]. Consistent with observations made following the accident
(Section 1.4.4) [5], and as depicted graphically in the plot of Figure 2.11 - all of the 134Cs/137Cs
activity ratios for the older material located in the FSPs fall below those observed across the
contaminated area. The wind directions at the time of each release event further support these
source attributions [33].
2.3 Particle forensics
The preferential sorption of ionic Cs over other elements (e.g. K, Mg and Na) onto the highly-
reactive frayed-edge sites of mica and clay-type minerals (where it is subsequently transported) is
well known and understood, having been extensively-studied as a consequence of the Chernobyl
accident in 1986 [167, 168]. Similar sorption of radiocesium within the Fukushima environment
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has been identified, with the work of Mukai et al., (2014) [169], employing focused ion beam (FIB)
systems to quantify specific amounts of such mineral uptake.
Alongside the release of gaseous species from Chernobyl, there also occurred the release of
differing forms of radioactive particulate, some of which were found far from the facility [170, 171].
Two types of radioactive particle (ranging in size from 0.5 - 150 µm) were identified - classified as
either "Group A" or "Group B" [171–173]. The former consisted of fragments of the fuel elements
(UO2) alongside differing intermediate volatility and other refractory elements; identified via
high-resolution α-particle and γ-ray spectroscopy. These particles were observed, however, to be
depleted in the more-volatile species such as Cs, I and Ru. Particles within "Group B" on the
other hand, were termed "mono" or "bi-elemental" in response to their limited compositional
variance (identified through γ-spectroscopy). Being composed almost exclusively of 103 + 106Ru
or 140Ba/140La, this material contained little or more frequently no actinide material and was
invoked to represent inclusions formed within the fuel matrix over standard reactor operation.
No strong relationship in the materials form was observed to permit differentiation between the
two types of particle, although those within "Group B" typically appeared more rounded and
slightly smaller than the marginally larger and more angular material of "Group A" [172, 173].
The particle sizing of "Group A" material was also observed to be consistent with the known
crystal sizes in UO2 fuel - whereby the constituent grains (approximately 10 µm in mean diameter
[23]) represent inherent weaknesses within the materials microstructure [23, 174]
In addition to Chernobyl, a number of other release events have occurred to introduce particulate
into the environment. Resulting from extensive atmospheric, underground and underwater
nuclear weapons testing prior to the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty being enacted in 1963,
large quantities of radioactive material were released into the global environment [175–177].
With what is believed to have amounted to over 2,000 tests conducted at locations around the
world, their influence has been felt across the planet - with a background Pu fallout signature
produced that will be preserved in the near-surface record for tens of thousands of years [178].
This extensive global testing program is estimated to have produced several orders of magnitude
more radioactivity than resulted from the Chernobyl accident [179].
Additional anthropogenically-derived species have been introduced into the environment as
a result of both the 1966 and 1968 aircraft incidents involving the transportation of nuclear
warheads at Palomares (Spain) and Thule (Greenland) respectively [180–182]. Further particulate
emissions have also occurred as a result of the widespread use of depleted uranium (DU) within
armour-penetrating munitions - starting in the 1991 Gulf War, with their usage continuing in
present-day conflicts in the Middle-East [183]. In addition, releases from power generating and
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reprocessing facilities, including those at the Sellafield (UK) and Le Hague (France) sites, are
well documented [184, 185]. In each of these scenarios, a particle of characteristic form and
composition was produced, illustrative of the waste precursor and processing activity [186, 187].
Since the first studies were undertaken to analyse radioactive particulate, the methods available
and the resolutions attainable have increased markedly. From basic electron microscopy techniques,
autoradiography and alpha-spectroscopy utilised to identify and evaluate the composition of
fallout material, current state of the art methods now include high-intensity synchrotron radiation
alongside a range of high-precision/sensitivity mass-spectrometric techniques. A review of such
advancements and methods are presented in various review works [186, 188, 189].
Like the events that occurred before it, a range of particulate material was emitted into the
terrestrial (and oceanic) environment as a result of the FDNPP accident. This material (like that
arising from Chernobyl) can additionally be classified into either one of two groups, in this work
(and the limited prior studies [164, 190]), differentiated wholly on size - existing as micron-scale
atmospheric particulate or the considerably larger (>100 µm) ejecta particulate. Alongside their
size difference, a number of distinctions associated with the form of this particulate can be made.
The former particle type is more rounded in appearance, whereas the latter are considerably less
well-rounded. Both particle types are, however, different to those produced as a consequence of
the 1986 Chernobyl accident [171, 172].
2.3.1 Atmospheric material
The first reported isolation and analysis of these highly-spherical emission particles, colloquially
termed "Cs-balls", averaging 2 µm in diameter, (shown in Figure 2.12) was reported by Adachi
et al., (2013) [191], on material collected from aerosol filters located 170 km south-west of the
FDNPP in Tsukuba. Amongst other constituents (including O, Si, Fe, Na, S, Ca, Zn and Pb) these
particles were found to contain a notable radiocesium (134 + 137Cs) content when analysed via
γ-ray spectroscopy and subsequently via energy dispersive x-ray spectroscopy (EDS). This work
was succeeded by the study of Abe et al., (2014) [192] on the materials internal structure through
the application of synchrotron radiation micro-focus x-ray fluorescence (SR-µ-XRF) analysis at
the Japanese Spring-8 facility. As well as confirming the existence of Cs, this study also identified
U at the cores of a number of these particles - suggesting that the FDNPP "sustained sufficient
damage to emit U fuel outside of the reactors PCV".
Yamaguchi et al., (2016) [193], further examined this plant-distal spherical particulate material,
using transmission electron microscopy (TEM). During this study (at greater resolutions attainable
than in the prior synchrotron studies), an internal variation in the distribution of Cs was
identified; with the Cs concentration increasing from the centre towards the outer circumference.
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Figure 2.12: Secondary electron image of a Cs-bearing aerosol particle (informally termed
"Cs-balls"), recovered in Tsukuba, 170 km south-west of the FDNPP. From [191].
The spherical particle was identified as formed of a silicate glass matrix containing additional
elements (Al, Cl, K, Fe, Zn, Rb and Sn). A depletion in alkali elements (including Cs) around
the very outermost rim of one of the samples raised concerns as to the potential release of
radiocesium due to species leaching by meteoric conditions. In work by Kogure et al., (2016)
[194], in addition to replicating the study undertaken by Yamaguchi et al., (2016), here on
particulate specimens retrieved from fabric samples exposed at the time of the accident, attempts
to artificially synthesise the spherical fallout particles within a laboratory setting were attempted.
Proving unsuccessful, the authors attributed this to the materials complex formation conditions
- namely the extremes of pressure, temperature and gas volume that existed in the reactor
environment.
Following the collection of soil (and road-side sediment) before extracting the radioactive particles
contained within, work by Satou et al., (2016) [195], found that similar form micron-scale
radioactive particles possessed a greater average diameter closer to the plant - with this
particulate type measuring up to a maximum of 6.4 µm at 20 km from the plant. It was
also observed that whilst a large portion of material existed in the previously reported highly-
spherical form, a component also occurred with a slightly more angular appearance. As well as
the characteristic Cs contribution detected via EDS, the major component of this material was
similarly Si-based. These results were corroborated by the later work of Higaki et al., (2017) [196].
A study by Furuki et al., (2017) [197], employing TEM on material obtained closer-still to
the plant (4 km) further confirmed Si to be the dominant component of this material, occurring
alongside strong compositional heterogeneity shown by the other elements. However, despite
being similarly isolated from the near-identical source material as that of Satou et al., (2016), the
particles within this study were found to be marginally smaller (ranging from 2.0 to 3.4 µm) -
invoked to represent a different phase in the large-scale release event.
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Figure 2.13: Secondary electron image of a typical ejecta particle. From [164].
Termed "Type A" by Satou (2016) [164], the γ-ray spectroscopy of this individual micron-scale
atmospheric particulate revealed its 134Cs/137Cs activity was analogous to that estimated for
reactor Unit 2 in the core inventory modelling work of Nishihara et al., (2012) [50]. This
provenancing of such fine-scale particulate is again supported via the prevailing (onshore)
meteoric conditions that existed at the time (Section 1.3.7).
2.3.2 Ejecta material
A contrasting suite of particles has also been identified - termed "Type B" by Satou (2016) [164].
Whereas the atmospheric material possesses dimensions of <10 µm, this ejecta material is an
order of magnitude larger in its maximum dimension - isolated from material collected near to
the northern boundary of the plant, 2 km from the site of the six reactors. An electron microscope
image of a typical isolated ejecta particle is shown in Figure 2.13. Arising from the individual
particulates 134Cs/137Cs activity ratio aligning with that of reactor Unit 1 (as determined by the
inventory modelling of Nishihara et al., (2012) [50]), this sub-mm material has been attributed
to have been sourced from the FDNPP reactor Unit 1 [164], following the explosive events that
occurred on the 12th March 2011.
Whereas this larger material has also received some analysis to date, it has been much less
extensive than the atmospheric material, owing to its smaller spatial extent - being dwarfed by
the main north-westerly plume produced from Unit 2 (and potentially a small component of Unit
3) (Figures 2.9 and 2.10). After isolating the material and performing initial γ-ray spectroscopy,
Satou (2016) [164], conducted SEM imaging and EDS compositional analysis of the particulate.
Analogous to the atmospheric material, this material was also primarily Si in composition -
occurring alongside additional elements including; Na, Mg, Al, Cl, K, Ca, Ba and Zn. In contrast
to the micron-scale particulate, however, no characteristic Cs emission peak was identified, nor
the significant contribution of Fe, itself a major contributor within the smaller particulate.
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Synchrotron radiation analysis, similar to that performed on the atmospheric material by
Abe et al., (2014) [192], has also been performed on a small sub-region of this larger fallout
material, employing SR-µ-XRF to attain a two-dimensional map the internal distribution of
the constituent elements, not possible with EDS. Within this work by Ono et al., (2017) [190],
Cs was again observed to occur - distributed heterogeneously throughout the sample volume.
High concentrations of Pb, Zr, Sr, Cd, Sb and Ag (also heterogeneously dispersed throughout
the sample), not formerly identified via the earlier EDS analysis, were also encountered. U was
also located, dispersed throughout the sample, although at low concentrations as small, isolated
regions.
This absence of a detectable Cs signal via EDS analysis of these larger particles can be ascribed
to two factors. One of which is the limited sampling depth (interaction volume) that the electron
beam has with a material - generating characteristic x-ray emissions from only ≈2 µm depth
[66]). Hence, if Cs were to occur at depths within the sample greater than this, it would simply
not be detected. This could occur alongside the second factor, being the techniques detection
sensitivity - with a limit of detection (LoD) of 0.01 wt%. This value is less than synchrotron-based
x-ray or secondary ion mass spectrometry (SIMS) techniques, whereby parts per million (ppm)
concentrations of an element can be determined [198]. A thorough description of EDS and other
experimental methods is contained within Chapter 5.
The rationalisation provided by Satou et al., (2016) [164], to account for the detection of Cs
within the smaller atmospheric material whilst not within the larger ejecta material by EDS,
results from the low concentration of the γ-emitting radioactive species that the different particle-
types contain. Despite containing up to two orders of magnitude more 137Cs than the smaller,
spherical, particles, the larger and more angular "Type B" particles are on average 5 orders of
magnitude greater in volume - therefore representing a considerable "species dilution", below the
EDS LoD.
A summary comparison of the physical and compositional differences between the atmospheric
(Unit 2) and ejecta material (Unit 1) is presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 respectively. Whilst a
radiation release from Unit 3 is known to have occurred [2, 7], alongside a contamination footprint
for the reactor having been invoked to exist to the south of the major Unit 2 plume [164] (Section
2.2.5), no particulate from the 15th March release of the MOX-burning reactor Unit 3 has yet
been identified/isolated.
As has been described, both the form and composition of the two particle types (atmospheric and
ejecta) are significantly different, with each possessing discernible and unique characteristics.
Whilst a notable volume of work has been undertaken on this material to derive its characteristics
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(almost exclusively by Japanese research groups), there is still a great amount of research effort
required to elucidate; (i) the mechanism(s) behind its release, (ii) the subsequent occurrence of
this material in the environment, and (iii) the environmental legacy of this particulate material.
It is therefore the aim of this thesis to advance the current understanding of the multiple (and
intricate) release events that resulted in the widespread dispersion of radiological particulate
contamination through the application of advanced materials analysis methods.
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As formerly discussed in Section 2.2.4, two distinct regions were combined shortly after the
incident, encompassing both the 20 km radius surrounding the plant (Restricted Area) as well as
the area extending north-west impacted by the contamination plume (Deliberate Evacuation Area)
(Figure 2.14 (a)). Under The Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Radioactive
Pollution [155], these together formed the Special Decontamination Area. This area is characterised
by locations whereby a cumulative annual dose would likely exceed 20 mSv. This resulted in an
area of approximately 1,170 km2, and affected 85,000 people from 11 municipalities [199].
The other Intensive Contamination Survey Areas (Figure 2.14 (b)) formed a larger region away
from the plant, where radiation levels ranged from 1 mSv yr-1 - 20 mSv yr-1; below those set for
both evacuation and any government-led remediation. As a result, any decontamination activities
deemed necessary in this area fell upon individual municipalities to fund, manage and perform.
The Special Decontamination Areas, on the other hand, are the subject of government-lead
actions. The remedial work undertaken within this area is detailed within The Japanese Ministry
of the Environment - Decontamination Guidelines [60], published shortly after the incident, in
response to the Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Radioactive Pollution and
the Japanese Nuclear Regulators (NRA) Comprehensive Monitoring Plan, [63, 155].
During the remedial work, all hard surfaces such as roads and buildings were to be scrubbed/pressure-
washed, organic material (such as trees, bushes and plants) would be removed or cut back and
combined with other stripped surface materials (soil, earth and grass) and sent for disposal. This
disposal consisted of packaging such wastes into 1 m3 high-density black plastic waste bags and
depositing them into one of the thousands of specially-constructed waste stores located across
the Prefecture. From these temporary sites, these bags would eventually be relocated into a
long-term storage facility, where they would remain for a period of 30 years [200]. As of March
2018, the construction of neither long-term or interim facilities had begun [200].
A comparison between the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents was published by Fesenko
et al., (2016) [201], which analysed many mechanistic and environmental parameters. Whilst a
number of differences exist between the two locations (including the usage of potassium-based
fertilisers, agricultural land application and population density), the most notably contrasting
factors between Fukushima Prefecture and Pripyat are the extensive topography and associated
rates of soil/sediment transport around Fukushima. This is enhanced relative to Pripyat by the
sub-tropical and typhoon-type environment of the region (average rainfall ≈1,500 mm yr-1) [31].
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Aided by the progressive decay of the γ-ray emitting radiocesium, the progress of the clean-up in
the Special Decontamination Area has been extensive around the periphery of the main plume.
Increasing regions are determined to exist with dose-rates of <20 mSv yr-1 and now have been
reclassified to fall into Area 1 - where evacuation orders are ready to be lifted, allowing those
displaced to return [156]. In contrast, the heavily contaminated central region of the plume (Area
3), still exhibits dose-rates of >50 mSv yr-1 despite the radioactive decay. As a result, the size of
this area remains unchanged and decontamination has yet to commence - having been deemed
that people will "have difficulties in returning (to their homes) for a long time" [156]. Remediation
continues in Area 2 ("habitation restricted areas", originally 20 mSv yr-1 - 50 mSv yr-1), within
the Special Decontamination Area, following the decay-related reduction in dose rate [202]. The
progress of this remediation is shown in Figure 2.15, with activities progressively moving inwards
towards the central Area 3 (shown in grey).
With only Area 3 and a small region defined as Area 2 yet to be decontaminated (as of March
2018), only 3% of the entire Fukushima Prefecture will remain under an evacuation order (413
km2). The cost of this extensive decontamination, not including the final storage of the wastes
generated, is estimated to range from U2.55 to U5.12 trillion (£20 to £40 billion) depending upon
the amount of vegetation removed [203]. This assessment by Yasutaka et al. (2016), however,
concludes that if complete remediation were to occur - with the removal of all contaminated forest
areas, then these costs would be significantly higher - up to U16 trillion (£110 billion). This cost
difference arises due to the large (90% of the Prefecture) and currently unremediated forested
areas, that may require decontamination. The total volume of wastes generated even for the
lower cost option is approximated at 30 million m3 [200]. For context - in the UK, the disposal of
30 million m3 would be £90 billion, based on a Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) stated
cost of £3,000 per m3 of low level waste (LLW) [204].
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Figure 2.15: Map of the Special Decontamination Area (as of April 2017), where evacuation
orders have been rescinded, as well as the locations where high levels of radiological










During the fieldwork component of this study, a number of radiation detection and characterisation
methods were utilised. Some of these represented conventional methods employed for routine
on-site characterisation, others, however, were developed for, or in response to specific challenges
and environments that presented during this work.
Alongside an overview of radiation interactions and the principles governing its detection, details
of both the ground-based and low-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) characterisation
systems are presented. The details of how each platform was calibration are discussed alongside
normalisation parameters to derive the correct on-ground air dose-rate.
Methods and results presented in this chapter have been previously published in the peer-reviewed
literature in a number of specific works:
P.G. Martin, O.D. Payton, J.S. Fardoulis, D.A. Richards and T.B. Scott. "The use of unmanned
aerial systems for the mapping of legacy uranium mines". Journal of Environmental Radioactivity,
vol. 143, pp. 135-140, May 2015.
P.G. Martin, O.D. Payton, J.S. Fardoulis, D.A. Richards, T.B. Scott and Y. Yamashiki. "Low
altitude unmanned aerial vehicle for characterising remediation effectiveness following the
FDNPP accident". Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, vol. 154, pp. 58-63, January 2016.
P.G. Martin, S. Kwong, N.T. Smith, Y. Yamashiki, O.D. Payton, F.S. Russell-Pavier, J.S. Fardoulis,
D.A. Richards and T.B. Scott. "3D unmanned aerial vehicle radiation mapping for assessing
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contaminant distribution and mobility". International Journal of Applied Earth Observation and
Geoinformation, vol. 52, pp. 12-19, October 2016.
P.G. Martin, J. Moore, J.S. Fardoulis, O.D. Payton, and T.B. Scott. "Radiological Assessment on
Interest Areas on the Sellafield Nuclear Site via Unmanned Aerial Vehicle". Remote Sensing, vol.
8 (11), p. 10, November 2016.
P.G. Martin, O.D. Payton, Y. Yamashiki, D.A. Richards and T.B. Scott. "High-resolution radiation
mapping to investigate FDNPP derived contaminant migration". Journal of Environmental
Radioactivity, vol. 164, pp. 26-35, November 2016.
D. Connor, P.G. Martin and T.B. Scott. "Airborne radiation mapping: overview and application
of current and future aerial systems". International Journal of Remote Sensing, vol. 37 (24), pp.
5953-5987, November 2016.
A.C. Keatley, P.G. Martin, K.R. Hallam, O.D. Payton, R. Awbery, F. Carvalho, J.M. Oliveira, L.
Silva, M. Malta and T.B. Scott. "Source identification of uranium-containing materials at mine
legacy sites in Portugal". Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, vol. 183, pp. 102-111, March
2018.
P.G. Martin, D. Connor, O.D. Payton, M. Leal-Olloqui, A.C. Keatley and T.B. Scott. "Development
and validation of a high-resolution mapping platform to aid in the public awareness of radiological
hazards". Journal of Radiological Protection (IoP), vol. 38. pp. 329-342, February 2018.
D. Connor, P.G. Martin, N.T. Smith, L. Payne, C. Hutson, O.D. Payton, Y. Yamashiki and
T.B. Scott. "Application of airborne photogrammetry for the visualisation and assessment of
contamination migration arising from a Fukushima waste storage facility". Environmental
Pollution, vol. 234. pp. 610-619, March 2018.
An additional work is currently under peer-review:
P.G. Martin, C. Hutson, L. Payne, O.D. Payton, Y. Yamashiki and T.B. Scott. "Validation of
a novel radiation mapping platform for the reduction of operator-induced shielding effects".




For radiation to be quantified, it must first be detected. To detect the longest-range form of
radiation, γ-rays, a number of different instrument types exist - using a range of different
detector materials.
3.1.1 Principles of radiation detection
Whereas the laboratory-based techniques employed in this work (described subsequently in
Chapter 5) are "active" methods, the detection of radioactive emissions (specifically γ-rays) does
not require an external stimulus and can be conversely classified as a "passive" technique.
In addition to the release of γ-rays, the two other primary mechanisms of radioactive decay
occur via the emission of either positively and negatively charged sub-atomic alpha (α) and beta
(β) particles. These emissions typically occur, alongside the release of γ-rays as a result of the
decay of large, neutron-heavy and unstable nuclei as they seek to approach a stable ground-state.
Due to the limited range of both α and β particles in air, their detection is difficult and cannot
easily be performed within regional environmental monitoring/mapping scenarios.
Gamma-ray photons interact with matter through three mechanisms, dependent on both their
energy and also the atomic (Z) number of the material with which they interact. These interactions
are; (i) the photoelectric effect (low energies and low-Z number materials), (ii) Compton scattering
(moderate energies and atomic densities), and (iii) pair-production (highest energies and absorber
densities) [66, 74, 206, 207]. A graph illustrating these three interaction mechanisms at the
differing γ-ray energies and detector material densities is shown in Figure 3.1. Highlighted is the
energy range over which the majority of environmentally-sourced γ-rays exist [72], as well as the
effective atomic densities of the detector types used in this work (Section 3.1.2).
As discussed formerly in Section 2.1.1.1 with reference to FDNPP monitoring activities, alongside
the traditional (and basic) gas-filled Geiger-Muller (GM) detectors, a number of different types of
solid-state detector exist. Unlike GM detectors, however, this type of system is able to provide
spectroscopic data on the incident radiation. These types of detectors can be classified as either
the more common and widely-used scintillator type, or the more recently developed semiconductor
type. A full review of the current state of the art types, geometries and electronic configurations
of such radiation detectors is included within Connor, Martin and Scott (2016) [79].
Consisting of the largest group of radiation detectors - different types of organic, plastic, gaseous,
glass and inorganic scintillator-type units exist. These are materials that are notionally fully or
semi-transparent, which permits for the transmission of near-UV or visible light generated via
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Figure 3.1: Plot depicting the three differing radiation-material interactions that occur as a
function of both atomic (Z) number and incident γ-ray energy. The atomic (Z) numbers for the
two detectors used in this work are also plotted, further highlighted is the energy window over
which the majority of anthropogenic γ-rays are observed. Modified from [207].
the materials interaction with incident γ-ray photons. The most common of the inorganic high
Z-number scintillator crystal materials are; LaBr3, NaI and CsI (all of which typically contain
a dopant species to enhance or modify the photo-emission produced - typically Tl). Scintillator
detectors operate whereby a gamma-ray photon incident on an atom, ejects an electron from the
lower-energy valence band (comprising numerous orbital shells) into the higher-energy conduction
band (also with numerous electron shells) resulting in the production of an "electron-hole" pair.
The subsequent infilling of this hole through the de-excitation (demotion) produces light (tuned
to the near-UV or visible range where photo-multipliers are at their most efficient). This light
emitted by the crystal leads to the production of photoelectrons by a photo-multiplier tube (PMT),
or diode, via the photoelectric effect. The multiplication of these electrons and their analysis then
follows, allowing for an assessment of the energy of the original gamma-ray photon that struck
the detector - being proportional to that of the photo-electron population produced.
Semiconductor detectors operate via a method similar to scintillator-type devices. Upon interaction
with ionising γ-rays, both "electron-hole" pairs are produced when electrons are promoted to
the conduction band from the valence band. The number of pairs produced is proportional to
the energy of the incident ionising radiation, and in the presence of an electric field, these pairs
travel to two opposingly charged electrodes - generating a measurable electronic signal pulse.
Semiconductor materials used for radiation detection are not as numerous as scintillator-type
materials, with typical detectors being comprised of Si, diamond, high-purity Ge (HPGe) and
more recently, the direct band-gap semiconductor CdZnTe (CZT).
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While α and β particles are easily detected (at short measurement distances) due to their
charged nature, γ-rays in contrast, are more difficult to detect with the ultimate efficiency of
a detector being a function of both its volume and also its sensitivity (or counting efficiency),
which itself is partly dictated by its density, band-gap and the energy of the interacting γ-ray
photon. For the incident gamma radiation to be registered and counted, it must have a sufficient
interaction with the detector [206]. As no detector material exists that is 100% efficient, not all
γ-ray energy will be absorbed and hence radiation detected.
A quantity termed the "intrinsic counting efficiency" is hence defined - existing as the ratio
of radiation incident onto a detector to that registered (and counted). This efficiency is the
physical density of the detector material, and its associated electron density. It is these electrons,
that migrate through the detector (as electron-hole pairs), that underlies radiation detection.
With radiation detection relying on the interaction between the incident γ-ray and the detector
material, the attenuation of radiation results from the similar, yet undesired, interception and
absorption of this radiation. As one of the most abundant compounds of the planets surface,
water is extensively utilised in the shielding of the ionising radiation that is emitted from spent
nuclear fuel in facilities worldwide alongside providing cooling owing to its high specific heat
capacity. Water has a high linear attenuation coefficient (µ) and therefore, is a strong absorber
and attenuator of γ-ray radiation [20, 74].
This property represents an issue, however, within environmental radiological surveys for a
number of reasons. The primary issues results from the majority of the human body being
constituted by water, with the male and female body on average being composed of 58% and 49%
water (as bodily tissues) respectively [208]. Work by Jones and Cunningham (1983) [113], placed
the total reduction of incident radiation resulting from its attenuation by the human body at
approximately 30%, with recent work by Buchanan et al., (2016) [114], attained a comparable
value at between 20% and 30% attenuation of a radiocesium source. While the human body can
be represented by a volume of water, this is a gross simplification, with the body composed of
many different materials - all with differing attenuation coefficients (Section 2.1.1) [74].
3.1.2 Detector instrumentation
The in-field characterisation of radiation described in this thesis was performed using one
scintillator and one semiconductor detector. Specifications of both are detailed in Table 3.1.
Both detectors (GR1 and SIGMA-50) were manufactured by Kromek™ Ltd., with their signal
outputted through a mini-USB as a series of channel numbers (1 - 4096) proportional to the
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Mass (g) 300 60
Maximum CPS 5,000 30,000




<7.2% FWHM <2.5% FWHM
Channels 4096
Table 3.1: Comparison of γ-ray detectors used during this study. From [209, 210].
individual γ-ray photon energies incident onto the detector. Each unit can be controlled through
the KSpect™ software provided by the manufacturer, however, for this work an alternative control
program was produced at the University of Bristol for the purposes of controlling either detector
during radiation mapping - described in MacFarlane et al., (2014) [100]. Within this alternative
code, the string of channel numbers obtained during the previous 0.5 seconds (2 Hz sampling rate)
was combined with positional information obtained from a GPS unit (Adafruit™ Ultimate GPS
Breakout - connected to an external GPS antenna) onto an Arduino™ Mega ADK micro-controller
board, before being written to a micro-SD card in near real-time (0.5 second processing delay).
Positional accuracy stated by the manufacturer was ±1 m, however, a resolution of ±0.5 m was
determined to be generally obtained. The entire system was powered by an internal high-capacity
lithium-polymer (LiPo) battery, all of which was encased within a protective ABS plastic case with
externally-mounted connections. Through the collection of the channel numbers corresponding to
the γ-rays incident onto the detector, an energy spectrum could be produced at every position.
In addition to the detector control software that was developed at the University of Bristol,
the software used to display, post-process and export the data for further analysis was also
constructed in-house, using the LabView™ environment from National Instruments™ (NI).
Prior to in-field deployment, an energy vs. channel number calibration was performed for each of
the detectors. A number of calibration sources were held in front of each detector (GR1 energy
range: 30 keV - 3.0 Mev and SIGMA-50 energy range: 50 keV to 1.5 Mev) to derive a value for the
specific emission energies corresponding to each of the detectors 4096 channels. While the GR1
was able to detect a greater energy range of γ-rays than the SIGMA-50, this larger energy range
was not required, as the principal radiocesium γ-ray photon energy is only 662 keV [52], and
therefore well within the range of the more sensitive SIGMA-50 - with twice the energy resolution.
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Figure 3.2: Detection efficiency of the CZT-based GR1 detector with incident γ-ray energy.
Optimum efficiencies are experienced at the lowest photon energies. From [211].
To permit the conversion of the measured counts per second (CPS) into a meaningful value
of dose-rate, an additional processing step and a further calibration were required. For this
calibration, each of the solid-state detectors was exposed to a number of different radiocesium
dose-rates, as quantified by a hand-held Tracerco™ PED dose-meter. Linear plots were produced
detailing the response from both detectors in comparison to values obtained from the dose-meter.
Existing as a cubic centimetre volume (1 cm3) of CZT detector material, encased within a uniform
thickness of Al with electronics positioned behind the crystal - the sensitivity of the GR1 detector
to incident radiation was determined to be almost independent of its orientation [211]. In contrast,
the prismatic volume of the SIGMA-50 detector (25 mm × 25 mm × 51 mm) resulted in significant
sensitivity differences dependent upon its orientation [212]. Within this work by the UK National
Physical Laboratory (NPL), a 40% increase in count-rate was observed when the detectors long-
axis was positioned parallel (facing) to the 152Eu source.
As formerly mentioned, the "intrinsic counting efficiency" is a further property of the detector
that requires an assessment to allow for quantitative results to be derived. A plot detailing the
exponential reduction in detection efficiency with increasing γ-ray energy, for a GR1 detector,
is shown in Figure 3.2. Evident from this plot is the rapid reduction in CZT photon detection
efficiency - from 0.79 at 59.5 keV (241Am), reducing to only 0.012 at 1,836.1 keV (88Y). The
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CsI-based SIGMA-50 is conversely characterised by a slightly improved detection efficiency at
higher incident photon energies (0.2 at 1,500 keV) [213]. Through applying the approximately
linear reduction in detection efficiency that is derived for either the GR1 or SIGMA-50 unit (when
graphed onto a log-linear scaling), a compensation for this energy-dependent efficiency of the
detector can be corrected for. This correction was performed during subsequent post-processing,
whereby the mathematically derived function describing the trend was applied to correct for such
detector efficiencies [214].
Having quantified the energy-dependent efficiency of the detector, the activity of the source/sample
can subsequently be determined using a number of additional setup/environmental parameters,
alongside values derived from the γ-ray spectrum. The equation used to derive a samples activity
is given in Equation 3.1, whereby in this equation; A = activity concentration of a specific
radionuclide in the decay series, Nnet = net background-subtracted peak count area (from the
γ-ray spectrum), ε = energy specific efficiency of the detector, I(γ) = emission probability (branching
ratio) of the specific energy photo-peak (0.851 for the 137Cs emission at 662.94 keV [52]), t =




The minimum detectable activity (MDA) of a counting system can also be derived using these
values, with the equation describing the lowest activity possible for a specific detector to accurately








Several on-ground surveys have been performed to characterise radiation across discrete areas
within Fukushima Prefecture alongside airborne mapping surveys (Section 3.3). In comparison
to sites examined via airborne survey, those sites examined using ground-based methods were
topographically simplistic and did not present access limitations that would otherwise require
an airborne survey. Such limitations are depicted in one of the initial radiation maps produced
around the Kawamata Town area of Fukushima Prefecture by Kinase et al., (2015) [215], shown in
Figure 3.3. While providing valuable information on the distribution of radiological contamination,
these results highlight the absence of spatial data coverage, away from the road network. Despite
this limited coverage, ground-based surveys are powerful in initially locating regions of interest.
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Figure 3.3: Map of ambient dose equivalent rates through vehicular surveys at Kawamata Town
(Fukushima Prefecture). From [215].
3.2.1 Detector setup
Two forms of ground-based radiation survey were performed as part of this thesis using slightly
differing derivatives of the base-setup formerly described and depicted in Figure 3.4. Within one
method, the setup as described was deployed - consisting of system electronics, GPS antenna and
a single GR1 or SIGMA-50 radiation detector placed within an operator’s backpack - positioned
at 1 m above the ground. Due to the directional sensitivity of the SIGMA-50 unit, it was placed
at the base of the backpack with its long-axis positioned parallel to the ground’s surface. To
maintain consistency, the same operator conducted all radiological surveys via this method.
As discussed previously (Section 3.1.1), and as shown in the various studies - the influence of
water (and the human body) on radiation attenuation is significant - greatly impacting on results
of radiological surveys [113, 114]. To address this limitation, a new form of radiation detection
system was deployed.
A schematic of this new dual-detector system is shown in Figure 3.5. To remove the approximately
30% reduction in intensity associated with nearby human operators, two SIGMA-50 units were
mounted at either end of a plastic pole mounted under the operator’s backpack, each extending
out a distance of 1 m. Two GPS units were used to independently record the position of each
of the detectors - with the system electronics modified to incorporate measurements from both
systems onto two Arduino™ Mega ADK micro-controller boards. As per the single unit system,
both detectors were held at 1 m above the ground surface to avoid the requirement to perform
the otherwise required height-correction.
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Figure 3.4: Exploded schematic of the base unit setup used during radiation mapping (a
SIGMA-50 detector is shown).
Figure 3.5: Schematic of the backpack-mounted ground survey platform.
Resulting from the two detectors being deployed by a single operator, the survey efficiency of this
method is considerably greater than in conventional surveys, therefore permitting for increased
ground coverage. However, as the nearby positioning of multiple GPS units is widely-regarded to
produce erroneous position readings due to radio-frequency (RF) interference, a prior study was
performed. The resulting position derived from both GPS units during this test survey are shown
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Figure 3.6: Influence of one GPS units position, as reported by the other neighbouring unit.
in Figure 3.6. From these results, however, neither GPS unit is seen to suffer from any form of
positional irregularity - suggesting sufficient separation of the units and no RF interference.
A further calibration was also undertaken to more accurately quantify the radiation reduction
as a result of bodily attenuation, and therefore the benefits of this system in comparison to
"traditional" survey methods. The results of this exercise are shown in Figure 3.7. Within this
calibration, the SIGMA-50 detector was progressively moved away from a central radiocesium
source, with the measured radiation levels recorded. A subsequent set of measurements were
made by placing a human volunteer (of typical build) between the source and detector. From
these measurements, an average reduction of 30% is calculated - identical to values determined
during earlier works [113, 114]. By therefore positioning the detector away from this source of
attenuation, a more representative account of true air dose-rate is recorded. As a result, for the
subsequently detailed ground-based detection setup whereby measurements were undertaken
with the detection unit held in close proximity to the body - a correction factor of 1.3 was applied
to the results.
A final calibration of the system to ensure repeatability between both SIGMA-50 units of the
dual-mapping system was undertaken within an established radiological environment. Over a
50 m length, a series of varying activity radioactive sources were positioned. During the first
pass of the platform, one detector (SIGMA-50 "A") passed directly over the sources, during the
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Figure 3.7: Influence of human attenuation on radiation intensity recorded by a detector.
return pass, the second detector (SIGMA-50 "B") travelled directly over each of the sources. A
comparison of each detector’s response to this radiation field is shown in Figure 3.8. Between
the two detectors, for measurements taken at the same location but with differing detectors,
a maximum difference of only ±5% was observed. Resulting from such a small degree of inter-
detector variation, the measurements attained via either of the SIGMA-50 units can be directly
compared, without the requirement for any normalisation be applied.
3.2.2 Survey setup
For radiation surveys within open areas, the operator would walk in a number of parallel survey
transects, each equally spaced. When using the single-detector (backpack-contained) unit, a grid
spacing of approximately 1.5 m was attempted, increased to 3 m, however, when the dual-detector
(boom-mounted) system was employed. In each case, a closer grid-spacing served only to enhance
the level of measurement overlap. If surveys were conducted in areas where space was limited or
where numerous obstructions existed, smaller survey grids comprising the full area were used.
To establish if any system "drift" (variation between time-resolved measurements from the
same location) had occurred, deliberate repeats of the same survey lines, at both the start and
end of the survey were made. This provided assurances of the accuracy of the system.
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Figure 3.8: Repeatability comparison of both SIGMA-50 units comprising the dual-detector
ground-based mapping system.
The measurement data was captured at a slow walking pace (approximately 1.0 ms-1), at a
2 Hz sampling frequency. Data was subsequently uploaded from the systems micro-SD card into
the processing and analysis software. Within this software, the number of the γ-rays incident
onto the detector during each 0.5 second sampling window were summed (and multiplied by two
for a per-second value), before being plotted as a user-defined colour-scaled (CPS or calibrated
dose-rate) overlay onto a satellite base-map of the area, using the GPS-derived position of the unit.
The circles that formed the radiation overlay were scaled to both the intensity of the radiation
(colour), but also in size to represent the region on the ground that this signal could originate. The
radius of these circles existed as a combination of the height at which the detector was held (1 m),
its velocity of travel, as well as the physical aperture (of the detector) for incident radiation. These
circles are here defined as 1 m in diameter, in-line with common practice - comparable to earlier
survey systems and collection methods [105, 216]. In regions where data point overlap occurred,
a "nearest-neighbour" smoothing filter was applied to the data to remove any inconsistencies that
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existed. The same nearest-neighbour filter was also used to interpolate measurements into areas
where the data density was lower or where a grid-separation greater than 1 m existed.
3.2.3 Platform testing, calibration and initial application
Prior to its deployment across Fukushima Prefecture, system testing of the single-unit ground-
based platform was performed at sites both in the UK and abroad, including;
• Geevor Tin Mine, Cornwall, UK
• South Bristol, UK
These test sites were selected to represent locations where there existed a known, but low-activity,
radiological signature, however, the extent of the contamination in each case was not fully
known/understood.
The survey undertaken in Cornwall represents an area formerly of extensive resource extraction,
with resulting legacy contamination. Investigations within Bristol were used to investigate
the deployment of the platform within a contrasting urban area, where low-activity geological
exposures and prior underground coal workings present radiological anomalies with a more
limited spatial extent.
The results of these initial studies and the associated calibrations can be found within the
peer-reviewed literature:
P.G. Martin, D. Connor, O.D. Payton, M. Leal-Olloqui, A.C. Keatley and T.B. Scott. "Development
and validation of a high-resolution mapping platform to aid in the public awareness of radiological
hazards". Journal of Radiological Protection (IoP), vol. 38, pp. 329-342, February 2018.
Geevor Tin Mine
Existing within a rich and extensive granite-derived mineral vein network, the county of Cornwall
in south-west England has long since exploited its metalliferous reserves for economic gain; with
the region formerly the worlds largest supplier of tin and tin-ores at the start of the 19th Century
[217]. One such mine to exploit these rich mineral reserves was the Geevor Mine, located on the
north-west Cornish coast - approximately 10 km north-east from Lands End, neighbouring the
numerous other mines found across the area, including its sister mine - Levant. The Geevor Mine
principally extracted tin ores (however, the Levant and other nearby mines also extracted Cu,
Ag, Au and As) formed as a result of the intrusion of the Lands End Granite and the associated
mineralisation dating from 223±7 Ma [218, 219].
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Figure 3.9: Dose-rate calibrated air dose-rate maps obtained using the single unit ground-based
system at the Geevor Tin Mine, Cornwall.
In addition to these primary tin phases, extensive later-phase uranium mineralisation also
occurred across the region [218]. After extraction, this uranium-containing material was treated
as gangue (waste) material and disposed of as large spoil heaps across the site. Since the demise
of the Cornish industry and the mine’s closure in 1990, these spoil piles have been removed and
the estate has since opened as a popular visitor attraction. However, low-levels of localised legacy
contamination were known to occur across the site, and therefore represented a useful system
test site for assessing platform sensitivity and resolution. The only prior radiological assessment
of this site was conducted as part of the Tellus SW Project [220], where a light-aircraft was used
to overfly the region (56 m - 200 m altitude) obtaining geophysical alongside radiometric data.
Radiological data from the site was obtained using a SIGMA-50 detector attached to the single-
unit backpack-contained setup, held at the standard 1 m above the ground, as detailed in Section
3.2.1. To enhance ground coverage in the time available, three units were deployed concurrently.
To attain consistency between each of the units, operators were chosen with similar builds - full
details of inter-unit calibrations are included within Martin et al., "Development and validation
of a high-resolution mapping platform to aid in the public awareness of radiological hazards".
Journal of Radiological Protection (IoP), vol. 38, pp. 329-342, February 2018.
Methods employed to survey the site were identical to those described in Section 3.2.2, with the
operators each walking in a grid pattern of consistent survey-line separation. The plotting of
survey data was performed as described in Section 3.2.2, with radiation levels corrected by a
factor of 1.3 to account for human-induced shielding of the detector. Calibration points were made
across the site using a RADEX™ hand-held dose-meter (Moscow, Russia) to permit for conversion
between dose-rate and system produced CPS output.
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Figure 3.10: Gamma-ray spectrum produced using the single unit ground-based systems at
locations (i) - (iv), as identified in Figure 3.9.
The calibrated dose-rate map of the site is shown in Figure 3.9, with the four points of increased
activity ((i) - (iv)) identified. Position (i) was determined to represent the location of a small legacy
spoil heap near to the coast, whilst (ii), (iii) and (iv) marked the locations of former extraction
and processing activities at the sites centre. A region with elevated activity trending NW-SE
through the site is also observed, coincident with a downwards slope where contaminant material
is ascribed to have progressively migrated. Resulting from this survey, the ability to identify
points that are both spatially limited in their extent as well as low in their activity is proven.
Whilst elevated in activity, these points are all well below levels defined as safe [221].
Analysis of the γ-ray spectra attained at the four points, (i) - (iv) shown in Figure 3.10, including;
the relative heights of each of the peaks, highlights the identical isotopic signature (±2% peak
height difference) at each of these locations. As expected from a uranium-ore material, the
contributing peaks result from the radioactive decay of the daughter products that have over-time
ingrown after the materials emplacement. The peaks identified in Figure 3.10 are from the
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Figure 3.11: Calibrated air dose-rate maps obtained using the single unit ground-based system
across a region of South Bristol.
radioactive decay of 214Bi and the parent 214Pb - with 214Bi decaying via strong gamma-emission
into the very short-lived 214Po, which following a number of intermediary decay steps reaches
the stable 206Pb. However, these intermediary steps are dominated by α and β decays, with only
limited (and difficult-to-detect γ-ray emission). Such spectral similarity shows a commonality to
the source material and the absence of preferential species transport/mobilisation.
South Bristol
The City of Bristol in south-west England, like Cornwall to its south, also has a rich history of
underground resource extraction resulting from its extensive buried resources, however, for coal
rather than various metalliferous ores [222]. These workings, sometimes at depths of <5 m below
the ground surface, have long presented issues for new construction as well as the subsistence of
existing properties across the city [223]. However, as is typical for coal, a radiological signature is
evident due to concentrations of naturally-occurring radioactive species (K and U) present within
the material [219, 224], accumulated during deposition and/or the subsequent interaction of U
and K carrying waters. Where past mining activity had occurred across south Bristol, the surface
manifestations are evident through the location of vents extending to the surface.
With the sensitivity and spatial resolution of the system already demonstrated by its application
at the Geevor Tin Mine, the deployment across south Bristol sought to further test and quantify
these attributes, and in addition examine the performance of the system within an urban
environment - where issues relating to GPS shielding and signal reflection/scattering events
could serve to produce measurement/locational errors.
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As per the surveys at the Geevor site (and detailed in Section 3.2.2), the single unit ground-based
system was used, with the more-sensitive SIMGA-50 unit attached. The system was again carried
in the operator’s backpack (1 m above the ground), with a factor of 1.3 applied to the results to
remove the influence of human attenuation. Like at the Geevor site also, a series of dose-rate
measurements were also obtained to allow for a CPS to dose-rate conversion. Unlike Geevor,
however, where evenly spaced grid-lines could be used to construct the survey, mapping was
undertaken by walking along either side of the road along the pavement. The calibrated dose-rate
map produced over the south Bristol area is shown in Figure 3.11.
From these results, a greater maximum dose-rate than at the Geevor site is evident, with
a larger number of "hot-spot" locations. The highest levels of radiation are associated with the
central portion of the survey area, correlating with the location of the greatest density of both
coal seams and resulting former mine workings [223]. The land to the north (close to the river)
and the east were not extensively exploited, and show levels of radioactivity up to 70% lower
than measurements obtained 200 m to the south - corresponding to the location of the Dean Lane
Colliery (closed in 1906) [222].
From these results, the spatial resolution (with meter-scale anomalies identifiable) and the
low limit of detection of the unit (<0.1 µSv hr-1 resolvable difference) shown previously at the
Geevor site are further evaluated. The lack of anomalous data points (representative of poor GPS
signal or RF "signal interference") supports the system for use within built-up environments such
as these. This system shows comparable results to other ground-based systems [64, 216], whilst
being both lighter, fully-spectroscopic and considerably more portable. Hence, this interchangeable
detector system represents a significant capability advancement over existing platforms.
3.3 Airborne (UAV) surveys
While ground-based surveys were suited to and undertaken at smaller sites that were readily-
accessible on-foot and exhibited limited topographic obstructions, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
surveys were utilised in areas where such obstructions presented access limitations or where it
was undesirable/impractical to send humans to perform such work.
3.3.1 Airframe
The low-altitude UAV used within this work is pictured in Figure 3.12, alongside a schematic of
the total system in Figure 3.13 - a full description of the airframe is contained within prior works
[102, 103, 225–227].
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Figure 3.12: Labelled photograph of the UAV with associated payload used for low-altitude
radiation mapping, consisting of; (a) detector payload, (b) LiPo batteries, (c) motors and
propellers, (d) tubular CF arms, (e) payload GPS, (f) legs, (g) radio-controls. From [102].
Consisting of an "X8" configuration with motors and propellers mounted both above and below its
four tubular carbon-fibre (CF) arms, the entire system was collapsible for transportation - with the
main central body of the system also constructed from a lightweight CF composite. The platform
was powered by two high-capacity LiPo batteries mounted under the main central electronic
systems to ensure an even weight distribution. These electronics (located under a protective
cover) consisted of a PixHawk™ or APM flight-control board containing an onboard inertial
measurement unit (IMU), compass, barometer and GPS (all for navigation), alongside power
distribution and speed control systems for the UAVs motors. Whilst being able to operate fully
autonomously during flights, control of the UAV was also possible using conventional hand-held
radio controls. Mounted under the UAV, between its flexible aluminium legs, was the radiation
detection payload - modified from the basic system described previously in Section 3.1.2.
3.3.2 Detector setup
Within ground-based surveys previously discussed in Section 3.2.2, the low height (1 m) above the
ground at which they were conducted permitted for the simplistic apportioning of a 1 m diameter
field of view from whereby the radiation incident onto the detector was sourced. However, due to
the varying distances from a surface that a UAV-mounted detection system would be deployed,
an enhancement to the basic detection system, shown formerly in Figure 3.4, was made. This
addition was the inclusion of a single-point (905 nm wavelength eye-safe infra-red) laser range-
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Figure 3.13: Schematic overview of the UAV and associated detection payload(s) - radiological
and imaging. From [225].
finder. The AR2500™ time-of-flight sensor from Acuity™ [228], possessed an accuracy of ±1 cm
over its 100 m operational range.
Alongside the series of channel numbers (corresponding to the energies of the individual incident
γ-rays) and GPS position information (latitude, longitude and altitude), a value for the height of
the unit above a surface (ground, roof or trees) was also concurrently recorded - sampled at the
same frequency of every 0.5 seconds (2 Hz).
Due to its lower mass and smaller size, the GR1 detector was employed for the majority of
the airborne survey work. The heavier, yet more sensitive SIGMA-50 was, however, used within
later portions of fieldwork across Fukushima Prefecture due to the decline in radiocesium activity
over the duration of this study. For either of the detection units, to ensure they remained in the
same orientation throughout the flight irrespective of the attitude of the UAV, they were mounted
onto a gyroscopically-stabilised three-axis gimbal. Alongside the detector on the gimbal was the
laser range-finder unit, itself also gimballed to ensure it remained normal to the ground’s surface.
The orientation of either detector when mounted onto the airborne system was the same as that
used during ground-based surveys.
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3.3.3 Detector field of view calibration
As presented in the work by Duval et al., (1971) [78] (and as previously discussed in Section
2.1.1), the height at which airborne surveys are conducted is central not only to the degree of
attenuation experienced, but also the spatial resolution attainable, termed in this work as the
"circle of investigation". While this work by Duval et al. accurately describes the typical on-ground
resolutions produced via higher-altitude survey methods such as planes and helicopters, this
rationalisation does not hold for lower-altitude radiometric surveys. Via this equation (Equation
2.2), an aerial survey performed at 10 m altitude would sample radiation from a radius of 39 m.
As before, in this equation, Y = radiation yield (or intensity), θ = half-angle of cone of incidence
from detector to ground, H = height of the detector, A = a constant dependent upon the setup
parameters, µe = linear attenuation coefficient of the ground within which activity is located, µa =
linear attenuation coefficient of air, λ = Euler’s constant (0.5772157), and x = ratio of the product
of µa and height (H), to cos θ
An alternative function to describe the on-ground sampling radius of an aerial detection system,
applicable to lower altitudes was subsequently provided by Pitkin and Duval (1980) [71], shown
in Equation 3.3. Where, H = height of the detector, R = radius of the "circle of investigation"
(ground sampling radius), θ = half-angle of the cone of response from detector to the ground, and
n = a constant dependent upon the detection setup.
tan θ = R
H
= n (3.3)
From this function, the on-ground radius (R) from which radiation is sampled is dependent
upon both the height of the detector (H), but more critically its half-angle (θ). The influence
of both factors is shown in the plots of Figures 3.14 (a) and (b). From Figure 3.14 (a), for a
detector with a large theta angle (sampling aperture), the radius of investigation is shown to be
strongly influenced by the detector height - illustrated here by a linear trend. This function is
further shown by Figure 3.14 (b), whereby for a specific survey altitude - detectors of widening θ
half-angles produce an ever-increasingly ground sampling radii ("circle of investigation").
To determine the specific half-angles of the two detectors, the GEANT4 software platform was
used [229]. GEANT4 is a simulation tool-kit constructed using the C++ programming language
at CERN for simulating the passage and interactions of differing sub-atomic particles through
various forms of matter and under a range of environmental conditions. For each detector in its
standard survey configuration, a radiocesium point source was positioned 2.5 m directly beneath
the detector - before being moved horizontally to attain a range of half-angles (±90°), with the
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Figure 3.14: Plots detailing the influence of; (a) detector height (H), and (b) detector half-angle
(θ), on the radius of investigation.
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resultant radiation intensity recorded. A height of 2.5 m was selected to represent the lowest
altitudes at which surveys would be performed. A graph of the GEANT4 simulation results for
both detectors is shown in Figure 3.15. This plot details the strongly-normal distribution and
hence the crucial influence altitude and detector half-angle plays on the spatial resolution of
airborne surveys.
For both detectors, at approximately 45° half-angle, the measured intensity falls to below 90%
of the maximum. This value of θ can, therefore, be taken to represent the characteristic angle
of the detectors - shown with dashed lines in Figures 3.14 (a) and (b). As shown in these plots,
for such a half-angle, the height at which the detector is positioned above the ground directly
corresponds to the radius of the "circle of investigation" on the ground. Therefore, for a survey at
10 m altitude, a 20 m sampling diameter would be attained. However, if survey flights were to be
performed at lower altitudes than 10 m, such a "circle of investigation" would be similarly reduced.
These modelling-derived results were subsequently verified through an in-field calibration,
whereby a 5 MBq 137Cs source was positioned on the ground, away from the UAV and its detector
(outside of the on-ground "circle of investigation"). By incrementally increasing the height of
the platform (hovering at differing altitudes over the same initial location), the height (and
resultantly the detector half-angle) at which the source became visible, was mathematically
determined.
The inclusion of the single-point laser range-finder as a component of the airborne detection
payload allows for the UAVs height above a surface to be determined over the duration of the
survey. From this altitude value, the "circle of investigation" and hence the diameter of the
on-ground sampling radius for each measurement can be derived.
Operating at such limited distances from the ground, the influence of surrounding topographic
features on measurement uncertainties is a further, required, consideration. To address this,
in work by Malins et al., (2015) [110], the influence of a number of spatial geometries (e.g.
valleys, hillsides, mountains and trees) on the detected air dose-rate, obtained via high-altitude,
low-altitude or ground-based systems, were each simulated. Following these works, it was
concluded that whilst high-altitude manned surveys may encounter significant uncertainties
in the determined on-ground dose-rate as a result of topographic features, UAV systems are
significantly less susceptible to such influences - therefore affording a greater measurement
accuracy. This study ultimately concluded that a greater influence on radiation levels (determined
via low-altitude aerial platforms including UAVs) was the result of source heterogeneity.
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Figure 3.15: Results of GEANT-4 simulations on both GR1 and SIGMA-50 detectors, illustrating
the field of view (θ half-angle) of the two detector units.
3.3.4 Survey setup
To conduct a radiation survey of a site, the area to be assessed was first inspected to ensure there
existed no unforeseen or obscured obstructions with which the UAV could collide when flying
autonomously. After determining the height at which the survey should be performed following a
measurement of the heights of any buildings or structures to be overflown, a GPS "geo-fenced"
area was set within the UAV Mission Planner™ control software [230]. Within this software, the
velocity and grid-spacing at which the survey was to be performed were also selected. Although
both take-off and landing were performed manually, the operation of the UAV during radiation
mapping flights was conducted using the platforms autopilot system - combining inputs from the
units onboard GPS, barometer and compass.
With measurement sampling at a frequency of 2 Hz, UAV radiological surveys were performed at
altitudes of 3.0 m - 10.0 m (up to 15 m in circumstances with considerable on-ground features),
velocities of 1.5 ms-1, and with resultant grid-spacings of 1.5 m - 5.0 m using a raster survey
pattern. Obstructions were overflown at a minimum height of 1 m. These parameters allowed for
data collection as a number of height-scaled overlapping "circles of investigation" (Section 3.3.3),
with subsequent nearest-neighbour smoothing and infilling performed, as used previously for
ground-based survey results (Section 3.2.2).
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3.3.5 Platform calibration and prior application
With the relationship formerly described by Duval et al., (1971) [78], equating both the detector
height and the on-ground radius ("circle of investigation"), not holding at these lower survey
altitudes (Section 3.3.3), the normalisation method through which data is corrected for reduced
altitudes requires consideration. As discussed in Section 2.1.1, this normalisation to derive the
air dose-rate at 1 m above the ground surface due to the attenuation from the air through which
it passes is performed using an exponential function - a number of which are shown in Figure 2.1.
To determine if the routine exponential normalisation method was applicable to surveys at these
lower altitudes (as well as to investigate a largely uncharacterised site), a study was undertaken
at South Terras - a former uranium mine located 22.5 km south-west of St. Austell, Cornwall, UK.
Associated with the extensive contact metamorphism that occurred following the emplacement of
the St. Austell granite, it is one part of the larger Cornubian batholith which also formed the
Land’s End Granite, responsible for the mineralisation at the Geevor Tin Mine and numerous
other sites across south-west England. Prior to its abandonment in 1927, it is estimated that
approximately 750 tons of uranium ore were produced at the South Terras site - most of which
was of a particularly high grade, with up to 30% uranium by weight at many points within
the primary lode [219]. Post-extraction, all processing was undertaken at the mine site, within
the numerous buildings. Owing to the absence of any environmental legislation at the time, a
considerable degree of legacy contamination exists across the site.
Owing to the significant topographic features that occurred across the entire site, a range of
operational altitudes were employed, from 3 m - 15 m. However, in each case, an identical grid
spacing of 3 m was employed alongside a velocity of 1.5 ms-1. Due to the size of the site, a number
of individual surveys were undertaken and combined to produce the radiological intensity map
of the entire site. From the known higher-activities at South Terras than at Geevor, and to
improve the overall survey duration possible with the UAV - the less-sensitive but lighter GR1
detector was attached to the gimballed aerial detection payload. To similarly permit the calibrated
conversion between CPS recorded by the γ-ray spectrometer and dose-rate, a RADEX™ (Moscow,
Russia) hand-held dose-meter was used to obtain measurements at points alongside the GR1.
The CPS and calibrated dose-rate map with height normalisation performed via the alternative
inverse-square law of radiation dispersion from a point-source (with the intensity of radiation
decreasing with the square of the distance from the source) is shown in the plots of Figure
3.16. Also identified in these plots are positions where corresponding ground measurements of
radiation intensity were made to assess the differences in normalisation method (inverse-square
vs. exponential). A graph detailing these results is shown in Figure 3.17.
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Figure 3.16: Height-normalised air dose-rate maps obtained using the UAV at the South Terras
site in Cornwall, UK. A site-wide map is shown in (a), with an enlarged view of the sites centre
shown in (b), alongside the location of the ground measurement points. An area to the south-west
of the main site is shown in (c), corresponding to the location of a hardcore track, the results of
radiation mapping over this area are shown in (d).
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In this figure, values for both the on-ground CPS obtained at a height of 1 m, and the raw CPS
measured by the UAV are shown. Alongside these values are shown the normalisation of this
aerial data via both the inverse-square law (Equation 3.4), as well as via an exponential function,
(Equation 2.1). From this plot, while a number of the measurement positions taken using the
UAV were normalised accurately to ground-level readings via the inverse-square law (positions 1,
2, 3 and 12), a range of the data points were conversely better corrected via the more commonly
utilised exponential function (positions 4, 8, 9 and 10).
When the location and altitude at each of these positions across the South Terras survey are
analysed, however, a trend is apparent as to the most applicable height normalisation formula.
For measurements taken at lower altitudes (<10 m) (position 7) and where the radiation is emitted
from concentrated areas (positions 2, 3 and 11) the inverse-square law better normalises the UAV
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data - defined as a "point-source" in Figure 3.17. In contrast, at locations monitored at greater
altitudes - typically >10 m (positions 4 and 10), and where the radiation was more laterally
extensive/diffuse (positions 5, 8 and 9), the exponential function provides a more appropriate
normalisation of the airborne data - defined in Figure 3.17 as a "planar-source".
While these two height normalisation functions are applicable for the correction of data with
differing source attributes (point, or the much larger, planer) and survey heights (<10 m to >10 m),
the over or under-estimation provided by the alternate correction method (in comparison to the
more accurate method) is not greater than ±32% in any instance. Such variations in measured
activities are expected during typical airborne surveys due to source heterogeneity [110].
As the aerial surveys forming this work (in the Fukushima Prefecture region of eastern Japan)
will be conducted near-exclusively at altitudes of <10 m above various surfaces, the use of point-
source normalisation is, therefore, more appropriate. With these aerial radiation mapping flights
focused on identifying small regions of radioactivity resulting from contaminant transport or left
as an artefact following remediation activities, the sources of radiation will occur in the form of
more isolated regions rather than more laterally extensive contamination bodies. In contrast to
the sites examined in the UK (South Bristol and Cornwall), the "hotspot" localities within Japan
will all exist within environments where a significantly elevated background activity occurs. This
can be interpreted as isolated point sources superimposed onto larger (lower-activity) planar
geometry sources.
By utilising these UAV systems, allowing measurements to be made at locations formerly
inaccessible/impractical to workers or where dose-rate considerations for the operative may
have occurred - this work details the adoption of this novel aerial mapping platform (alongside
the associated ground-based system) at localities across Fukushima Prefecture. The key topics
addressed as part of this thesis pertain to, (i) the mobility of contamination within the environment
- including its residence, transport and likely entrapment, and (ii) the impact of restorative works
- rapidly, safely and efficiently quantifying their effectiveness. Together, both topics are important
in the long-term remediation of extensive portions of Fukushima Prefecture, contaminated by











Samples analysed during this work fall into either one of two distinct categories; those smaller
than 10 µm in maximum dimension (down to several hundreds of nm), and those considerably
larger - greater than 100 µm in typical dimensions. These smaller particles are henceforth termed
atmospheric material or particulate, while the larger are conversely termed ejecta material or
particulate. Atmospheric material was sampled via the collection of organic species onto which
the fine-scale particles became trapped or adhered. The larger material, however, was sampled
directly from the ground (dust and sediment samples). Details of both sampling strategies and
isolation methods are hereby discussed.
Methods presented in this chapter relating to the extraction of individual atmospheric-type
particles from a bulk sample ahead of subsequent analysis have been previously published in the
peer-reviewed literature:
P.G. Martin, I. Griffiths, C.P. Jones, C.A. Stitt, M. Davies-Milner, J.F.W. Mosselmans, Y. Yamashiki,
D.A. Richards and T.B. Scott. "In-situ removal and characterisation of uranium-containing
particles from sediments surrounding the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant". Spectrochimica
Acta Part B: Atomic Spectroscopy, vol. 117, pp. 1-7, March 2016.
4.1 Atmospheric material (<10 micron)
This form of particulate consisted of fine-scale material obtained at numerous sampling localities
across the Fukushima Prefecture. As a result of its small mean particle size and resulting ability
to be readily-transported by an entraining air mass, the material of this type is encountered at a
wide-range of distances extending out from the power plant. The distribution of this material
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Figure 4.1: Photograph of typical samples from which atmospheric material was isolated; (left)
moss samples and (right) roadside sediments.
is apparent from the previously discussed contamination plume map produced [85, 86, 154] -
identified by the numerous surveys that have been performed since, and are still to this day
ongoing [156, 231].
4.1.1 Sampling strategy
To obtain sufficient material for detailed analysis, multiple sampling visits were made to the
Fukushima Prefecture region of western Japan. Consideration was given to ensure as best as
possible that a wide-range of samples were collected from across the entire fallout-affected area.
In order to fully analyse the spatial and depositional trends of the radioactive fallout, samples
were taken from a variety of depositional settings, e.g. forested areas, valley floors and roadsides.
To minimise/negate the impact of both naturally-occurring and legacy contamination species from
compromising the sample set, the material for analysis consisted of organic substrates found
more than 1 m above the ground. Bulk samples selected for analysis were those that showed
elevated levels of radioactivity when examined using a hand-held Geiger-counter. Occurring as
natural "particle filters" due to their fibrous nature, these surfaces included; lichens, tree bark,
mosses and dead leaves. A number of highly-textured anthropogenic surfaces (or those where
radioactive material was witnessed to collect) were also sampled, these included concrete walls,
gutter/drainage networks, rooftops and air-conditioning intakes (from abandoned settlements).
Images of a selection of typical bulk organic samples are shown in Figure 4.1.
For organic substrate collection, a razor blade or metal spatula was used to gently loosen material
from the underlying surface before being removed using a pair of sterile disposable plastic
tweezers. A typical sample was approximately 3 cm × 3 cm. Additional sample material from
walls, roofs and drainage networks was collected directly using disposable plastic spatulas. Each
sample was then double-bagged, inventoried and a dose-rate measured before being securely
packaged and shipped back to the UK for analysis using a specialist hazardous materials courier.
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Figure 4.2: Locations at which atmospheric particulate-containing bulk samples were obtained.
Base-map from Geospatial Information Authority of Japan (GSI) [152].
Prior to sampling at each locality, permission was sought from either the property owner or
local official. Full protective equipment, including; FFP3 respirators, gloves and disposable
outer-jackets were used whilst undertaking sampling. Such precautions were emplaced owing
to the easily inhalable nature of this material [232] - consistent with precautions employed by
remediation operatives within the region [155].
4.1.2 Sample inventory
A large number of organic samples were collected over the multiple visits to Fukushima Prefecture.
The details of these samples are presented in Table 4.1, with the locations shown graphically
within Figure 4.2. Characteristics of each of these samples are further documented in Table 4.2.
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Ref. Location Town / City Latitude (°N) Longitude (°E)
1 Emataira Fukushima 37.724482 140.487234
2 Shimohiso Iitate 37.614174 140.708123
3 Okuma (I) Okuma 37.400413 140.950743
4 Okuma (II) Okuma 37.404197 140.971492
5 Kamiibuchi Date 37.797488 140.619856
6 Dai Minamisoma 37.604078 140.914587
7 Katsurao Futaba 37.512471 140.816988
8 Yamakiya School Kawamata 37.602655 140.676441
9 Kitaosawa Kawamata 37.545626 140.427948
10 Hirokuboyama Kawamata 37.580838 140.716738
11 Shiobite Namie 37.565656 140.796706
12 Odakaku Kanaya Minmisoma 37.553426 140.873597
13 Teramae Namie 37.491576 140.981855
14 Mukaihata Futaba 37.394940 141.004750



















Table 4.2: Characteristics of atmospheric particulate-containing bulk samples.
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4.1.3 Sample precautions and preparation
Resulting from the largely unknown elemental and isotopic composition of the atmospheric
material contained within the organic filter-type materials, a methodical and step-wise approach
to their preparation was employed.
As for any work in which radioactive material is handled, special sample handling and processing
procedures were required to comply with University of Bristol Health and Safety requirements.
Due also to the fine size of the radioactive particulate contained within the samples, further
care was taken to ensure any particulate was not inhaled during handling, thereby avoiding
any internal expose issue. It is widely accepted that material <2.5 µm also presents a range of
other potential health implications [233]. When not being analysed, all bulk samples were stored
double-bagged inside a locked, shielded container. During handling of the material, to produce a
sub-sample for particle isolation (Section 4.1.4), the radiation-controlled area was cleaned and
monitored prior to manipulating the sample to establish background levels of radioactivity before
being covered in multiple layers of a non-absorbent protective Bench-coat (VWR Ltd.). After
sample manipulation, the area was thoroughly monitored and cleaned as necessary to achieve
the formerly determined background.
For each of the samples, a new (sterilised) plastic spatula was used to extract a small volume
(approximately 0.1 g) of the sample material onto a filter paper disc. Using the spatula alongside
a pair of plastic tweezers, portions of the sample material exhibiting elevated count-rates
on a GM-counter were separated from the bulk. These sub-samples were placed onto a new
electron microscope pin-stub that had been ultra-sonically cleaned using acetone, HPLC grade
isopropyl alcohol and finally methanol. These sub-samples of the bulk material were adhered
to a microscope pin-stub using low elemental background Spectro Tab™ double-sided adhesive
carbon discs (TED PELLA Ltd.). Each of these pin-stubs was then placed within its own sealed
plastic sample tube to provide effective containment of the sample.
4.1.4 Particle isolation
A complete description of the methods used for the location of individual atmospheric particulate
material from within these sub-samples is included within Section 8.3.1, as well as extensively
within the aforementioned publication. This section also describes the isolation/manipulation of
these isolated particles for the subsequently applied analysis methods. Details of the compositions
of the particulate removed from these bulk samples are included in Chapter 7, with the subsequent
analysis of U composition fragments in Chapter 8.
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Figure 4.3: Location at which ejecta particulate-containing samples (CF-01) were obtained.
Overlain onto the air dose-rate map as of October 2014. From [234].
4.2 Ejecta material (>100 micron)
The second form of particulate material, termed ejecta material, was also analysed as part of this
thesis. This material consisted of fragments at least an order of magnitude greater in size than
the atmospheric material formerly discussed.
4.2.1 Sampling and extraction
The sediment and dust samples containing these larger fallout particles were collected close to
the FDNPP boundary (less than 2 km) in October 2014, during the fieldwork of Dr Yukihiko
Satou (Japan Atomic Energy Agency - JAEA). The two sampling locations for this material are
shown in Figures 4.3 and 4.4.
Identical to the sampling performed to obtain the atmospheric material, the bulk samples
containing ejecta material were those that displayed notably higher radiation intensity when
scanned with a hand-held radiation monitor. A series of ≈100 g samples were collected from these
plant-proximal sites to extract the radioactive particles they contained.
To isolate each individual sub-mm particle, a multi-stage autoradiography process was used,
the full details of which are presented in Onda et al., (2015) and Satou et al., (2016) [195, 235].
In summary; after an initial homogenisation of the clear plastic bag containing the bulk dust
or sediment, it was placed onto an autoradiography scanner (imaging plate - IP). After a brief
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Figure 4.4: Location at which ejecta particulate-containing samples (FT-13) were obtained.
Overlain onto the air dose-rate map as of October 2014. From [234].
exposure of only 5 minutes of the systems phosphor screen to the sample, only the most radioactive
regions within the sample were apparent - shown as small regions of local darkening when this
film was rastered by the systems detection laser. By hand, the areas not exhibiting radioactive
emission were removed - with this reduced sample being then rescanned before further division
and re-exposure were performed. When only a limited volume of material remained, an optical
microscope alongside a manipulation arm were used to remove these most-radioactive fragments.
Final confirmation of the radioactive nature of the material was made using a hand-held radiation
meter. These fragments were then secured onto a piece of adhesive Kapton™ film (DuPont Ltd.)
or an adhesive carbon disc for the advanced characterisation techniques discussed subsequently
in this work.
4.2.2 Sample inventory
The particles provided by Dr. Satou for analysis were sourced from two sampling sites during
October 2014. One group of samples (CF-01) were collected from the former Cambridge Filter
Company Limited (Location: 37.437662° N, 141.022131° E) to the north-north-west of the FDNPP
site. The second suite of samples (FT-13) were obtained from the west of the facility (37.471410°
N, 140.999804° E), further from its perimeter boundary (in Futaba Town), but from a region
shown to exhibit significantly higher levels of radiological contamination (than the sampling site
of CF-01) during the proceeding aerial radiation mapping surveys [234]. This study has focused
near-exclusively on the CF-01 particulate, which was observed to show a highly-complex external
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morphology, alongside being invoked to have resulted from the more-northerly trending reactor
Unit 1 contamination plume. Owing to the more spatially-limited extent of this plume, it has been
considerably understudied in comparison to the more spatially-extensive and greater magnitude
emission that is observed more westerly from the plant - invoked to have resulted from reactor
Unit 2 (Section 2.2.5) [2, 236]. The ability of the atmospheric material to become entrained in
such transporting air masses, in contrast to this significantly larger ejecta particulate which
would rapidly fall/settle-out of any entraining air mass, provides a mechanism to explain this











The results presented in this thesis were obtained using a wide-range of analytical equipment
and an extensive suite of physical samples. This chapter details the instrumentation used as well
as the specialist sample handling and preparation methods/steps.
To examine the surface, internal structure (morphology) and composition of fallout samples,
the analytical techniques applied typically involve subjecting the sample to high energy beams
of either electrons, ions or x-rays - with the resultant secondary signals being measured and
processed as part of the analysis (with the exception, however, of the "passive" γ-ray spectroscopy).
5.1 Gamma-ray spectroscopy (γ-spec)
The physics of γ-ray spectroscopy and the detectors employed during this work were described
previously in Section 3.1. The same detectors as those used during fieldwork were also employed
in the laboratory to undertake sample characterisation. Both detectors were solid-state (crystal-
based) and were manufactured by Kromek Ltd., the two units were:
• GR1 - a new-generation of semiconductor-type detector composed of Cadmium Zinc Telluride
(CdZnTe or CZT), 1 cm3 in volume. Operating at room-temperature, this detector has a
maximum throughput of 30,000 CPS across the energy range of 30 keV to 3.0 MeV (over
4,096 channels) and a high energy resolution of <2.5% Full Width at Half Maximum
(FWHM) at 662 keV [210].
• SIGMA-50 - a scintillator-type detector composed of thallium-doped cesium iodide - CsI(Tl).
Like the GR1, the SIGMA-50 operates at ambient temperatures but possesses a greater
total interaction volume of 32.8 cm3. More sensitive than the GR1 and therefore better in
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lower-activity situations, the SIGMA-50 has a maximum throughput of 5,000 CPS across
the energy range of 50 keV to 1.5 MeV (over the same 4,096 channels). The energy resolution
of this unit is considerably wider than the GR1 at <7.2% FWHM at 662 keV [209].
5.2 Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM)
The fundamental principle that determines the resolution at which an image can be obtained is a
direct consequence of the wavelength of the medium used to attain that image [237]. Due to the
shorter de Broglie wavelength of the electron (circa. 1 nm) compared with that of visible light
(400 nm - 700 nm) [238], the scanning electron microscope is able to produce images of material
surfaces with nano-meter resolution - whilst optical systems are unable to surpass length-scales
much below a micron.
Since their first invention in the early 1940’s ahead of widespread manufacturing commencing
around 1965 [237], considerable advancements have been made to the technology. Despite the
progression in electron source type, the general principle and configuration of the instrument
remains largely unchanged. The following sections describe the generation of the primary electron
beam, its interaction with the sample and the subsequent detection of a secondary signal -
including the information that this interaction can provide about the sample.
5.2.1 Theory
After the highly-focused beam of electrons exit the vertical column (described in Section 5.2.2)
it interacts with the sample in the area it strikes to produce five different detectable signals,
each originating at different depths from within the sample - up to ≈5 µm, (Figure 5.1) [239].
These interactions and the resultant emissions are detected by a number of different detectors,
installed within the SEM. Occurring at progressively greater depths are; Auger electrons,
secondary electrons, backscattered electrons, characteristic x-rays, continuous (Bremsstrahlung),
and cathodoluminescence (visible) light. The three most-studied emissions and those used in
the analysis in this thesis are secondary electrons (SE), backscattered electrons (BSE) and
characteristic x-rays (EDX), the interaction mechanism responsible for the generation of each is
shown in Figure 5.2.
The image resolution attainable by the SEM is further demonstrated in Figure 5.1. Combined
with the beam current; which controls the spot size and therefore the diameter of the surface
interaction, the accelerating voltage additionally determines the electron beams interaction
volume (depth penetration) that occurs. Although also largely dependent on the material, a
higher beam current and accelerating voltage will produce lower resolution and less surface-
sensitive images than if lower values for both parameters were used.
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Figure 5.1: Schematic of the various depths from which the different emission signals are
generated by the primary (incident) electron beam. Modified from [239].
Secondary electron (SE) imaging
When the high-energy incident electron beam collides with the electron cloud that exists at
the samples surface, inelastic scattering occurs as secondary electrons are ejected - with the
parent atom ionised as a result, (Figure 5.2 (a)). Due to the high kinetic energy of the primary
beam and the incomplete transfer of this energy to the secondary electrons, these electrons
possess only a fraction of energy of the primary beam (<50 eV), which itself loses very little in
comparison. Multiple low-energy secondary electrons can be generated and released from the
sample as a result of the collision cascade that occurs in the uppermost 10 nm of the sample. Due
to their shallow depth of this interaction, the influence of surface topology greatly influences the
generation of the secondary electrons. When rastering the electron beam across an area of the
surface, it is possible to generate a grey-scale (secondary electron yield) image of the sample that
depicts its fine-scale topography.
Backscattered electron (BSE) imaging
Whereas SE imaging relies on measuring the ejection of excited secondary electrons from a sample,
backscattered electrons are the result of the re-emission of the same primary incident electron
back out from the sample. Instead of colliding with an atoms electron (and resultantly ionising
the atom), if the high energy incident electron of the primary beam is "scattered" back out of the
sample upon interaction with the atom’s nucleus, then it is termed to have been "backscattered"
(Figure 5.2 (b)). The size of the nucleus being impinged will determine the amount of backscatter
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Figure 5.2: Schematic of the three principal electron beam producing signals; (a) secondary
electrons (SE), (b) backscattered electrons (BSE), and (c) characteristic x-rays (EDX).
that will occur, with larger nuclei (great atomic number) producing more electron scattering.
These backscattered electrons are characterised by an escape energy >50 eV and originate from
depths of approximately 1 µm. Resulting from the varying amounts of backscatter that occurs
from different mass atoms, such backscattered electrons provide an imaging method that is
highly sensitive to the sample’s composition and is ideally suited to identifying high Z-number
elements/particles (e.g. U and Pu) contained in a low Z-number background.
Energy dispersive x-ray (EDX) analysis
Originating from depths deeper than both secondary and backscattered electrons (circa. 2 µm),
characteristic x-rays (or EDX) provide quantifiable compositional information relating to the
elemental make up of the sample (Figure 5.1). Upon interaction with the primary electron beam,
a secondary electron is ejected, resulting in a production of valency (electron vacancy) that is
rapidly filled by an electron relaxing from a higher energy orbital (Figure 5.2 (c)). This demotion
of an electron to a lower energy state yields a surplus of energy which is released in the form of
an x-ray. The x-ray will have a characteristic energy specific to the electron orbital and therefore
the atom from which it originated. With electrons ejected from all atomic shells, there exists a
characteristic energy spectrum for each element.
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Figure 5.3: Schematic of a field emission gun (FEG) scanning electron microscope column.
Modified from [240].
5.2.2 Experimental instrumentation
Electron generation and beam control
Although able to attain highly-detailed images with nanoscale resolution, the principles behind
the operation of an SEM are inherently simple. At the top of the column, electrons are generated
in a concentrated beam and accelerated down the column, passing through a number of focusing
lenses to be electronically rastered over the sample’s surface - a schematic is shown in Figure 5.3.
The entirety of an electron microscope is held under a vacuum (of varying levels) to allow for
the uninterrupted primary electron beam to travel through the system to the sample while also
allowing for the various secondary signals produced to be transmitted and detected without
(significant) losses. As is typical of most modern instruments, the source used to generate
the incident electron beam is a field emission gun or tip (FEG). Through a process known as
"tunnelling", a sharp (<50 nm) chemically etched tip, typically of W coated in a 5 nm thickness
of zirconium oxide, is strongly biased with a high negative potential (-9 kV) while a nearby
alternately charged anode is used to strip (draw) electrons away in order to produce the initial
(unrefined) electron beam [239].
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Figure 5.4: Schematic of the detectors installed within the Zeiss SIGMA™ HD SEM, showing
their position relative to the lower portion of its optics. Modified from [240].
The acceleration of this beam down the column towards the sample then occurs, where it is
focused and shaped using a condensor lens before passing through the desired physical aperture,
milled into a Pt film. This selection of apertures both refines the beams size (and hence the beam
current) incident onto the sample as well as removing any stray electrons that remain after
passing through the large condensor lens. Magnetic objectives (and for this instrument a "beam-
booster™") are used to further refine and accelerate (or decelerate in some circumstances) the
beam [240]. Scan coils and magnetic lenses positioned near the base of the column control both
the rastering of the electron beam over the samples surface, and also its stigmation (roundness).
An electrostatic lens at the very base of the column serves to further refine the electron beam.
Signal detection
To analyse the sample, the emissions that are produced following the primary electron beams
interaction must be detected and quantified. A schematic of the detector setup installed within
the electron microscope used for this PhD research is shown in Figure 5.4.
Secondary electrons
The secondary electrons (those with energies less than 50 eV) are detected using a standard
Everhart-Thornley detector [241]. By applying a low bias voltage (+300 V to -300 V) to a grid
across the front of the detector, the higher energy (backscattered) electrons are not attracted - in
contrast to the secondary electrons, which having entered the detector, are rapidly accelerated by
a high bias voltage (circa. 15 kV) to a scintillator detector. After impacting the scintillator near
the front of the detector, photons are produced which then travel along the detectors cylindrical
light-guide towards a photomultiplier. This photomultiplier then amplifies and converts the
photon signal into an electronic one, allowing for an image to be constructed [239].
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An Everhart-Thornley detector, however, cannot operate outside of a high-vacuum environment.
To detect secondary electron emissions within a reduced-vacuum, a Variable Pressure (VP)
detector is alternatively used (Figure 5.4). Rather than detecting secondary electrons, this system
detects the photons that are generated as a result of the ion cascade when electrons collide (and
ionise) residual gas molecules within the microscopes chamber. A greater volume of water, air
or nitrogen in the chamber results in an increased likelihood of such collisions and therefore an
enhanced signal [240].
Backscattered electrons
To detect the higher energy (>50 eV) backscattered electrons, an Everhart-Thornley detector is
insufficient, due principally to the angle at which it exists - but also its bias grid [241].
Typical of backscattered electron detectors, the Carl Zeiss four-quadrant backscattered electron
detector (Four-quadrant CZ-BSD™) consists of a ring of silicon dioxide semiconductor pixels
located at the base of the electron column (shown in Figure 5.4). Identical to the means by which
characteristic x-rays are detected (detailed below), the detector uses the production of electron-
hole pairs within the material and their corresponding energies to generate a grey-scaled image.
A thin coating on the detector surface discriminates against lower energy electrons interacting
with the SiO2 detector by shielding their passage [240].
With backscattered electrons ejected near-vertically from the sample, the detector is positioned
horizontally - as a consequence, both sample tilt and topographic imaging are not possible
[239]. Unlike the Everhart-Thornley detector for secondary electrons, the backscattered electron
detector can operate in low-vacuum/environmental modes.
Characteristic x-rays
The characteristic x-rays that are produced via the interaction of the electron beam with the
sample are analysed via energy dispersive spectroscopy (EDS). To traditionally detect the emitted
x-rays, a Peltier-cooled single-crystal of lithium-doped silicon (now increasingly replaced with
silicon drift detectors - or SDD) is used, shown schematically in Figure 5.5. When the incident
x-ray enters the crystal, its energy is absorbed through an ionisation event - leading to the
production of an "electron-hole" pair. By applying a high bias voltage to the contacts on either
side of the crystal, these hole and electron pairs are drawn to alternate faces of the crystal,
resulting in the production of an electrical signal pulse. This signal (pulse) voltage is directly
proportional to that of the energy of the x-ray that produced it, with a plot of this intensity (x-ray
energy) versus frequency constituting an EDS spectrum. This EDS analysis is quantifiable for
elements with an atomic (Z) number greater than Li. Cooling of the crystal is required to reduce
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Figure 5.5: Schematic of a traditional Li-doped EDS detection system, now more commonly
replaced with SSD-based units.
the electrical noise that would otherwise saturate the detectors counting electronics. Previously
undertaken cryogenically, it is now more typically performed via Peltier (thermoelectric) stages.
Operating alongside the beam control software of the SEM, the EDS system used in this study
was operated in three modes:
• Point: obtains a spectrum at a point (single or multiple) or a defined region of interest on
the sample surface.
• Line-scan: moving the beam along a pre-selected linear portion of the sample to determine
changes in elemental concentrations.
• Mapping: systematically rastering the beam over a user-defined region of the sample to
map an elemental (or phase) distribution.
Instrument
The instrument used during this work was a Zeiss SIGMA™ HD Variable Pressure (VP) system
controlled using the SmartSEM™ software. Attached to which was an Octane Plus™ Si-drift
EDS detector from EDAX (Ametek) Ltd., with control and data analysis performed via the
TEAM™ software platform. This software contained the necessary algorithms to undertake
the required ZAF (atomic number, matrix-related x-ray absorption, and internal fluorescence)
spectrum/compositional correction of the EDS results [242]. Also installed onto this instrument,
within the microscope chamber, was an MM3A™ Micromanipulator from Kleindiek GmbH [243].
Capable of movement steps of the systems fine needle in increments of mm down to nm, the usage
of this manipulation system and the SEM instrument are detailed extensively in the subsequent
experimental chapters.
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Figure 5.6: Schematic illustration of the interaction of a primary ion beam with a surface, with
resultant secondary emissions.
5.3 Focused Ion Beam (FIB)
Focused ion beam (FIB) instruments entered commercial manufacturing approximately a decade
after electron microscopes, with their development employing liquid metal ion sources (LMIS)
pioneered in the work of Seliger et al., (1979) [244]. Unlike an SEM, a FIB uses ions, typically
Ga+ [245], although other ions are becoming increasingly widely utilised (e.g. He+, Ne+, Xe+ ,and
Ar+). Due to their greater mass (and size) than electrons, the incident ion beam has a greater
kinetic energy, therefore is destructive and is subsequently used for removing small volumes
(nm3 to µm3) of material from a surface to "mill" a section often with a smooth, damage-free face
to investigate a samples interior structure.
5.3.1 Theory
Like an SEM instrument, a FIB must also operate under a vacuum for the primary beam to travel
unimpeded to the sample as well as for the secondary emissions generated to be detected. Through
a mechanism near identical to that of an SEM, the incident ion beam bombards the samples
surface, with the interactions (elastic and inelastic) and ionisations, resulting in a cascade of
a range of secondary particles - including secondary electrons and ion fragments (Figure 5.6) [246].
Of the range of material ejected, the "lightest" portion - the secondary electrons, can be detected
as per a scanning electron microscope to obtain an ion-contrast image of the sample. The other
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Figure 5.7: Schematic of a focused ion beam column. Modified from [250].
(heavier) ejecta species consist of neutral atoms or charged ions. These charged secondary
particles can be detected and analysed (a technique known as secondary ion mass spectrometry
- SIMS, to determine isotopic composition), or used in surface etching, material deposition or
for ion-implantation [247]. This implantation (Figure 5.6) is desired within some applications
(i.e. semiconductor fabrication doping [248]) but is an undesirable artefact in the compositional
analysis of an ion beam prepared sample surface. Owing to its versatility, the FIB instrument is
a widely utilised tool within materials science and wider industry [246], principally as a method
through which to prepare samples for further analysis - the primary being transmission electron
microscopy (TEM).
5.3.2 Experimental instrumentation
Ion beam generation and control
With a similar setup to an SEM, the schematics of a FIB column are shown in Figure 5.7. Like
an SEM, the instrument is held under a vacuum to allow for the production of a highly-focused
beam and to permit for its passage all the way to the sample’s surface. Unlike an SEM, however,
the ion beam formed at the top of the column is obtained from a liquid metal source [245, 249].
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Such a LMIS is formed of a filament of the high melting point element tungsten, that is connected
to a microscopic source of solid Ga metal. By applying a high voltage between the source and the
nearby extractor (heating the Ga metal), a Taylor cone is formed, with the metal "flowing" to the
filaments tip [251, 252]. This high-voltage (approximately 8 kV) results in the generation of an
electric field, with the ionisation and subsequent emission of the Ga+ ions [253].
After the release of Ga+ ions, they are accelerated down the instrument column through a
number of components to focus and refine the beam (Figure 5.7) [245]. After passing through
the first set of Einzel lenses (which control the resultant beam current by applying a voltage
between plates through defining a magnetic field), there occurs both physical apertures to define
the beam size as well as an assembly to "blank" the destructive beam from further progressing
down the column without having to suspend source emission. A magnetic assembly consisting of
a quadrupole and an octopole (or two octopole magnets) are then used to manipulate the beams
stigmation as well as raster the beam onto the sample. A final set of Einzel (plate) lenses act to
finally focus and refine the incident ion beam.
As for an SEM, by increasing the current of the beam - greater degrees of sample interaction
occur. Described more comprehensively within Section 5.3.3, at low beam currents (pA), good
quality sample imaging is possible without significantly degrading the material’s surface by
material removal. Using higher beam currents (nA), however, results in the extensive milling of
the sample - with greatest extraction (removal) rates at the highest attainable beam currents
(approximately 20 nA).
Signal detection
The signals detected within a FIB to yield an image of the sample are the same as those for SEM
imaging. Upon interaction of the primary ion beam with the surface, secondary electrons are
ejected alongside a range of other particles (Figure 5.6). These are detected using a side-mounted
Everhart-Thornley detector.
Instrument
The instrument used during this work was an FEI Helios™ NanoLab 600i DualBeam system,
controlled using the FEI NanoLab™ software interface. This system incorporated a vertical FEG
electron column with a coincident side-mounted Ga+ ion source allowing for the simultaneous
ion-milling and electron beam imaging of samples. Like the Zeiss SIGMA™ HD SEM, both an
EDS detector (XMAX™ 50 mm2 from Oxford Instruments Ltd.) was installed onto the instrument
for compositional analysis of samples as well as a Kleindiek GmbH MM3A™ Micromanipulator
[243] - used extensively in the in-situ preparation of TEM (foil) samples (Section 5.3.3).
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5.3.3 Sample fabrication
The primary use of the FIB instrument during this work was the ion beam sectioning of samples.
A further use centred on the related preparation of thinned TEM foils. A sequence of steps was
performed to produce a high-quality surface suitable for both imaging and compositional analysis.
To protect the surface of the region of interest from the highly-damaging ion beam, a thickness
of Pt (approximately 0.5 µm) was first deposited at low beam currents of approximately 90 pA,
and 15 kV accelerating voltage. For the succeeding bulk material removal, a high-energy (2.7
nA - 6.5 nA, and 30 kV) stepped ion beam cut was used - ending some distance from the desired
final vertical surface. A series of progressively reduced ion beam energies were then used to
remove progressively smaller volumes of material and any "curtaining" artefacts produced from
proceeding high-energy sectioning, gradually approaching the desired final vertical (cut) surface.
5.4 X-ray analysis
Existing at the higher energy portion of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum, x-rays were famously
first discovered by the German physicist and mechanical engineer Willhelm Röntgen at the end
of the 19th century, using a simple cathode-ray tube setup [198]. Over the last 100 years, however,
considerable advancements have been made in x-ray generation and associated x-rays optics -
allowing for better-focused, higher energy and more intense (brighter) x-ray beams to be attained.
Owing to the wide range of analytical techniques that employ highly-penetrating x-rays to probe
a sample, applications extend out into the medical, aeronautical and materials research fields.
During electron or light microscopy analysis of a sample, only the outermost surface of a material
can be studied. The application of penetrating x-rays, however, allows for the three-dimensional
visualisation of a sample that would only be possible through destructive FIB sectioning.
Consisting of electromagnetic radiation, x-rays are formed of transverse waves with perpendicular
electric and magnetic component vectors, like all other forms of radiation that exist as part of the
EM spectrum. While some debate exists, x-rays are classified as having wavelengths (λ) between
0.01 nm and 10 nm, an energy (E) of 100 eV - 100 keV, and frequencies (f ) of 3×1016 Hz - 3×1019
Hz. A further division between "soft" (<5 keV) and "hard" (>5 keV) x-rays also exists.
5.4.1 Theory
When x-rays are incident onto a solid sample, one of three phenomena may occur; (i) absorption,
or scattering, which can be subsequently described as either, (ii) coherently (elastically), or
(iii) incoherently (also known as Compton scattering). These phenomena are the result of the





If the energy possessed by the photons of the incident x-ray is absorbed by the electrons of the
sample, then the transmitted (outgoing) x-ray will exhibit a lower energy (and longer wavelength).
If the atom is ionised, then the interacting (impinging) photon will cause the ejection of an
outer-shell electron. Existing briefly in a state of surplus energy, the atom will return to its stable
ground-state configuration through the emission of a photoelectron alongside the demotion of a
higher energy electron into a lower energy orbital (this mechanism is the same as for radiation
detection, described formerly in Section 3.1).
Coherent (elastic) scattering
During this interaction mechanism, if the electrons orbiting the atoms of the sample oscillate
at the same frequency as the electric field of the incident x-ray (photon), then simultaneous
acceleration and deceleration of these electrons will occur. These electrons will resultantly emit
x-rays at the same wavelength and frequency as the incident beam. With no energy being lost as
a result of this interaction, it can also be termed elastic.
The term coherent arises from the way through which the scattered photons interact with
one-another, emitted as spherical waves away from the centre of each atom. When each of these
waves are "in-phase" with one another, constructive interference results - producing a greater
wave amplitude. Out of phase waves, in contrast, result in destructive interference. It is this
constructive interference produced by the surface of a crystalline solid that results in the signal
analysed through x-ray diffraction (XRD).
Incoherent (Compton) scattering
While coherent (elastic) scattering results in the complete transfer of incident photon energy
- with the emission of a photon with the same wavelength and frequency, during incoherent
(Compton) scattering, however, kinetic energy is lost in the photon-electron energy transfer. This
results in the emission of a photon of lower energy (and correspondingly longer wavelength).
5.4.2 X-ray Fluorescence (XRF)
As a consequence of the multiple electron shells (and sub-shells) that surround an atom (e.g.
K, L, M and N), numerous characteristic emission peaks exist, each occurring at discrete energies.
To generate this fluorescence emission from a sample, the incident x-ray beam must exist
at an energy greater than the ionisation energy of that atom [239], an energy of 20 kV is typically
used to excite atoms up to and including the actinides. For the detection of a fluorescence (photon)
signal as the incident x-ray beam is translated over the sample, solid state detectors (over older
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gas-filled units) are typically employed - with single-crystal Si-drift detectors used extensively
in both laboratory and synchrotron-based studies. Identical to detector systems used for EDS
analysis, the energy of the incident (ejected) photon, absorbed by an atom within the detector
(and transmitted through the crystal) is directly proportional to the charge output by the detector.
5.4.3 X-Ray Tomography (XRT)
Whereas serial FIB sectioning combined with electron imaging and EDS analysis represents
one method through which to derive information about the internal form and composition of a
sample [250], it is not only destructive but possible only on relatively small sample volumes. Such
three-dimensional visualisations are potentially unrepresentative of the bulk sample material.
Rather than using electrons or ions, x-ray computed tomography - typically referred to as x-ray
tomography (XRT) has become an established and highly-versatile technique through which to
non-destructively study the microstructure and composition differences within samples [254].
To generate a three-dimensional XRT rendering, the sample is positioned within a collimated
x-ray beam, in front of a solid-state x-ray detector/camera. Owing to the previously described
absorption phenomena, a change in the intensity ratio of the x-ray transmitted through the
sample will occur due to its interactions with regions of different density within a heterogeneous
sample. Microstructural features (of low density) such as cracks, pores and voids within the
sample will display significantly less attenuation than regions composed of solid (denser) material.
By rotating the sample through 180° (or 360°), the two-dimensional radiograph images (slices)
from each projection can be computationally rendered to yield a volumetric reconstruction of the
entire sample [254].
A property central to XRT is the materials linear attenuation coefficient (µ), which is employed
within the Beer-Lambert Law (Equation 5.1), where I0 = incident beam intensity, I = transmitted
beam intensity, and x = sample thickness. The linear attenuation coefficient is a function of the
energy of the x-ray beam in addition to the density of the material and atomic (Z) number. Such
coefficients have been determined for a range of materials, compounds and mixtures [65].
I
I0
= e(−µ · x) (5.1)
Alongside both the x-ray source and detector, all tomography instruments include a rotating
stage to accurately position the sample through the full range of orientations. Combining
accurate positioning of the sample with better-focused x-rays and greater numbers of radiograph
projections (employing increased computing power) has allowed for the spatial resolution attainable
via both lab and synchrotron-based XRT to increase significantly, to voxel (pixel) resolutions of
below 10 nm [255].
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Figure 5.8: Schematic representation of a typical XAS spectrum (at the Rh K-edge), illustrating
the pre-edge, absorption edge, XANES and EXAFS regions. Modified from [257].
5.4.4 X-ray Absorption Spectroscopy (XAS)
Owing to the intricate energy-dependent behaviour associated with an atoms atomic structure,
inter-atom bonding and coordination chemistry; x-ray absorption spectroscopy (XAS) permits
for the fine-scale differences associated with an elements absorption edge to be examined [256].
Despite such an atomic property having first been observed in 1918 and quantified in the years
that followed [257], it was the mainstream usage of XRD as well as the absence of synchrotron
facilities to offer XAS analysis that led to its usage being dwarfed by diffraction studies.
Contrary to XRD, XAS does not require a long-range crystallographic order to attain a signal,
being able to determine the atomic ordering of a material irrespective of its chemical or physical
state [258]. This spectroscopy method provides details of the inter-atomic spacings (up to an
atom-atom separation of 5 Å), the oxidation states as well as the number and type of the atoms
that surround the central, absorbing atom (its coordination environment). The ability to finely
tune the incident x-ray energy allows for XAS to be a highly-selective technique, permitting
the analysis of the state of individual elements within a sample. Alike to other x-ray analysis
techniques, XAS relies on the photoelectric effect (described with respect to radiation detection in
Section 3.1.1), resulting from the ejection of a photo-electron in response to an x-ray stimulus.
Unlike previous x-ray techniques, however, a double-crystal (typically Si) monochromator is used
to precisely vary the energy of the photons incident onto the sample across a user-specified energy
range. When this energy is equal to an atoms core-shell binding energy, a marked rise in the
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energy absorption occurs (shown graphically in Figure 5.8), with the production of the absorption
edge. Such edges are observed for each of the core electron sub-shells [256]. Centred around this
rapid rise in absorption, the XAS spectrum can be divided into three separate regions; pre-edge
(of limited use), x-ray absorption near edge structure (XANES) and extended x-ray absorption fine
structure (EXAFS).
The Pre-edge is the energy region immediately proceeding the absorption edge and is the
least-informative of all the regions, whereby the impinging photons do not possess the energy
required to induce an ionisation event. These photons do, however, have sufficient energy to cause
the excitation of a low-energy 1s electron into a vacancy within a higher energy orbital. Only
information pertaining to coordination chemistry on the very local scale (<3 Å) from the excited
atoms can be obtained from this portion of the spectrum [257]. As a consequence, this portion of
the spectrum is seldom examined.
5.4.4.1 X-ray Absorption Near-Edge Structure (XANES)
At energies immediately above the sharp absorption edge (up to approximately 30 eV above the
peak), occurs the region defined as the XANES. This region is representative of the photoelectron
transitions into various unoccupied, higher energy bound (but not continuum) states [198]. As
a consequence, XANES is indicative of chemical bonding, in addition to the absorbing atoms
oxidation state [257]. This is important in the current work, for example, defining the oxidation
state of U in an unprovenanced sample to invoke its likely origin.
5.4.4.2 Extended X-ray Absorption Fine Structure (EXAFS)
Extending into the higher energy portion of the XAS spectrum, the EXAFS incorporates energies
from 30 eV up to 1,000 eV above the absorption edge (Figure 5.8) [198]. At these higher
energies, the promotion of the photoelectron into the higher energy continuum band is observed.
Representing greater separations (distances) from the absorbing atom, the EXAFS portion of
the XAS spectrum is independent of the influences contained with the XANES region (chemical
bonding). EXAFS conversely provides information on the atoms coordination number, interatomic
spacings as well as details of the host material structure and order/disorder [257].
5.4.5 X-ray sources and experimental instrumentation
To attain x-rays for use in experiments, two types of source exist; either laboratory-based or the
larger, higher fluence and greater resolution synchrotron sources. During this study, both forms




Despite being significantly smaller than synchrotron sources - therefore producing considerably
lower source intensity, otherwise termed flux (photons per second); modern laboratory-based
systems are capable of providing not only highly-focused x-rays for sample analysis but also
tunable energies, often over ranges exceeding those available at synchrotron facilities [254, 259].
X-rays are produced in a laboratory system using x-ray tubes - with the resultant radiation
being highly monochromatic (of a single wavelength) [260]. Through accelerating, under vacuum,
electrons from a high-temperature and high-voltage cathode towards a positively charged anode
(typically composed of W, Mo or Re), interactions occur to yield x-rays with a discrete energy
spectrum (dependent upon this anode "target" material). The primary mechanism (≈80%) by
which x-rays are produced, is via Bremsstrahlung (or "Braking") radiation [260]. As a fast electron
emitted from the cathode approaches the nucleus of the target metal anode, it is slowed, with this
loss in energy resulting in the emission of an x-ray photon equal to that energy. If an electron,
however, interacts with the targets nucleus, then a characteristic x-ray is produced (Section 5.2.1),
with these x-ray energy peaks superimposed onto the energy continuum of the Bremsstrahlung.
Zeiss Xradia-520 Versa™
Laboratory-based XRT was performed using a Zeiss Xradia-520 Versa™ x-ray microscope - a
photograph of which is shown in Figure 5.9. With a true spatial-resolution of <700 nm, a minimum
attainable voxel of 70 nm is possible on the instrument [261]. Samples were positioned onto the
instruments three-axis rotational stage and irradiated with a collimated x-ray beam produced
by a micro-focus Mo x-ray source at incident energies of up to 160 kV. Transmitted x-rays were
detected and quantified using a Zeiss high-efficiency x-ray detector mounted behind the sample.
One of twelve source filters is used to tune the energy spectra of the incident beam by removing
low energy tails (via attenuation).
A user-defined step-size of the stage is selected to achieve the appropriate level of spatial
resolution in the desired time-frame with appropriate exposure times to 1 second - 40 seconds.
The level of detector, sample and source separation is also tuned to facilitate the desired spatial
resolution (increased beam divergence occurs at larger separations). Control of the microscope
was undertaken using the instruments Scout-and-Scan™ control software, with the associated
XM3D-Viewer™ software used to render and visualise the results in the instruments native
"Xradia" data format.
107
CHAPTER 5. EXPERIMENTAL METHODS
Figure 5.9: Schematic of the Zeiss Xradia-520 Versa™ x-ray microscope - both source and
detector are shown fully-retracted. The yellow dashed line represents the path of the x-rays from
source to detector (left to right).
Niton™ 950 Field X-ray Lab (FXL)
Whereas the Zeiss Xradia Versa™ is able to derive the internal structure of a sample, it is unable,
however, to determine compositional information beyond discriminating high and low atomic
density materials. The Niton™ 950 Field X-ray Lab (FXL), in contrast, is able to attain a bulk
XRF elemental breakdown of a material. Consisting of a Ag x-ray (anode) tube, the system can
quantify x-ray emissions up to 60 keV (25 keV in this work) using four overlapping energy sweeps
(main, low, high and light range) before employing one of a number of in-built peak fitting and
identification algorithms (e.g. "Soil", "Mining" and "TestAll Geo"). Over a 240 second acquisition
period, a stated limit of detection less than 5 ppm (2 ppm for U) was attainable for most transition
metals and rare earth elements [262]. The analysis of spectra obtained using the instrument was
performed through the Thermo Scientific Inc. NDT™ software.
5.4.5.2 Synchrotron
The synchrotron source used in this work was the Diamond Light Source (DLS) in Harwell,
Oxfordshire, UK. As a third generation synchrotron, using insertion devices as well as traditional
bending magnets to produce synchrotron light, the facility is classified as "medium-energy", with
the production of a 3 GeV beam. In contrast to laboratory x-ray sources, the light produced
by synchrotron facilities is 10 orders of magnitude brighter (more intense), as well as being
highly-collimated - with typical fluxes at the DLS of 2×1012 photons per second (at 10 keV) [263].
A labelled schematic of components of a third generation synchrotron, such as the DLS, are
shown in Figure 5.10 [263]. To produce the intense synchrotron light, electrons are accelerated
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Figure 5.10: Schematic of the component parts of a third generation synchrotron facility such as
the Diamond Light Source. Modified from [263].
to relativistic velocities before being manipulated using powerful magnetic arrays. After being
first produced via the heating of a high-voltage cathode maintained within a high-vacuum ((1) in
Figure 5.10), the electrons are accelerated down a 10 m linear accelerator, or LINAC (2), where
their energy is increased from 90 keV to 100 MeV using a succession of radio-frequency (RF)
cavities. These electrons are then injected into the near-circular booster ring (3), where additional
RF cavities and hexapole magnetics focus and accelerate the electron beam up to 3 GeV. Having
reached this energy, the electrons are then injected as discrete, equally spaced "bunches" into the
562 m circumference storage ring (4), where further magnets and RF cavities focus and curve the
electron beam (5). Whilst circular in appearance, the DLS is, however, comprised of 24 straight
sections separated by curved (bending) sections - all of which is maintained under ultra-high
vacuum (×10-11 mbar) to prevent against loses from collisions with residual air molecules.
X-rays are produced at synchrotrons from the orbiting electron beam using either one of two
methods: bending magnets and insertion devices - consisting of wigglers and undulators (6).
Bending (dipole) magnets are used to curve the electron beam around the synchrotron ring but
are also used to produce a broad spectrum of synchrotron light (from x-rays to infra-red). The
more advanced insertion devices are conversely located on the straight sections of the storage
ring. These consist of arrays of opposing magnets that surround the orbiting electron beam -
producing more intense light over bending magnets. By modifying the separation of the magnets,
the energy of the x-ray beam can be tuned. Experiments at synchrotrons are conducted at various
end-stations or beamlines, each established for specific experimental conditions. After being
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Figure 5.11: Schematic of the I18 beamline optics setup. The distances quoted are referenced
from the beamlines undulator. From [263].
generated, the x-ray beam passes through the beamlines optics cabin (7) where focusing and
tuning occurs before it enters the experimental hutch (8). Control of the experiment is performed
in the beamlines control cabin (9), protected from the scattered radiation field inside the hutch.
In this thesis, two different beamlines at the DLS were employed - both using insertion devices
(undulators) to generate the x-ray beam. Micro-focus spectroscopy and x-ray fluorescence were
conducted on beamline I18, whilst further fluorescence imaging, as well as x-ray tomography,
was performed on the I13-1 (coherence) beamline.
I18
Following the production of the initial x-ray beam using a 2 m in-vacuum undulator located
within the storage ring, the x-ray beam undergoes extensive focusing before reaching the sample.
A schematic of the I18 setup is shown in Figure 5.11. After passing through an initial aperture,
the beam is then focused in the horizontal plane using a Rh-coated Si mirror, before progressing
onto a liquid nitrogen-cooled double-crystal Si[111] monochromator - defining the energy (2.05 -
20.5 keV) of the resulting beam. The second set of mirrors serves to provide harmonic rejection
of low-energy noise before being directed onto the sample using Kirkpatrick-Baez (KB) mirrors
after passing through a final set of slits [264].
The resultant x-ray beam has dimensions and a spatial resolution of 2 µm × 2 µm, with a
typical flux of 2×1012 photons per second. A core energy range of 5 keV - 15 keV permits the
analysis of most elements, including Cs and the actinide elements [260, 264].
110
5.5. MAGNETIC SECTOR-SECONDARY ION MASS SPECTROMETRY (MS-SIMS)
Figure 5.12: Schematic of the I13-1 (coherence branchline) optics setup alongside the
neighbouring imaging branch. The distances quoted are referenced from the beamlines
in-vacuum undulator. From [263].
I13-1
The initial x-ray beam is again attained through an undulator (although canted), like I18.
However, the I13 beamlines (I13-1 and I13-2) are the longest at Diamond, with the experimental
stations located 250 m from the source [265]. As a result, the coherent (strongly in-phase) nature
of the source and resultant x-rays can be exploited. Dependant upon the experimental setup,
a spatial resolution identical to I18 can be achieved over an energy range of 4 keV - 19 keV.
A similar array of apertures and slits, as well as a water-cooled Si[111] monochromator, are
employed on the I13-1 beamline shown in the beamline schematic of Figure 5.12. Unlike I18, all
deflection optics are installed in the horizontal plane to maintain the coherence of the source.
Final focusing of the x-ray beam (flux = 7×1014 photons per second) is achieved using either
Kirkpatrick Baez (KB) mirrors or Fresnel (plate) lenses (termed "focusing optic" in Figure 5.12).
5.5 Magnetic Sector-Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometry
(MS-SIMS)
Contrary to studying the outer electronic structure of an atom, spectrometric techniques, of
which Magnetic Sector-Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometry (MS-SIMS) (herein referred to as just
SIMS), represents a powerful tool to analyse a materials isotopic composition - via its mass
(m)/charge (z) ratio. To derive a mass spectrum of a sample (a plot of abundance vs. m/z ratio),
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it must first be ionised - therefore all forms of mass spectrometry are destructive, consuming
a portion (or entirety) of the sample material. Whereas other techniques utilise laser-ablation
or dissolution (aqueous) chemistry to generate material/for material introduction, SIMS uses
a highly-focused primary ion beam. This magnetic sector SIMS instrument differs from other
time-of-flight systems, whereby a magnet is used to separate ions of differing m/z ratio, rather
than recording the duration of their flight time down an accelerator tube.
Regardless of the type of mass spectrometry system, each instrument comprises three core
components: a mechanism through which to generate ions, a mass analyser to differentiate the
ions based on their m/z ratio and finally a means through which to detect this range of ions.
Despite the first experimental SIMS instrumentation being developed during the mid-1930’s
[266], it was not for another thirty years that the first commercialised instruments were produced
[267, 268] and employed, for both routine elemental and isotopic analysis. Unlike the surface
analysis afforded by EDS, SIMS is advantageous in being extremely surface sensitive, as well
as providing isotopic data, with the signal produced resulting from the uppermost few nm of
the material. This data can be used to derive not only a simplistic mass spectrum of the sample
to reveal its composition but depth profiles through several 10’s of nm to a couple of µm of a
sample’s surface can be achieved, in addition to selective ion surface mapping.
SIMS can be sub-divided into two types: static or dynamic. The lesser-used, static method
employs a lower energy primary ion beam (usually pulsed) to sputter material from the sample’s
surface. This method is only readily utilised in the characterisation of monolayer samples,
where the surface is of uniform composition and limited sample etching is required. Dynamic
SIMS, in contrast, uses a considerably higher energy incident ion beam, and as a result is far
more destructive. This method allows for a greater sample volume to be analysed, down to ppb
concentrations. Because of the ability to study a greater, three-dimensional, sample volume - this
method is hence referred to as dynamic [269].
In addition to the implantation of the primary ion beam into the sample’s surface at depths
of up to 10 nm (depending upon the incident energy) [269], a range of other surface processes
occur to produce complex ion emissions and uncertainties for the subsequent analysis of the
derived spectrum. One of the greatest factors to introduce complications during SIMS analysis is
the ion yield achieved from a sample’s surface. This yield, defined as the number of secondary
ions successfully sputtered, ionised and detected, depends upon a number of factors, and results
in yield differences over several orders of magnitude [269]. The principal factors include the
element’s electron affinity (for anion-forming species), its ionisation potential (for cation-forming
species) in addition to influences such as those attributable to local-scale chemical variations in
the sample and also primary beam interactions with the secondary ions [269].
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Local-scale compositional variation may also introduce what are termed matrix effects [268].
These interferences are produced when the secondary ion yield from one species is affected
(generally increased) by the presence of an additional species within the material. Species
responsible for this enhanced secondary ion generation are reactive species such as oxygen or
the halogens (positive-bias SIMS) and the alkali metals (negative-bias SIMS) (detailed within
Section 5.5.2). Surface topography is a further factor to influence secondary ion generation (and
detection) due to a combination of inconsistent or inhomogeneous surface sputtering, alongside
potential re-absorption or shielding of emitted ions by the materials surface features. In practice,
this limits the data reliability of depth profiles up to approximately 20 µm.
Like all other mass spectrometric methods, SIMS is capable of determining the isotope ratios
within a material - rather than just the elemental composition. Difficulties arise with such
techniques, however, in separating species (e.g. oxides and hydrides) that occur with the same
total atomic mass. This is highlighted in the mass spectrometry of uranium, whereby the many
isotopes of uranium (234U, 235U, 236U and 238U) can occur alongside a range of uranium oxide,
hydride and hydroxide compositions in what are termed isobaric interferences. Contributions
from other elements within the Periodic Table further serve to complicate routine analysis -
with smaller ions summing together to equal the masses of larger isotopes [268, 269]. Alongside
numerous O2- and H+ interferences for U masses, the potential occurrence of Pu within a sample
presents mass attribution issues for SIMS - with the mass at 239 amu representing both 239Pu but
also 238UH. The careful setup of the instrument can, however, remove or significantly reduce these
influences [246]. Modern inductively coupled plasma-mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) instruments
now employ collision-cell technology to react-out undesired species before the ions reach the
detection portion of the instrument [270]. As this technology relies on the carrier plasma (typically
Ar) to permit for these reactions to occur, such cells do not exist for SIMS systems.
5.5.1 Theory
With an ion beam used as part of standard FIB sample preparation to investigate a material’s
internal composition and morphology (Section 5.3.1), SIMS utilises the associated secondary ion
ejecta to determine sample composition. A typical MS-SIMS instrument can be broken down into
a number of core components, shown schematically in Figure 5.13.
Standard for most analytical equipment is the vacuum system, with the operation of any SIMS
instrument performed under ultra-high vacuum (UHV) levels, at pressures lower than ×10-6
mbar. This reduces the likelihood of primary and secondary ions being removed through collisions
with any residual air molecules and hence increases the systems detection efficiency. In order
to easily maintain such a high vacuum level within the system, and protect against potential
113
CHAPTER 5. EXPERIMENTAL METHODS
Figure 5.13: Schematic of the custom-built MS-SIMS used in this work. From [271].
system and specimen contamination, an entry chamber is used to load the samples, and evacuate
them to a suitable transfer pressure before admitting them into the main analytical portion of the
instrument, without having to repeatedly expose the entire system to atmosphere. The samples
are transferred onto a multi-axis stage for analysis.
There exist multiple ion sources to produce the primary ion beam used for SIMS analysis.
These can fall within three categories; (i) gas-phase sources (O- and Ar+), (ii) surface ionisation
sources (Cs+) or the more common, (iii) liquid metal ion sources (LMIS) (Ga+). The selection of a
LMIS source is typical for dynamic-type instruments due to the high sputter-rates that can be
achieved. After being generated, arising ions and ion clusters must then be extracted, focused
and accelerated towards the sample. The primary optics used to achieve this are identical to
those within a FIB column, as described in Section 5.3.2 and represented schematically within
Figure 5.7. After sputtering the sample, secondary ion extraction occurs using a bias formed by
an electric field to draw charged particles away into the systems mass spectrometer - of which
a magnetic sector is used in this work. Before this, however, an energy filter is used to remove
undesired ion species and improve the resolving power of the system [269]. At the end of the
instrument are located the detectors of which there are multiple types - typically operating within
a pulse-counting mode to detect the signal generated by single ions. In addition to Faraday cups,
the most commonly used detectors are electron multipliers (EM) - of which the channeltron-type
detector is the most common [269].
All of this instrumentation is controlled using a dedicated, combined data acquisition, control
and evaluation system. Typically one or more computers serve to control the various instrument
components as well as record, plot and process the arising data.
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5.5.2 Experimental instrumentation
Instrument
The instrumentation used during this work was custom-built at the University of Bristol.
Consisting of an FEI Ga+ LMIS source to produce the primary ion beam, typical parameters of
25 keV accelerating voltage and 3 nA beam current are used. Beyond the ion source, a Vacuum
Generators 7035 double-focusing magnetic sector mass analyser was used to screen the secondary
ion products. Typical of mass spectrometry instruments, results of this instrument are reported
as atomic mass units (amu), in Da or u.
To initially locate the region of interest (RoI) on a sample, an SE image is acquired using
the instruments Everhart-Thornley SE detector. Within this instrument, an operational vacuum
of better than 5×10-7 mbar is maintained at all times to ensure sufficient secondary ion yield.
Prior to Ga+ ion beam exposure, the sample is first biased with a high voltage of ±4.5 kV. This
user-defined bias polarity determines the proportions of either positive or negative ions that are
generated by the incident beam.
Instrument control, data acquisition and analysis
With the instrument having been constructed in-house, the entire control software for the system
was also produced specifically for this application, written by Dayta Systems Ltd. Three methods
of operation were possible, depending on the desired results; (i) mass spectrum, (ii) depth profile,
and (iii) ion mapping. The acquisition of a mass spectrum was performed initially in each instance
to quantify the instruments mass calibration and confirm the surface composition. Depth profiling
or ion mapping followed once a general knowledge of the sample was attained.
During the generation of a mass spectrum, an area of the sample is rastered by the primary Ga+
ion beam. The m/z ratios of the ejected secondary ions are screened by the magnet (sweeping
through the user-specified m/z ratios), before being analysed downstream. As alluded to previously;
at increased m/z ratios, there exists a greater number of ionic combinations through which
it is possible to form each of the mass peaks. This results in peak broadening across the
spectrum, with the instruments curved magnet unable to efficiently discriminate between the
heavier ions and molecules. To reduce this peak width, permitting for different masses to be
distinguished/separated, therefore attaining an enhanced mass resolution, the size of the physical
apertures (or slits) located before and after the magnet were reduced. By refining the size of these
slits, while the quality of the spectrum is enhanced - the total signal is reduced.
The destructive nature of SIMS can be employed for investigating compositional variations
through depth profiling. After selecting an area of the sample and a number of masses of interest
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(five for this instrument), their secondary ion concentration is measured as the primary beam
etches through the material. If the etch rate of the material is known, then it is possible to
convert from this ion count rate to etch depth. This etch rate is a function of the total area etched
(nm2), beam current (nA) and ion yield (s-1), shown in Equation 5.2.
etch rate = sputter rate × beam current
scan area
(5.2)
Sputter rates (the thickness of material removed from the surface) vary from less than 1 nm s-1
to 5 nm s-1, yielding 5 - 15 secondary ions per primary ion [268]. Whilst typical of most materials,
factors such as the primary ion beam current, the samples composition and the materials
crystallographic orientation all influence the rate at which secondary ions are generated. A
computational approach to predicting sputter rates (alongside ion-ion interactions within matter)
can be derived using The Stopping Power and Range of Ion in Matter (SRIM) software [272].
A highly-visual representation of sample composition can be produced using ion mapping. By
rastering the primary beam over a micron-sized region of interest, the SIMS instrument is set up
to detect a single atomic mass unit (ion or molecule), with the signal intensity (brightness) at
each pixel scaled to represent the concentration of that ionic species. The distribution of multiple
ions can be studied whilst repeatedly rastering the sample - detecting the contrasting mass units.
A three-dimensional compositional rendering can also be derived by repeatedly rastering/etching
through the sample.
5.6 Experimental methods summary
As detailed in this chapter, each of the different analytical techniques employed as part of this
thesis allows for contrasting information on the form, structure and composition of a sample to
be determined. In isolation, the information gained from a single technique does not contribute to
the complete characterisation of a sample. Hence, this multi-technique and sequential approach
permits for a more extensive sample evaluation - facilitating the inter-technique correlation of
both results and hypotheses.
To ensure that the precious particulate samples examined during this thesis were analysed
to their fullest extent, non-destructive characterisation methods were first performed (and
exhausted) - prior to any destructive methods, deemed worthwhile, were employed. It is only
as a result of the cutting-edge techniques available both at the University of Bristol and other
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6.1 Introduction
Beginning on the 12th March 2011, and continuing over the succeeding six days, an estimated
520 PBq of radioactivity was released from the FDNPP [119]. Despite estimates that 80% of this
material was dispersed eastwards into the neighbouring Pacific Ocean [39, 150], such a combined
activity represents one of the largest ever on-land contamination release events from a nuclear
facility (behind the 1986 accident at Chernobyl) [236].
Over the days and weeks after the release, the shorter-lived radioisotopes that comprised the
majority of the release inventory, including; 131I, 133I, 129mTe, 132Te, 136Cs and 133Xe rapidly
decayed into stable species (Table 2.1) [119]. Consequently, the current radionuclides responsible
for the detectable γ-ray radiation across the affected Fukushima Prefecture (and the source to
the extensive decontamination effort) are the two longer-lived, high fission product yield isotopes
of Cs - 134Cs (t1/2 = 2.065 years) and 137Cs (t1/2 = 30.17 years).
As presented in Chapter 2, the primary land contamination exists as a plume extending north-
west from the FDNPP, a result of the radioactive release from reactor Unit 2 on the 15th March
2011 [153]. This radioactive plume extended for 50 km, approaching (but fortunately not reaching)
the densely-populated Fukushima City [85], the capital of the Prefecture with a population of
over 300,000 [152]. This contamination, although decreasing in its activity with distance from
the FDNPP, was observed to have occurred as a homogeneous covering across typical local-scale
survey sites [85], with such measurements supported by the modelling undertaken by Malins
et al., (2016) [273]. Since the accident, numerous mapping surveys, conducted using a range
of mapping systems and carrier platforms, have been undertaken under the Japanese Nuclear
Regulator (NRA) Comprehensive Monitoring Plan [63]. A detailed review of Prefectural and
regional mapping was provided by Saito and Onda, (2015) [64].
In addition to the vast number of regional and site-specific contamination monitoring surveys
[57], there has also been a considerable volume of work assessing the behaviour of radiocesium
within the environment. As well as being densely populated with a large land-use dependency,
the Fukushima region is typified by high mean annual precipitation and extensive volcanogenic
topographic variation [31, 151, 236]. These factors have resulted in studies modelling the
transport and fate of Fukushima-related Cs in soils [137, 274–276], as well as within the larger
catchment-scale systems [277, 278]. This anthropogenic radiocesium represents a powerful means
to perform large-scale tracer experiments, where environmental transport cycles in sub-tropical
zones can be studied - applicable for the assessment of residence times and associated transport
rates. Following its initial application by Rogowski and Tamura (1965) [279], Walling et al.,
(1991) [280], used the radiocesium input into the environment as a consequence of the Chernobyl
accident to investigate soil erosion across arable land across the UK.
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During September 2011, Typhoon Roke (one of many typhoons to impact the region annually),
mobilised a total of 10.08 TBq of radiocesium within the Abukuma Basin as suspended particulate
material. This output represented close to 2% of the total input into the catchment [277].
Studied extensively following the Chernobyl accident, the behaviour of ionic Cs and its high
sorption affinity with ion exchange minerals (e.g. clays such as Illite and Montmorillonite) has
been well-characterised [167, 168, 281]. As an ionic species, it is observed to become strongly
sorbed onto the highly-reactive frayed-edge sites of such microscopic clay and mica-type minerals,
with the formation of inner-sphere complexes, whereby Cs is strongly-bound and difficult to
remove. It is therefore readily transported under fluvial conditions, bound to colloidal clay and
mica (mineral) material. [280, 282, 283].
The similarity, in addition to the physio/chemical nature, of the soil profile across the majority
of Fukushima Prefecture (including areas close to sites in this study) has been reported in the
work of Konoplev et al., (2016) [284]. Following from the work of Rosen et al., (1999) [285] ,
who observed a high degree of Cs absorption within the typical soil horizons surrounding the
Chernobyl reactor site, Konoplev et al., concluded that a higher partition-coefficient (Kd) was
typical for Fukushima soils. At 1 - 2 orders of magnitude greater than that of Chernobyl soils, this
elevated Kd value was attributed to the high radiocesium interception potential (RIP) - a result
of the soils higher clay component (in part also a consequence of the glassy and highly-insoluble
nature of the fallout [191]). This high soil clay component results from the volcanically-derived
terrain of Fukushima Prefecture [151], in contrast to the thick sedimentary sequences of poorly-
compacted clastic deposits that constitute the Chernobyl region [286].
Despite what has been shown to be highly-mobile contamination, remediation of the affected
regions continues, via methods detailed within the Japanese Ministry of the Environment
Decontamination Guidelines [60]. However, the overall effectiveness and value of this current
work in manually reducing the dose-rate to below 20 µSv hr-1 to allow for re-population has been
questioned in several works [287–289], all of which cite the remobilisation of material or input
derived from additional long-term sources as challenges to remediation targets.
Forming a baseline from which to quantify the level of contamination that has occurred, Abe et
al., (1981) [290] undertook an extensive nationwide radiological survey during the late 1970’s.
Advancing previous dose-rate estimations by sampling at localities representing every 100,000
inhabitants (approximating to a 30 km2 mesh) through a hand-held survey-meter, the work
assessed influences of both sub-surface geology and atmospheric fallout. Whilst identifying
marginally-elevated dose-rates in south-west Japan, a mean national dose-rate of 0.097±0.013
µSv hr-1 was determined, marginally less (at 0.090±0.013 µSv hr-1) across Fukushima Prefecture.
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Such dose-rates corresponded to an annual dose of 0.8 mSv (<25% of the UK average [221]).
As discussed formerly in Chapter 2, with the total cost of both the land remediation and disposal
of the radioactive wastes generated estimated at between ¥2.55 trillion and ¥16.0 trillion [203],
the cost-effectiveness of these actions has been questioned in achieving a permissible dose-rate.
This high-cost per unit dose-rate reduction for differing types of radiologically contaminated site
has been detailed in the numerous works by Yasutaka and co-workers [199, 203, 287].
These works highlighted the combined influences of the Fukushima topography and meteoric
conditions (sub-tropical precipitation) alongside the highly mobile nature of the contamination,
in re-contaminating remediated sites. Compounded by this analysis, such large-scale stripping
of areas located on or close to valley floors is increasingly viewed as futile, with contamination
promptly replenished onto these remediated sites from the bordering slopes and forested areas.
A more pragmatic approach to this decontamination effort would be based on that employed
during "traditional" nuclear reactor decommissioning [204], where a comparable radionuclide
activity is encountered. Termed "delay (entry) and decay" - this method involves waiting for
periods of approximately 30 years (although this can be as much as 50 years) from the shutdown
of a reactor to allow for the short and medium-lived (mostly γ-ray emitting) species to decay into
stable species. Only once this period has passed will full-scale decommissioning commence.
This approach is currently being implemented as part of the UK’s ongoing decommissioning of
its fleet of legacy Magnox reactors, and could also be utilised in the Fukushima remediation. In
the case of Fukushima, as well as allowing for the similar decay-related reduction in the total
radioactivity, a delay before the commencement of remediation/a break from current activities
would permit for the downwards movement of a large volume of the radiocesium contamination,
ahead of the onset of the costly clean-up program. As a result, not only would the dose experienced
by the operator be reduced, but also the total volume of contaminated wastes generated.
6.2 Aims
The work detailed in this chapter sought to investigate site-wide variations in radiological
contamination as a result of material transport, as well as focusing on assessing the impact of
remedial works on formerly contaminated sites and the success in reducing radiation levels. This
was undertaken through the application of the newly developed low-altitude UAV alongside the
ground-based mapping platform. Through which, an increased spatial-resolution over former
aerial methods was possible in addition to affording the ability to survey locations formerly
inaccessible to human survey personnel.
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Using the results of these surveys to identify regions of elevated activity, targeted sampling could
be undertaken to identify material for subsequent, laboratory-based, analysis.
6.3 Survey methods
At each of the five sites, each subsequently described, a radiological survey was performed using
either the ground-based or the UAV radiological mapping platform. A full account of the methods
and calibrations for each of these systems was detailed previously in Chapter 3. Both the GR1
and SIGMA-50 detectors were used, with the calibrations undertaken to allow for the CPS output
of each detector to be converted to a meaningful unit of dose-rate described in Section 3.1.2.
6.4 Survey sites
The sites investigated as part of this work were all located at the northern-western most extent
on the main north-west trending contamination plume, within the Exclusion Zone established
to contain Areas 1 and 2 [156]. All survey sites were located in Area 2 at the commencement of
the study, within 3 km of the border with Area 3 and the Restricted Zone - where habitation is
not permitted and residents will "unlikely be able to return (to their homes) for the foreseeable
future" [155]. In contrast to the Restricted Zone, following successful decontamination and dose-
rate reduction (to <20 µSv hr-1), the evacuation orders pertaining to each of these sites will be
removed [155]. An air dose-rate map of the region (from May 2014) detailing the locations of each
of the sites is shown in Figure 6.1, alongside the survey date(s) and the Area 3 northern-most
perimeter. Contamination following the March 2011 releases has been observed to be spatially
uniform in its extent [85], with the sites studied in this work receiving a total (homogeneous)
radiocesium deposition of 1 MBq m-2 - 3 MBq m-2.
6.4.1 Irikuboyama
(Latitude: 37.586248°, Longitude: 140.701586°). Comprising a strip of inclined farmland 200 m ×
50 m running north-south, formed from a series of smaller near-horizontal fields all of differing
size is shown in Figure 6.2, an aerial photograph of the site. Prior to the accident, the site was
used for rice production, with 30 cm wide irrigation channels bounding each of the smaller
sub-fields. To allow for farming, between each of the fields, cut into the hillside, were a number
of steeply-inclined (near-vertical) banks ranging from 1 m to 5 m in height (forming a terraced
or stepped appearance). The height difference between the northern extent (topographic high)
and southern extent (topographic low) of the site was approximately 25 m. At the time of the site
survey (May 2014), no remedial work on the site had been performed.
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Figure 6.1: Location of survey sites at the north-west extent of the main plume-line, alongside
survey dates, overlain onto the air dose-rate map as of October 2014. From [234].
Figure 6.2: Aerial photograph showing the location of the Irikuboyama site (date of imagery: May
2012), the survey area is highlighted (green region). From Google Earth™.
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Figure 6.3: Aerial photograph showing the location of the Iitate Village site (date of imagery:
May 2012), the survey area is highlighted (green region). From Google Earth™.
While capable of performing the survey during one UAV flight, due to the height variation over
the extent of the site, a number of smaller mapping flights were undertaken, modifying the
GPS-derived altitude for each flight. Every survey was undertaken with a grid-spacing of 2
m, a velocity of 1 ms-1 and above-ground heights ranging from 1 m - 10 m. The lighter GR1
γ-spectrometer was used - mounted onto the UAVs gimballed detection payload. As well as being
advantageous for aerial surveys due to its low mass, the GR1 was capable of operating in higher
radiation environments, where the larger volume SIGMA-50 detector would saturate [209].
6.4.2 Iitate Village
(Latitude: 37.614125°, Longitude: 140.708053°). Larger in extent than Irikuboyama, the site in
Iitate Village was dissected by both a small river trending east-west as well as a tarmac road -
entering the site from the north before crossing the river and bending to the west to run parallel
to the river, as shown in Figure 6.3. Across the site, there occurred differing fertiliser usage
between areas. Like Irikuboyama, this site (and much of the rest of Iitate Village) had not received
any remediation during May 2014, however, prior to the second survey during October 2015,
remedial activity had commenced at areas of the site. During this decontamination, crops had
been removed alongside soil to a depth of 15 cm (as per the Japanese Ministry of the Environment
Decontamination Guidelines [60]). Extensive surface scrubbing was also undertaken.
Typical of much of populated Fukushima Prefecture, this site existed on the base of a valley
floor (500 m wide) bounded by parallel (forested) valley sides (200 m high). Aside from the 5 km
north-south trending coastal plain bordering the Pacific Ocean where the FDNPP is located, the
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region is typified by extensive igneous, metamorphic and sedimentary sequences - all extensively
faulted and deformed [151], providing such a rugged terrain and extreme topography.
Unlike the aerial survey at Irikuboyama, however, both mapping works at Iitate Village were
performed using the ground-based survey platform, with the miniaturised GR1 γ-spectrometer
attached. This ground-based method was selected (over aerial mapping) due to the strong wind
that occurred down the valley in which the site was located. Both surveys were undertaken by
the same operator - with the device held in their backpack, 1 m above the ground. As before, a
factor of 1.3 was applied to the data to correct for the influence of bodily-attenuation to derive a
corrected CPS value prior to converting this value to a more applicable dose-rate.
Resulting from the seventeen-month separation between surveys, numerous site features had
changed, the greatest of which is the initiation of remediation at portions of the site prior to
the latter October 2015 visit. Additional features of this Iitate Village site included a small
river, a tarmac-covered road (routinely washed during clean-up activities) and differing fertiliser
usage (prior to the accident). As such, this locality served as a powerful validation experiment to
quantify the dose-rate reduction between surveys potentially attributable in-part or entirely due
to; (i) radioactive decay, (ii) soil infiltration (depth attenuation) and, (iii) contaminant migration.
This was achieved through the selection of 14 arbitrary points located across the site from both
survey dates, representative of the various land uses and conducting the subsequently described
dose-rate modelling. From personal communications with the land-owner, the sole crop-type
produced across the site was identical (winter wheat) - having since become overgrown since the
radioactive release and resulting evacuation.
Decay-only modelling. As formerly discussed in Section 2.2.1, in the years after such a
radiological release incident, the principal radionuclides contributing to external dose are
radiocesium; the shorter-lived 134Cs (t1/2 = 2.065 years) and the longer-lived 137Cs (t1/2 = 30.17
years). These nuclides were produced following the FDNPP accident with a characteristic 1
to 1 (equal) activity ratio [50]. Because of such species dominance, contributions from other
radionuclides were considered insignificant and excluded from calculations as part of this study.
Both forward and back modelling of measurement values determined in May 2014 from the
14 on-site data-points was performed using a weighting factor calculation to account for the
difference in half-lives of 134Cs and 137Cs (28 years). The formula used for backwards activity
calculations is shown in Equation 6.1, with the forward modelling values obtained via Equation
6.2. In both, λ = the decay constants (yr-1) for either 134Cs and 137Cs, N0 = initial dose-rate, and
Nt = dose-rate at time (t) years.







Nt (Cs134+ Cs137) = N0 (Cs134) e−λ(Cs134)× t + N0 (Cs137) e−λ(Cs137)× t (6.2)
Depth attenuation modelling. Invoked by Malins et al., (2016) as the main mechanism
through which a reduction in air dose-rate is achieved alongside radioactive decay, is the
downward migration of radiocesium into the soil profile - with a resulting enhanced attenuation of
γ-rays with increasing radiocesium depth (burial) [273]. Values for Cs infiltration from a number
of studies undertaken across Fukushima Prefecture in the wake of the accident were used to
describe the Cs distribution within the soil profile [291–293], and are shown in Figure 6.4.
A mass attenuation coefficient (µ) from Hubbell and Seltzer (2004) [65], was used to describe
the associated attenuation that occurred at Cs γ-ray energies for soil compositions (silt, clay and
sand) described in the work of Teramage et al., (2014) [293]. The equation used to calculate the
theoretical dose-rate assuming losses from both radioactive decay and depth-related attenuation
(of May 2014 data), is shown in Equations 6.3 and 6.4. Where Nt (depth) = dose-rate at time (t)
incorporating depth-related attenuation, ∆ = the proportion (%) of radiocesium at depth x (cm), µ
= the linear attenuation coefficient (cm-1), and ρ = the soils bulk density (g cm-3) - also at depth
(x). The value of Nt represents the dose-rate at time (t) (in years), as determined previously for
the position in Equation 6.2.
With the sites crop type entirely uniform and therefore shown to not represent a factor through
which differential Cs fixation or soil penetration could occur, another factor that could produce
differences across the site may result from the differing application of fertiliser species (principally
K-based), resulting in ionic Cs-K competition within clay-type minerals. However, no such
compounds were applied to any portion of the site since May 2010 (personal communication with
land-owner) and can, therefore, be discounted as a possible influence on the retention of ionic Cs.
Extensive ploughing activities to homogenise the upper 45 cm of the soil profile have further
served to disrupt the occurrence of organic-rich horizons. It is these heterogeneous layers that
contribute to a reduction in Cs retention in a soil - comprising a proportion of the soil otherwise
constituted by clay-type minerals that would strongly absorb ionic Cs [294, 295]. This regolith
homogenisation (termed "soil-burying") is a common remediation strategy to reduce dose-rates
at agricultural sites across Fukushima Prefecture - burying the uppermost contaminated soil
surfaces below unaffected horizons [87, 296]. Despite not physically removing the Cs like other
remediation strategies, a dose-rate reduction factor of 2.3 is typically achieved through this
method. No ploughing, however, had been performed at the Iitate Village site since similar
agricultural ploughing in May 2010.
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Figure 6.4: Depth distribution of radiocesium within the soil profile. As determined in earlier
works [291–293].
Due to the universal crop-type, negligible fertiliser usage and extensive ploughing prior to
the accident (but not following the accident) - both the site and underlying soil characteristics
were considered to be consistent across the site.
Nt (depth) = Nt × depth attenuation f actor (6.3)
Nt (depth) = Nt × exp− (∆1 (µ1 · x1 · ρ1 ))+ (∆2 (µ2 · x2 · ρ2 ))+ ((...)) (6.4)
6.4.3 Yamakiya Junior High School
(Latitude: 37.60226°, Longitude: 140.676035°). Located the greatest distance away from the
centre of the plume than any of the other sites surveyed during this work, the Yamakiya Junior
High School (YJHS) site was the least radiologically contaminated [85]. Because of this, the YJHS
also existed as a JAEA study/test site for remediation strategies and as a result, had seen a range
of decontamination activities as of May 2014 [297]. Such actions included the removal of surface
material from the schools playing field, the removal of vegetation, clearance of gutters and drains,
in addition to the high-pressure washing/scrubbing of surfaces. An aerial photograph of the site
during early remediation in 2012 is shown in Figure 6.5, highlighting the rooftop survey area
investigated in this work. To evaluate the effectiveness of this roof clearance (where solar-panel
arrays had been installed prior to the accident), a UAV survey was undertaken (in addition to an
accompanying ground survey of the site, although not discussed in this thesis).
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Figure 6.5: Aerial photograph showing the location of the Yamakiya Junior High School site
(date of imagery: May 2012), the survey area is highlighted (green region). From Google Earth™.
Like the survey performed at Irikuboyama, a flight velocity of 1.0 ms-1 was used employing the
radiation mapping payload equipped with the GR1 γ-ray spectrometer. Unlike the survey that took
place at Irikuboyama, however, where post take-off, the flight was performed fully-autonomously,
here the whole flight was conducted using conventional hand-held remote controls. Hence, the
pitch of the roof could be mirrored at varying altitudes maintaining a 1.0 m separation throughout.
To compensate for this reduced height and therefore the smaller "circle of investigation" (Section
3.3.3), the grid-spacing was reduced from 2.0 m to between 0.5 m and 1.0 m.
6.4.4 Hirokuboyama
(Latitude: 37.581745°, Longitude: 140.716527°). In addition to being the largest of the sites
studied during this work, the former livestock farm at Hirokuboyama was the closest to the
north-western border with Area 3 and the Namie Town region. This boundary is shown in Figure
6.6, an aerial photograph of the site, detailing also the study area described in this work. As a
result of its closest proximity to the FDNPP site, it was the most heavily contaminated by the
accident out of all the sites mapped - receiving an estimated 3.0 MBq m-3 of radiocesium, with a
resulting total dose-rate of 15.0 µSv hr-1 in May 2014 [85].
As a location that was not only heavily contaminated but also extensive in size, a new method of
dose-rate reduction was trialled to negate against the requirement to otherwise remove extensive
volumes of contaminated surface material. With the exception of a small dwelling and a number
of farm buildings around its northern-most perimeter, the site consisted of flat open grassland
300 m × 300 m in size - bounded by thick forests to its south, with a steep hillside rising to its
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Figure 6.6: Aerial photograph showing the location of the Hirokuboyama site (date of imagery:
May 2012). The survey area is highlighted (green region), as is the position of the border with the
restricted Namie Town. From Google Earth™.
south-east. Approximately 30 of the now infamous 1 m3 waste bags had also been placed at the
entrance to the site, close to the location of the farm buildings.
For this experimental method of dose-rate reduction, the central portion of the site (an area 80 m ×
100 m) was covered by a 15 cm thickness of sand, with the remainder of the site left unremediated.
Being both the flattest and least obstructed of any of the sites, the entire site survey was
performed autonomously using the UAV with the GR1-equipped detector payload attached.
Monitoring was performed as a series of separate, overlapping flights due to the size of the
location. Typical of standard unmanned aerial surveys, a flight velocity of 1.5 ms-1 was used
alongside an altitude of 5 m and grid-spacing of 2 m to ensure adequate on-ground coverage.
6.4.5 Okuboiriyama
(Latitude: 37.592393°, Longitude: 140.700477°). A large number of storage sites exist throughout
Fukushima Prefecture to contain the contaminated materials removed from decontaminated
sites until final disposal facilities are constructed. One such facility - located on the site of former
rice fields is at Okuboiriyama, in the Yamakiya District of Fukushima Prefecture. An aerial
photograph of the study site and surrounding area is shown in Figure 6.7. After the original
top-soil had been removed, the site was covered with an impermeable polymer and covered with
a 10 cm depth of clean (imported) sand. The 1 m3 bags of contaminated soil collected in the
surrounding contaminated region were then stacked on the site. Surveyed in October 2016, this
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Figure 6.7: Aerial photograph showing the location of the Okuboiriyama site (date of imagery:
May 2012), the survey area is highlighted (green region). From Google Earth™.
site had been constructed, and was part-filled with waste material. The first bags installed at
the site were emplaced ten weeks prior to the survey - with a total of approximately 250 bags
having been positioned (up to three units high in places). Over the course of the lengthy process
of installing the waste bags, a temporary, impermeable material was used to protect the bags
against water ingress (and the resultant outflow of contamination).
To survey this site, the dual-unit ground-based mapping system was used - comprising the two
SIGMA-50 units mounted 1 m from the operator, again at a height of 1 m above the ground.
Owing to the specifics of the platform (detailed in Section 3.2.2), an increased separation of 2 m
was used - yet still providing a high degree of data-point overlap. In order to survey the entire
site, the operator walked both the ground that surrounded the waste material, as well as directly
on top of it. Resulting from the low radioactivity levels at the site, the more sensitive SIGMA-50
detector was used opposed to the higher throughput (yet less sensitive) GR1 detector.
6.5 Environmental transport of contamination
The γ-ray radiation detected within this study arose exclusively from radiocesium (134Cs and
137Cs). The ratios (activity and atomic) of 134Cs to 137Cs varied depending on the survey date,
decreasing with the decay of the shorter-lived 134Cs.
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6.5.1 Irikuboyama
Results of the aerial surveys conducted at the terraced farm site in Irikuboyama are shown in
Figures 6.8 (a) - (c). Owing to data obtained by the UAV containing information relating to both
its altitude (from the units onboard GPS) and its distance from a surface immediately below the
detection payload (from the single-point laser range-finder), a numerical subtraction of distance
from altitude allowed for a crude elevation model of the overflown surface to be constructed. A full
description of this method using the National Nuclear Laboratory (NNL) produced EnVi software
to digitalise the three-dimensional surface by combining both data-streams is included within
the previously published works [298]. This topographic surface is shown as an altitude heat-map
in Figure 6.8 (a) - agreeing with the in-field observations. The plots depict the decline in site
elevation from north to south - in addition to an elevated area along the sites western-most extent.
During post-processing of the results derived from the Irikuboyama test site, a number of
irregularities were observed within the data stream recorded by the range-finder (distance). These
anomalous laser returns (deriving both negative and extreme height values for the platform),
were identified to result from survey positions whereby differing thicknesses of water were
encountered - the results of subsequent laboratory tests are shown in Figure 6.9. The ns-pulsed
laser return from the water body is shown to occur from its surface, for water thicknesses of up
to 0.4 m, producing an accurate measurement of the platforms altitude (distance to a surface).
However, in situations where the thickness of the water is greater than 0.4 m, the altitude
determined by the UAV is shown to be highly-erroneous. This error is likely the result of the
increased scattering for within a larger depth of fluid [299], combined with the "piling-up" of the
various returns to the range-finder from the water and underlying surfaces.
To account for the small number of erroneous points within the resultant site topography model,
the nearest neighbour correction (smoothing filter) was applied. This correction replaced <0.5%
of the data-points from across the site, but succeeded in removing such spurious data points.
Translating Figure 6.8 (a) to generate a triangular irregular network (TIN) representing the
sites topographic surface, followed by overlaying the radiation map obtained by UAV produces
the three-dimensional radiation map shown in Figures 6.8 (b) and (c). From these two plots,
low levels of activity are seen across the higher western and northern portions of the site. In
contrast, elevated levels of radioactivity are apparent, distributed over the rest of the downwards
(southwards) sloping site, with highly-localised areas of increased radioactivity corresponding
to the irrigation (drainage) network. Forming a local sink of transported material, dose-rates
averaging 5.1 µSv hr-1 are evident at these points - above the site average of 4.5 µSv hr-1. Both
differ from the mean dose-rates at the northern and western portions of the site, of 2.8 µSv hr-1,
with local minimum values in these areas between 1.3 µSv hr-1 and 1.5 µSv hr-1.
130
6.5. ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSPORT OF CONTAMINATION
Figure 6.8: Results of the UAV survey at Irikuboyama; (a) height variation recorded across the
site, alongside (b) and (c), air dose-rate radiation map overlain onto this topographic data.
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Figure 6.9: Influence of water depth on range-finder return. Modified from [298].
With radioactive material having originally been deposited uniformly [85] - owing to both
overland and channel flow, extensive volumes of fallout Cs have since been re-distributed. This
movement correlates with the numerous studies on the form of Fukushima-derived radiocesium -
highlighting its affinity and significant transport potential when bound to the surfaces of clay
and mica-sized material [300–302].
6.5.2 Iitate Village
Results of the two radiation surveys at the Iitate Village site are shown in Figures 6.10 (a) and
(b) - obtained during May 2014 and October 2015 respectively. Shown in Figure 6.10 (a) also, are
the locations of the fourteen geo-referenced points. While no remediation had occurred prior to
the May 2014 survey, the influence of vehicular activity along the road dissecting the site, as
shown in Figure 6.10 (a), depicts a band of reduced activity with respect to the surrounding fields
- whereby contamination was likely removed upon adhesion to transiting vehicles. Also apparent
from the May 2014 data is the contrasting dose-rate north and south of the road and stream. A
site-wide activity average in May 2014 was determined to be 400 CPS (4.8 µSv hr-1), with the
lowest levels of contamination found on the road (2.9 µSv hr-1) - a 40% overall activity reduction.
The radiation levels in the southern field (site maximum) were determined to be 5.8 µSv hr-1,
unlike the northern fields where a dose-rate of 4.4 µSv hr-1 was measured.
An elevated dose-rate south of the road (and river) was similarly observed in survey results
from October 2015 (Figure 6.10 (b)). Identified in these results also, are the locations where
remediation work had commenced at the site, in addition to the area where this removed
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material was temporarily stored (identified as "Bail Store"). The site average 17 months later was
determined at 267 CPS or 3.0 µSv hr-1, with a similar disparity between northern and southern
fields - with dose-rates of 2.7 µSv hr-1 and 3.0 µSv hr-1 respectively.
The activities and calibrated dose-rates at the fourteen reference localities, derived from both
May 2014 and October 2015 are plotted in Figure 6.11. Also plotted are the values resulting
from both back and forward modelling of May 2014 values produced using Equations 6.1 and 6.2.
Location numbers are shown for the October 2015 data. From the average site-wide value of 398
CPS (4.8 µSv hr-1) in May 2014, backwards modelling calculations placed the total activity at the
Iitate Village site in the immediate aftermath of the release at 820 CPS (9.7 µSv hr-1). This level
is consistent with formal radiation monitoring results of 9.0 µSv hr-1 - 11 µSv hr-1 [85]. Forward
modelling of the May 2014 data to October 2015 yields a mean value of 323 CPS (or 3.4 µSv hr-1)
- a reduction over the 17 month period of 33%, this calculation, however, produced a greater value
than the average actually determined at the site of 3.0 µSv hr-1.
Shaded within Figure 6.11, identified amongst the data from the May 2014 surveys, are the
blue data-points, corresponding to the positions on the dissecting road. The activity measured at
these locations (reference 1, 2 and 3 on Figure 6.10 (a)) prior to any formal remediation, all plot
below the main clustering. The additional divergence of data between values measured and those
calculated to have existed in October 2015 are depicted by the spread of red data-points in Figure
6.11 - away from the anticipated (predicted) activities in black. A comparison of the measured
and calculated values from each of the 14 points for the October 2015 data is shown in Figure 6.12.
As highlighted in Figure 6.12, and apparent from the two maps in Figure 6.10, remediation
activities prior to October 2015 had contributed to dose-rate reductions at a number of locations
(9, 11 and 12) - as well as on the road (1, 2 and 3). Storage of this removed material at locality 10
had produced a contrasting activity increase.
Represented graphically in Figure 6.12, a dose-rate reduction is observed at other survey points
across the site beyond that ascribable only to radioactive decay or site remediation activities (4, 5,
6, 7, 8, 13 and 14). The results of modelling the γ-ray attenuation resulting from the infiltration
(burial) of radiocesium into the soil regolith at these seven positions are shown in Figure 6.13.
With the measured value only slightly below the calculated value at point 4, this position is
not subsequently discussed. At a number of points (5, 6, 13 and 14), the application of this
depth-related attenuation to the October 2015 calculated values yields results equatable to those
yielded by actual on-site monitoring - with reductions in intensity through the application of
this attenuation factor ranging from 10.9% to 15.5%. As such, the influence of Cs infiltration
can be viewed as the likely mechanism by which the dose-rate has been reduced. Despite this
mechanism contributing to appreciable reductions in calculated radiation intensity (allowing for
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Figure 6.10: Ground-based air dose-rate maps of the Iitate Village site obtained during, (a) May
2014 and, (b) October 2015. Modified from [103].
Figure 6.11: Calculated and measured activity levels (CPS and dose-rate) for the 14 points across
the Iitate Village study area. Modified from [103].
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Figure 6.12: Site reference point comparison between calculated and measured radiation levels
in October 2015. Modified from [103].
a comparison to physically measured values), lower levels of radiation, not rationalised by this
mechanism were, however, determined at other points - both positions 7 and 8.
Both of these survey points contrast to the majority of the other positions in their proximity to the
river - itself 1.5 m wide and within a 2.0 m incised channel. Points 7 and 8 are located 9 m and
13 m respectively from the rivers southern-most bank. With both surveys being performed using
the instrument maintained at 1 m above the ground, combined with the small size of the river -
no attenuating effects from the small volume of water contained within the channel are envisaged.
Typical of many environments, and especially one located within an area typified by typhoon-type
conditions [31], soil erosion and transportation (together with surface run-off and overland flow)
are prevalent as illustrated previously at Irikuboyama (Section 6.5.1). Following the deposition
and absorption of radiocesium onto fine-scale mica and clay-type minerals - its transport as
particulate (over a dissolved ionic species) has been determined in a number of studies [303–
305]. The extensive output of suspended Cs-containing material into the Pacific Ocean has
been reported in Yamashiki et al., (2014) [277] - exacerbated by the region weather conditions.
Consistent with these observations, this reduction in dose-rate is likely the result of the fluvial
transport of Cs-containing particulate - introduced following erosion of the contaminated banks.
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Figure 6.13: Comparison of October 2015 measured radiation intensity values with those derived
from forward modelling of May 2014 values, also shown are results of additional
depth-attenuation modelling of the May 2014 results. Modified from [103].
6.6 Environmental remediation
6.6.1 Yamakiya Junior High School
The maps depicting both the UAV flight path and radiation dose-rate from the airborne survey
at the YJHS are shown in Figures 6.14 (a) and (b) respectively. Despite the manual control of
the UAV during this work, in contrast to the survey at Irikuboyama (Section 6.5), the consistent
grid-line spacing of the survey is evident in Figure 6.14 (a).
Whereas extensive remediation had been performed on the buildings prior to the survey in
May 2014 [297], two regions of elevated activity are apparent. Even though these highly-localised
areas exhibit dose-rates of 0.75 µSv hr-1 and 0.8 µSv hr-1 - many times greater than the mean
radiation level across the remainder of the roof (of 0.3 µSv hr-1), such dose-rates are only one
third of those requiring remediation under the Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling
of Radioactive Pollution, instigated by the Government of Japan [155].
The contamination anomalies in this instance are associated with; (i) the location of a large
solar-panel array (installed shortly before the accident) - close to the apex of the roof, and (ii)
a drainage downpipe on the south-eastern corner of the roof. While following any remediation
of part of this Act, extensive characterisation is performed to ensure the removal of all traces
of radioactivity [60], the intricate nature and inaccessible nature of the solar panels, however,
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Figure 6.14: Results of UAV radiation surveying at the Yamakiya Junior High School, showing;
(a) the flight-path of the system and (b) height-corrected dose-rate map. Modified from [102].
presents difficulties in this final assessment step. The report by Miyahara et al., (2012) [296],
details the extensive contamination and remediation challenges surrounding drainage pipes
and sewage networks - where large source areas feed into/are pre-concentrated. Such areas may
therefore be easily omitted or hard to fully decontaminate.
An additional source of material, however, likely arose from the neighbouring forest on the
hillside to the east of the school. The influence of the regions extensive forests as a long-term
source of (particulate) contamination (and hence radiological dose) since the accident has been
the focus of a number of studies [289, 306, 307], with this site in Kawamata Town having been
left untreated to allow for the through-flow study, presented in Cresswell et al., (2016) [308].
In this study fallout material was shown to have been initially trapped by the highly textured
surfaces of leaves and bark, with the subsequent downwards redistribution resulting from wind
and/or rain, re-contaminating areas/sites/buildings once remediated.
Despite presenting only a minimal radiological hazard in this instance due to; (i) the isolated
nature and, (ii) the low activity of the contamination - the importance of not only ensuring
complete initial site remediation, but also performing continued site monitoring to determine the
extent of any contamination migration/recontamination is shown to be essential. Also further
demonstrated, is the ability of the system to resolve radiation anomalies at the meter-scale -
comparable to that performed through human monitoring, however, at localities inaccessible or
impractical for human operatives to study.
6.6.2 Hirokuboyama
In addition to the cumulative flight-path map of the airborne surveys - shown in Figure 6.15
(a), the resultant radiation (dose-rate) map of the site is presented in Figure 6.15 (b). Due
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to the sites large size, the total flight-path of the UAV is extensive - formed from a series of
20-minute to 30-minute duration flights, with irregularities in its path due to on-site obstructions.
Apparent from the radiation map of Figure 6.15 (b), are a number of elevated radiation intensity
features. To the north and west of the site (highlighted) were located two areas where surface
(stripped) waste material was stored, alongside dense forest around the southern boundary of the
site. While the UAV did not enter into the forest, the influence of contamination adhered to its
numerous physical surfaces is observed (as was the case at Yamakiya Junior High School). This
woodland represents a secondary radiation emitter, existing perpendicular to the radiologically
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Figure 6.16: Portion of the UAV radiation mapping survey from Figure 6.15 (b), showing; (a) the
path of a single flight and, (b) the height-corrected air dose-rate map. Modified from [102].
Observed also in Figure 6.15 (b), is an area at the centre of the farm where a considerable dose-
rate reduction exists. This local activity minimum corresponds to the location of the contrasting
method of remediation employed at this site. Whereas all other sites in this study were remediated
through the removal of material, at this locality, however, as previously stated a 15 cm thickness
of coarse sand was applied as a blanket directly over the contaminated land. A portion of the
survey flight over the transition that exists between the remediated (sand-covered) area and the
remainder of the uncovered field is shown in Figure 6.16, detailing in (a), the systems flight path,
and in (b), the resultant dose-rate map. The clear and rapid drop-off in activity, as determined
by the sub-meter resolution attained by the UAV is apparent, as is also shown graphically in
Figure 6.17. Over a distance of 10 m from A to B (Figure 6.16 (b)), a two-fold increase in activity
is measured - with an average dose-rate increase from 1.8 µSv hr-1 to 3.5 µSv hr-1. This increase
is observed around the entire area overlain by sand.
While this experimental remediation method has yielded a dose-rate reduction to levels below
those defined as sufficient under the Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of
Radioactive Contamination [155], at 2.3 µSv hr-1, this reduction is not as substantial as those
resulting from conventional decontamination methods. Similar to the ploughing of affected
agricultural fields, this strategy is advantageous in dose-rate reduction as it does not produce
material that requires final disposal, rather relying on the attenuation from the overlying
material. Hence, this method would be cheaper to administer.
Unlike "traditional" methods, this technique does not physically remove contamination from the
affected area - where it continues to exist distributed within the uppermost soil horizons, as such,
public acceptance is likely to be lesser than if the contamination were to be completely removed.
This strategy, although a rapid and low-cost means through which to "decontaminate" a large
140
6.6. ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION
Figure 6.17: Dose-rate variation outwards from the sand-covered portion of Hirokuboyama site,
between points A and B (Figure 6.16 (b)). Modified from [102].
area of agricultural land, does require greater upkeep over the succeeding years. The impact of
not providing adequate care and maintenance to this site was evidenced during a subsequent visit
in June 2017. With no actions undertaken to control plant growth beyond the deposition of sand
that occurred shortly before the May 2014 survey, extensive re-growth of plants had occurred.
Because of this, the dose-rate measured across the sand-covered portion of the site was identical
to that determined elsewhere across the survey site. This re-establishment of pre-remediation
dose-rates is likely the result of (sand) buried Cs becoming bound to plant surfaces, which have
grown through the covering sand layer. The study by Tanaka et al., (2012) [309], and Niimura et
al., (2014) [310], detailed the high level of Cs incorporation into the physical structure of such
organic material, and explains such an observation.
6.6.3 Okuboiriyama
Representing the final step within the extensive remediation process, the radiation map from the
1 m3 bags located across the interim waste storage site at Okuboiriyama, determined using the
ground-based dual-unit system, is shown in Figure 6.18.
Despite having only been placed onto the newly-prepared (and formerly contamination free)
site for a maximum of ten weeks, an apparent "plume" of contamination away from the known
(marked) position of the waste storage bags was observed. Whilst a dose-rate high of 2.5 µSv hr-1
was found at the location of the waste storage bags, dose-rates greater than 2.0 µSv hr-1 occurred
over a 100 m area to the south of the under-construction storage facility. This apparent movement
of radioactivity is consistent with the location and topography of the site, existing on a hillside,
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Figure 6.18: Air dose-rate map of the Okuboiriyama waste storage site. Identified is the location
of the area containing the bagged waste material, the direction of apparent contaminant
migration and also positions at which γ-ray spectra were obtained ((i) to (iii) in Figure 6.19). A
photogrammetry rendering, corresponding to the location of the waste bags, produced through
stitching overlapping aerial photographs is additionally shown.
with the site gently inclined to the south. While considerable care was employed to minimise water
ingress into the waste bags during the site’s construction, the eventual outflow of species under
hydrological conditions was likely to be the result of precipitation through-flow - subsequently
carrying radiocesium out either as an ionic species or associated with solid particulate. The
escape of fluids originally contained in the storage bags is an additional, potential source of the
highly-mobile radiocesium.
Following γ-ray spectroscopy of the storage bag heap and associated radioactive plume (Figure
6.18, points (i) and (ii)), the contamination signature was determined to be identical to the
other sites - comprised exclusively of 134Cs and 137Cs (Figure 6.19 (a)). Additional spectroscopic
analysis of the imported sand used to overlie the site (Figure 6.18, point (iii)), however, detailed
the existence of other, non-accident attributable, γ-ray emitting radioisotopes.
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Figure 6.19: Gamma-ray spectra from Okuboiriyama representing; (a) locations
containing/contaminated with radiocesium (positions (i) and (ii)), and (b) newly-imported sand,
(position (iii)).
Contrasting to the waste materials, the γ-ray spectrum of the uncontaminated "clean" sand
is shown in Figure 6.19 (b). While not containing any radiocesium, the spectrum shows the
emission peaks from 214Pb and 214Bi - isotopes within the uranium-series decay chain. This
sand is sourced from localities in neighbouring regions of Japan (personal communication with
remediation site manager), all of which contain a (small) natural uranium component [151].
Through the application of the γ-ray spectrum to activity conversion equation detailed in Equation
3.1, an approximate activity for a subsequently sampled volume of both the stripped (and now
stored) radiocesium-containing organic material and the imported sand could be quantified. This
collection of additional in-field γ-ray spectra was similarly performed (as per the aerial mapping)
using the hand-held GR1 miniaturised γ-ray spectrometer, however, employing a counting time of
30 minutes on a 1 kg mass of sample. The results of this analysis determined the Cs-containing
(bagged) wastes to exhibit an activity of approximately 27,300 Bq kg-1, with the sand showing an
activity an order of magnitude less at 2,570 Bq kg-1 (2.57 Bq g-1).
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While remediation activities continue to actively reduce dose-rates to below the prescribed
limits [155], the site-wide addition of sand at this particular site has conversely resulted in
the addition of radioactivity. Although the total duration of the uranium-series decay-chain is
many orders of magnitude greater than even the longest-lived Cs isotope (137Cs) [52] (with a
correspondingly lower activity), this addition of naturally-occurring radioactive material (U, Th
and K) contradicts with the governments goal of significantly reducing radiation levels across
Fukushima Prefecture. It should be noted, however, that this U decay-series containing material
is not only naturally-occurring [311], but has a γ-ray activity below levels deemed acceptable (in
the UK) [221].
6.7 Discussion
This chapter sought to apply two types of newly-devised radiation monitoring platform to
determine the time-resolved spatial extent, migration behaviour and environmental impact
of Fukushima-derived radiocesium at a number of analogue sites. These sites were characterised
as either having been remediated (or are in various stages of remediation) or having been
untouched since the March 2011 radiation release.
Through the high-resolution mapping results, at sites where little or no remediation had
occurred (Irikuboyama and Iitate Village), extensive contaminant transport was evidenced.
This movement of material away from an initially uniform radiocesium distribution to generate
markedly concentrated hotspots of radioactivity was seen to result from its readily-mobilised
nature, transported under the influence of water; a result of both precipitation and fluvial action
(in the case of Iitate Village). Material from Irikuboyama was observed to have travelled tens
or hundreds of meters in the three years post-release, with material from Iitate Village having
likely travelling tens of kilometres, feeding into the Pacific Ocean through the Abukuma river. As
shown in the numerous formerly described studies, with the radiocesium strongly bound to the
highly-reactive edge sites of clay and mica-sized particles, it is not only difficult for it to become
desorbed from its host colloidal sized particle, but also for this material to settle out from the
fluid that transports it - requiring near-still fluid transporting conditions.
Contaminant transport and reintroduction was also observed at remediated sites. The Yamakiya
Junior High School in Kawamata Town highlights the likely influence of material sourced from
neighbouring un-remediated areas, re-contaminating locations previously cleaned. This material
was likely mobilised by the wind, being further transported by rain - transport mechanisms
typical of the typhoon-type sub-tropical environment within which Fukushima Prefecture exists.
The extensive fluid-related movement has also caused notable migration at the Okuboiriyama
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waste storage site - a location established to contain material for the period prior to the instigation
of interim and permanent disposal facilities. At the time of writing, following the presentation of
these results to the company charged with the construction and maintenance of this storage site,
it has since been remediated. This remediation has seen the contaminated hard-stand sediment
replaced and the bag pile covered with an impermeable geo-polymer (with welded seams) to
prevent against water ingression.
6.8 Conclusions and implications for Fukushima
Both the newly-devised UAV and ground-based radiation detection systems have further proven
their ability to determine the spatial extent and isotopic composition of radioactive contamination
across a series of test sites. The units ability to monitor regions of interest with challenging/difficult
access, or those sites dangerous for human operatives to work (due to the risk of radiation
exposure) therefore represents significant advantages of these low altitude UAVs over "traditional"
human-based (ground) surveys methods.
The readily-mobilised nature of radiocesium, sorbed onto particle surfaces, has large-scale
implications for the distribution of residual radioactive contamination across the entirety of
Fukushima Prefecture. While a concern prior to the onset of remediation, the pre-concentration of
material and the production of highly contaminated "hot-spots" are of equal concern at sites where
remediation has occurred. There hence exists the requirement for the continued monitoring of
sites in the years after the main clean-up activities to fully assess the need for any supplementary
remedial actions. With a large number of both remediated and un-remediated areas across
Fukushima Prefecture alongside hundreds of tonnes of contaminated material, there exists a
significant challenge ahead for the Japanese authorities.
As has been shown in this work, UAVs represent a powerful tool for the radiological monitoring
of contaminated sites - especially those where accessibility for human operatives is a limitation.
Being autonomous, utilising a series of predefined way-points and altitudes, UAVs are able
to offer a repeatability that ground-based human surveys cannot simply match. Using UAVs
also results in theoretically no ionising dose being experienced by the operator. While primarily
advantageous from a radiation protection viewpoint, the impact of differing amounts of bodily
radiation attenuation by the operator (that would otherwise be incident onto the detector and
therefore require an intricate correction be applied), can be excluded.
Work as part of this study on the Okuboiriyama waste storage site highlighted the challenges
in providing a suitable, long-term storage facility for the contaminated material generated by
the remediation. With material observed to have leached from its original location after a period
of only ten weeks; when a longer-term facility is (eventually) constructed, both an improved
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containment design as well as continued care and maintenance of the facility will have to be
considered.
Having analysed the spatial extent and behaviour of the radiocesium contamination, more
"scientifically sensible" approaches to the current clean-up operations could be invoked - with not
only a reduced cost but also resulting in a lower radiation exposure to operatives undertaking such
work:
1. "Delay and decay". Assuming the contamination were to result exclusively from the γ-ray
emitting radiocesium, bound to fine-scale particulate - which itself is highly-mobile, then
one approach would be "delay and decay" (a technique associated with the decommissioning
of nuclear facilities [204]). After waiting for a sufficient period for; (i) natural radioactive
decay to reduce the total activity and, (ii) for particle-bound contamination contained within
the regions hill-sides to migrate to the valley floors - only one phase of decontamination
would therefore be required.
2. Do nothing. Again assuming the contamination were to result entirely from radiocesium
- immobilised as an ionic species by its sorption onto solid fine-scale solid particulate,
another (and considerably cheaper) approach would be to do nothing - allowing for the
dose-rate to reduce naturally. With dissolved Cs shown to exhibit only a limited toxicological
risk in comparison to other release species [179, 312], and with radiocesium having been
immobilised through its sorption to the surfaces of solid particulate, the element does not
represent a toxicity risk whilst in the environment via its biological uptake - rather a
radiological hazard.
Resulting from the majority of the contaminated (and currently habitation restricted) region
displaying dose-rates below those observed to occur naturally (Section 3.2.3), remediation
activities could be avoided in their entirety.
However, both of these more "scientifically sensible" approaches assume that the species responsible
for the contamination is the volatile and high-yield fission product of radiocesium. These
approaches, however, would not be valid if other species (e.g. actinides) were to exist as a













Nuclear reactor cores contain a range of materials with contrasting compositions and properties,
each serving to perform specific functions, including; (i) structural and shielding materials, (ii)
boilers and heat exchangers and, (iii) the physical (fissile) fuel and the associated control rod
material [35, 128, 174].
As discussed formerly in Section 2.2, with the majority of the work on nuclear fallout having
focused on the volatile fission products (principally radiocesium [313–315]) and to a lesser
extent that of several actinide elements [145], the environmental impact of particulate of other
compositions has yet to receive consideration within the peer-reviewed literature. While some of
this material potentially ejected from the FDNPP is radioactive, many of the reactor products are,
however, only very weakly or nominally non-radioactive. Despite not presenting a radiological
hazard, many elements and materials associated with the FDNPP pose an environmental concern
as a result of their chemotoxicity - as defined by the World Health Organisation [316]. The likely
micron length-scale of this ejecta material (if comparable to that of the emission material already
encountered) presents additional issues owing to its easily inhalable nature - consequently
resulting in respiratory issues if smaller than 3 µm in diameter [233].
Complications arise, however, with respect to the analysis of this non-radioactive particle analysis
owing to the number of additional anthropogenic sources from which this material could be
sourced. Extensive analysis has been performed on both trace and rare earth elements (REE)
encountered in the environment at sampling sites around the world; with the foremost number of
studies having been undertaken within Japan. These works have investigated anthropogenically-
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derived material incorporated into soils [317, 318], contained within meteoric precipitation
(rainwater) [319, 320], or entrained as aerosol particulate [321, 322].
In contrast to many European countries, the United States of America and Canada, the limited
available undeveloped rural and urban space suitable for development in Japan means that
nearly all waste (both industrial and domestic) is incinerated at a large number of plants, rather
than being directed to landfill [323]. Recent values placed on wastes generated by the Japanese
Ministry of the Environment [324] determined that 70% of all of Japan’s waste was incinerated,
with only 20% being recycled and 10% directed to landfill. This value is only marginally down
on the 74.3% reported by Sakai et al., (1996) [323], two decades earlier. During this period,
considerable advancements have been made in the efficiency of capturing the fly ash otherwise
released by the incineration process alongside the more efficient (complete high temperature)
combustion of the waste material [325].
Owing also to the strong manufacturing and technological industries located across Japan
and the surrounding Asian sub-continent (e.g. China, South Korea and more recently India),
alongside the limited environmental legislation to control emissions and wastes - aerosol-derived
particulate contamination has been witnessed to occur extensively across the region [326]. Much
of this particulate has been associated with the production of electronic components, or their
end-of-life recycling to recover the highly-valued REEs and other precious metals owing to the
record high prices that such elements currently command.
7.2 Aims
The work detailed in chapter sought to undertake a detailed examination of both the composition
and size distribution of high Z (atomic) number, micron-scale atmospheric particulate fragments
distributed across Fukushima Prefecture - potentially released as a consequence of the FDNPP
accident. With no prior studies having examined such a suite of non-active material, this work
sought to first establish whether material from the FDNPP existed within environmental samples
collected from different locations, alongside an analysis of any resulting depositional trends.
If the observed particulate was not able to be definitively attributed to result from the FDNPP
accident, an alternative source provenance was required to exist alongside additional (and as-yet





A full description of the sampling undertaken across Fukushima Prefecture is detailed in
Section 4.1, with site information presented in Table 4.1. To obtain the micron-scale atmospheric
material potentially released by the incident, naturally occurring organic substrate materials
were collected from positions above ground level. These bulk material samples consisted of
lichens, mosses, leaves and bark - a number of roadside sediment samples (informally termed
"black substances" [327]) obtained from within drainage channels, gutters and culverts were also
collected. Each was associated where elevated levels of activity were detected.
For sample analysis (detailed extensively also in Section 4.1), a small portion of each bulk sample
(approximately 0.1 g) was placed onto a low elemental background Spectro Tab™ adhesive carbon
disc (TED PELLA Ltd.), itself then mounted onto a standard SEM pin-stub. This bulk sub-sample
was then placed into the SEM and maintained under vacuum at better than ×10-5 mbar for two
hours to permit for sufficient sample out-gassing.
7.3.2 Sample classification
An initial characterisation of a bulk sample from each of the 14 sampling locations was obtained
prior to SEM analysis using γ-ray spectroscopy. To afford the best spectral resolution possible
(at a detriment to the total γ-ray energy range) the GR1 miniaturised γ-ray spectrometer was
used. To derive such a location-specific spectrum, a sample of approximately 10 g was placed
within a flat-bottomed (cup-shaped) sample container with the energies of the emitted γ-rays
recorded over a 4 hours counting period. A background spectrum with no sample present was also
obtained over the same collection period to permit for an appropriate background subtraction to
be performed - subtracting the background signal from that obtained from the bulk sample. The γ-
ray spectroscopy analysis presented herein was performed during November 2014, corresponding
to the passing of one half-life of the shorter-lived 134Cs.
7.3.3 Particle identification and analysis
The examination of the sub-samples after sufficient time held under vacuum was conducted using
a Zeiss SIGMA™ Variable Pressure (VP) SEM with attached EDS instrumentation (Octane Plus™
Silicon Drift Detector) and TEAM analysis software supplied by EDAX (Ametek) Ltd. Through
the use of the microscopes VP-mode, the negation of electron beam-induced sample charging
was achieved through the introduction of a nitrogen-rich atmosphere at low-vacuum conditions
(approximately 1×10-1 mbar). This setup removed the requirement for a conductive coating (e.g.
C or Au) to be applied to the sample - maintaining an "as collected" sample composition.
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Figure 7.1: Influence of atomic (Z) number on electron backscatter coefficient, calibrated for pixel
brightness across a range of accelerating voltages (5 kV, 7.5 kV, 15 kV and 30 kV) in the Zeiss
SIGMA™ HD SEM. Coefficient data obtained from [240].
During analysis, a consistent working distance of 9.5 mm - 10.5 mm in addition to an accelerating
voltage of 25 kV and 1.7 nA beam current (120 µm diameter beam aperture) were maintained
throughout. To both rapidly locate and subsequently analyse the elevated atomic (Z) number
particles, over mm2 areas, the instruments backscattered electron detector (Carl Zeiss AsB™)
was used alongside high-speed EDS mapping. Using the high-contrast imaging mode alongside a
threshold value for pixel brightness, as determined via the calibration results presented in Figure
7.1, upon automatically scanning the sample and moving the microscope’s stage accordingly,
particles with elevated atomic (Z) number above the background matrix material were identified
- evident as bright (white) spots. After the particulates stage-referenced location was recorded by
the automated system, the composition of the particles was classified using EDS.
When performing EDS acquisitions of individual particles, the electron beam was rastered
over a rectangular region containing no less than two-thirds of the particle - with a background
spectrum also acquired of the surrounding substrate area immediately neighbouring the particle
for comparison. A collection period of 250 seconds was used to maximise the signal to noise ratio in
each instance. Resulting from the interaction depth (approximately 2 µm [239]), from which EDS
analysis samples the material, for particles with a thickness less than this, then a contribution
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from the underlying matrix was known to arise. This "dilution" of the particles signal with that
arising from the substrate resulted in the reduction of the true elemental concentration observed
for each of these particles, with an enhanced light element (e.g. C, Si, S and P) contribution.
In addition to analysing the weight percentage (wt%) composition of each high Z-number particle,
measurements for the two observable perpendicular (major) axes of the fragment were recorded,
as well as the particles surface area and approximate volume - all automatically determined by
the microscopes control and analysis software (following the similarly automated identification
and compositional quantification). The smallest particles identifiable were determined to be
approximately 80 nm in diameter.
A total of 12,000 individual particles were identified and subsequently analysed during this work,
across 10 - 15 sub-samples from each of the 14 localities, representing different background
(substrate) matrices (bark, leaf, moss etc.). A number of "particles of interest" were later extracted
from the samples for subsequent analysis, as described in Section 8.3.1.
7.3.4 Location convention
The convention employed during this work to describe the location of the sampling sites in
relation to the FDNPP is shown graphically in Figure 7.2. The distance of each sampling site to
the FDNPP was measured directly "as the crow flies" (irrespective of the compass bearing) to the
centre of the coastal reactor site.
7.4 Results
7.4.1 Bulk gamma-ray spectroscopy
Arising from the identical source of the radioactive contamination (reactor Unit 2), the γ-ray
spectrum resulting from each of the 14 samples were identical - with a representative background-
subtracted spectrum shown in Figure 7.3. Corresponding to the earlier spectroscopic results
attained by the UAV (Chapter 6 and Figure 6.19), the radionuclides responsible for the γ-ray
emitting contamination are those of radiocesium (134Cs and 137Cs). A slight difference in the
peak ratios of the two isotopes exists as a result of the difference in their collection (and analysis)
date. As a result of the greater count-rates recorded by the GR1 micro γ-ray spectrometer, the
laboratory-based γ-ray spectroscopy results contain a considerable number of "double-energy"
peaks - whereby the dead-time of the spectrometer was insufficient to differentiate between
closely-spaced γ-ray (photon) arrivals.
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Figure 7.2: Radiation intensity map showing the height-corrected air dose-rate resulting from
the FDNPP release. The direct-distance convention (from the FDNPP to each sampling site) used
in this work, is shown. Modified from [231].
Figure 7.3: Representative γ-ray spectrum for bulk samples obtained from the 14 sampling sites.
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33 39 40 44 46 47 48 50 51 52 56 72 73 74 79 82 83
As Y Zr Ru Pd Ag Cd Sn Sb Te Ba Hf Ta W Au Pb Bi
Site 1 x x x
Site 2 x x x x x x
Site 3 x x x x
Site 4 x x x x x x x x x
Site 5 x x x x x x x x
Site 6 x x x x x x x x x x
Site 7 x x x x x x x x x
Site 8 x x x x x x x x x
Site 9 x x x x x x x
Site 10 x x x x x x x x x
Site 11 x x x x x x
Site 12 x x x x x x x
Site 13 x x x x x x x x
Site 14 x x x x x x x x
Table 7.1: Elemental composition of atmospheric particulate (elements As - Bi) observed at each
of the sampling sites, 1 - 14.
7.4.2 Particle composition
The elemental composition of the various particulate encountered at the 14 sampling sites, as
identified via EDS, is shown within Tables 7.1 and 7.2 for elements Bi through As, and La
through U respectively. Each of the particles were characterised by only containing a single
element (with the exception of some particles whereby Ce, La and Nd occurred together, each
at equal wt%concentrations) in addition to any number of lighter elements, including; O, S,
Na, K, P, C, Si, Al, Fe, Mn, Ti, Cu and Zn - at varying wt% proportions. Apparent from both
tables is the commonality that exists for a number of elements observed across most/all sampling
locations (e.g. Zr, Ru, Ag, Ba, Au, Pb, Bi, Ce and U). In contrast, the distribution of other elements
was markedly less extensive - with particles of As, Pd and Hf encountered at only one locality.
Particles containing U were observed at all localities except Site 5 (Date City) - the furthest from
the FDNPP, with all of the REEs (Table 7.2) present at numerous (albeit differing) sites.
A plot illustrating the variation in observed wt% composition of the entire particle inventory
is presented in Figure 7.4. Apparent is the wide variability in the proportion of the particles
principle component; with Ag ranging from 5.5 wt% up to 92.8 wt%, and Au from 4.2 wt% to 81.7
wt%. A similarly large range in principle component of 66.3 wt% and 63.9 wt% is observed for Ce
and U respectively. In contrast, smaller ranges in weight percentage composition are observed
for species including; As, Sb, Te and Th. Also shown in Figure 7.4 (as green boxes) is the wt%
range of these elements present within known naturally-occurring mineral species [328]. For
many of the elements, this range of known mineral compositions encompasses all of the particles
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57 58 59 60 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 70 90 92
La Ce Pr Nd Sm Eu Gd Tb Dy Ho Er Yb Th U
Site 1 x x
Site 2 x x x
Site 3 x
Site 4 x x x
Site 5 x x x x
Site 6 x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Site 7 x x x x x x x x x x x x
Site 8 x x
Site 9 x x x x x x x x x x
Site 10 x x x x x x x x
Site 11 x x
Site 12 x x x
Site 13 x
Site 14 x x x
Table 7.2: Elemental composition of atmospheric particulate (elements La - U) observed at each
of the sampling sites, 1 - 14.
encountered in this work - with Zr, Ru and Te, for example, all bound by these known mineral
compositions. Mobilisation and re-deposition of such mineral particles is one mechanism by which
some of this material could exist within the environment [329]. This mechanism could account for
this particulate material, including particles composed of Au, Ba, Au and U - observed across the
largest number of the sampling sites. As it is discussed subsequently in Chapter 8, the results
are not presented nor discussed here, however, U particulate was shown to exist with the fewest
(and smallest) contributions from other (accessory) elements.
The wt% composition of some of the particles identified within the environment, however,
plot firmly outside those of recognised mineral compositions - with some elements existing
at concentrations considerably beyond those attributable to geological minerals. The particles
exhibiting such a significant elemental enrichment are the REEs (Ce to Yb) - with Tb, Ho
and Er showing no overlap with the elemental wt% of known mineral material. Tb exists
with a maximum particle weight percentage of 63.8 wt%, while its naturally-occurring (in-
mineral) concentrations vary only between 0.03 wt% and 0.57 wt%. Such elemental concentrations
represent direct evidence for this material resulting from anthropogenic processes. The most
of which is manufacturing, but this does not alone provide a conclusive mechanism to account
for how this material came to exist as aerosol sized fragments. Images of typical fragments are
shown in Figure 7.5, illustrating their highly-angular form and embedded/adhered nature onto
the surfaces of their containing substrate materials.
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Figure 7.4: (Top) elemental weight percentage composition of particulate across all sampling
sites (black lines), alongside the compositional range of elements observed within known mineral
species (green boxes). Mineral composition data obtained from [328]. (Bottom) average diameter
for particulate of each elemental composition. The sampling depth of EDS (circa 2 µm) is
highlighted (grey), whereby the influence of substrate interaction/sampling would dilute the
compositional analysis results derived from the particulate.
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Figure 7.5: Secondary electron images of atmospheric particulate material observed on organic
substrate surfaces obtained across the 14 sampling sites. Scale bars = 1 µm.
7.4.3 Elemental size average
The mean diameter for each of the particles (of differing elemental composition) is shown in
Figure 7.6, averaged across all 14 of the sampling sites. With the exception of two outlier points
(Y and Hf), there is a gradual reduction in particle size with increasing atomic mass - with
particles of U being some of the smallest observed (average size = 1.07 µm), distributed across
the plume-affected area.
Many REEs, circled in Figure 7.6, are seen to group together - existing below the trend-line
derived for the particulate of other compositions. Based on such a grouping of the REE, this could
invoke that fragments constituted principally of these elements were derived from a specific
formation scenario potentially associated with events at the FDNPP, or conversely, a source
entirely unrelated to the 2011 release.
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Figure 7.6: Variation in particle diameter with differing principle elemental component. Y and Hf
outliers are highlighted, as is a grouping containing the REEs.
This plot, however, does not factor the influence that differing site location (distance from
the source) has on the particles diameter - rather illustrating the reduction in average particle
size with composition. Whereas a reduction in particle size is apparent for atomic (Z) number,
such a trend would not be observed if elemental density were, in contrast, plotted against average
particle diameter. The variations in density for both native elements and typical metal-oxide
species is detailed within the CRC Handbook of Chemistry and Physics [165]. While representing
an interesting yet unexpected trend, as the densities of the most frequently observed oxide species
of the two end-member elements (Zr and U) are near-identical [165], the average diameters of
these particles should be comparable - for which, as shown in Figure 7.6, they are not. More
appropriate and meaningful representations of the distributions of this particulate data, however,
are hereby subsequently presented.
7.4.4 Average particle size
A plot showing the diameter of all particulate as well as the weighted average value (blue) for
fragments of all compositions sampled at all 14 localities, is presented in Figure 7.7. Apparent
from this plot is the small range that exists between these average particle size values, with
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Figure 7.7: Mean particle diameter for all composition material, plotted against distance from
the FDNPP.
diameters occurring between 0.93 µm and 2.62 µm - alongside a mean value for all particulate of
1.61 µm. When plotted on this log-linear axis scaling, the trend-line applied to the data follows a
linear relationship, with the mean particle diameter showing a decreasing size with increasing
distance from the plant. Over the near 64 km distance, a reduction in particle diameter equal to
the mean, of 1.61 µm is observed (a 64.6% overall decrease).
7.4.5 Elemental size average
In addition to the linear relationship (when plotted on log-linear axes) shown by the average
particle diameter vs. distance plots for all elemental compositions (Figure 7.7), similar trends are
observed for specific elements - with the average particle diameter declining markedly over the
length of the north-west trending plume. These plots, detailing the average particle diameter for
specific elements with distance from the FDNPP are shown in Figures 7.8 and 7.9.
Ag composition material has been extensively studied and quantified in a number of earlier works
[330, 331]. It is shown here to exhibit a strongly negative correlation - with fragments located
within 10 km of the plant being some of the largest material encountered during this entire study
(>3 µm in diameter).
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Figure 7.8: Average particle diameter with distance from the FDNPP, for elements: Ag, Ru, Ce,
Sm, Au and Bi. The coefficient of determination (r2) is shown where a correlation is observed.
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Figure 7.9: Average particle diameter with distance from the FDNPP, for elements: U, Pb, Zr, Sn,
Ba and REEs. The coefficient of determination (r2) is shown where a correlation is observed.
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Exhibiting with a similar gradient to Ag, particles of Ru composition, were also identified to show
the same decline in particle diameter with increasing distance from the FDNPP site. Unlike Ag
and fragments of other compositions, however, the density of Ru is significantly greater than
other elements. Such a density (12.1 g cm-3 [165]) may provide a mechanism to account for the
occurrence of Ru fragments only at localities less than 35 km from the FDNPP - representing the
first to be deposited, having only remained entrained within the transporting air-mass (plume) for
a more limited period. Additional potential (Fukushima-related) mechanisms exist to account for
this more spatially limited extent of Ru-containing material. One such rationalisation could result
from an inherent degree of sampling bias - whereby despite the extensive examination of multiple
samples (collected >35 km from the FDNPP), no particles of Ru composition were identified -
despite existing within the containing matrix. An additional FDNPP-related explanation could
result from the minimum size at which Ru-based particulate exists - with no such composition
particulate occurring with diameters below circa. 1.5 µm.
A similar trend to Ag for the Ce fragments is also observed, with an appreciable decline in
mean particle diameter over the extent of the sampled sites. In contrast to Ag, Ru and Ce,
however, Sm, Au and Bi are all characterised by considerably smaller average particle diameters
at sampling localities close to the boundary with the FDNPP site (circa. 1.2 µm - 1.5 µm). While
a reduction in the average particle size is similarly apparent along the 60 km plume, the size of
this material and resulting gradient of the trend-line are both smaller and shallower respectively.
Occurring as one of the few elements observed at a large number of the sampling sites (Table
7.2), U is also seen to display a particle diameter reduction over the 60 km length of the plume.
While displaying a shallower trend-line gradient, comparable to both Sm and Au, the spread of
the U data laterally away for the calculated trend-line is the greatest of all of the composition
particles encountered - indicating a weaker degree of correlation in comparison to the other data.
The elements Ag, Ru, Ce, Sm, Au, Bi, and U are all shown to display a negative linear trend -
with the average diameter of particles composed of these elements decreasing over the 60 km
distance north-west from the FDNPP site. Such a linear relationship, however, is not apparent
for Pb-containing particulate - whereby no such correlation is observed. The same absence of any
mean particle diameter reduction (with distance from the FDNPP) is observed for particles of Zr
composition. The material of both compositions is employed extensively for roles within nuclear
facilities - the implications for the particulates source attribution is subsequently discussed.
In contrast to the aforementioned particulate whose mean dimensions show either a negative
correlation or no correlation with distance from the FDNPP site, material containing Sn and Ba
is seen to exhibit positive linear correlations - with size increasing over the length of the plume.
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Figure 7.10: Average particle diameter vs. density (corrected for their mean composition - from
Figure 7.4) for Sites 6 and 7, located 22.8 km and 20.3 km from the FDNPP site respectively. No
correlation to the micron-scale particulates distribution is, however, observed.
Whereas the strength of the fit is not as great for Sn as it is for Ba, a notable disparity with
the formerly discussed particulate is clearly evident. This dissimilar trend strongly invokes a
different origin of this material to other particulate.
While no correlation is observed for both Pb and Zr containing material and with a highly
contrasting positive correlation, however, existing for the particulate containing Sn and Ba - the
combined REEs exhibit a strongly-negative correlation, analogous in gradient and fit to both Ag
and Ru. In contrast to the various composition particulate, the mean particle size distributions of
which are shown in Figure 7.8, the REEs exhibit a degree of size variability closest to the FDNPP.
A plot detailing the average particle diameter at two similarly located sites (Sites 6 and 7)
in which the influence of the materials composition (from Figure 7.4) and hence its density are
corrected for, is presented in Figure 7.10. For the two sites, located 22.8 km and 20.3 km from the
FDNPP respectively, no degree of statistical correlation is observed. If such particulate material
were to be sourced exclusively from a release at the FDNPP, then it could be reasoned that
material with the lowest density would possess the largest diameter - with the greatest density
material, however, forming the smallest diameter particulate encountered at these two sampling
sites. These results, therefore, invoke an additional source contribution to this particulate. As
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discussed formerly with respect to Ru-containing material, factors may exist, however, to yield
particulate across only limited size ranges - therefore contributing to this apparent absence of an
observed density vs. particle diameter correlation.
7.5 Discussion
As evidenced by the various distance, size and composition-based plots shown in Figures 7.7, 7.8
and 7.9, in a number of instances there exists a correlation between the average diameter of the
particulate and the distance (from the FDNPP) at which it was obtained.
While the negative linear trend shown by the average particle diameter versus atomic number
(Z) in Figure 7.6 could invoke a compositionally induced decline in mean particle diameter, as
previously alluded, the influence of the particles density is, however, not considered within this
plot. As such, these results serve only as an unusual peculiarity. Whereas the densest element
observed during this study was in-fact U - possessing one of the smallest mean particle sizes
(1.07 µm), other elements with a comparable high density (e.g. W, Au and Ta), were observed
to exist with a smaller mean particle diameter than fragments of a much lower density (e.g. Bi,
Dy, as well as the majority of the highlighted REE). When a density correction is applied to
account for the summed wt% contributions from each constituent element in the total particle,
no statistically significant correlation between the micron-sized particles total density and its
site-wide diameter was observed (shown in Figure 7.10).
This grouping of REE-containing particulate below the trend-line in Figure 7.6 suggests a
commonality of the source. The likely anthropogenic nature of the material is further illustrated
due to a large component of the particles containing elemental abundances above those of known
naturally observed minerals (average 30 wt%) - as shown in Figure 7.4.
Owing not only to the wide compositional range of particulate associated with a nuclear facility,
but also the highly-variable topographic nature of the contaminated region - the analysis of
material by site illustrates an improved and less-erroneous mechanism through which to explore
the distribution of particulate via its diameter - excluding the influence of composition.
Shown in Figure 7.7 by the blue data points, is the statistically significant linear correlation
(when plotted using log-linear axes) between the mean particle diameter (for all composition
fragments) and the distance at which the particulate was obtained from the plant. Such a trend
represents strong evidence for this material having been derived from a common emission source
- one located to the east of Fukushima City - towards the coast, and likely the FDNPP, to generate
such a mean particle size reduction over distributed sampling sites.
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While the decline in mean particle size for a number of elements used within (or produced
by) standard nuclear reactor operation (e.g. Ag, Ru, Ce, Sm and U) serves to further support
these conclusions, the lack of a distinctive negative correlation shown by Pb and Zr in addition to
the absence of other elements expected to occur within the fallout (e.g. Rb, Sr, Rh and Pd [133])
suggests that some/a component of the particulate is, however, not sourced from the FDNPP.
A non-Fukushima contribution of particulate is evidenced by the occurrence (and comparable
negative linear trend) of Au and Bi material - neither of which are associated with nuclear
operations. In contrast, while both Sn and Ba are elements associated with (produced as a result
of) nuclear energy generation, particulate of both elements shows a trend indicative of a source
in the opposing direction to the FDNPP - centred inland. The distribution of REEs is statistically
significant and similarly invokes a sourcing of material from a location coinciding with the
position of the FDNPP.
Exhibiting one of the best-defined particle diameter vs. distance correlations of all elements,
therefore strongly invoking its provenance from the FDNPP, Au is an element that is neither
used nor produced within a nuclear reactor during its operation [133]. The same is also true
for Bi, whereby a strongly linear trend is also observed (despite not resulting from a nuclear
source). Being both chemically inert (in all but a small number of instances) as well as being
corrosion resistant and electrically conductive results in the majority of Au being utilised in the
electronics (and to a lesser extent) the jewellery industry [332]. Bismuth, on the other hand,
possesses a considerably smaller number of commercial/industrial applications - the main ones
are high-temperature ceramics, industrial castings and specialist alloy manufacturing [333, 334].
Despite occurring as known fission products, produced following the thermal neutron irradiation
of standard uranium-dioxide (UO2) fuel [133], the occurrence of Ag and Ru at significant
concentrations and spatial distributions when considered alongside those of Au and Bi further
strengthens the requirement for an additional anthropogenic source of particulate. The case for
material input from a contrasting non-Fukushima related source is strengthened by the spatially
limited occurrence of additional elements - unattributable to a nuclear origin. Such particles
include those composed principally of W, Ta and Cd (Table 7.1). With the main application of W
being the production of super-hard metals, both Ta and Cd are utilised extensively, and near-
exclusively, within electronics and electrical component fabrication [332, 334]. The existence of
a number of particles containing As at Site 13 (Teramae, Namie Town) could represent fission
product material [133], however, its sole occurrence combined with the low fission product yield
of 75As, hence implies a contrary (non-Fukushima) source of this material.
Owing to their unique properties, the REEs are utilised in the manufacturing of a large number
of specialist products and materials [333, 334]. Several of these REE are also produced at notable
abundances as fission products [133], including; Ce, Nd, La, Pr, Sm, Eu and Gd (decreasing
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in natural elemental abundance through this sequence). Despite Ce and Sm both showing a
correlation between particle diameter and distance along the main plume - the combination
of; (i) the absence of any other fission product REE-containing particles (e.g. Nd, La and Pr)
at comparable concentrations - despite equatable fission produce yields [133], (ii) a contrasting
diameter between both particle compositions (Figure 7.8), in addition to, (iii) being amongst the
most naturally abundant of the REEs [335], invokes an origin for such material unrelated to the
numerous Fukushima release events. Finally, (iv) the proportion of these elements contained
within some of this particulate is very high (Figure 7.4) for elements that initially exist at
negligible concentrations - being "ingrown" over the UO2 fuels in-reactor lifetime.
The most characteristic species resulting from a nuclear release scenario is that of the U fuel -
originally contained within the facilities core and fuel storage pond(s). Like many of the other
particle diameter vs. distance relationships shown in Figures 7.8 and 7.9, the trend of U is
similarly linear - albeit with a greater degree of data spread away from the applied trend-line.
The mean particle diameter of U-composition material is also one of the smallest encountered,
despite exhibiting one of the largest ranges in wt% component composition of all fragment
material - with an average U content across all material of 19.6 wt%. In contrast to particles of
other compositions, those containing U were observed as part of this work to contain a reduced
number (component) of accessory (accompanying) elements. Owing to the small diameter (<2 µm)
of these U particles, as discussed previously and illustrated graphically in the bottom portion
of Figure 7.4, their EDS compositional analysis will result in the electron beam interaction and
resultant sampling of the underlying (containing) bulk material [239]. This quantification will
resultantly introduce a background (and additional species) into the spectrum and subsequent
quantification determined for the particle.
In the works of Kikawada et al., (2009 and 2012) [336, 337], both enrichments and depletions in
U isotope ratios (235U/238U) for atmospheric deposits obtained at localities across Japan were
determined. Despite not analysing particulate material as part of this study (rather bulk material
via solution analysis), the enrichment and depletion were suggested to result from nuclear testing
fallout (from East Asia) and depleted uranium munitions (from the 1991 Gulf War) respectively.
This material was blown across from the source regions by prevailing winds. The application of
phosphate fertilisers as invoked by Yoshida et al., (1998) [338], is a further mechanism through
which elevated concentrations of U were reasoned to exist, with Hirose and Sugimura (1981)
[339], attributing the atmospheric burn-up of the Russian COSMOS-954 in 1978 as a further
source of anomalous U ratios. The global influence of the 1986 Chernobyl accident has also been
recorded across the entirety of Japan as a result of bulk material isotopic analysis by Aoyama et
al., (1987) [340], and later by Hirose et al., (1990) [341]. Highly-localised U isotope anomalies
associated with the criticality accident at the JCO campus (Ibaraki) in September 1999 have
been further cited as a source of anthropogenic uranium in the environment by Yoshida et al.,
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(2000) [342]. None of these sources, however, can singularly describe the existence, and more
importantly, the decreasing particle size observed away from the FDNPP.
Aside from the atmospheric release events at the FDNPP, and as mentioned previously, a range of
alternative sources exist to account for the existence of some of the particulate types - associated
with specific industries/processes. One such source is the suspension/resuspension of elements,
including REE, sourced from soils and geological deposits [329, 343]. Major sources of this
material, some from significant distances from where they are eventually recovered, arise from
the increased use of motor vehicles and urban activities [344]. However, the underlying geology of
the Fukushima Prefecture region - much like the rest of the country, is typified by a contrasting
REE signature to that particulate compositions observed in these works [151, 338, 345].
Japan’s lengthy history of extensive municipal waste incineration (MWI) is another potential
source of these particulate species, occurring with a wide range in compositions owing to the
material feed-stock that is consumed [325, 346, 347]. A further, related, source of particulate
arises from the consumption of fossil fuels for electricity production. As a result, numerous
studies have been performed on the various micron-scale aerosols, "fly-ash" and "bottom-ash"
produced during the combustion processes [348–350]. Despite the nearby proximity of a number
of coal, gas and oil-fired power stations to the FDNPP site [14], as well as likely location to
one of the several thousand waste incineration facilities distributed across Japan [346]; major
advancements in particulate capture have ensured that such material is not readily released into
the environment [323].
Analytical work by Ault et al., (2012) [351], on various forms of urban particulate derived
from Ohio (USA), determined that combustion products near-exclusively occurred with a highly-
spherical geometry. The resuspended mineral dust originating from the erosion of geological
material was observed, however, in this study by Ault et. al., to be 5× the mean particle diameter
as well as possessing a significantly different form to the samples analysed in this work.
The occurrence of this material adhered to the outermost surfaces of living bulk moss, lichen
and leaf samples implies that this highly-angular material is recent in its origin - whereby
meteoric alongside other natural processes would have otherwise resulted in its removal. Despite
considerable care being taken during the initial sampling to ensure that bulk material samples
were obtained from locations significantly above the ground (Section 4.1), the influence of a
component of particulate resuspension cannot be excluded.
It could be invoked, that such an observed particle size vs. distance from the FDNPP trend
could rather represent a particle size vs. distance from the coast trend - with major industrial
facilities (located neighbouring the FDNPP along the Pacific coast) generating such particulate.
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However, after searching for the locations of industrial activities within the 3 km - 6 km wide
north-south trending coastal band (that transitions into the regions characteristic mountainous
topography to the west) [152], only a single such site was observed.
Located 4 km south-east of Minamisoma City (and 17 km north of the FDNPP), this chemical
plant (Ouchi Shinko Chemical Industrial) researched and produced various S-containing synthetic
(rubber) and agricultural products - not, however, the composition of particulate material
encountered during this study. This particulate could therefore not have originated from activity
located within this coastal belt, despite the prevailing wind directions readily transporting such
material onshore, and north-westwards towards the populated Fukushima City [41, 352].
7.6 Conclusions and future work
Resulting from the analysis of over 12,000 individual particles through combined SEM-EDS
analysis, patterns pertaining to the spatial and/or compositional distribution of such material
were observed in a number of instances. For some particulate, however, no such correlations were
encountered - with many species absent or depicting contrasting depositional trends.
In-spite of the observed trends for many elements - when combined with a range of other indicative
factors including the absence of other (nuclear-sourced) elements, an identical correlation of
these (likely nuclear-derived) species with non-nuclear particulate, in addition to vastly differing
particle size between different composition (but potentially nuclear-origin) material, would
strongly suggest a non-Fukushima source for the bulk of this material. Owing to the wide
compositional variance displayed by this particulate, alongside the extensive occurrence of
REE species; electronics fabrication (and/or its subsequent recycling and processing), specialist
metallurgical production and non-ferrous smelting plants are ascribed as the most likely sources
of this particulate. The declining particle-size with distance from the FDNPP would imply a
source location geographically similar to that of the coastal nuclear facility - despite no such site
(as yet) having been identified.
While potentially unrelated to Fukushima, the environmental impact of this particulate is
still of concern. Being readily-inhalable due to its micron length-scale, the material of this size
is irritant to the respiratory tract and represents "a long-term exposure risk contributing to a
heightened risk factor for cardiopulmonary and lung cancer mortality" [233]. The composition
of these particles themselves also represents a hazard (resulting from their chemical toxicity)
beyond just respiratory distress. A breakdown of elements and common pollutants by the World
Health Organisation (WHO) details the 10 chemicals (or groups of chemicals) of major (global)
public concern [316]. In addition to general air pollution - As, Cd and Pb are included within this
classification - having been encountered as particulate at sites across Fukushima Prefecture.
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Future work will first seek to isolate a range of particles of interest from these bulk samples, in
addition to U - the analysis of which is described in Chapter 8. After their extraction, standard
mass-spectrometric techniques will be employed to determine their true isotopic composition
alongside Three-Dimensional Atom Probe Tomography (3D-APT) to derive isotopic information
as well as details on the position sensitive distribution of the materials constituent atoms. It is
only then that material can unequivocally be apportioned to the Fukushima accident or another,
specific, emission source. In either case, as a result of much of the particulate materials inherent
chemotoxicity, it is of considerable importance to determine its likely source provenance in order
to reduce the future volume/impact of such material released into the environment. It should be
noted, however, that the total volume of all such particulate, irrespective of its composition, is very
small - requiring extensive electron microscope examination to identify its existence within the
containing (bulk) material. Unless "considerable" volumes of this micron-scale particulate were
to be inhaled, ingested, or sufficiently pre-concentrated via the food-chain, then a detrimental
exposure/dose, however, is unlikely to be encountered [311]. The observed entrapment/adhesion
of this material onto surfaces will further serve to reduce its aerosol mobility (as shown in Figure
7.5). Therefore, citizens currently residing, or set to shortly return, should not be adversely
impacted by the existence of such material.
Additional future work will explore samples obtained from other sites across Fukushima Prefecture
- located both within as well as outside of the radioactive plume. This will hopefully enable the
potential source(s) of the particle material to be located, in addition to identifying sites where
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8.1 Introduction
As shown previously in Chapter 7, U-containing material (alongside material of a wide range
of other compositions) has been observed to exist distributed across the majority of Fukushima
Prefecture. This U-rich atmospheric particulate was shown to be some of the smallest to exist
(with a mean diameter of 1.07 µm), while containing the fewest additional elemental constituents
(i.e. predominantly composed of just U and O).
In addition to being the fuel material used near-exclusively at the FDNPP (alongside a number
of Pu-containing MOX assemblies) and the thousands of other nuclear reactors around the world
[8], U also exists with a considerable natural (crustal) abundance. With a total annual production
of approximately 75,000 tons in 2016 [353], U exists with an average crustal concentration of
2 parts per million (ppm) - therefore making it the 51st most abundant element [332]. This
concentration is in contrast to both Ag (65th most abundant) and Au (72nd most abundant),
which are considerably less-enriched within the crust, despite being perceived by many to be
significantly more abundant than the actinide element [332].
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Not occurring as native U metal, naturally-occurring U has been identified to exist as a component
of over 350 minerals [36, 354] - with the U displaying a wide wt% variation across the mineral
inventory, shown formerly in Figure 7.4. Alongside U, a considerable number of other cations
comprise these minerals, however, only one "hyper-rare" mineral contains both U and the alkali
metal Cs in its structure [36]. This yellow monoclinic, Carnotite Group mineral known as
Margaritasite ((Cs,K,H3O)2(UO2)2(VO4)2 · H2O) is observed only at a single type-locality in north-
west Mexico. Several anthropogenically-produced minerals have also been observed to contain
both U and Cs - the principal species being Chernobylite (a variety of Zircon); containing U from
the fuel elements and Zr ± Cs, found within the "corium" produced during the Chernobyl accident.
While U occurs with a considerable natural abundance, the species interactions associated
with actinides (e.g. U, Am, Pu and Cm) in the environment and their inherent chemotoxicity is
well-known and significant for both humans and other biological organisms [147, 355]. Owing to
their low radiological activities in comparison to the γ-ray emitting fission products, the concern
for human exposure is chemical, over radiological, toxicity [146, 355]. The development of cancers
(such as leukaemia) after exposure to depleted uranium (DU) munitions was determined by
Hamilton (2001) [356], to result after seven to ten years of environmental exposure. Alongside this
U-containing material, there may also exist other species (e.g. Cd, Pb and Pa), which represent
further chemotoxicity issues [355].
With the results of geological mapping undertaken by the Geological Survey of Japan (GSJ)
unable to identify the existence any significant U-mineralisation (across all but a few minor
and commercially unexploitable/unviable sites across the entirety of Japan (Section 7.5)) [354],
the source of this material is unlikely to represent the resuspension of U-containing mineral
species. This material therefore likely represents material derived from an anthropogenic source.
To irrefutably discriminate any potentially natural material from anthropogenically-derived
actinides, an in-depth analysis of not only the materials structure but also its composition, is
required. This analysis would further permit for the discrimination between different types of
anthropogenically-derived U material that may exist.
8.2 Aims
This chapter sought to provide further analysis of a suite of U-containing particles - both
compositionally as well as through the examination of their internal form and structure. With
such actinide-containing particles having been found at nearly all of the 14 sampling localities,
it is crucial to understand whether this material is the result of the 2011 FDNPP accident, the
result of another (potentially anthropogenic) source or if it is conversely entirely natural. If
originating from the FDNPP accident, a number of questions arise pertaining to; (i) its long-term
170
8.3. EXPERIMENTAL METHODS
stability within the environment, (ii) the potential existence of other reactor-sourced species, and
(iii) if the provenance of such material may be attributed to specific FDNPP reactor Units as per
the studies using radiocesium to ascribe the source of the material described in Chapter 2.
8.3 Experimental methods
Following their extraction from the containing bulk organic substrate, a range of complementary
techniques were employed to analyse the U-containing particulate, these included both non-
destructive and destructive methods.
8.3.1 Sample preparation
U-containing particles, adhered/entrapped onto the surfaces of organic substrates identified using
combined SEM-EDS analysis (described previously in Section 7.3.3), were first removed to enable
their sole analysis - independent of this background material. To remove these micron-scale
particles, a Kleindiek MM3A™ Micromanipulator (Kleindiek Nanotechnik GmbH) [243, 357],
was used - mounted inside the chamber of the Zeiss SIGMA™ HD SEM, used formerly to identify
the fragments. This instrument was similarly operated in low-vacuum (Variable Pressure)
mode to negate against specimen charging under the incident electron beam. Using a polar
(circular) coordinate system, the MM3A™ Micromanipulator was capable of moving the associated
probe/needle with steps of 0.5 mm (S6) down to 1.0 nm (S1), alongside providing full rotation of
the tip. A labelled image of the electron microscope’s chamber detailing the relative positions of
the source, stage, detectors and MM3A™ Micromanipulator is shown in Figure 8.1.
After performing exploratory EDS analysis at high(er) beam currents (2.7 nA) and accelerating
voltages (25 kV), a lower beam current 90 pA (30 µm aperture) and reduced accelerating
voltage (10 kV) were used for the subsequent removal of the particle of interest. Using the
Micromanipulator, either tungsten probe-tips (PT-4-10, Picoprobe Industries Inc.) or thermally-
extruded borosilicate capillaries (needles) were used to remove the material. To adhere the
micron-scale U-containing particles to the tips of these needles, an electron beam hardened
adhesive (SEMGlu™ Kleindiek Nanotechnik GmbH) was used [358, 359]. After applying a small
volume of this vacuum-compatible adhesive to the end of either tip type while in the SEM (at the
lower energy beam conditions) it was then contacted onto the particle - where an increase in both
the beam current and accelerating voltage (to those typically used for EDS analysis) caused its
rapid (30 second) polymerisation. A graphical depiction of the steps used in the removal of such a
particle is shown in Figure 8.2.
The needle containing the particle was then carefully withdrawn and removed from the electron
microscope before being stored in an air-tight sample container. Subsequent analysis of the
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Figure 8.1: Labelled image of the Zeiss SIGMA™ HD scanning electron microscope chamber.
bond-strength of the adhesive yielded results consistent with those specified by the manufacturer
at 2 mN [359]. Subsequent exposure analysis additionally showed the glue to be resistant to
dissolution with water and dilute (1M) HCl and HNO3 acids after 24-hour exposure.
Using SEMGlu™ over the Pt deposition from a gaseous organometallic precursor (Trimethyl-
methylcylopentadienyl Platinum-IV) routinely used as an adhesive within FIB/SEM systems
[252], was advantageous not only in the increased bond-strength it afforded but also in preventing
the need to deposit additional high atomic mass (Z) number elements onto the sample. The
incorporation of any such higher mass elements would serve to generate considerable atomic
interferences during any subsequent mass spectrometry analysis.
During this study into the large number of U-containing particles formerly identified (Chapter 7),
material from a single location, representative of an area with significant Fukushima-derived
radiocesium contamination (Site 2: Shimohiso, Iitate Village - Table 4.1) was selected owing to
experimental time constraints. This site, located 35.7 km north-west from the FDNPP on the
main plume line, exhibited dose-rates of >19.0 µSv hr-1 during initial aerial surveys in the period
that immediately followed the accident [85].
8.3.2 Ion beam slice and view
Following their isolation from the bulk material, ion beam sectioning was employed to destructively
analyse a number of these U-containing fragments to ascertain structural and compositional
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Figure 8.2: Steps detailing the removal of a particle from sediment material; (a) the particle is
located and referenced within the microscope, (b) and (c) applying a small quantity of SEMGlu to
the tip of the needle, before, (d) and (e) progressively moving the tip towards the particle, and (f)
lifting out a particle from the surrounding material - adhered to the needle. Modified from [227].
information on the particle. The high adhesion strength of the particle to the needle afforded by
the SEMGlu™ allowed for the sectioning to be performed without the need to otherwise remount
the particle onto another support mechanism (e.g. Si-wafer or Cu/C support grid).
Using the FEI Helios™ NanoLab 600i DualBeam system consisting of a vertical electron beam
and a side-mounted co-incident Ga+ ion beam, a low current (0.9 nA) Ga+ ion beam was used
to remove sequential "slices" through the U particles. This was achieved using the automated
"Slice and View" software installed within the Helios™ NanoLab control system; whereby a
user-defined depth of section and slice thickness was sequentially removed from the sample.
After each FIB cut, the sample was rotated from 52° to the horizontal (used for FIB sectioning)
back to the horizontal, for a secondary electron (SE) image to be obtained using the systems
vertically-mounted electron beam, before then being rotated back to 52° for further milling.
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Figure 8.3: Process of manually ion beam sectioning a U-containing particle; (a) initial deposition
of a protective Pt strip, and (b) progressive ion beam cuts towards the central particle.
During several points in the automated process, EDS compositional mapping of the particle
was also performed. To undertake this analysis, the automated serial-milling was paused - with
the sample-containing needle rotated back to the horizontal. Using the Oxford Instruments
Ltd. XMAX™ EDS detector mounted onto the instrument, the electron beam was rastered over
the sample with the characteristic x-ray emissions from the particles cut surface mapped and
concentrations quantified. A consistent 20 kV accelerating voltage, 2.7 nA beam current and 4.12
mm working distance were used during all EDS analysis within the DualBeam instrument.
Manual ion beam sectioning and imaging were also undertaken, with the U-containing particle
prior deposited onto a low elemental background adhesive carbon Spectro Tab™ disc (TED
PELLA Ltd.) - itself mounted onto a standard SEM pin-stub. To ensure that the particle emplaced
onto the adhesive surface remained in place, a thin (200 nm thick) Pt strip was deposited using
electron beam ionisation of a Pt precursor. Alongside ensuring adhesion, the Pt served to protect
the sample’s surface from the incident ion beam (Figure 8.3 (a)). Initially, a high energy Ga+ ion
beam (30 kV and 6.0 nA) was used to make the primary cuts, before lower beam currents (down
to 90 pA) were progressively used to obtain a surface free from substantial Ga+ implantation and
the effects of ion beam "curtaining" due to the non-uniform cutting afforded by differences in the
samples internal structure.
Owing to the greater range of stage/sample movement, in addition to the greater detector
volume, the EDAX (Ametek) Ltd. Octane-Plus™ Si-drift EDS system within the Zeiss SIGMA™
HD SEM was used to undertake the compositional analysis of this particle "wafer". As per its
previous operation, a 25 kV accelerating voltage and 2.7 nA beam current (120 µm aperture)
were used. The sample was, however, located at a smaller working distance (5 mm) and was
additionally angled at 45° from the horizontal, directed towards the EDS detector.
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Figure 8.4: Illustration of the synchrotron beamline sample setup, with the sub-micron
U-containing particle adhered onto the tip of a fine tungsten support needle.
8.3.3 Synchrotron micro-focus spectroscopy
Unlike ion beam analysis which results in the destruction of the particle, synchrotron radiation
micro-focus x-ray absorption spectroscopy (SR-µ-XAS) is non-destructive, but also benefits in
providing compositional, species and bonding-state information not attainable using ion beam
lithography combined with EDS.
To undertake the XAS study, the I18 beamline at the Diamond Light Source was used (capable
of producing monochromatic tuned x-rays in 0.5 eV increments over an energy range of 2.05
keV - 20.5 keV), operating at the nominal beam current of 300 mA using a "standard mode" fill
pattern of 900 contiguous electron "bunches", each 2 ns apart, with a total "bunch-charge" of
0.33 mA [263]. For the analysis of the individual U-containing particles, each was left adhered to
the tip of the tungsten needle (via SEMGlu™), onto which they were originally removed from
their containing substrate. A graphical rendering of this particle-needle setup, as mounted onto
the I18 beamline, is shown in Figure 8.4, with the full setup within the beamlines experimental
cabin shown in Figure 8.5. During the experiment, steps were undertaken to prevent against the
radioactive particles from being lost into the beamline setup if they were to become dislodged due
to the effects of local heating brought about by the x-ray beam. To achieve this, an envelope made
from x-ray transparent Kapton™ film (DuPont ®) was used to enclose the particle in its plastic
mount.
The standard beamline optical setup was used to attain the 2 µm × 2 µm x-ray beam incident
onto the sample, as detailed previously in Section 5.4.5.2. During the analysis of each needle-
mounted particle, the samples approximate location was determined using a camera mounted
within the experimental setup - used to assist with preliminary positioning. For optimal signal
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Figure 8.5: Experimental cabin setup on the I18 micro-focus spectroscopy beamline at the
Diamond Light Source with the various components labelled.
generation and collection, as shown within Figure 8.5, the fluorescence detector was mounted at
90° to the incident beam - with the needle-mounted sample conversely positioned at 45° to the
source. Owing to the high flux of the beam (2×1012 photons per second) combined with the small
size of the sample to generate signal absorption, the transmission detector (mounted directly
behind the sample) would have become over-saturated, was hence was not used in this work. The
obliquely mounted x-ray fluorescence (XRF) detector also suffered from high count-rates (due
to its high signal sensitivity), however, a 0.1 mm Al foil was inserted to reduce these effects in
addition to screening out lower-energy fluorescence peaks. A high-precision three-axis (+ rotation)
piezoelectrically-driven stage from Thorlabs Inc. was used to accurately manipulate the sample.
Each of the samples was initially mapped using XRF to derive the correct position from which
to subsequently obtain both x-ray absorption near-edge structure (XANES) and extended x-
ray absorption fine structure (EXAFS) data. All of the XRF, XANES and EXAFS analysis
was performed using a six element SGX Sensortech Si-drift fluorescence detector (Xspress-
3) controlled by software constructed in-house at Diamond. These XRF maps were obtained at an
energy of 18,000 eV, above the U-L3 edge at 17,166 eV, using a dwell of 30 seconds per point to
enhance the resulting signal quality. Additional U edges (with higher fluorescence yields) also
exist, however, all are encountered at energies greater than those attainable on the I18 beamline.




Having identified the 2 µm × 2 µm area on the needle from which the U signal originated -
the subsequent collection of the µ-XAS was performed at that point. Data were obtained using
the same Xspress-3 Si-drift detector, with the pre-edge data collected at 5 eV energy steps from
17,014 eV to 17,139 eV, before reducing to 0.5 eV steps up to 17,300 eV and finally coarsening to
1.0 eV to the upper limit at 17,412 eV. Each of these energy "sweeps" was performed over the
same region a total of three times to enhance signal quality and suppress spurious noise.
The processing of the XAS data - including normalisation, deconvolution and linear combination
peak-fitting to known standards was performed using the Demeter software package (version
0.9.24) [361]. This package included the Athena and Artemis programs (for XANES and EXAFS
analysis respectively), based upon the IFEFFIT code [362, 363]. Spectroscopy standards were
obtained from the International X-ray Absorption Spectroscopy (IXAS) Database [364], with data
derived from a number of global facilities (e.g. SSRL, CHESS and NSLS).
8.4 Results
8.4.1 SEM and EDS
Secondary electron images from the Zeiss SIGMA™ HD SEM (operated in low vacuum mode)
of three of the smallest U-containing particles (A, B and C) obtained from organic substrate
material in Site 2: Shimohiso (Iitate Village) are shown in Figures 8.6 (a), (b) and (c) respectively.
An elemental map of Particle A (obtained using the electron microscopes associated EDAX EDS
system), confirming the location of the U corresponding to the exact position of the sub-micron
particle is shown additionally, in Figure 8.6 (d). For each of the three particles, a complete EDS
spectrum is shown in Figure 8.6 (e). As was observed during the initial in-situ quantification of
the particulates composition and as was discussed formerly in Section 7.5 - the sample interaction
volume associated with EDS analysis (circa. 2 µm) incorporated the underlying bulk substrate
material into the quantification of such very fine particles (<2 µm). This "sampling" consequently
resulted in the increased Si, Al and Ca spectral contributions in Figure 8.6 (e).
Despite occurring with an elevated background contribution, the compositional analysis of the
particles in Figure 8.6 highlights not only a large inherent similarity between the material,
but also the absence of any elements strongly indicative of a nuclear reactor origin (e.g. fission
products such as; Cs, Sr, I and Rb, activation products including; Co, Ni, Nb and Ag, or other
actinide species; Am, Cm and Pu). The elemental breakdown of this analysis - detailing the
compositional similarity between the particles, is shown in Table 8.1.
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Figure 8.6: Secondary electron images (a), (b) and (c) of three U-containing particles, alongside
(d) an EDS U map for Particle A, and, (e) the EDS spectra of the three particles shown in (a), (b)




Element Particle A Particle B Particle C
O 26.66 ± 0.61 36.44 ± 0.81 29.88 ± 0.68
Na 1.53 ± 0.06 1.39 ± 0.05 2.86 ± 0.07
Mg 0.08 ± 0.01 0.16 ± 0.02 0.74 ± 0.04
Al 7.82 ± 0.19 8.99 ± 0.23 8.09 ± 0.35
Si 18.74 ± 0.44 15.59 ± 0.39 17.68 ± 0.51
P 1.26 ± 0.04 1.08 ± 0.03 2.07 ± 0.06
S 1.79 ± 0.05 2.02 ± 0.07 3.04 ± 0.10
U 31.45 ± 0.77 17.33 ± 0.21 23.01 ± 0.36
K - - 1.12 ± 0.06
Ca 4.38 ± 0.09 6.77 ± 0.11 4.44 ± 0.18
Ti 0.43 ± 0.02 - 0.54 ± 0.03
Mn 0.14 ± 0.01 - 0.25 ± 0.02
Fe 4.44 ± 0.13 9.35 ± 0.15 2.76 ± 0.20
Cu 1.28 ± 0.07 0.89 ± 0.11 0.92 ± 0.08
Table 8.1: EDS weight percentage (wt%) elemental composition of the three particles: A, B and C,
with the associated measurement error for each sample shown.
8.4.2 Ion beam analysis
The results of ion beam sectioning and subsequent compositional analysis of a typical U-
containing particle are shown in Figures 8.7 (a) to (d). Within Figure 8.7 (a), obtained using
the backscattered electron detector installed onto the Zeiss SIGMA™ HD SEM, is shown the
high atomic number (Z) nature of this micron-scale particle - located within the adhesive carbon
disc (low atomic number (Z) to backscattered coefficient ratio) and overlain by the thickness of
deposited Pt (moderate backscattered electron yield). It was this high backscatter coefficient that
enabled the particle(s) to be initially identified. As apparent from the homogeneous white colour
displayed by the particle, the elemental distribution of material appears, before compositional
analysis, to be spatially consistent. The secondary electron image taken of a slice located in the
centre of the particle is also shown in Figure 8.7 (b). Not only is the highly-irregular morphology
of the particle apparent, but also evident is the texture at the samples centre - occurring as
nano-crystallites, each ten’s of nm in size. Their appearance, raised above the FIB cut surface,
suggests that these features are significantly harder than the surrounding particle.
Supporting the earlier compositional analysis of such material (Figure 8.6 (a)), a strong U signal
was observed via EDS mapping over the sectioned particle - the results are shown in Figure 8.7
(c). Although not presented here, sample mapping results also detailed the occurrence of the
numerous accessory elements identified (and quantified) in Table 8.1. As per the EDS mapping
results of a typical particles surface shown in Figure 8.6 (d), the distribution of U in this section,
alongside all of the other elements, are homogeneously distributed throughout the sample.
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Figure 8.7: SEM-derived analysis of the particle; (a) backscattered electron image of the FIB-cut
particulate, (b) secondary electron image detailing the existence of nm-scale particle inclusions,
(c) U EDS elemental map, and (d) Cs EDS elemental map.
While the EDS results acquired from both the external surface and sectioned face of the U-
containing particle are consistent in their composition, the mapping results of the ion beam
sectioned internal surface of the sample, however, highlighted the presence of Cs - albeit at low
concentrations of 1.2 wt% - similarly homogeneously distributed. The Cs EDS map from the
region containing the sectioned particle is shown in Figure 8.7 (d).
Despite additionally identifying the existence of Cs within the sectioned particle, EDS mapping
(and later single-point analysis) was unable to resolve the composition of the raised (likely harder)
surface features present on the samples cut surface. Such results are, however, expected owing
in part to the greater interaction volume (circa. 2 µm) of the incident electron beam (with the
sample) than the features subjected to analysis (10’s of nm) [239], but also the ultimate spatial
resolution (precision of beam positioning) attainable by the SEM instrument. Hence, the spectrum
derived is not solely the result of these sub-micron features, but in the majority of cases from the
surrounding bulk sample interaction.
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Figure 8.8: Results of SR-µ-XANES analysis of particles A, B and C at the U-LIII edge. A
reference spectrum for Uraninite (UO2) is shown for comparison.
8.4.3 Micro-focus spectroscopy
Results derived through SR-µ-XANES on three separate U-containing particles (A, B and C) are
shown in Figure 8.8 (alongside a Uraninite (UO2) reference spectrum). As is shown in this plot,
these results confirm the existence of U as a core component of the particle - with a clear peak at
17,167 eV, corresponding to the position of the U-LIII absorption edge.
When the SR-µ-XANES spectra from each of the three particles (A, B and C) are directly compared
with a (UO2) reference spectrum, a high degree of similarity between each of the isolated particles
and the material standard, are observed. Uraninite is one of the primary U minerals with a
chemical composition that is near-entirely UO2 (although some degree of hyper-stoichiometry
will occur to yield a small additional component of triuranium octoxide - U3O8), with U existing
within the thermodynamically stable and insoluble U(IV) oxidation state. Notably, UO2 and the
Uraninite structure, is also the form in which nuclear fuel exists. Therefore, provenancing this
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material to either source represents a challenge for SR-µ-XANES analysis. Hence, knowledge
of the differences in the U atoms coordination chemistry determinable through the succeeding
EXAFS portion of the absorption spectrum - brought about by the effects of the materials
irradiation and incorporation of fission product species is required [258].
However, owing to the high thermal effects of the x-ray beam imparted onto the sample, difficulties
were experienced whereby the poor thermal conductivity of the tungsten needle onto which the
particle was mounted thermally drifted (in some instances by several microns) over the duration
of the experiment. When combined with the size of the incident beam (2 µm × 2 µm) being
greater than the material analysed, this vibration resulted in significant spectral noise. As such,
quantification of the subsequent and delicate EXAFS portion of the absorption spectrum (that
follows the main absorption edge and succeeding XANES region of the spectrum) - providing
information on bonding-state and coordination chemistry, was not possible.
8.5 Discussion
As invoked formerly in Chapter 7, one of the potential sources of this U-containing material
(and the other varying composition micron-scale atmospheric particulate), is the resuspension of
naturally-occurring mineral material [329]. The compositional results of this chapter, however,
firmly suggest that this mechanism is most likely not the source of this particulate.
From the EDS results of particles A, B and C - shown graphically in Figure 8.6 (e) and quantified
in Table 8.1 are detailed; (i) the high wt% U component, but also (and most distinctively), (ii)
the absence of other constituent elements contained at wt% concentrations within most other
commonly encountered U-bearing minerals [36, 354]. Such "accompanying" elements include As,
Th, Y, Ba, Zr and most of the REEs including; Ce, Sm, La, Nd, Dy and Gd. While these elements
have not been detected during this EDS analysis at the wt% abundances they would exist at in
naturally-occurring minerals, this does not constitute their complete absence from the particulate
at concentrations below the techniques lower limits of detection (LoD).
Owing to the low activities of the principal U isotopes (235U and 238U) - with half-lives of hundreds
of millions and billions of years respectively [52], if this material was formed of primordially-
aged, naturally-occurring U, then since its formation, there should exist a small component of
ingrown daughter product Pb. However, none of these were observed from the EDS analysis. This,
therefore, implies that the state secular equilibrium (the quantity of a radioactive isotope remains
constant as its production rate is equal to its decay rate) had recently been reset - with this
material either; (i) naturally-occurring - having been newly-formed and therefore yet to undergo
decay (and such daughter product ingrowth) or more likely, (ii) being non-natural in origin, with
the U having similarly yet to decay into an EDS-detectable quantity of these daughter products.
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Although the LoD of EDS analysis is poor in comparison to other analytical quantification
techniques (with a sensitivity of >0.01 wt%, or 100 ppm) its application would still be suitable in
this instance. If primordial in origin, 235U would have passed through 0.65 half-lives, while 238U
would have conversely decayed through exactly one half-life - resulting in the production of both
207Pb and 206Pb, for 235U and 238U respectively (after passing through a number of intermediary
decay steps). N.B. it is through measurements of Pb isotopes in U-rich Zircon minerals that it has
been possible to accurately determine the age of the Earth [365].
Despite the limited results provided by the SR-µ-XANES analysis of particles A, B and C - the
synchrotron findings do, however, support those of the EDS compositional analysis of the same
material. Alongside such compositional results, from this synchrotron analysis, the structure
of the samples is observed as analogous to the Uraninite (UO2) - with U existing near-entirely
within the U(IV) oxidation state. In nature, numerous other U-containing minerals also exist
- displaying an extensive compositional range, varying oxidation state, and differing atomic
structure [354]. A comparison of the differing U oxidation states and their influence on the
XANES spectrum is detailed (with respect to U contained within sub-mm ejecta particulate) in
Section 10.4.2 of Chapter 10. Alongside being the structure of naturally-occurring Uraninite,
both the structure (U(IV)) and composition (UO2) of this mineral are identical to the pressed and
sintered fuel employed almost universally in the global nuclear reactor inventory [21, 366].
An intricate microstructure observed within one of the ion beam sectioned particles, consisting of
a clustering of nano-scale crystallites at its centre, was shown in the electron microscope image
of Figure 8.7 (b). This observation further promotes a non-natural (anthropogenic) source of
this material. While compositional analysis of these features was not possible via EDS due to a
combination of the inadequate spatial resolution attainable by the instrument, as well as the
bulk dilution effect from the surrounding (enclosing) particle - the raised form of such inclusions
implies their elevated hardness over the bulk.
The anthropogenic nature of the ion beam sectioned particle (which extends to the other similarly
sourced U-containing particles) is further confirmed through its EDS compositional analysis.
As was shown in Figure 8.7 (d), alongside the homogeneous distribution of U (Figure 8.7 (c)),
was a similar Cs distribution - albeit at an expected lower wt% abundance. With only one
naturally-occurring mineral (found only in north-west Mexico) containing both U and Cs as
component cations [36, 354], a source other than Fukushima is therefore very unlikely. A number
of anthropogenically-derived minerals otherwise not encountered naturally, containing both U
and Cs, have been found close to the reactor as well as across the nearby Ukrainian environment
- produced by the 1986 Chernobyl accident [354].
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Figure 8.9: Schematic representation through an irradiated UO2 fuel pellet (11 mm in diameter).
Modified from [24], after the initial work by [23].
Whereas EDS analysis of the sectioned U particle was able to detect the existence of Cs,
the corresponding exterior surface analysis of the particles when adhered to the containing
substrates, however, was unable to detect (and quantify) any such Cs existence. This can, again,
be attributed to result from the larger than particle of interest electron beam-sample interaction
volume, generating characteristic x-ray emissions from depths of circa. 2 µm (Figure 5.1), hence
masking/diluting the low intensity Cs signal. With such thinned samples possessing thicknesses of
<100 nm, there is no bulbous sampling volume present beneath the particle - with the x-ray signal
and compositional analysis resulting only from the characteristic x-rays generated by the particle.
These Cs-containing U particles, are therefore almost certainly the result of the environmental
dispersion of fragmented, irradiated fuel, ejected from the FDNPP facility over the duration of,
or in the period following the accident. While both the U and O found within the particle arise
from the initial UO2 fuel material, the homogeneous distribution of Cs within the particle
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results from the incorporation of the major fission product species over power generation
operations. Such a distribution is consistent with numerous earlier works, exploring both the
structure and composition of post-irradiation nuclear fuel during standard operation as well as
following emergency/LOCI scenarios [23, 24, 367]. As shown within Figure 8.9, in addition to
existing at increased concentrations towards the outer-most portion of the non heat-affected/Pu-
enriched/high burn-up zone of the fuel pellet as intra-granular fission product gas bubbles
and oxide precipitates, Cs (as well as other fission product species) occurs also (at greater
concentrations) between the micron-scale grains as an inter-granular (grain-boundary) species.
Due to the "inter-granular" nature of the Cs, it (and other highly-volatile fission product gas
species), contained between the crystal grains as well as within the "gap region" between the fuel
element and the C and Zr-based cladding, are unlikely to represent the Cs encountered within
these micron/sub-micron particles. This inter-granular and "gap region" Cs not contained within
the physical lattice structure of the UO2 fuel, would be easily volatilised and liberated from the
material - therefore accounting for the large activity of radiocesium released by such a LOCI
[119, 135]. These gaseous and fine-scale ionic nature of this contamination has seen it sorbed
and strongly-bound onto the frayed-edge sites of various clay and mica-type minerals [167, 169].
In contrast, it is the intra-granular (lattice-bound) Cs that is the form of the fission product most
likely to exist within these micron-scale U-based particles, this "entrapped" Cs is difficult to
liberate from the UO2 crystal structure, hence providing a rationalisation to account for why the
full inventory of such volatile species are not fully-released during such a LOCI event - instead
existing contained within a "corium" composition volume formed during the event [24, 127, 368].
The existence of these micron-scale U-containing particles is consistent with the centrally located
and similarly sized material observed to exist at the centres of spherical "Cs-balls" by Abe et al.,
(2014) [192]. These balls (approximating 2.6 µm in diameter, isolated following air-sampling in
Tsukuba - 170 km south-west of the plant), are considered to have formed after the fragmentation
and Si-incorporation of the U fuel. With the high-pressure of Cs contained within the RPV being
readily incorporated into the outermost circumference of the partially-molten spherical reactor-
sourced Si before being transported away in the buoyant (super-heated) air-mass [193, 194].
With the large north-west trending plume, responsible for contaminating the sampling site
at Iitate Village having been formerly determined as resulting from the radiological release of
Unit 2 [69, 153, 160] (Section 2.2.5), this material is able to further substantiate claims and
support the current hypotheses that exist - that the PCV had indeed been compromised/breached
by the incident [2, 7, 34]. Alongside the leak of volatile species, actinide-containing material was
additionally released and deposited at localities up to 36 km from the site. Whereas the events
at reactor Units 1 and 3 were both violent explosions that resulted in large mushroom-cloud
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style emissions, the non-explosive emission from Unit 2, in contrast, was only evident at the
time of the release as a result of increased radioactivity levels detected by the (limited) on-site
monitoring network that survived the tsunami [33].
8.6 Conclusions and future work
This multi-technique analysis of micron-scale U-containing particulate has served to near
definitively attribute its provenance to result from the FDNPP accident, emitted from reactor
Unit 2 on the site. Not only is the form of each particle highly-indicative of such an anthropogenic
provenance, but also the coexistence of Cs distributed homogeneously within the UO2 material.
Although a number of studies have formerly identified the occurrence of a non-natural 235U/238U
atomic ratio across Fukushima Prefecture [142, 144] - the existence, isolation and microscopic
analysis of such actinide-bearing material from amongst bulk material had, until now, to be
undertaken. Despite representing only a small sub-sample of particulate derived from a single,
yet initially highly-contaminated site, these results compound earlier works - that core material
had been released from the FDNPP site [192], reaching distances of at least 40 km. Further
work will analyse additional U-containing material from other sampling sites across Fukushima
Prefecture to explore its similarity to that currently examined.
A further set of synchrotron experiments on this micron-scale material is planned on the I14
(nano-focus XAS) beamline at the Diamond Light Source to further quantify both composition,
phase and internal elemental distribution within either ion beam sectioned or unprepared
samples. To prevent the previously encountered beam-induced heating-related movement of
the particles while attached to the tips of the tungsten composition support needles, a different
particle preparation setup will be employed during this future work. This setup will again the
needle-mounted micron-scale particulate (sectioned or unprepared) being contained/wrapped
within adhesive Kapton film, however, the particles will only be mounted onto the tip of extruded
glass capillary needles and not the tungsten composition needle tips.
Subsequent TEM is proposed on a suite of samples after first exhausting all non-destructive
analytical methods. Having suitably ion beam thinned each particle sample, the materials
structure, as well as the phases present, can be derived. Such analysis would be focused towards
looking for evidence of nano-scale non-volatile fission product precipitates and heavier actinides
(e.g. Am, Pu and Cm). To determine high-accuracy isotopic information from each particle,
both Three-Dimensional Atom Probe Tomography (3D-APT) and/or Laser Ablation-Inductively
Coupled Plasma-Mass Spectrometry (LA-ICP-MS) are being explored as potential analytical tools
for interrogating such fine-scale material.
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From such isotopic analysis, the material can be further and more-strongly attributed to the
FDNPP accident. Not only confirming the anthropogenic nature of this material as a result of the
March 2011 accident, atomic ratios (e.g. 235U/238U, 135Cs/137Cs, 134Cs/137Cs, 240Pu/239Pu, and
241Pu/239Pu) and the presence of non-natural isotope abundances/activities (e.g. 234U and 236U
[144, 145], in addition to various other indicative transition/REE species [330]), will enable this
particulate material to be independently confirmed as originating from a specific source on the











STRUCTURAL AND COMPOSITIONAL ANALYSIS OF EJECTA
MATERIAL
Results and methods presented in this chapter have previously been published in the peer-reviewed
literature:
P.G. Martin, Y. Satou, I. Griffiths, D.A. Richards and T.B. Scott. "Analysis of external surface
irregularities on Fukushima-derived fallout particles". Frontiers in Energy Research: Nuclear
Energy, vol. 5. (25). p. 9, September 2017.
9.1 Introduction
In addition to the micron and sub-micron scale atmospheric particulate identified through
combined electron microscopy and characteristic x-ray (EDS) analysis (as described formerly
within Chapter 8), a suite of considerably larger particles were also released into the environment
- the analysis of which is herein described.
Alike to the earlier studies that occurred shortly after the accident which identified the micron-
scale "Cs-balls" within bulk aerosol and environmental samples through the application of
autoradiography [191, 192, 195], the same methods were also used to locate these sub-mm ejecta
particles - similarly discernible via their characteristic fissionogenic radiocesium γ-ray emission.
Contrasting to the significantly smaller atmospheric material, this larger ejecta material has been
sourced from sites located less than 2 km from the FDNPP, within Area 3 - or the region defined
as that where displaced inhabitants "are not expected to return (to their homes) for some time"
[156]. Owing to the more spatially limited extent of this sub-mm material, it has to-date been
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greatly understudied - with much still be to determined. While the spherical "Cs-balls" have been
located at sites of considerable distances (some as much as 170 km south-west) from the FDNPP
[191], where populations currently exist (or will shortly return under planned repopulations) -
the analysis of this more plant-proximal material, although distributed across localities where
people are not set to inhabit "for some time" is still of crucial importance in understanding the
accident scenario as well as any long-term environmental consequences that may likely result.
Despite the very limited works to date on such large-scale material [164, 190, 370], a number
of preliminary differences have been identified between this ejecta particulate and the vastly
size contrasting "Cs-balls". As mentioned earlier within the background provided in Section
2.3, during the study by Satou (2016) [164], the smaller (1 µm - 10 µm) spherical "Cs-ball"
material was referred to as "Type A", while the larger (70 µm - 400 µm) particulate as "Type
B". Whereas their size and the locations at which they were collected represented two macro-
scale characteristics for subdividing the particulate, their contrasting radiocesium (134Cs/137Cs)
activity ratios served as an objective indicator as to the materials contrasting provenance. From
γ-ray spectroscopy measurements during this work by Satou (2016) [164], the smaller "Type A"
particulate was attributed to Unit 2, with "Type B" material, conversely ascribed to having been
released from the neighbouring reactor Unit 1. These attributions were based on the comparison
to core inventories of radiocesium as predicted by the modelling of Nishihara et al., (2012) [50].
9.2 Aims
This chapter sought to provide an enhanced insight into the nature of "Type B" (Unit 1) derived
sub-mm ejecta particulate collected (and subsequently isolated) from a locality neighbouring the
FDNPP. Alongside information on its interior/exterior structure, when combined with information
on the particles composition and its elemental distribution, it is hoped that an initial hypothesis
into the mechanism(s) responsible for the formation of the material can be alluded to.
In addition to this Unit 1 ejecta particulate (designated CF-01), this chapter also sought to perform
a similar (albeit less extensive) analysis on Fukushima-derived particulates with a comparable
length-scale to "Type B" (Unit 1) material, but obtained, however, from a region attributed to
contamination from reactor Unit 2 [69, 153]. Not only do the area-wide contamination mapping
results illustrate a radiocesium signature indicative of reactor Unit 2, but this newly isolated
mm-scale radiocesium containing particle (designated FT-13) was sourced from a region that has
been shown to contain the highly-spherical "Type A", "Cs-balls" [193, 197, 371] - attributed to
reactor Unit 2 [164]. As a result, this chapter subsequently aimed; (i) to establish if this material
was sourced from reactor Unit 2 - despite being several orders of magnitude greater in size than
the typical "Cs-ball" particulate, or, (ii) if the material resulted from the reactor Unit 1 release -
although being located within an area contaminated with reactor Unit 2 fallout.
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Despite only being able to perform a highly-detailed analysis on a small sub-set of Fukushima-
derived ejecta particulate as part of this thesis, the wider aim of this work was to devise a
sequential analytical methodology, through which the subsequent analysis of further particulate
material could be based. Such an increased sample examination would not only provide an
improved statistical basis to the conclusions herein, but would also for the suitability of methods




The ejecta particulate sample studied during this work is described fully in Section 4.2, with
the majority of this work centred on material sourced from the bulk dust sample collected at
the Cambridge Filter Company (termed "Type B" [164]), denoted herein as CF-01. This site was
located less than 100 m from the site boundary, approximately 2 km north-north-west from the
facilities six reactor Units - with reactor Unit 1 invoked to be responsible for the release of this
material [164]. The latter, subsequent, portion of analysis was conducted on the mm-scale ejecta
material isolated from bulk sediment material collected from Futaba Town (designated FT-13) -
located directly west of the site within contamination attributed to reactor Unit 2.
Also detailed within Section 4.2 is the multi-stage process employed to isolate such particles
from the bulk substrate material (dust in this instance), to produce a sample either; (i) contained
within a "sandwich" of x-ray transparent adhesive Kapton™ film (DuPont ®), or (ii) securely
bonded to an adhesive and conductive carbon disc (Spectro-Tab™, TED PELLA Ltd.).
While numerous isolated particle samples of both CF-01 and FT-13 designation existed, owing to
combined time constraints and equipment availability (primarily synchrotron-based techniques),
only a representative suite of selected particles were analysed. Therefore, only a single particle
from the Cambridge Filter Company was analysed using all of the techniques subsequently
described, however, additional particles (three in total) extracted from the same bulk sediment
were used to contribute to γ-ray spectroscopy, combined scanning electron microscope (SEM) and
energy dispersive (x-ray) spectroscopy (EDS) surface analysis and bulk compositional analysis
via laboratory-based x-ray fluorescence (XRF). Only a single particle from Futaba was analysed,
although unlike the Unit 1 sourced CF-01 material, this particle was only subjected to γ-ray
spectroscopy, combined SEM-EDS surface analysis and laboratory-based x-ray tomography (XRT).
While this analysis was performed on only a small number of the total ejecta particles isolated
from each site, care was taken to ensure that the material analysed was representative of the
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Figure 9.1: X-ray analysis experimental setup, with the sub-mm CF-01 radioactive particle
enclosed within a double-layer thickness of Kapton™ film, mounted onto a support needle.
entire suite of material isolated from a localities bulk sample. This was achieved by pre-screening
each particle in the SEM, before selecting those on which to perform the succeeding and more
extensive body of analysis.
To further prepare either sample (CF-01 or FT-13) for x-ray characterisation (XRT and XRF),
additional layers of Kapton™ film were placed around the sample to provide a double thickness
of the film to securely contain the particle while in the instrument. Any surplus Kapton™ that
surrounded each of the particles was removed and an aluminium support pin mounted to the
Kapton™ using a quick-drying adhesive to produce a sample setup as shown in Figure 9.1. The
entire 5 mm × 12 mm pin-supported sample was subsequently secured onto a magnetic holder.
9.3.2 Gamma-ray spectroscopy
Prior to its extensive analysis, initial γ-ray spectroscopy of the particulate was undertaken using
methods identical to those described for the characterisation of bulk organic samples (Chapter 7),
obtained from the 14 localities extending along the north-westerly plume from the FDNPP. For
this quantification, the GR1 γ-ray spectrometer from Kromek Ltd. was used - positioned 1 cm
from the sample. A total counting time of six hours for each of the particles was used to ensure
sufficient signal quality. In addition to the spectra of the particulate, a background spectrum of
the detector within the shielded sample environment was also obtained to allow for background
subtraction and contributing peak identification.
9.3.3 Surface examination
Following the detailed analysis of the structure and composition of the micron-scale (atmospheric
particulate using combined focused ion beam (FIB) milling alongside high-resolution SEM and
EDS (Section 8.4.1), the same methods were also applied in the analysis of the outer surfaces
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of both forms of this larger ejecta particulate. Three of the CF-01 designation particles were
studied via this technique alongside the one mm-scale FT-13 particle. To perform this surface
analysis, one side of the Kapton™ film enclosing the particle was removed - with the remaining
side adhered to the surface of an adhesive carbon disc before being mounted on an SEM pin-stub.
As per the analysis of the atmospheric material, an FEI Helios™ NanoLab 600i DualBeam
system was used to perform the ion beam lithography (sectioning) of the various surface features
existent across the sample. After depositing a protective Pt strip to prevent any ion beam
induced surface damage, a succession of reducing Ga+ ion beam energies were used to remove
progressively finer amounts of material (as well as to protect against any surface "curtaining"
that may occur). The electrically conductive nature of both the sample and mount resulted in
a conductive coating (Au, Pt or C) need not be applied. Subsequent imaging and EDS analysis
was performed within the Zeiss SIGMA™ SEM with associated EDS (Octane Plus™ Si-drift and
TEAM control/analysis software) from EDAX Ltd.
9.3.4 Laboratory x-ray fluorescence
Initial compositional XRF quantification of the ejecta material samples was performed using the
Niton™ FXL 950 X-ray Lab, with the particulate sample securely contained within the Kapton™
film envelope. Positioned as close as possible to the instruments x-ray source (<1 mm) using the
systems inbuilt optical camera, the sample was irradiated with 25 keV x-rays for 500 seconds
through the four overlapping energy ranges (main, low, high and light). To analyse and quantify
the full range of potential elements within the sample (from C to U), the "TestAll Geo" peak-fitting
algorithm was used within the Thermo Scientific Inc. NDT™ analysis software. Three successive
scans were conducted and results combined for noise reduction through averaging each of the
recorded spectra.
9.3.5 Laboratory tomography
Alongside synchrotron tomographic reconstructions of the material, x-ray (absorption) tomography
was additionally performed using the Zeiss Xradia 520 Versa™ to attain structural and phase-
contrast data. The identical sample setup to the Niton™ XRF and subsequently described
synchrotron-based methods was employed, with the ejecta particulate enclosed within the double-
layer Kapton™ envelope (Figure 9.1).
Using the instruments Scout-and-Scan™ control software, a total of 3,601 rotational angles
(through 180°) were used, each scanned with a pixel resolution of 0.2410 µm over a 30-second
total exposure per point. An incident beam energy of 140 kV and 8.0 W was used to attain
maximum image contrast between the full range of elements (phases) likely to exist within the
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Figure 9.2: Experimental setup of the I13-1 experimental end-station.
sample. In order to attain the highest-possible spatial resolution, a ×40 optical magnification
was used alongside source-sample and sample-detector separations of 0.8 mm and 0.9 mm
respectively. A refinement of the source energy profile (specific for the sample) was made through
the insertion of the LE1 filter, upstream of the particle. Both three-dimensional reconstructions
and tomographic slices were performed using the instruments XM3D-Viewer™ software.
9.3.6 Synchrotron analysis
Further extending the surface analysis afforded through the FIB-SEM/EDS examination of the
material, the synchrotron radiation (SR) x-ray analysis of the large-scale internal structure and
elemental distribution within the ejecta material was performed on the I13-1 (coherence branch)
beamline at the Diamond Light Source (DLS). With 250 m distance between the insertion device
(undulator) and the experimental end-station, the beamline benefits from highly-coherent x-rays
(in-phase) with an energy range of 4 keV - 23 keV (19 keV used in this study). Full details of
the beamline are described in Section 5.4.5.2 as well as within [372], with a schematic shown in
Figure 9.2.
Owing to time constraints, only one of the particles isolated from the dust sample obtained from
the Cambridge Filter Company was analysed using synchrotron radiation - with separate scans
of the material undertaken using both SR-µ-XRT and SR-µ-XRF mapping.
Synchrotron tomography
The initial synchrotron scans of the material undertaken were SR-µ-XRT to derive the material’s
structure. Here, the sample was illuminated with a 19 keV collimated x-ray beam and rotated
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through a total of 180° in 1800 incremental steps to acquire a series of grey-scale images which
could be subsequently rendered into a three-dimensional volumetric projection. These absorption
(phase contrast) images were obtained using an optical microscope coupled to a 26 µm GGG:Eu
scintillator, providing a ×20 sample magnification. This resulted in a 0.45 µm pixel size.
An x-ray camera placed downstream (behind) the sample was used to acquire data on the
degree of sample absorption (transmission) that occurred at each of the stage positions (rotations)
using a dwell-time (exposure) of 0.5 seconds per stage position.
Synchrotron fluorescence
Synchrotron XRF was performed, with the same incident 19 keV x-ray beam, however, focused
using Kirkpatrick-Baez (KB) mirrors rather than being sourced directly from the beamlines
insertion device (undulator). A 10 µm pinhole located upstream of the sample was used to remove
any undesired "wings" from the focal spot. Unlike the XRT, the sample was scanned (using this
refined beam) in a raster (snake) pattern - translated through the incident beam at 10 µm steps
while additionally rotated through 180°in a reduced number of only 40 incremental steps to
derive a three-dimensional image with each pixel composed of a complete fluorescence spectrum.
Limited by the diameter of the upstream focusing aperture - a 10 µm pixel size was achieved. The
step size of the stage during these raster scans was selected to match this spot size, at 10 µm.
A single element Vortex™ (Hitachi High Technology) fluorescence detector, positioned perpendicular
to the sample and incident beam (Figure 9.2), was used alongside custom-built control and data
acquisition software, developed in-house at the DLS. An increased dwell-time for XRF, of two
seconds per acquisition (pixel), was used to derive the highest possible intensity fluorescence
signal with minimal noise contribution.
Reconstructions
From the series of thousands of iterative projections, a three-dimensional volume for each
element was reconstructed using the ordered-subset penalised maximum likelihood algorithm,
with weighted linear and quadratic penalty algorithms in the TomoPy framework [373]. An
iterative algorithm to correct for the level of sample self-absorption was also employed during
the processing of tomography results (publication in preparation by the I13-1 beamline scientists).
The combined x-ray fluorescence (XRF) and x-ray absorption tomography (XRT) signals were
both reconstructed and graphically rendered using the FEI Avizo™ software package [374]. Sole
XRT renderings were processed using the open-source ImageJ software package with the HDFS
plugin (to interrogate the stack of outputted .HDF files).
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Figure 9.3: Typical background subtracted γ-ray spectrum for one of the sub-mm ejecta particles
with contributing peaks identified.
9.4 Results
The results presented in Sections 9.4.1 through 9.4.5 represent those obtained from the analysis
of the CF-01 ejecta particulate, for which Satou (2016) [164], attributed to have originated from
the FDNPP Unit 1, and the reactor building hydrogen explosion that occurred on the afternoon of
the 12th March 2011 [2]. The analysis of the larger FT-13 ejecta particle is subsequently presented
in Section 9.4.6.
9.4.1 Gamma-ray spectroscopy
Due to their identical source provenance, the γ-ray spectra obtained from the three CF-01 ejecta
particles were identical - with the background subtracted spectrum shown in Figure 9.3. Despite
only depicting the sole contributions from radiocesium (134Cs and 137Cs) - with the production
of a near-identical γ-ray spectrum to the bulk organic material obtained at the sampling sites
60 km north-west of the plant (Figure 6.19) - there exists a slight difference in the 134Cs to
137Cs (primary) peak ratios when decay corrected to March 2011, between these plant-proximal
individual particles and the more plant-distal bulk material.
With the decay-corrected activities of each of the CF-01 ejecta particles averaging 35 kBq, the
134Cs/137Cs activity ratio of these particles (determined through peak intensity subtraction) is
0.94, less than the 1.05 determined for the samples obtained from along the primary north-
westerly plume. This serves to confirm the provenance of this material as having been derived
from the FDNPP Unit 1, as invoked in the earlier works [153, 164] - having matched the reactor
core inventory modelling values published in the works of Nishihara et al., (2012) [50].
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9.4.2 Surface irregularities and composition
A secondary electron image of one of the entire CF-01 particles is shown in Figure 9.4 (a).
Observable is the highly angular form and irregular surface texture. While the majority of the
samples outer surface is smooth, a considerable portion, however, is characterised by numerous
pits or recesses - each sub-micron to several microns in diameter, all typically rounded in their
form (Figure 9.4 (b)). Also distributed across the surface are numerous elongate fibrous features
(Figure 9.4 (c)). These fibres all vary in their thickness; occurring with dimensions from less than
10 µm, through to bulbous portions averaging 30 µm - 35 µm in maximum diameter. The total
length of these fibres also varies, from short lengths of 50 µm through to longer sections over
100 µm. Observable from Figure 9.4 (a) is the fibres attachment mechanism to the body of the
particle (yellow dashed region), where each of these strands is physically fused at its ends to the
particle’s surface.
An EDS spectrum acquired over the entire sample is shown in Figure 9.5. As observed in earlier
works [164, 190], the constituents comprising the majority of the particle are Si, O, C and Na.
Further component elements consistent with these earlier studies include P, K, Ti, Ca, Mn, Fe
and Zn. Also observed is the higher atomic (Z) number element Ba (albeit at low concentrations) -
a fission product readily-volatilised and released in the reducing atmosphere typical of a nuclear
reactor [125]. The work by Ono et al., (2017) [190], also detected Pb and Cr in some particles -
although none was detected in this large-area raster scan. The existence of such elements agrees
with the results of studies on the smaller, spherical material, derived from Unit 2 [191, 192].
The supplementary results of EDS point analyses taken across the entirety of all three CF-
01 samples are shown in the three compositional plots of Figure 9.6. Of the elements present
within the samples, the most abundant is Si - with the weight percentage - wt% (or mass fraction),
component of this element ranging from 24.9 wt% to 53.8 wt%. Within this range, two distinct
clusters can be observed - with Si compositions ranging between 24.9 wt% to 37.1 wt% and 44.6
wt% to 53.8 wt%. This upper range of data points was determined from the fibres that lay across
the surface of the particle, whereas the lower values were all associated with the surrounding
bulk of the particle. A similar elemental enrichment associated with the fibrous component
of the material is also apparent for Al - where a clear compositional difference is observed
between the bulk particle and the associated surface fibre. As shown in Figure 9.6, the fibre
contains more than four times the concentration of aluminium than the material that surrounds
it. Also enriched within the particle, although not at levels as high as for both Si and Al, is the
halogen-group element Cl. As highlighted within Figure 9.6, the fibres all displayed an elevated
Cl content (average 2.02 wt%), whereas the remainder of the particle contains comparatively
little Cl (average 0.27 wt%).
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Figure 9.4: Secondary electron images of; (a) one of the entire sub-mm CF-01 designation
particles, (b) smooth surface region showing micron and sub-micron sized recesses and, (c)
fibrous surface feature - with line of section (Figure 9.7 (a)) shown.
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Figure 9.5: EDS spectrum derived for the entire sub-mm sized ejecta particle.
Figure 9.6: Elemental comparison of both the fibrous and surrounding bulk particle. Values are
derived from the compositional analysis of three separate ejecta particles.
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Figure 9.7: EDS line scans (Si and Zn) across the fibrous features on particle surfaces; (a) line
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In contrast, however, some elements show an observable depletion within the fibrous features in
relation to the surrounding bulk particle. The transition elements of Fe and Zn both show a large
reduction in their relative concentration across the fibre features. Fe occurs within the fibres
with a mean value of 0.41 wt%, whereas away from these structures, the average mass fraction is
7.47 wt%. Similar compositional variation is observed for Zn, however, to a much lesser extent -
with the particle containing an average of 0.16 wt%, and the surrounding bulk particle 0.69 wt%.
Several elements do not display any discernible difference in their abundance between the
enclosing particle and the fibres. Both Ca and Na exhibit a wide compositional variation of
several wt%, however, neither element shows a marked difference in abundance between EDS
results obtained from the particle or the fibres. The other elements; Mg, K and Ti, all show a
much smaller spread in their composition (<1 wt%), with no significant difference observable
between EDS results obtained over either region. A small amount of compositional difference is,
however, observed for Pb between the contrasting regions of the sample (having not previously
been identified in the large area EDS raster analysis). However, the degree of overlap is small
and could be invoked as insignificant given the low concentrations of this element (between 0.22
wt% and 0.70 wt%) within either region. While Pb is used extensively within nuclear facilities
as a shielding material [35], its ductility has additionally afforded its usage as cladding for the
various thermally insulated pipes of the heat-exchanger network (personal communication with
TEPCO engineer).
The results of an EDS line scan across a fibrous structure (position identified in Figure 9.4
(c)) are shown in Figure 9.7 (a), detailing the compositional variance for both Si and Zn. As is
shown graphically in Figure 9.6, a considerable enrichment in Si exists across the width of the
fibre, above the lower levels observed within the surrounding particle bulk. A similar depletion of
the fibre in Zn, as again shown quantitatively in Figure 9.6, is also shown within the line scan
across the raised fibre. Results from an identical line scan over a thicker diameter fibre (28 µm)
are shown in Figure 9.7 (b). These results are consistent with the smaller fibre, (Figure 9.7 (a)),
with a considerable enrichment in Si, and a corresponding depletion in Zn.
EDS analysis of both the bulk particle and the fibrous features showed no discernible emission
peaks for Cs (Figure 9.5), however, the γ-ray spectrum derived from the particulate, as shown in
Figure 9.3, shows the characteristic radiocesium emission (it is these γ-ray emissions that were
used to initially locate the material through autoradiography). The low sample penetration depth
(circa. 2 µm) afforded by EDS analysis [239], therefore dictates that the Cs contained within the
particle may be contained at depth below the surface of the particle, or more likely, present at
concentrations below that detectable by EDS (Limit of Detection = 0.01 wt%). An inhomogeneous
distribution of radiocesium has previously been identified through synchrotron analysis of the
finer-scale (circa. 2 µm) spherical "Cs-ball" (Unit 2) material [192, 194], with the Cs concentrated
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Figure 9.9: Rose diagram detailing the orientations of the fibres found on the surfaces of the
three CF-01 (Unit 1) ejecta particles studied.
exclusively around the particles circumference. Owing to the potential commonality in their
formation mechanism, a comparable (inhomogeneous) spatial distribution of Cs is hence expected.
A secondary electron image of a fibre following focused ion beam sectioning is shown in Figure
9.8 (a). From this image, the lack of internal structure within the fibres is apparent - with no
micro-scale crystals or discernible external outer rim or rind around its circumference. Towards
the top right of the image are two small micron-sized voids, most-likely representing the location
of gaseous inclusions associated with the materials formation or the exsolution of formerly
contained volatile species.
The glassy and amorphous nature of the principally Si-based CF-01 ejecta particle was confirmed
through the application of Raman spectroscopy. A broad spectrum, absent of any specific peaks,
was observed - illustrating the materials long-range structural disorder [375].
Elemental EDS mapping of the region imaged in Figure 9.8 (a) is shown in Figures 9.8 (b)
and (c), for Si and Al respectively. From these maps, the uniform distribution of Si along the
external surface as well as through the fibre’s interior is apparent. The reduced concentrations
of Si present within the bulk region immediately surrounding the particle is also evident -
supporting the earlier line scan EDS results shown formerly in Figures 9.7 (a) and (b). Whereas
Al was observed to have an enrichment within the fibre in contrast to the containing bulk particle
(as shown formerly in the plot of Figure 9.6), a contrast is apparent in Figure 9.8 (c), between the
fibres outermost surface and its interior.
203
CHAPTER 9. STRUCTURAL AND COMPOSITIONAL ANALYSIS OF EJECTA MATERIAL
To assess this, additional EDS line scans were performed - outwards from the fibre centre, to
quantify their compositional consistency. The resultant line scan over the particles end-section
for Si, is shown in Figure 9.8 (d) and supports the earlier findings - with the concentration of
Si consistent (average 58 wt%) from the fibre’s centre through to its exterior surface. However,
while the line scan of Al shows that the concentration of Al within the fibre’s sectioned core
is constant (Figure 9.8 (e)) - a 40% increase in Al concentration is associated with its external
surface (increasing from 5 wt% to 7 wt%).
Acting also as an indicator of the provenance of the material, although not as powerful as
assessing composition, the orientation of these features across the surface of the particulate could
yield information regarding the conditions of formation. A rose diagram detailing the orientation
of the fibres encountered across the surface of these three samples is shown in Figure 9.9. From
this plot, the spread of fibre orientations appears highly-uniform. This directionality distribution
may, therefore, suggest that these fibrous features result from a source material that is itself
highly-heterogeneous in form. Conversely, this material may exist as the result of an event that
served to generate a wide orientation variance. While an examination of the structure across the
ejecta particles surfaces has been performed, a contrasting texture may exist within its interior.
9.4.3 Tomographic reconstructions
Unlike the analysis of the outermost regions of the particles(s) afforded by combined FIB and
SEM-EDS, the application of XRT provides not only a non-destructive means through which
to study a material but also a method to investigate its internal structure alongside its basic
phase/density composition.
Iso-surface renderings showing views of the "front" and "back" (defined as the long axis of
the particle perpendicular to the source) of a CF-01 ejecta particle derived from the SR-µ-XRT
are shown in Figures 9.10 (a) and (b) respectively. Apparent from both renderings is the highly-
complex and heterogeneous internal structure of the material, with many near-spherical voids
existing over a wide range of sizes - the largest of which measures 80 µm, while the smallest
occurs with a diameter of less than 0.8 µm. A total of 24% of the particle is constituted by such
void space. The particle can be viewed as foam-like internally, but with a solid, and generally
smoothed, outer-surface.
In addition to this considerable porosity, a large solid fragment (subsequently identified as Fe-
based via SR-µ-XRF) is observed to exist, embedded in the outer surface of the sample, closely
surrounded by several of these large-diameter pores. The location of this fragment is highlighted
(orange) within Figure 9.10 (a), and is further detailed in the corresponding tomographic slices
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Figure 9.10: SR-µ-XRT renderings of; (a) the "front" face of the particle, with the location of the
Fe-rich inclusion highlighted alongside lines of section (Figure 9.11), and (b) the "back" surface.
through the sample in both Figures 9.11 (a) and (b). In these sections, taken vertically and
horizontally through the sample, the fragment (composed near-exclusively of Fe) is observed to
represent the only prominent surface extrusion aside from the fibrous features and surface pitting.
As well as the discontinuous (unconnected) nature of the majority of the voids, an approximately
bi-modal size distribution of the pore-space is evident, illustrated through the tomographic slices
shown in Figures 9.11 (a) and (b). With mean diameters of the larger voids at 70 µm, the smaller
voids occur with diameters ranging between 5 µm and 20 µm (a small number of vesicles also
occur as small as 1.5 µm). Both are generally distributed homogeneously throughout the material
apart from a slight edge enrichment in the smaller voids. Several areas exist, however, where
very few (or none) of any size void exist (shaded green in Figures 9.11 (a) and (b)).
Identified in Figures 9.11 (a) and (b) by dashed white boxes, are the locations that interactions
occur between the various voids. In each case, the smaller voids are observed to impinge upon the
larger ones - resulting in a slight degree of deformation (of the larger voids) as well as highlighting
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Figure 9.11: SR-µ-XRT sections; (a) vertically and (b) horizontally through the particle (as
identified in Figure 9.10). The location of the Fe-rich particle (orange) and regions of low void





CaO 60.2 - 66.3 62.5 ± 0.76
SiO2 18.2 - 23.4 25.1 ± 0.33
Al2O3 2.4 - 6.3 2.3 ± 0.02
Fe2O3 1.3 - 6.1 6.8 ± 0.05
MgO 0.6 - 4.8 1.4 ± 0.02
Na2O 0.05 - 1.2 0.3 ± 0.01
K2O 0.05 - 1.2 0.1 ± 0.01
SO3 1.7 - 4.6 1.5 ± 0.02
Table 9.1: Comparison of the reference wt% composition of Portland Cement (from [376]), with
EDS wt% results from the green highlighted regions (as identified in Figures 9.11 (a) and (b)).
the relative order of formation (with the larger voids emplaced initially, ahead of the smaller
ones). The likely, yet uncommon amalgamation of these smaller pores, identified with a yellow
box and * in Figure 9.11 (b), details their potential parallel formation - potentially contributing
to the production of the larger diameter voids.
The results of EDS elemental analysis (plotted as oxide ratios) taken over the low void density
exterior regions of the sample, highlighted in green in Figures 9.11 (a) and (b), are detailed
in Table 9.1 alongside those of a reference Portland Cement (from [376]). This compositional
similarity of the low void density regions within the CF-01 particle with that of the reference
Portland cement clearly illustrates these fragments as having originated as former structural
material, associated with the reactor. Their existence, alongside the Fe-based particle, would
be expected from such a reactor building explosion, which served to explosively produce such
composition ejecta species. A contrasting hardness between the Fe and concrete could serve to
explain the difference in the surface form of both included "fragment" types.
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Figure 9.12: Zeiss Xradia Versa™ two-dimensional (flat) x-ray absorption image through the
particle, the location of the formerly identified Fe-rich particle is highlighted.
Of the two materials, structural concrete (as used in nuclear reactor facilities) has a typical value
for Mohs Hardness of between 5.0 and 6.0 [37, 376, 377]. In contrast, the Fe-based particle which
through EDS is shown to have a composition equatable to a steel possesses a hardness of between
7.0 and 8.5, brought about by its heat treatment/fabrication process [35, 377]. As a consequence
of these hardness differences, during as well as after the explosion, the "softer" concrete material
that would have likely existed extruded from the surface of the particle, would have been easily
eroded/abraded to produce a rounded particle surface, contrasting to the "harder" Fe-rich material
- which in contrast, did not.
In addition to the SR results, a two-dimensional slice of the particle is shown in Figure 9.12,
obtained using the lab-based Zeiss Xradia Versa™ system. As well as both the extensive void
volume (previously calculated at 24%) and the previously discussed, extruding Fe-rich particle
(highlighted in Figure 9.12), despite representing only a single vertical slice taken across the
length of the sample - a number of additional, smaller and higher-density (dark) particles are
observed, not otherwise identified in the lower-resolution SR analysis. While the SR analysis
afforded both tomography combined with fluorescence (elemental) mapping (whereas the Xradia
Versa™ could only perform three-dimensional absorption contrast imaging); the increased time
available, maximum spatial resolution (pixel size) attainable as well as the number of rotational
tomographic slices, together enabled for an improved internal sample visualisation over the
internal imaging performed on the I13-1 synchrotron beamline during the initial beam-time.
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A number of renderings, based on the computed tomographic absorption derived from the Xradia
Versa™ system, are shown in Figure 9.13. In each of the four visualisations of the particle,
alongside the large surface projecting Fe-rich fragment (highlighted in each case), there exists a
significant number of additional (albeit smaller) high-density particles.
Analogous to the bimodal distribution observed for the voids contained within this particle
- a similar size deviation is apparent for these solid inclusions. The largest of the fragments
occur within maximum dimensions between 25 µm and 100 µm. The smaller, grouping comprises
particles ranging from 1 µm - 3 µm in maximum dimension. Whereas the grouping of larger
fragments occurs exclusively with a significant degree of observed angularity, the smaller material
occurs with a variable morphology from angular to highly-spherical in nature. In addition, the
frequency at which the fragments (classified into these two groups) occur within the sub-mm
particle are very different - with five times the number of smaller (angular to rounded) material
existing over the order of magnitude larger, and solely-angular, material.
As well as the increased frequency of the material, a further disparity is associated with the
location at which these smaller fragments exist. Highlighted within the tomographic renderings
(Figure 9.13), the larger material is strongly associated with the very outer circumference of
the particle, whereas the considerably smaller material is found located at positions marginally
closer to the centre of the CF-01 ejecta particle - away from its surface. Supporting the SR-µ-XRT
results, the results from the Xradia Versa™ XRT also highlights the majority of this larger
material existing protruding from the ejecta particles surface. Identical also to the distribution of
voids within the sub-mm particle (Figure 9.11), there also exist locations whereby neither of the
two particle size groupings is observed to exist as has been associated with the locations of the
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Figure 9.14: SR-µ-XRF spectrum obtained from the entire sub-mm ejecta particle, with
contributing emission peaks identified.
9.4.4 Fluorescence spectroscopy
A representative SR-µ-XRF spectrum from the CF-01 ejecta particle is shown in Figure 9.14.
While the characteristic emissions at <3 keV (principally the bulk elements Na, Mg, Al and
Si), are below the energies attainable on the beamline, a compositional agreement with prior
SR analysis on Unit 1 material is attained [190], showing a considerable Fe and Pb component.
While EDS is capable of attaining abundance sensitivities of >100 ppm, XRF is conversely able to
quantify elemental concentrations down to ppm levels [262, 378]. XRF is further advantageous
over EDS, as no vacuum is required to ensure the unimpeded path of the incident electron beam
onto the sample through which the characteristic x-rays (EDX) are generated.
Unlike the results obtained via EDS analysis of the material (Section 9.4.2), the x-ray emission
peaks from SR-µ-XRF additionally detail the existence of Cr, Ni, Cu, Rb, Sr, Zr alongside the
principal fission product, Cs. Whereas EDS identified both Ba and Mn within the particulate,
these elements were not encountered during this SR compositional analysis. The study by Ono
et al., (2017) [190], also identified the presence of additional elements, however, these were
not identified during this work due to either their potential absence/low concentration/spectral
overlap with other elements (Nb, Mo and U), characteristic emissions beyond that achievable on
the beamline (Ag, Cd, Sn, In, Pd, Sb, Te, and Ba), or their highly-limited spatial extent.
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Figure 9.15: Sources of the various composition materials occurring within (and around) a
nuclear reactor. Modified from [192].
All of the elements contained within this ejecta particulate have been formerly assigned in
the work of Abe et al., (2014) [192], to originate from either the reactor pressure vessel (PRV), its
neutron-absorbing control rods, the fuel elements themselves or their Zr-Sn based (Zircaloy-4™)
cladding material. A schematic of which is shown in Figure 9.15 - consistent with the materials
application in nuclear facilities as described in the review by Zinkle and Was (2013) [35].
The subsequent bulk fluorescence spectrum produced from the laboratory-based Niton™ XRF
system is shown in Figure 9.16. Whilst able to attain fluorescence emissions at greater energies
(25 keV) - after collection, normalisation and quantification of the results with the Thermo
Scientific Inc. NDT™ software, an energy window between 10.0 keV and 16.0 keV (highlighted
grey in Figure 9.16) was observed to contain no characteristic emission peaks, owing to a fault
with the systems x-ray detector over that energy range.
Despite the absence of any emission peaks from this 6 keV window; the confirmation of previously
determined elements as well as the existence of additional elements beyond those previously
identified through either EDS or SR-µ-XRF, are apparent within this spectrum. An approximate
quantification provided by the platforms peak-fitting and signal intensity correction algorithms
was also possible, as shown in Table 9.2. This spectrum and associated quantification shows
the occurrence of a near-identical suite of elements as determined by Ono et al., (2017) [190],
derived through SR-µ-XRF analysis, including; Fe, Zn, Cr, Mn, Zr, Nb, Mo, Ag, Cd, Cs, Rb, Ni, Pd
and U. The Niton™ laboratory-based XRF analysis also determined contributions from Cl and
Ca - alongside a significant signal from Si. These three elements all occur with x-ray emissions
below those quantifiable in the preliminary study (on similar material) by Ono et al., (2017)
[190]. Like the SR-µ-XRF spectroscopy provided by the I13-1 beamline, the upper energy limit of
this laboratory-based system (25 keV) does not permit the detection and quantification of the
primary x-ray emissions of In, Sn, Sb, Te, and Ba, all of which may have existed within this
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Figure 9.16: XRF spectrum derived from the entire particle using the Niton™ FXL 950 X-ray Lab
with contributing emission peaks identified. The region absent of x-ray emissions is highlighted.
particulate. The measurement errors as determined by the instrument for each of the elements
are shown in Table 9.2 alongside the results of the materials compositional quantification. These
values (like the peak-fitted quantification) will feature a considerable level of inaccuracy due to
the absence of emissions between 10 keV and 16 keV. As a consequence of this uncertainty, the
Niton™ XRF analysis is, therefore, more appropriately considered as a qualitative representation
of the particles composition over a quantitative one.
In contrast to this previous study, however, the emission peaks observed at the higher-energy
portion of the spectrum (Figure 9.16) detail the existence of Tc and Rh. Both elements are known
fission products, generated with yields of around 6% and 3.6% respectively [133]. The main
isotope of Tc is 99Tc - with a low activity and lengthy half-life (211,000 years) [52], it would still
exist at an abundance close to original levels long after a release event. Two isotopes of Rh are
produced as fission products - 103Rh and 105Rh. Whereas 103Rh is radiologically stable, 105Rh
conversely exists with a half-life of only 35.36 hours [52], before decaying into the stable 105Pd -
the form that would now exist. Alongside 105Pd, other isotopes are also produced (105Pd, 106Pd,
107Pd, 108Pd, 109Pd and 110Pd), with a combined fission product yield of circa. 8% [133]. The Pd
primary (Kα) emission peak (in Figure 9.16), exists as a higher-energy shoulder and broadening


































Table 9.2: Average weight percentage quantification of the CF-01 ejecta particulate as determined
via the Niton™ FXL 950 X-ray Lab and associated Thermo Scientific Inc. NDT™ peak fitting and
quantification software. * The results are plotted as oxide wt% for applicable elements and as
pure elements for native species. The measurement errors on these values is shown.
Despite being known fission products, neither Tc or Rh have been identified in the Fukushima-
derived ejecta particulate material until now. Resulting from the earlier reactor inventory studies
of Pontillon et al., (2010) [125], as part of the large French-led multinational VERCORS project,
both Rh and Pd were similarly classified within the "semi-volatile" group - one of four fission
product emission categories (the others being "volatile", "low-volatility" and "non-volatile").
Elements within this group include Mo, Ba and Pd - all of which have also been observed to exist
within these Fukushima-sourced ejecta particles. Such "semi-volatile" elements are released at
levels of 50% - 100% of their total core-inventory, with deposition occurring at locations "close to
their source".
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Table 9.3: Elemental volumes of the total CF-01 ejecta particle as determined via SR-µ-XRF
mapping on the I13-1 beamline. The total particle volume, derived through SR-µ-XRT analysis -
also performed on the I13-1 beamlines, is additionally shown.
Such an inconsistent occurrence of both Tc and Rh within the ejecta particulate not only supports
the results of the VERCORS test-studies; highlighting the incomplete release (<100%) and
subsequent deposition of such composition material close to the plant, but also compounds the
conclusions of Ono et al., (2017) [190], that there exists an extreme amount of compositional
heterogeneity within this particulate. The results of other fuel post-irradiation and reactor release
studies have provided additional insight into the inconsistent elemental distribution that exists
throughout the fuel matrix [23, 24, 379]. Such low concentrations of Tc and Rh, in this instance,
most likely represents; (i) the low concentration of these elements in a typical burn-up nuclear
fuel and, (ii) the spatial distribution at which these species are located - hence not being fully
represented within this particulate sample set. Unlike species such as Cs, I, Xe, Kr and C which
exist within either the void space between the fuel pellet/cladding or as discrete gas bubbles
within the fuel matrix [23, 24], both Rh and Tc (alongside other elements) occur as inter-granular
precipitates, and are therefore less easily liberated from the irradiated fuel.
9.4.5 Species distribution
Applying the SR-µ-XRF mapping results to the SR-µ-XRT rendering of the particle, yields the full
three-dimensional compositional rendering shown in Figure 9.17. From these reconstructions, a
high-degree of internal species heterogeneity is observed.
Of note is the distribution of Cs. From prior studies on the circa. 2 µm spherical "Cs-ball"
particulate attributed to having been released from reactor Unit 2 at the FDNPP, Cs was
observed to be spatially inhomogeneous within the Si-glass matrix - concentrated radially around
the particle [193, 194, 197]. From Figure 9.17, the Cs is observed to occur in a few limited, but
highly-concentrated locations. As well as surrounding the internal surface of the smaller voids,
the Cs is principally associated with the locations of the larger, yet spatially discrete Fe-rich
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Figure 9.17: SR-µ-XRT rendering of the particle, overlain with compositional data derived via
SR-µ-XRF mapping. Scale bar = 100 µm.
regions. The same highly-concentrated and heterogeneous distribution is also observed for a
number of the other elements, as shown in Figure 9.17, including; Fe and Ti. In contrast, a more
spatially extensive elemental distribution is shown by the additional species of Sr, Mn, Pb and Zr,
yet all are still distributed heterogeneously throughout the ejecta particle. All of these elements,
however, are observed to occur at higher concentrations radially around the external perimeter of
the sub-mm particle, with little (or none) existing towards the particles centre.
With the preliminary results obtained on a small (circa 70 µm) sub-region of a similar reactor
Unit 1 particle by Ono et al., (2017) [190], likewise exhibiting a circumference enrichment in Cs,
a similar origin for this species as a component of the material can be instigated. A mechanism to
account for this peripheral distribution of Cs in Unit 2 "Cs-ball" material (classified as "Type A"
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by Satou (2016) [164]) has been provided by Kogure et al., (2016) [194]. Kogure and co-authors
invoked that gaseous Cs (as Cs2O and CsOH etc.) was "diffused into the Si glass particles from
outward to inward after the formation of the glass particles in the atmosphere of the reactor".
This work continued by speculating, that such Cs diffusion would likely have occurred after the
onset of solidification of the Si matrix at high temperature. If such a matrix were to be molten
at the time of Cs exposure, then enhanced diffusion would occur to yield Cs at greater depths
within the material than otherwise observed [380].
In relation to the previously discussed bi-modal void structure of the particle, while no Cs
(and to a lesser-extent, Sr) were observed associated with the larger diameter pores - distributed
homogeneously throughout the sample, the converse was observed for the smaller, µm-scale voids.
These more circumference-concentrated voids were observed to exist with elevated levels of both
Cs and Sr - suggesting both species occur as a result of the coating of/condensation onto the
interior surfaces of such micron-scale voids.
A volumetric breakdown of the various elemental components contained within the CF-01 ejecta
particle are shown in Table 9.3, as determined through the SR-µ-XRF mapping performed on the
DLS I13-1 beamline. The total particle volume as derived through the co-incident SR-µ-XRT is
also included in Table 9.3. From these values, these seven specific elements (Cs, Mn, Sr, Zr, Ti, Pb
and Fe) together constitute circa. 9% of the particles total internal volume. Owing to the differing
degrees of elemental co-existence that occurred across the pixels used to derive these values,
the resultant errors associated with the signal contribution deconvolution is approximated to
represent ±5% for each of these elements.
From this compositional volume analysis, the total Cs contained within this representative
CF-01 ejecta particle is shown to constitute 0.002% of the sample’s total (XRT-derived) volume.
Immediately prior to the combined SR analysis, γ-ray spectroscopy of this sample (against
radiocesium reference standards) found it to exhibit a total activity of 18,600 Bq - associated
with radiocesium isotopes 134 + 137Cs. The majority of such activity was associated with the
longer-lived 137Cs (16,800 Bq) over the much shorter-lived 134Cs (1,800 Bq), which had decayed
through approximately three half-lives since its environmental release. Converting this activity
(of Cs) to a mass (assuming 1 g of 134Cs has an activity of 48.10 TBq and the same 1 g of 137Cs
has an activity of 3.215 TBq [75]), yields a value of approximately 4.7×10-9 g of 137Cs alongside a
much smaller 3.74×10-11 g of 134Cs.
The volume of this fissionogenic Cs contained within this ejecta particle can be approximated
(assuming a Cs density of 1.93 g cm-1 [165]). This yields a total radiocesium volume of 14,240 µm3
- of which 137Cs constitutes 10,170 µm3 and 134Cs comprises 70 µm3. Assuming a 135Cs/137Cs
ratio for reactor Unit 1 of 0.35 - 0.40, as calculated from the ORIGEN modelling by Nishihara
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et al., (2012) [50], this yields a 135Cs volume of approximately 4,000 µm3. Such an assumption,
that Cs exists as a native (metallic) element rather than as one of its various oxides (e.g. Cs11O3,
Cs4O, Cs7O, and Cs2O), is likely to introduce a degree of uncertainty to these constituent (isotope)
volumetric values.
The final main isotope of Cs to contribute to the total XRF signal would be the primordial
133Cs - also being produced at very low fission product yields [133] - several orders of magnitude
less than 134Cs, 135Cs and 137Cs. In the isotopic analysis undertaken by Imoto et al., (2017) [371],
a substantial 133Cs component within similar Fukushima-derived particulate was highlighted.
From the combined γ-ray spectroscopy and secondary ion mass spectrometry (SIMS) analysis
on a suite of samples sourced from around the perimeter of the plant, a 137Cs/133Cs isotopic
ratio of ≈1.0 was determined - illustrating approximately equal quantities of both Cs isotopes.
However, the approximate Cs budgeting presented above accounts for the entirety of the Cs to
exist as radiocesium; either 134Cs, 135Cs or 137Cs - with no contribution remaining for 133Cs. This
contrasting absence of any such primordial 133Cs is supported through the subsequent SIMS
analysis detailed in Section 10.4.3.
9.4.6 FT-13
Gamma-ray spectroscopy
The γ-ray spectrum obtained from the single FT-13 ejecta particle is shown in Figure 9.18. Alike
to the background subtracted γ-ray spectrum of the CF-01 particulate presented previously
in Figure 9.3, the emission energies detected correspond solely to those of the fission product
isotopes of radiocesium - 134Cs and 137Cs. After a decay correction of both isotopes activities to
the March 2011 release date, a 134Cs/137Cs (activity) primary peak ratio of 1.05 is observed. The
total activity of this particle (at the time of measurement in October 2017) was determined to be
2,600 Bq - an order of magnitude less than the CF-01 (reactor Unit 1) material.
In contrast to the 134Cs/137Cs activity ratio of 0.94 that was derived for the CF-01 ejecta
particulate, this value for the FT-13 sample is consistent with the radiocesium core inventory
value of Unit 2, as estimated through the ORIGEN modelling undertaken by Nishihara et al.,
(2012) [50]. While statistically different to the CF-01 ejecta particulate, this radiocesium activity
ratio is not unforeseen, as the bulk sample from which this particle was isolated was obtained
from a site (Futaba Town) located at the base of the main north-west trending contamination
plume, attributed by regional radiation mapping to result from reactor Unit 2 [69, 153, 162].
These attributions are also, however, based upon the reactor radiocesium inventories as predicted
in the work of Nishihara et al., (2012) [50], although these values have achieved wide acceptance
in the scientific community.
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Figure 9.18: γ-ray spectrum obtained from the FT-13 particle, with contributing peaks identified.
Figure 9.19: Secondary electron image of the entire mm-scale FT-13 ejecta particle.
Surface examination
A secondary electron image of the surface of this Unit 2 derived FT-13 ejecta particle is shown in
Figure 9.19. Apparent from this image is not only the size of the particle (2 mm in maximum
dimension) but also its smooth exterior - contrasting to the extensive fibrous surface morphology
observed for the CF-01 material (Figure 9.4). Whereas the Unit 1 sourced CF-01 material was
characteristically angular in its form, the exterior of the FT-13 material is considerably well-
rounded - with no pronounced points or distinctive angular edges.
An EDS spectrum acquired over the entire surface of the particle is shown in Figure 9.20. From
this spectrum, like the sub-mm CF-01 material, the primary component of the sample is observed
to be Si - existing alongside significant contributions from C, O, Na, Al, Mg, Ca and Ti. Whereas
218
9.4. RESULTS
Figure 9.20: EDS spectrum derived from the entire surface of the FT-13 ejecta particle.
the EDS analysis of the CF-01 particulate revealed the additional contribution of Zn and trace
quantities of Ba within the more angular particle, these species were absent from the EDS
analysis of the FT-13 material. While the CF-01 material contained low concentrations of Fe, the
FT-13 particle is shown to contain notably more of the transition metal. From EDS elemental
mapping of both particle types (not shown), this Fe is observed to be distributed homogeneously
across the entirety of the larger FT-13 material - having conversely being concentrated as angular
sub-particles within the CF-01 ejecta particulate.
X-ray tomography
With the surface of the FT-13 particulate being homogeneous with respect to both its form
and composition, its internal structure and composition were subsequently evaluated through
the application of the laboratory-based Zeiss Xradia™ Versa XRT system. A series of three-
dimensional computational renderings of the particle shown in a number of orientations are
displayed in Figure 9.21.
In contrast to the XRT results obtained on the smaller, sub-mm CF-01 ejecta particulate presented
in Figure 9.13, the internal form of the FT-13 particle is vastly different. Whilst the Unit 1
particulate exhibited a considerable internal porosity (24% void volume), such a texture is not
apparent within the FT-13 particle. The entire internal volume of this sample is shown to be
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constituted by an amorphous solid material, within which no porosity exists. Although the outer
surface of this particle details none of the fibrous structure apparent across the surface of the
CF-01 material, some internal artefacts of similarly fibrous material exist - the locations of which
are additionally highlighted with yellow boxes in Figure 9.21.
As well as the isolated regions containing these fibres, a number of high-density inclusions
are also observed. Opposed to the CF-01 particle, where a large number of contrasting density
fragments (existing across a wide size range) were observed both within as well as extruding from
the surface of the sample, the FT-13 particle contains a significantly smaller component of elevated
density fragments none of which are observed to protrude from the particles exterior. These
inclusions are represented in the tomographic renderings and volumetric cross-sections shown in
Figure 9.21 by the areas with red colouration. In addition to their more limited occurrence as
well as complete containment within the main particle, these inclusions are not angular in form
like those associated with the outermost surfaces of the CF-01 ejecta particle. As shown in Figure
9.21, the high-density sub-particles within the FT-13 sample are concentrated within a small
region, located towards the flat base of the particle.
Furthermore, in contrast to the strongly bi-modal size distribution of the particle inclusions
within the CF-01 ejecta particulate, the inclusions contained within the FT-13 particle are
strongly uni-modal in size. These particles occur with comparable dimensions to the larger suite
of high-density material associated with the CF-01 ejecta particle, existing over a size-range
of 40 µm - 100 µm in maximum dimension. Ion-beam milling into the surface of the FT-13
sample at positions corresponding to the locations of several of these high-density particles
was subsequently undertaken, prior to performing EDS elemental analysis. This quantification
confirmed that the particulate, like those contained within the CF-01 sample, was similarly
Fe-based.
As per the Raman spectroscopy analysis of the CF-01 sample, the similar analysis of this larger
FT-13 sample yielded identical results - with the amorphous nature of the sample confirmed by
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Figure 9.22: Schematic of a typical thermally-insulated stainless-steel pipe used to transmit
steam around the various reactor components.
9.5 Discussion
CF-01 (Unit 1)
The highly-fibrous nature of the Si-rich material is synonymous with a thermal insulation-
type material. This insulation is encountered in numerous positions within a nuclear reactor;
surrounding large portions of a typical reactor pressure vessel (RPV), it’s associated heat-
exchanger/piping network, as well as within the reactor building structure itself.
Opposed to a pressurised water reactor (PWR) system, where the high-pressure steam produced
within the RPV is used to supply steam to a secondary boiler circuit which subsequently feeds
steam into generator turbines, BWRs (as at Fukushima) do not possess this secondary loop -
supplying steam generated in the reactor directly to the power-generating high-speed turbines
[20]. Being older in their design (with the reactor at the FDNPP dating from the 1970’s), BWRs
are now not a common type of LWR design - having been globally dwarfed in number by PWR
systems [8]. Despite PWR units operating at twice the pressure of BWRs (15 MPa, rather than
around 7.5 MPa) - therefore requiring substantially thicker piping to transfer reactor-generated
steam, the secondary loop design of PWRs means that unlike BWRs, water and other downstream
components, are not radiologically contaminated. Resultantly, a greater length of stainless-steel
pipework at the FDNPP would have carried, and therefore been exposed, to various types of
(largely γ-ray emitting) radioactive material.
As shown in the schematic cross-section of Figure 9.22, one such use of this fibrous material is to
provide thermal insulation to the kms of stainless-steel tubing that serves to transfer the steam
and pressurised water around the various components of the facility. At Fukushima, this Si-clad
network was surrounded by a layer of Pb shielding - for both radiological protection and to also
ensure that the insulation completely enclosed the pipe.
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Figure 9.23: Schematic of the FDNPP Unit 1 reactor building, detailing the location of the
Si-composition thermal insulation material.
Alongside this thermal insulation material utilised in close proximity to the reactor vessel, an
additional source of this fibrous material is shown in the Figure 9.23 schematic - conversely
located away from the RPV and PCV. This material is located in the building’s roof space,
surrounding the extensive concrete and steel superstructure that housed the reactors themselves.
As shown in Figure 9.23, a service area many meters high (containing cranes used to transfer
the fuel assemblies in and out of the reactor) in addition to the water-filled fuel storage ponds
served to separate the underlying RPV from this roof space (void) located material. Owing to
differences in their final designs, eventual construction and subsequent upkeep of each of the
FDNPP reactor buildings at the site, the Unit 1 reactor hall was significantly different (and much
more structurally robust) than each of the other reactor Unit buildings [5, 11]. Whereas reactor
Units 2 - 6 all comprised a simpler and less extensive concrete roof with no such insulation, the
roof of Unit 1 was not only painted extensively with a Zn-based paint (to afford a level of corrosion
resistance) but also contained a 0.5 m thickness of the fibrous Si-composition insulation material.
A third and final location within reactor Unit 1 where such fibrous Si-based thermal insulation
material was located is shown in the Figure 9.24 schematic. This application of Si-based material
represents its greatest volumetric use within the entire reactor Unit, employed as a 30 cm
thickness to provide thermal insulation around the stainless steel PCV/dry well. Alongside
being the greatest volumetric use of this material, this insulation was located within the closest
proximity to the reactor core and the greatest potential heat intensities.
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Figure 9.24: Schematic of the FDNPP Unit 1 RPV, PCV (dry well) and suppression (wet) well,
with the location of the fibrous Rockwool™ thermal insulation shown.
Following personal communications with Dr Y. Satou (JAEA) and TEPCO engineers at the
FDNPP, the insulation material located within the roof space, cladding the pipes of the reactors
heat exchanger network as well as enclosing the PCV, was of the Rockwool™ type.
A comparison of the characteristics of typical (melted, and subsequently extruded) geologically-
sourced fibrous material, as determined in a number of studies, alongside the current technical
data provided by the original Rockwool™ brand, are presented in Table 9.4. From these results, a
strong similarity is apparent between the fibres observed in this study, and published/manufacturers
technical values for such rock-sourced material.
The average fibre diameter measured in this study was 12 µm (range: 6 µm - 32 µm), with
the reported diameters of insulation-type materials varying from 2 µm - 25 µm. This contrast
between the size of many of these fibres and the typical values of the insulation material presented
in Table 9.4 may result from the partial melting of the Si fibres - permitting for the material to
flow under the elevated temperatures experienced during the reactor Unit 1 LOCI (and ensuing
reactor building hydrogen explosion). The existence of the extensive micron-sized pits across the







Öztürk (2010) 8 - 20 [381]
Zihlif and Ragosta (2003) 2 - 25 [382]
Rockwool™ Limited (2017) 4 - 5 [383]
IARC Working Group on the
Evaluation of Carcinogenic
Risk to Humans (1988)
"General Thermal Insulation"
6 - 15 [384]
IARC Working Group on the
Evaluation of Carcinogenic
Risk to Humans (1988)
"High-Temperature Thermal Insulation"
<3 [384]
Klingholz (1977) 4 - 6 [385]
This Study 6 - 32 (average: 12) [386]
Table 9.4: Mean fibre length of Si-based insulation materials obtained from prior studies on their
physical form.
pockets, formed during the materials initial production, or during the accident - whereby either
reactor and fission product gases were incorporated into the sample, or more likely, the exsolution
of (volatile) species contained within the material produced an extensive internal gas volume.
Of the three potential sources of the Si-based insulation material that could account for the form
and composition of this reactor Unit 1 particulate (Figures 9.22, 9.23 and 9.24) - the source of this
fibrous material can, however, be best attributed to the thickness of material that surrounded
the PCV. During the LOCI and associated fuel melting that occurred at reactor Unit 1 [7], this
insulation would have; (i) reached the highest temperatures of any of the insulation material, and
(ii) was located closest to the reactor materials in addition to the high temperature and pressure
reactor-sourced gases.
Although located close to the reactor core, the elevated temperatures associated with the melting
of the reactor Unit 1 fuel assemblies (and relocation to the base of the PCV and underlying
concrete pedestal) alongside the large volumes of reactor steam would not have caused the
heating and melting of the insulation that existed around the peripheral piping network above
what is considered normal operational conditions [2, 20]. This integrity was confirmed in the
subsequent post-accident analysis of the facility [9, 59], which verified that no melting of this
component had occurred. The third volume of Rockwool™ type insulation - located in the Unit 1
roof space, and the greatest distance (>10 m) from the heat associated with the LOCI in the RPV
below, would also not have been adversely impacted by the elevated temperatures associated
with the core-melting that occurred some distance below, within the RPV/PCV [9]. An analysis of
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the temperature values recorded during the incident within the above-reactor fuel storage ponds
further confirmed that temperatures were within normal operational bounds [33].
While considerably more radiation was released from reactor Unit 2 as a consequence of the
substantial (yet non-explosive) breach of the reactors PCV [7, 30] (where a high temperature
and pressure state existed until its eventual damage on the morning of the 15th March), the
source of radiation from reactor Unit 1 was the dramatic reactor building hydrogen explosion
[7]. Despite numerous episodes of RPV venting to relieve the elevated pressure in Unit 1, the
structural integrity of the PCV was eventually lost in the hours proceeding the explosion [7].
Resulting from this critical loss of structural integrity, a substantial quantity (and pressure)
of highly-combustible hydrogen gas (approximately 130 kg [387]) was released into the region
around the PCV and base of the reactor assembly, to a position where fuel was subsequently
determined to have relocated [54]. This hydrogen gas originated from the steam-driven auto-
catalytic H2-O breakdown of the reactors coolant water in the presence of the Zr cladding that
reached elevated temperatures during the LOCI. In addition to the H2 gas, numerous fission
product species, including; Cs, I, Xe, Kr and Te would have all existed closely associated with this
region of the reactor. The resultant combustion of this gaseous volume resulted in the explosive
fragmentation (and release) of this structural component, with a proportion of this gas also having
been incorporated into the partially-melted Si-based material with the elevated temperatures.
The internal morphology of these sub-mm particles, as observed via SR-µ-XRT, compliments
the observations of the particulates external (fibrous) structure - having likely been formed
from the considerable thickness of fibrous Rockwool™ insulation alongside the reactors pedestal
(structural) concrete and stainless-steel from the reactor vessel itself. A comparison of the
internal form of this representative particle with naturally-occurring volcanically-derived pumice
highlights their high degree of structural similarity [388], and provides a mechanism to account
for the observed bi-modal void distribution. Upon the accident-related heating and partial melting
of the source silicate material (originally produced itself through the melting and extrusion of
basaltic rocks), volatile (low boiling-point) species originally contained as solids were exsolved to
produce a considerable gaseous pore volume, and the larger of the internal voids. The well-formed
and highly-spherical nature of these larger voids suggests that they were not produced by gases
flowing into what would have been a highly-viscous material (where non-spherical pores would
be produced) - rather growing in-situ, via the exsolution of dissolved gases and volatiles as the
molten silica was heated (and depressurised) with the intense heat of the LOCI.
In contrast, the smaller suite of voids are ascribed to result from later stage incorporation
of the reactor-sourced gases from the FDNPP. With SR-µ-XRF identifying the location of Cs and
Sr to be located around the periphery of the particle, at positions corresponding to locations of the
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smaller-sized voids, the significant hydrogen and fission product overpressure associated with
the reactor Unit 1 is highly likely to be responsible for developing these voids. This is supported
by the Cs and Sr coatings observed on the surfaces of these (smaller) voids, ascribed to species
condensation upon incorporation into the parent particle. The locations at which interactions
occur between the two void types is shown in Figures 9.11 (a) and (b). In each case, the smaller
voids are observed to "impinge" into the larger ones - resulting in a slight amount of deformation,
as well as highlighting the relative order of formation (with larger voids emplaced initially). The
amalgamation of these voids (* in Figure 9.11 (b)) may also contribute to the formation of larger
voids, from the subsequent (smaller) gaseous volumes. A component of the Cs is additionally
associated with the Fe-based (surface protruding) fragment. This co-existence supports the known
affinity of ionic Cs for Fe-based surfaces examined in the work of Al Rayyes et al., (1993) [389].
The explosion of the reactor building, as well as fragmenting the Si-based insulation material
to yield the sub-mm particles, will also have resulted in the destruction of the other structural
materials comprising the reactor Unit and surrounding building. Identified within the ejecta
particle tomographic slices (Figures 9.11 (a) and (b)) are distinct regions (75 µm - 150 µm in
maximum dimension) where neither voids nor high-density particles (of either of the two distinct
size groupings) were observed to exist. Such regions were shown to represent cement fragments,
embedded within the partially-molten Si-based material during its violent ejection. This material
has been rounded through their attrition with other particulate and surfaces during their release.
The smaller diameter (included) elevated density particulate could, like the smaller-sized
component of the particle’s voids, result from pre-existing material contained within the Si-based
source material. Like the concrete material discussed above, the composition and peripheral
nature of the larger steel fragments "embedded" into the particle advocates that this component
is sourced from the reactor building hydrogen explosion, "adhered" to the surfaces of the softened
material. Further supported by the diameter of such material being considerably larger than
even the greatest sized fibre diameter for the Rockwool™ material (presented in Table 9.4), a
provenance of having originated within the insulation fibre can be disregarded. This difference
between the protrusive Fe and the smoothed cement surfaces were described previously in Section
9.4.3 - resulting from their contrasting levels of hardness.
While not detailed in the XRF spectrum obtained via SR analysis on the I13-1 beamline (Figure
9.14), the occurrence of U was, nonetheless, identified within the XRF results provided by the lab-
based Niton™ system (Figure 9.16). Combining the high-density of the smaller (approximately
micron-scale) particles, located towards the exterior of the sub-mm particle (Figure 9.13), with
similarly-sized and smaller U composition material having been formerly identified to originate
from the FDNPP (Chapter 8) albeit from reactor Unit 2, this signal could potentially result from
a U component existing in this reactor Unit 1 particulate.
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Such high-density, micron-scale material could have existed as a component of the original Si-
based insulation material. In the work of Morgan and Lovering (1965) [390], the basaltic (mafic)
rock precursor used to produce the standard Rockwool™ was shown to contain approximately
0.2 ppm U. Such species, despite being homogeneously distributed throughout the source basalt,
were determined to become heterogeneous and concentrated during the Rockwool™ production
as a consequence of the melting and extrusion process due to the strong incompatibility for U
within a geological fluid (melt).
Despite being a potential source of this material, the size of these particles is significant in
relation to that of the source fibres within which they are found; with the high-density material
possessing diameters of circa. 1 µm - this would therefore constitute a large component of the
entire cross-sectional area of the Rockwool™ insulation (Table 9.4).
To analyse these potentially U-containing micron-sized particles, further SR analysis was applied
to the sample. As well as further utilising the coherence imaging (I13-1) beamline at the Diamond
Light Source, the higher-resolution micro-focus spectroscopy (I18) beamline was additionally
used. The results of this spectroscopic analysis are presented in Chapter 10, alongside the
complementary SIMS analysis of the same embedded material.
FT-13 (Unit 2)
This material represents the largest diameter particulate encountered from reactor Unit 2 to-date
when compared to the highly-spherical "Cs-ball" material and the small volume of other micron-
scale material analysed by other authors [164, 196, 371]. At 2 mm in maximum dimension, this
particle is greater in size (by an order of magnitude) than any of the formerly discussed CF-01
(Unit 1) ejecta particulate. Despite being comparable in its size to material from reactor Unit
1, the 1.05 134Cs/137Cs activity ratio of this FT-13 particle ascribes it to reactor Unit 2, when
evaluated with respect to the core-specific values defined by Nishihara et al., (2012) [50].
As documented in official accounts of the accident [2, 9], in addition to the description of the
accident in Chapter 1, the events at the Unit 2 reactor were not only the last within the series of
catastrophic release events to occur - but were also the greatest in magnitude. Also contrasting
to reactor Unit 1 was the mechanism of the Unit 2 release; representing an eventual (but rapid
duration) failing of the PCV - having existed at elevated temperatures for 100 hours prior to
release, opposed to the Unit 1 rapid (24 hours after SCRAM) PCV breach and H2 gas explosion.
These dissimilar release conditions combined with their timings after the seismic activity, SCRAM
and tsunami, together provide an explanation to account for why this large-scale ejecta particulate
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Figure 9.25: Decay heat for a typical FDNPP BWR following shutdown (SCRAM). The periods
over which continuous cooling (provided by water injection) was suspended at each reactor is
illustrated by solid blocks, with the timing of each reactor Units environmental discharge shown
by the arrows along the horizontal axis.
from reactor Units 1 and 2 is so characteristically different. A plot summarising the release
events from each reactor Unit at the FDNPP is shown in Figure 9.25 (arrows), alongside solid
bars depicting periods during which interruptions to each reactors core cooling provision occurred.
These events are plotted alongside the residual decay heat that would have existed within an
FDNPP BWR loaded with an LEU fuel after the initiation of such a SCRAM event.
As illustrated in Figure 9.25, unlike reactor Unit 1, where core-cooling was lost immediately
after the tsunami inundated the site (when residual core thermal output would have been at its
highest), adequate cooling of reactor Unit 2 was maintained for close to 100 hours (during the
greatest thermal output of the reactor), until the morning of the 15th March - when eventual core
and reactor damage was sustained. While the reactor core of reactor Unit 1 would have been
considerably hotter at the time of the radioactive release, less extensive melting (and volatile
exsolution) of the fibrous Si material would have occurred than associated with the reactor Unit 2
thermal insulation. This difference in duration at which elevated temperatures were experienced
in each reactor can be viewed as one factor to rationalise the difference in particle morphology
between that produced by reactor Units 1 and 2.
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At the time of the Unit 1 reactor building explosion, the Si-based thermal material is likely
to not have reached an entirely molten state - illustrated by the strongly fibrous form of the ejecta
particle. Although some degree of core cooling was maintained, in contrast, the Si matrix that
constitutes the Unit 2 ejecta particulate would likely have achieved a near fully-molten state.
This is demonstrated by the largely structure-less form of the Unit 2 (FT-13) material. Such an
extensive degree of melting permitted the full out-gassing of the volatile species contained within
the Rockwool™ material.
The disparity observed between the fragment-rich surface of the Unit 1 particulate and the
featureless surface of the Unit 2 material can be rationalised by; (i) the nature of the release
event alongside, (ii) the physical state at which the Si-rich Rockwool™ existed. Whereas the
Unit 2 release was a non-explosive breach of the primary containment (and therefore did not
result in the generation of the extensive volume of reactor-sourced fragment species), the H2 gas
explosion of reactor Unit 1 on the other hand, resulted in the production of vast quantities of
material fragments. As the Rockwool™ was softened (partially-melted) under the conditions of
the Unit 1 LOCI, these fragments became incorporated into the surface of the material, which
itself became ejected during the explosion. This material "softening" also permitted for the rapid
decompression enabling for the exsolution of volatile species contained within the Rockwool™
(producing the large diameter voids), in addition to the inwards diffusion and condensation of
both H2 gas and various fission product species contained within the region encompassing the
reactors PCV.
The absence of porosity within the Unit 2 (FT-13) particulate supports such a hypothesis, that
this PCV enclosing insulation material underwent a significant (if not complete) degree of
melting during the LOCI. This melting would have permitted for volatile gases to exsolve entirely
out of the material - resulting in the solid particulate, observed through XRT analysis. The
absence of fission product species within this insulation-containing environment, until the PCV
integrity compromise occurred, would not have resulted in the formation of pores within the
sample. Instead, these radioactive species would only have become incorporated within the very
outermost surface of the particle (shortly ahead of its reactor Unit 2 release).
Despite being considerably larger in diameter than all other Unit 2 derived particulate material
described in the literature [164, 196, 371], a comparable internal structure consisting of a glassy
Si matrix with no internal porosity, has been observed during this study. Having been isolated
from closer to the facility (2 km from the site boundary) than any of the other material, its size (2
mm) is the result of having been deposited earlier (closer to the source) as a gravity-fall deposit in
contrast to the smaller material capable of being transported further distances whilst entrained
within the transporting plume.
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Although no high-density actinide composition inclusion material was seen to exist within
the Unit 2 ejecta particle material, as was observed in a number of the atmospheric particulate
samples by Abe et al., (2014) [192], the inconsistent occurrence of U was described in the same
work, as was also discussed in that of Ono et al., (2017) [190]. Therefore, the absence of actinide
material is not entirely unexpected within such a small sampling of this material.
9.6 Conclusions and future work
The analysis of material in this chapter has allowed for a greater understanding as to the likely
source of these radioactive ejecta particles found immediately in the immediate proximity of the
FDNPP. This analysis has also afforded a better insight into the events that occurred in March
2011 as the reactors experienced severe Loss Of Coolant Incidents (LOCI), with subsequent
reactor building hydrogen explosions or PCV structural failure.
The large size of the CF-01 particulate collected near the reactor site, coupled with the highly
angular nature of the embedded fragments is illustrative of a highly-energetic mechanism of
formation - explosive in nature and consistent with the events described as part of the numerous
accounts of the incident by organisations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
[2] and the plants operators the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) [7]. As is now widely-
accepted, this incident represents a large-scale reactor building hydrogen explosion resulting
from the combustion of hydrogen gas following the exothermic oxidation of the Zircaloy-4™ fuel
cladding at elevated reactor core temperatures. The incorporation of structural cement, alongside
extrusive and angular particles of metallic Fe (as steel), supports such a formation mechanism
[2, 7, 30].
The complementary analysis of the FT-13 particle confirmed that this material was likely derived
as a consequence of the PCV breach/leak associated with reactor Unit 2 - the specific nature and
location of which (inside the PCV) is still the topic of much debate [34]. With a maximum diameter
of 2 mm, this sample represented the first large ejecta particulate possessing a 134Cs/137Cs
signature attributable to reactor Unit 2 to be analysed. Having in all likelihood been sourced
from the same precursor Si-based Rockwool™ insulation material, the contrasting conditions
associated with its formation (PCV breach over an extended time period rather than a reactor
building H2 explosion) resulted in the production of a material with an internal form contrasting
with the CF-01 (reactor Unit 1) ejecta particulate.
Future work shall investigate any specific compositional variance in samples containing voids.
One such future experiment planned on this highly-porous ejecta material will seek to analyse
the composition of the voids/void surfaces that comprise 24% of the total sample. Employing
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the FIB system with a residual gas analyser (RGA) attached, the low operational pressure of
the instrument (×10-6 mbar), and the destructive Ga ion-beam - this process will selectively
ablate the sample’s surface. The material released by this targeted FIB milling can then be










SPECTROSCOPY AND ISOTOPIC ANALYSIS OF EJECTA MATERIAL
10.1 Introduction
The results of Chapter 9 identified the existence of a number of micron-scale particles of
considerable density contained within the CF-01 (Unit 1) ejecta particulate. In addition to these
surface and sub-surface fragments, Cs (as well as other elements, including Pb, Sr and Zr) were
observed to be strongly-heterogeneous - located as spatially discontinuous regions at elevated
concentrations. Despite exhibiting a spatially heterogeneous occurrence of these elements (within
the Si-based particle) - the location of such constituents was shown to be concentrated greatest
around the exterior circumference of the sub-mm sample.
In contrast, the FT-13 (Unit 2) material was shown to be homogeneous in its internal form
- comprising no internal void volume and showing only a limited number of sub-surface fragments.
These fragments were additionally of lower bulk density in comparison to those in the CF-01 ejecta
particulate sample. Although constituted by the same bulk (Si) matrix material, the differing
release dynamics associated with the Unit 1 and Unit 2 events were hence ascribed as being
responsible for the dissimilar structural (and compositional) characteristics of the two forms of
ejecta particulate.
While the events that occurred at the FDNPP Unit 2 have been shown (in this work) to have likely
resulted in the emission of core material (Chapter 8) - the radiological release from Unit 1 has
(to-date) only been observed to have been constituted by fission-product species condensed from
a vapour - and not any actinide material (e.g. U, Pu or Am) [164, 190]. As such, if this sub-mm
Unit 1 particulate were to contain reactor-sourced U, this would invoke a situation whereby
similar actinide release and contamination to Unit 2 has occurred. Although U, as the UO2,
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would represent the actinide encountered at the greatest concentrations within the environment
should such a core-compromise occur - a number of additional actinide elements (e.g. Pu, Am and
Np) associated with nuclear transmutations, would also be anticipated. As discussed in earlier
chapters, whereas fission products are typically characterised as possessing a greater (γ-ray)
radioactivity (with shorter half-lives), actinides have considerably longer half-lives - on the orders
of hundreds of thousands to millions of years [52]. Over a hazard resulting from their γ-ray (and
their α-particle) activity/emission, the actinides present an increased toxicological concern over
elements such as Cs and Sr owing to their direct chemotoxicity to humans (and other species)
[311, 332, 355], of which the anthropogenically-derived Pu is of an extreme concern [391].
If derived from a reactor source, it is essential to determine the physiochemical state and
abundance of the actinide material within this ejecta material. The form and oxidation state of
this particulate, like the micron/sub-micron U and Cs containing particles studied in Chapter 8,
has important environmental implications. With differences in their oxidation state, the solubility
of uranyl ions varies considerably [147, 392] - resulting in material entering solution, with
the potential for such material to be readily environmentally transported and subsequently
up-taken by species including plants and animals. As a consequence, such material may become
pre-concentrated in the food-chain.
Previous "nuclear forensics" studies on material derived from around the world have utilised both
spectroscopic and isotopic analysis methods as part of the standard "tool-kit" to examine nuclear
fallout material. Following advancements in synchrotron radiation (SR) sources, enabling them to
provide greater intensity (fluence) x-ray beams and at ever-decreasing beam profiles (emittance)
- the x-ray analysis afforded by these large-scale and multi-technique facilities has become a
central part of fallout analysis. The first instance of x-ray microanalysis techniques applied to
nuclear fallout is described in the work of Salbu et al., (2001) [393]. Using the ID22 beamline
at the European Synchrotron Radiation Facility (ESRF), the team employed SR-µ-XANES and
SR-µ-XRD to derive information pertaining to the oxidation state and respective phases of U
contained within Chernobyl-derived particulate. This work also employed a high-resolution
charged-coupled device (CCD) x-ray detector camera (with a spatial resolution of 0.6 µm) to
generate a three-dimensional representation of the structure of the sample, as well as a physical
volume onto which the other data could be overlain.
Synchrotron-based x-ray imaging and µ-XANES analysis on U-based particulate have seen
further application since this initial work by Salbu et al., (2001). Works by García López et al.,
(2007) [182], and Lind et al., (2007) [180], both applied these synchrotron techniques to material
distributed in the environment from the 1966 Palomares (Spain) release event, following on
from the work of Lind et al., (2005) [394], having undertaken the corresponding analysis of








Unit 1 0.40 0.94
Unit 2 0.34 1.08
Unit 3 0.35 1.04
FSP 1 0.52 0.54
FSP 2 0.44 0.64
FSP 3 0.38 0.74
FSP 4 0.42 0.68
Table 10.1: Characteristic 135Cs/137Cs atomic ratios and 134Cs/137Cs activity ratios for reactor
Units 1 - 3 and associated fuel storage ponds (FSP) 1 - 4 at the time of the accident and release.
As determined by [50].
These high-energy x-ray based techniques have more recently been applied to the oxidation
state analysis (and environmental stability assessment) of U composition particulate material
encountered as Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM) and Technologically Enhanced
Radioactive Material (TENORM) by Lind et al., (2013) [395]. Works by Crean et al., (2014) [183],
and Crean et al., (2015) [396], have again used these x-ray techniques - analysing the oxidation
state chemistry of U associated with depleted U (DU) munitions and uranium ore concentrate
(UOC) particles, both obtained from the environment, respectively.
SIMS has also been an extensively deployed tool within the nuclear forensics analysis portfolio,
allowing for the analysis of single particles of interest [397–399]. One of the initial uses for
SIMS for single particle nuclear forensics analysis, was on material derived from the 1986
Chernobyl accident by Tamborini et al., (2000) [400]. Unlike synchrotron-based methods which
are entirely non-destructive (although a certain amount of beam-induced sample alteration may
occur [401]), SIMS results in the particles consumption, but unlike x-ray methods, SIMS yields
isotopic information on the sample, which provides information critical for determining material
provenance.
Further applications of SIMS have included the analysis of DU particles [402, 403], surface/near-
surface nuclear weapons testing particulate [404–406], radioactive fragments generated by
nuclear weapons transportation accidents (Palomares, Spain), in addition to particles associated
with the storage and reprocessing of nuclear wastes (Kola Bay, NW Russia) [407]. Owing to
the simple sample preparation afforded to SIMS, in addition to the selectivity of the analysis
(targeting only individual identified spots) and low limits of detection (LOD) [246, 408], SIMS is
one of the methods of choice for particle analysis by the IAEA [409].
As shown formerly in Table 1.3, the 134Cs/137Cs activity ratios (produced through the modelling
work of Nishihara et al., (2012) [50]) of each of the reactor units and fuel storage ponds are
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Figure 10.1: 135Cs/137Cs atomic (isotope) ratios derived from a range of organic samples (leaves,
bark and sediment) obtained from positions to the north/north-west (red shading) and
south/south-west (green shading) of the FDNPP by Snow et al., (2016) [43], Zheng et al., (2014)
[162] and Shibahara et al., (2014) [161] - all are compared with ORIGEN estimates produced by
Nishihara et al., (2012) [50]. Modified from [43].
distinctive one from another. It is these characteristic ratios that have allowed for the reactor
unit provenancing of environmental contamination, as detailed in Section 2.2.5. An additional
mechanism through which to study and attribute the radioactive material to a specific provenance,
however, is via atomic ratios. Whereas activity ratios (non-destructively) utilise γ-ray emission
peaks to derive a ratio indicative of composition, as detailed within Chapter 5, mass spectrometric
methods (such as SIMS) destructively ionise the sample - counting the number (frequency) and
mass of ions incident onto the systems ion-counting array. Whereas activity ratios represent
a "quick" and "simple" means through which to analyse the composition of a γ-ray emitting
radioactive material, it is widely-accepted that greater accuracy, more reliable and repeatable
results, with less sample preparation and no requirement for long counting periods (typically
24 - 48 hours) can be attained using mass spectrometry techniques [189, 410]. Alongside the
activity ratio for the strongly γ-ray emitting 134Cs/137Cs, Nishihara et al., (2012) [50], additionally
predicted the corresponding atomic ratio of 135Cs/137Cs alongside the other fissionogenic isotopes.
The characteristic ratios (134Cs/137Cs activity and 135Cs/137Cs atomic) for Units 1 - 3 and the
associated fuel storage ponds (FSP) 1 - 4 are detailed in Table 10.1. As per the 134Cs/137Cs
activity ratios, a clear difference is apparent between the ratios ascribed to reactor Unit 1
and Units 2/3 - a result of the differing levels of fuel burn-up. In contrast to the Cs activity
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ratios of the SFPs which are markedly different to the three reactor cores, there exists no clear
separation in the 135Cs/137Cs atomic ratios between the cores and their associated FSPs - with
the FSP of Unit 3 possessing a value bounded by those of reactor Unit 1 and reactor Units 2 and 3.
Unlike 134Cs, which occurs with a half-life of only 2.065 years, 135Cs is longer-lived with a
half-life of 2.3 million years [52] - decaying through the emission of a low-energy β-particle
into the stable 135Ba. Owing to its lengthy half-life and low activity, 135Cs represents less of a
radiological hazard than 134Cs and 137Cs. This long-lived isotope is produced through the β-decay
of 135Xe. However, due to the precursor 135Xe possessing; (i) a very high fission product yield
(6.3333% for 235U irradiated with thermal neutrons [133]) and, (ii) the greatest thermal neutron
capture cross-section of any nuclide [52], this results in the near entirety (>90%) of the 135Xe
being rapidly transmuted into stable 136Xe during routine reactor operations - with therefore
little remaining to decay into 135Cs [368, 411].
Arising from these source-term isotopic ratios calculated by Nishihara et al., (2012) [50], a
number of works have sought to utilise the variation displayed by these values (Table 10.1)
to attribute environmental contamination (across Fukushima Prefecture) to these differing
sources. A summary plot detailing the results of a number of these studies is presented in Figure
10.1. Some of the earliest work of this type was performed by Shibahara et al., (2014) [161],
who employed thermal ionisation mass spectrometry (TIMS) on grass, bark and moss samples
collected from localities to the north, north-west and west of the FDNPP site. Despite illustrating
a close-clustering of results (averaging a 135Cs/137Cs ratio of 0.364), such a value is not consistent
with any inventory predictions (core or FSP), made by Nishihara et al., (2012) [50].
Subsequent work by Zheng et al., (2014) [162], conversely utilised a newly-developed triple-
quadrupole inductively coupled plasma-mass spectrometer (ICP-MS) to determine the 135Cs/137Cs
atomic ratios for a number of sampling sites located principally to the north-west of the FDNPP.
In contrast to the work of Shibahara et al., (2014) [161], the isotope ratios for these samples
better aligned with predicted values derived formerly from the ORIGEN calculations. The results
excluded the possibility of material being sourced from any of the FSPs - with samples obtained
from the north/north-west of the site shown to exhibit 135Cs/137Cs ratios indicative of a release
from reactor Unit 2 at 0.341±0.002 (marginally below the Cs signature invoked for reactor
Unit 3). To the south of the facility, however, a greater 135Cs/137Cs signature (0.375±0.024) was
measured. The authors concluded that such a value could result from; (i) "significant deposition
of radiocesium from Unit 1", or more-likely (ii) a "mixing of global fallout radiocesium with
the FDNPP-sourced radiocesium". This second explanation was favoured owing to the previous
detection of ≈10% fallout Pu (239 + 240Pu) in this sample [143]. It was concluded, however, that
more analysis was required to fully ascribe a provenance to this material.
237
CHAPTER 10. SPECTROSCOPY AND ISOTOPIC ANALYSIS OF EJECTA MATERIAL
Figure 10.2: Measured variation in 135Cs/137Cs atomic ratio vertically down the length of a
typical boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel rod. A corresponding increase in 137Cs activity (Bq) was
also observed at positions associated with the top of the fuel rod. Data obtained from [53].
A more recent study was undertaken by Snow et al., (2016) [43]. This work reported the further
analysis of Fukushima-derived samples (soil and vegetation) using TIMS to provide 135Cs/137Cs
isotopic ratios. While the samples in earlier works were obtained from localities within Fukushima
Prefecture - ranging from 5 km to 70 km from the reactor site, the material studied by Snow et al.,
(2016) was obtained from "undisclosed locations across the Kanto region of Japan". Located 100
km - 250 km directly south of Fukushima Prefecture, the Kanto region comprises the entire Tokyo
Metropolitan Area (TMA). Like the results obtained by Zheng et al., (2014) [162], a clustering
of the 135Cs/137Cs isotope measurements was attained (Figure 10.1). However, owing to their
contrasting provenance from the south/south-west of the FDNPP, an average 135Cs/137Cs isotopic
value of 0.376±0.008 was obtained. The authors attribute this value to a source comprising mixed
emissions from reactor Units 1, 2 and 3, but invoke the work of Guenther et al., (1991) [53], as a
mechanism to account for a potentially high degree of spread between the isotope ratios.
Results of the work performed by Guenther et al., (1991) are shown graphically in Figure
10.2. Through the analysis of 135Cs/137Cs profiles down a typical BWR fuel rod, the isotopic
ratio was observed to be significantly higher towards its top - where neutron fluxes are lower
(preventing the transmutation of 135Xe into 135Cs). This ratio is observed to approach a more
consistent value (indicative of the true degree of fuel burn-up) further down its length owing to
the increased neutron flux experienced. Hence, the radiocesium composition "characteristic" of a
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reactor is observed to vary according to the portion within the core from which the material was
sourced - showing variation over the total integrated (average) core value predicted (via ORIGEN
modelling). Alongside a fuel rod location-dependent variation in the radiocesium atomic ratio,
this study also observed an increase in the total 137Cs activity (Bq/g).
This work by Snow et al., (2016) [43], additionally examined the 134Cs/137Cs activity ratios
of the suite of Kanto region samples, likewise comparing the results to the core inventory
predictions made by Nishihara et al., (2012). Unlike previous plant-proximal studies (discussed
in Chapter 2) which provided a clear attribution of the contaminations 134Cs/137Cs activity ratios
to specific reactor unit events - this was not possible with Snow’s values derived from analysis
of more distally obtained samples. For all sample mediums (including soy-beans, mushrooms,
rice and soil) an average 134Cs/137Cs activity ratio across all samples was determined to be
1.00±0.06 - therefore falling between all values derived by Nishihara et al., (2012) [50]. These
results supported the authors earlier conclusions, that this material (acquired from considerable
distances south and away from the main plume were the result of; (i) multiple reactor sources,
but also potentially, (ii) variations in the radiocesium down the length of a single fuel rod.
Conclusions such as this support and highlight what is now regarded as the "best-practice" in
the "nuclear forensic" analysis of radioactive samples [186, 189, 399], and hence why individual
particles were the subject of this study. Unlike this aforementioned solution-based bulk-analysis
of large (gram size) samples via TIMS and ICP-MS - whereby the contributions from individual
sources are combined into one resultant signal, the analysis of individual particulate removes this
summation and averaging - with the results obtained originating from a small and representative
volume of material. As has been shown in the aforementioned works centred on the FDNPP
accident; for determining Cs isotope ratios such a bulk-analysis approach makes specific reactor
Unit attribution difficult and for Pu ratios, a discrimination from global fallout equally challenging.
10.2 Aims
Following the compositional and structural analysis performed using combined FIB and SEM-
EDS, laboratory-based XRT and coincident SR-µ-XRF/SR-µ-XRT, this chapter had two principal
goals. The first of which sought to employ additional synchrotron radiation techniques to
interrogate the numerous high-density micron-scale particles (potentially of U composition)
located within the sub-mm, silica-rich and fibrous-structured Unit 1 derived CF-01 sample.
Following this non-destructive analysis, the second portion of this chapter seeks to undertake
destructive SIMS to further investigate the spatial distribution of any such U particles, as well
as determining the isotopic composition of such inclusions within the CF-01 ejecta particulate.
An accurate value for the 235U/238U isotopic ratio would exist as the key indicator for the
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anthropogenic nature of the uranium contained within this particulate. With natural uranium
(NU) containing 0.7 wt% 235U, levels of between 3 wt% and 5 wt% 235U would define any U as
having an enrichment typical of that used in a light water reactor (LWR) [8, 11] - such as those
at the FDNPP [25]. The potential existence of non-natural abundances of both 234U and 236U
isotopes within such inclusions (the abundances of both are increased over naturally-occurring
levels as a by-product of the fuel enrichment process) would further demonstrate its anthropogenic
nature [21, 52]. This quantification would serve to refute the formerly suggested existence of U
being the result of the naturally-occurring U (2 ppm) contained within the basaltic precursor
material used to produce the Rockwool™ insulation [164].
The application of SIMS will also permit for the characteristic radiocesium ratio of the CF-
01 particulate, collected north-west of the FDNPP close to its perimeter boundary (Figure 4.3),
to be determined as well as that associated with the larger FT-13 material. This value can
hence be evaluated with respect to the reactor inventory values attained through the ORIGEN
core/FSP modelling of Nishihara et al., (2012) [50]. With the results obtained through SR-µ-XRF
(described in Chapter 9) of the CF-01 material illustrating the distribution of Cs to be highly
spatially discontinuous (Figure 9.17), SIMS is advantageous in permitting accurate mapping
and depth-profiling into these previously identified Cs-rich regions. The application of SIMS will
also be used to explore the wider isotopic composition and its variance within the representative
particulate. Any observed elemental/isotopic discontinuity is anticipated to match that produced
in the particle-wide SR-µ-XRF mapping, the results for Cs were shown in Figure 9.17.
In addition to isotopically evaluating the 135Cs/137Cs isotope ratio within the CF-01 material and
confirming its provenance (released from Unit 1 as a consequence of its 134Cs/137Cs activity ratio
[164]), isotopic analysis via SIMS will also be performed on the FT-13 particulate, to similarly
assess through additional methodologies, its release source. As well as being considerably larger
in diameter than the CF-01 particulate (2 mm in maximum dimension), this material was
obtained directly to the west of the FDNPP (opposed to the north-west), but at a comparable
distance from the reactors - as shown in Figure 4.4. The 134Cs/137Cs activity ratio analysis
performed by Satou (2016) [164], has attributed it to the release that occurred from reactor Unit
2 - consistent with the radiocesium distribution (mapping) results of Nishizawa et al., (2015) [50],
and Chino et al., (2016) [153] - as shown in Figure 2.10.
This utilisation of SIMS represents the first application of the technique to isotopically evaluate
the composition of the larger individual ejecta particulate. While the aforementioned works
analysed contaminated bulk organic samples [43, 161, 162], it was only during the Doctoral work
of Satou (2016) [164], that SIMS was applied to the determination of radiocesium isotope (atomic)
ratios within the spherical "Cs-balls" (termed atmospheric particulate in this work).
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Through estimating the total amount of U that exists within one such large volume CF-01
fallout particle and combining this with the approximation of their depositional frequency from
Satou (2016) [164], a crude but initial estimation of the total amount of actinide within the
environment is possible within these contaminated regions.
10.3 Experimental methods
10.3.1 Synchrotron sample preparation
To analyse the CF-01 ejecta particulate formerly studied in Chapter 9, the same sample setup was
used as in previous SR analysis. For this continued work, the particle was contained within the
same double-layer of x-ray transparent adhesive Kapton™ film, supported on a stainless-steel
pin and mounted onto a magnetic base - shown previously in Figure 9.1.
10.3.2 Synchrotron sample analysis
Two beamlines were employed for this analysis, used formerly to examine ejecta material or the
considerably smaller, atmospheric material. Both located at the Diamond Light Source (DLS)
synchrotron, a third generation facility operating with a nominal 300 mA current and 3 GeV
beam energy, the I13-1 and I18 beamlines were used for tomography/fluorescence imaging and
fluorescence imaging/micro-focus spectroscopy respectively. A full description of the optics located
downstream of the sample environment for each experimental end-station is included in Section
5.4.5.2.
Tomography and fluorescence
Although U was not formerly identified during the prior analysis on the representative sub-mm
particle, further SR-based analysis to investigate the micron-scale high-density particle inclusions
was conducted on the I13-1 (coherence) beamline. For this subsequent work, the same methods
were used as detailed in Section 9.3.6, although enhancements were made to the downstream
optics setup for the fluorescence scans, following the earlier experiment.
The same three-dimensional XRT (absorption) rendering of the representative CF-01 particle
generated previously in Chapter 9 was used as a surface on which to apply the new (enhanced)
SR-µ-XRF mapping results.
As per the earlier SR-µ-XRF analysis on I13-1, Kirkpatrick-Baez mirrors were used to refine the
incident (undulator-sourced) beam, however, to enable x-ray XRF mapping at increased spatial
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Figure 10.3: Plan view schematic (not to scale) of the revised setup at the I13-1 experimental
end-station, the location of the newly installed 5 µm focusing aperture is highlighted.
resolutions above the 10 µm of the initial analysis, an additional 5 µm focusing aperture (pin-hole)
was installed upstream of the sample - yet downstream of the previously singularly-used 10 µm
pinhole. This larger, first, focusing aperture was installed principally to remove the undesired
beam "wings" that resulted from the limited amount of source emittance (3.17 nm rad) and beam
divergence that occurred as a function of the synchrotron storage ring and subsequent beamline
optics [263]. The second, smaller, aperture located between the 10 µm pinhole and the sample
served to further focus the beam as well as removing any additional "edge effects" that resulted
from interactions with this proceeding pinhole. A plan view schematic of this enhanced setup is
shown in Figure 10.3.
With this "enhanced" optical setup producing a better-focused x-ray beam than during the earlier
work, to further enhance the resolution of the XRF mapping to match this optical advancement, a
reduction in the step-size of the raster scan (via the sample stage step) was made - reduced from
10 µm to 2.5 µm. The sample 180° sample rotation (through 40 incremental steps) as per the
previous SR-µ-XRF analysis, was again used. Owing to the region within which U was potentially
contained having been speculated and resulting from the limited analysis time available on
the beamline, only an isolated area of the sample 200 µm × 100 µm × 100 µm was scanned for
elemental composition. To derive the SR-µ-XRF data, as for the earlier compositional analysis, a
single element Vortex™ (Hitachi High Technology) fluorescence detector was used, positioned
perpendicular to the sample and incident beam (Figure 10.3).
Taking into consideration the degree of sample absorption recorded at each stage position using
the x-ray camera mounted directly behind the sample (used also for tomographic reconstructions)
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Figure 10.4: Labelled photograph of the I18 (micro-focus spectroscopy) experimental end-station.
the three-dimensional volume of U was reconstructed using the ordered-subset penalized maximum
likelihood algorithm, with weighted linear and quadratic penalty algorithms in the TomoPy
framework [373]. As per the earlier reconstructions, three-dimensional volumetric representations
were rendered using the Avizo (FEI Company) software package [374]. The resulting spatial
(pixel) resolution of the SR-µ-XRF U particle mapping during this latter analysis on the I13-1
beamline was 2.5 µm × 2.5 µm × 2.5 µm, a consequence of; (i) a smaller (better focused) beam
size, and, (ii) the reduced stage step-size.
Micro-focus spectroscopy
SR-µ-XAS, as per the analysis on the atmospheric particulate described in Chapter 8 was
performed on the representative CF-01 particle sample on the Diamond Light Source I18 (micro-
focus spectroscopy) beamline. The same experimental setup was used as in the prior work, as
detailed in Section 8.3.3, with a schematic of the end-station shown in Figure 10.4. Owing to
the sub-mm thickness of the sample - which would result in the saturation of the beamlines
downstream transmission detector, the perpendicular-mounted fluorescence detector was again
used. To further reduce the intensity of the emission registered by this detector, a piece of
0.1 mm-thick high-purity Al-foil was placed over the face of detector - this reduced the signal
intensity to levels to allow for appropriate dead-time (≈20%) of the six element SGX Sensortech
Ltd. (Xspress-3™) Si-drift XRF detector.
After the approximate position of the sample (within the Kapton™ film "sandwich") was located
using the optical camera on the beamline setup, initial XRF mapping was then performed. With
the smallest beam-size afforded by the setup being 2 µm × 2 µm, the resulting pixel size of the
243
CHAPTER 10. SPECTROSCOPY AND ISOTOPIC ANALYSIS OF EJECTA MATERIAL
two-dimensional map was of the same spatial resolution when using a complimentary 2 µm stage
step size. Using the maximum beam energy attainable by the I18 beamline, this mapping was
performed at an incident energy of 21 keV - with a spectrum recorded at each individual scan
position upon movement of the sample by a high-precision three-axis (+ rotation) stage (Thorlabs
Inc.). The high source (photon) flux of the I18 beamline permitted for a per-pixel dwell time of
only five seconds while generating maximum peak counts of >150,000 counts.
To permit for a calibration of these mapping results, a spectrum was additionally attained
from the metallic support pin holding the Kapton™ film enclosed particle onto its magnetic base.
Following the identification of U-composition material within the two-dimensional XRF map of
the particle, the XAS analysis was performed on the sample at these specific stage positions. To
study the characteristic emission surrounding the U-LIII edge at 17,167 eV, the incident x-ray
beam energy was swept over the energy range of 17,025 eV to 17,510 eV - encompassing the
pre-edge, emission-edge and extended-edge regions of the emission spectrum. For analytical
efficiency, while still providing optimal spectral resolution, the energy steps of the scan "sweep"
were varied over the 485 eV energy range. Between 17,025 eV and 17,140 eV - a 5 eV step was
employed, reduced to 0.5 eV over the range 17,140 eV to 17,205 eV, before being coarsened (to 1
eV) between 17,205 eV and 17,252 eV, coarsened still further (to 2 eV steps) up to 17,400 eV and
eventually at 2.5 eV increments up to the final energy value at 17,510 eV. To enhance the signal
to noise ratio recorded within these scans, three repetitions were made for each particle inclusion
over this energy window.
The interpretation of the two-dimensional XRF map was conducted using the Python multichannel
analyser (PyMCA) [360]. As per the processing of the XAS data within Chapter 8; normalisation,
deconvolution and linear combination peak-fitting to known reference materials were performed
using the Demeter software package (version 0.9.24) [361]. This package contained the Athena
and Artemis programs (for XANES and EXAFS analysis respectively), based upon the open-
source IFEFFIT code [362, 363]. Spectroscopy standards for comparison were obtained from the
library of reference materials contained within the International X-ray Absorption Spectroscopy
(IXAS) XAFS Database [364], representing data from global synchrotron facilities.
10.3.3 Secondary ion mass spectrometry sample preparation
For the destructive SIMS analysis, both samples CF-01 and FT-13 were first diligently removed
from their enclosing Kapton™ film, before being manipulated onto separate adhesive carbon
discs. An electrically-conductive coating of Au was first applied to the sample prior to their SIMS
analysis to negate against the samples electrically charging under the incident Ga+ beam and
high electrical sample biasing (positive or negative). This charging would adversely impact not
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only upon the stability and rastering of the incident beam but also the resulting secondary ion
emission and its subsequent detection and quantification.
For particle CF-01, prior to the SIMS analysis of both its bulk outer surface as well as the
U particulate contained within the sample - a number of ion beam cuts were first made at
grazing (oblique) angles into the material to remove the "excess" material from around/above
the U-containing particles. To perform this, the FEI Helios NanoLab 600i DualBeam system was
used. Commencing at a high incident Ga+ beam energy of 16.0 nA (30 kV accelerating voltage
and 4.12 mm working distance) a large (50 µm × 50 µm) trench cut was made, before a series
of progressively decreasing beam currents, alongside the cleaning cross-section function of the
instrument, were used to obtain a final finish free from the influence of ion beam "curtaining" or
significant Ga+ implantation. These cut surfaces were used to enable the targeting of regions of
interest within sample CF-01 - as identified during earlier XRT and XRF analysis. In contrast,
no surface preparation was performed prior to the SIMS analysis of the FT-13 ejecta particulate -
which exhibited a contrastingly smooth and featureless surface form.
10.3.4 Secondary ion mass spectrometry analysis
All SIMS isotopic analysis was conducted using the in-house built magnetic sector (MS) SIMS
instrument, utilising a primary Ga+ ion beam to sputter the sample and produce the charged
secondary ions from discrete areas. The electro-magnet downstream then filtered these ions based
upon their mass, before they were then measured and the results quantified. Whilst spectrum
across the entire mass range (0 amu - 300 amu) were collected, owing to the highly-characteristic
ratios illustrative of their provenance, both Cs and U were the focus of the SIMS analysis.
The simplest methods of SIMS sample analysis used in this work was the generation of a
mass spectrum from a region of interest, this was achieved by rastering the primary Ga+ ion
beam over an identified region of interest. Whilst the size of the regions sputtered varied, from 50
× 50 µm down to 10 × 10 µm, a consistent set of parameters were used to obtain each spectrum.
The Ga+ ion beam was set to an incident energy of 2.0 nA, with the magnet and detector stepping
through the predefined mass window(s) in increments of 0.1 Da (atomic mass units) using a 1,000
ms dwell time on each (to obtain sufficient ion counts).
By rastering the beam over a predefined area and quantifying the mass of the secondary ion
emissions at a specific location, a 2-dimensional image was produced. All ion mapping was
performed at ×5000 magnification, with the resultant regions of interest measuring 40 µm ×
40 µm. During ion mapping, the same incident ion beam current (2 nA) was used to generate
the secondary species, however, the dwell time was reduced to 500 ms. For each map, a specific
mass of interest was chosen, rather than the magnet alternating between varying mass units.
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Multiple maps for different masses could be performed, although a change in the systems setup
was required in each case. Features on the micron-scale were discernible on these SIMS maps.
The third mode of SIMS analysis employed the highly-destructive nature of the incident Ga+ ion
beam to etch into the sample to attain depth profiles for specific masses of interest. These profiles
were able to detail variations in secondary ion (ejecta) composition with increasing etching (depth)
into the material. Although etching depths of several microns can be readily-attained using the
profiling functionality of the instrument, with greater etching depths, the influence of "edge" or
"wall" effects become increasingly prevalent - with detected ion species originating not from the
square region of interest, but from the oblique sides of the cut. To limit this detrimental influence,
only depths of up to 10 µm were made into the sample (controlled via the total specified analysis
time) - quantified fully post-analysis. As per the previous analysis techniques using the SIMS
instrument, the same 2.0 nA primary Ga+ ion beam energy was used, with a number of mass
units of interest (up to six) profiled through the sample. The dwell time of the instrument was
increased during this depth analysis to 5,000 ms per mass unit of interest, with the total analysis
time set to three hours (to prevent the detrimental impact of "wall" effects). Each of these profiles
was made at ×5000 magnification, resulting in a profile through an area 40 µm × 40 µm.
In addition to these three operational modes available on the in-house constructed SIMS
instrument, a further function of the instrument (as with all other SIMS systems) is the ability
of the setup to operate in either "positive" or "negative" bias modes. Such a biasing is the high
voltage polarity (±4.5 kV in this instance) applied to the sample, which determines the proportions
of either positive or negative ions that are generated [266]. During this analysis, both positive
and negative bias SIMS were used to account for sample-specific differences in the production of
secondary ions.
While EDS analysis of a sample allows for a (pseudo) quantitative compositional analysis to
be derived [242], it is not a surface sensitive technique (sampling material at depths within
the sample of up to 2 µm [239]). The opposite, however, is true of SIMS. Although permitting
for depth sampling on the order of tens of nanometres, comparable quantifiable compositional
information is not possible owing to inconsistent ion generation (and detection). Despite this,
valuable information regarding the proportions (ratios) of different isotopes of the same element
can be derived from SIMS due to their comparable ionisation behaviour under either positive or
negative sample bias conditions. To obtain these values, the total areas bounded by the respective




As in to Chapter 9, the initial results presented in Sections 10.4.1 to 10.4.3 of this chapter
represent the analysis of the CF-01 (Unit 1 attributed) material, while the succeeding Section
10.4.4, details results obtained from the larger FT-13 and Unit 2 derived, ejecta particulate.
10.4.1 U and species distribution
The results of the combined SR-µ-XRF and SR-µ-XRT, highlighting the position of the U-
containing inclusions, as determined on the I13-1 (coherence imaging) beamline, are shown
by the green regions of the particles longitudinal sections shown in Figure 10.5. However, as
previously stated, owing to time constraints on the I13-1 beamline, only a 200 µm × 100 µm
× 100 µm region of the sample was further studied through XRF mapping at these enhanced
spatial resolutions. From this reconstruction, the locations of the U particles are observed to be
near-exclusively associated with the exterior circumference of the representative larger particle.
Only one U-rich particle, however, is shown to be greater than 15 µm from the samples external
(circumference) surface. All of the U-containing particles observed within this SR-µ-XRF scan (of
the sub-region of the CF-01 particle) are additionally associated with the margins of the larger
voids. Comparable in their location to both the peripheral Fe and cement composition fragments
observed to exist embedded into the particles exterior surface in Chapter 9, the location of this
U-composition material aligns with this works earlier conclusions. Not only did an explosive
release event occur to produce structural reactor components, but also served to produce and
incorporate the closely associated U reactor core material.
This abundance of U, located near-exclusively just below the outer circumference of the sub-mm
CF-01 ejecta particle, serves as additional evidence to support the anthropogenic provenance of
the species - rather than having originated as a constituent of the fibrous Rockwool™ precursor
that surrounded the reactors steel PCV. As the fibrous form of the particle has been shown to still
be evident (Sections 9.4.2 and 9.4.3), complete (total) melting of the material had not therefore
taken place - with the resulting redistribution of species, however, not occurred. Therefore, this U
material represents the surface incorporation of material as a consequence of a much later event.
From the compositional overlays taken at various longitudinal sections through the sample
shown in Figure 10.5, it should be noted, however, that while the U particles are shown to exist
with dimensions of up to 10 µm, the raw SR-µ-XRF mapping data details this actinide material
to possess maximum dimensions <2.5 µm. This observed "coarsening" of the spatial resolution is
a consequence of the post-processing algorithm used to derive the XRF maps. While the location
of the U inclusion in the particles longitudinal sections shown in Figure 10.5 (taken at 0 µm,
20 µm and 40 µm up from the central horizontal axis), all detail an apparent U-rich particle
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existing at the same position in all three images (at the base of the ejecta particle) - this however,
represents a number of different, discrete particles. These multiple micron-scale particles exist
as a clustering associated with the edge of a 70 µm diameter internal void.
Also highlighted (in blue) within the four longitudinal sections presented in Figure 10.5, are
the regions of low void volume (porosity), identified formerly in Section 9.4.3 - corresponding
to regions of cement composition. As expected for a volume of former structural material that
had become incorporated into the partially-molten particle (during the final stages of the reactor
buildings hydrogen explosion), no U composition particles are associated with this extensive CaO-
rich region. A similar absence of the micron-scale U composition particles is similarly associated
with the Fe-rich fragment (coloured orange in Figure 10.5), that was similarly embedded into the
particles surface again during the ejection event. The incorporation of this angular, Fe composition
fragment, into the partially-molten and softened material during the violent release event could
afford a mechanism to account for the location of the single U-based particle, contained within
the particles centre - identified in the section 40 µm from the particles median horizontal axis.
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Figure 10.5: Compositional rendering of the SR-µ-XRF results of U mapping (green) overlain
onto the SR-µ-XRT rendering of the CF-01 ejecta particles internal structure. Fluorescence
mapping was performed only at high spatial resolution within the identified rectangular region.
The values stated represent the distance of the horizontal section up from the central,
longitudinal, tomographic slice through the sample volume. Blue shaded regions represent the
location of cement composition regions with orange of those composed of Fe (steel), identified
previously in Chapter 9. Scale bar = 100 µm.
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While a valuable three-dimensional representation of the U distribution within the representative
CF-01 ejecta particulate could be attained on the I13-1 beamline through multiple-projection
analysis of the sample and the resulting rendering of µ-XRF data onto the earlier µ-XRT results,
only a 2.5 µm XRF spatial resolution was possible using the beamlines best available experimental
setup. Despite not allowing for the same three-dimensional rendering (due to the absence of
sample rotation), the I18 beamline allowed for a slightly enhanced 2 µm × 2 µm pixel size over
the entire particle, rather than a smaller, area of interest (as on the I13-1 beamline). This was
only attainable due to the greater photon flux (2×1012 photons per second, at 10 keV) onto the
sample than on the coherence beamline - with sufficient fluorescence yielded in the short dwell
time (5 seconds) for each 2 µm × 2 µm pixel to constitute a full fluorescence spectrum. The two-
dimensional XRF results showing the location and signal intensity of the distinct compositional
regions within the entire CF-01 ejecta particle are shown in Figures 10.6 and 10.7, for the range
of elements attainable/detected.
Although not depicted in these XRF results due to its characteristic x-ray emissions (1,739 eV and
1,835 eV) occurring below that attainable on the I18 beamline (minimum beam energy = 2,050
eV), Si was previously determined via sample-wide EDS analysis to be homogeneously distributed.
This compositional homogeneity is observed to occur alongside considerable contributions from
both Mn and Sr, as shown in Figure 10.6 (a), with the bulk of the particle-containing contributions
from both elements in approximately equal concentrations. From the XRF map, little mixing of
these elements is observed - with Mn concentrated within the bottom region of the particle and
Sr conversely enriched in the top portion of the sample. These results complement those shown
earlier in Figure 9.17.
The occurrence of Cs and its close association with the locations at which Fe is observed are
shown in the XRF maps of Figures 10.6 (b) and (c). In addition to Cs being located in the large
(surface protruding) Fe composition fragment identified and subsequently studied during the
earlier synchrotron works (Section 9.4.3), the fission product species is also concentrated within
a number of micron-scale regions, located towards the left-hand side region of the particle. These
combined Cs and Fe-rich regions are, like the considerably larger particle, associated with the
ejecta particles exterior. Also shown (coloured green) within Figure 10.6 (c) are micron-sized
areas of elevated Cu concentration. While similarly located around the samples perimeter, these
Cu-rich regions are not associated with the position of any other elements.
The spatial distribution of Fe, alongside Zn and also Pb is shown in Figure 10.6 (d). As is
the case for the other elements, Zn is also distributed around the particles circumference, and like
Cu, is found as mono-elemental regions uncorrelated with the locations of other elements - again
agreeing with Chapter 9 results. Pb, in contrast, is found concentrated towards the left-hand
portion of the particle - associated with many of the other elements.
252
10.4. RESULTS
A further XRF map detailing this samples exterior surface enrichment in Pb and Cs - distributed
within a homogeneous background of Sr, is shown in Figure 10.7 (a). This co-existence of Pb,
concentrated as isolated yet diffuse regions within the particle alongside other elements, is
further shown in Figures 10.7 (b) and (c). In the former, the concentration of Pb (red) is plotted
with that of the halogen element Br (blue). The purple colouration of the resulting overlay clearly
illustrates the combined Pb-Br composition of the numerous isolated regions, found concentrated
near-entirely around the particles left-most border.
In Figure 10.7 (c), the intensity of Pb (red) is plotted alongside the metalloid, Se (blue). Like Pb
and Br in 10.7 (b), the purple colouration of the XRF elemental overlay details the co-existence of
both Pb and Se, similarly concentrated in a number of regions close to the left edge of the particle.
Combined, Pb, therefore, occurs associated with both Br and Se. These Pb-Br-Se regions are
notably more diffuse in their appearance, with no clear edge structure/compositional boundary
shown, unlike the Fe-Cs and Cu-rich regions. This disparity may, therefore, imply a difference
in the form of these species contained within this CF-01 ejecta particulate. Hence, the Fe-Cs
material may exist as solid (fragmented) particulate incorporated into the bulk (Si, Mn and Sr
based) matrix, whereas the material composed of Pb-Se-Br may have undergone melting or a
departure from a solid state ahead of its incorporation to yield such a highly-irregular and diffuse
internal distribution.
Combined with the spatial distribution of both Cs and Fe, the distribution of Rb within the
CF-01 ejecta particle is detailed in Figure 10.7 (d). Identical to Se and Br, Rb is additionally found
associated with the location (and diffuse form) of Pb - observed distributed around the exterior of
the particle, concentrated most significantly around its left-most perimeter.
While the XRF analysis on the I13-1 beamline resulted in the three-dimensional compositional
mapping of the sample by generating fluorescence spectrum at multiple angles, the corresponding
analysis on the I18 micro-focus spectroscopy beamline was only two-dimensional. Therefore,
owing to the computed XRF signal from the latter I18 sample scan resulting from an averaging
of the entire sample thickness, and not from the tomographically-integrated XRF mapping as on
I13-1 beamline, the U signal from I18 was near-entirely masked by the spectral overlap from
Rb. Whereas regions of U could themselves not be identified based upon their characteristic
emissions from the sample, a number of regions (formerly identified as U on the I13-1 beamline),
were shown to exhibit elevated Rb fluorescence intensity. No other fluorescence emissions from
other actinides (e.g. Pu, Am or Np) were observed for this entire CF-01 ejecta particle, as these
emission peaks would not overlap with those of Rb.
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Figure 10.8: SR-µ-XANES analysis of two CF-01 included U particles (A and B) at the U-LIII
edge, alongside a reference UO2 (Uraninite) spectrum.
10.4.2 U micro-focus spectroscopy
Despite having not been able to identify the spatial distribution of U during the I18 analysis, the
location of U within the CF-01 particle sample was, however, successfully determined during the
proceeding three-dimensional study on I13-1. As mentioned previously, these U-rich positions
were also observed to show enhanced signal intensity around the Rb fluorescence region when
mapped on the I18 beamline - confirming their location within the sample.
With no actinide other than U observed within the entire ejecta particle, XANES analysis was
performed at the locations of two of these U particles. The results of this XANES analysis,
alongside that of a reference UO2 sample [412], are presented in Figure 10.8. Immediately
apparent from these scans, over the 200 eV window across the U-LIII edge (17,176 eV), is the




Figure 10.9: Comparison of experimental and calculated XANES spectrum at the U-MIV edge for
differing U oxidation states. The dashed lines represent the energy positions of the main peaks
corresponding to the U IV and VI oxidation states respectively. Modified from [416].
The XANES spectra of both particle A and B, shown in Figure 10.8, are characterized by a
broad "white line" (absorption edge) peaking around 17,176 eV before smoothly decreasing
towards a minimum at 17,200 eV. This shape has been previously attributed to U(IV) oxidation
state in uranium oxides and uranium composition glasses, whereas more oxidized forms; U(V) and
U(VI) - typical of U in surface environments, are characterized by an increasingly asymmetrical
shape, with a distinctive "shoulder" region apparent between 17,185 eV and 17,195 eV [413–415].
Although taken at the lower-energy U-MIV absorption edge, a representation of this change in the
form of the XANES structure for differing U oxidation states (IV, V and VI) is shown in Figure
10.9, obtained during the study of Kvashnina et al., (2013) [416]. This same energy shift, as
well as the occurrence of additional "shoulder" peaks on the higher-energy region of the XANES
spectrum, is similarly observed on the U-LIII edge - representing a broadening of the "white line".
Beam damage, characterised by a reduction of the "white line" intensity following tens of seconds
of exposure to the high-energy (and flux) incident x-ray beam, has been previously reported
255
CHAPTER 10. SPECTROSCOPY AND ISOTOPIC ANALYSIS OF EJECTA MATERIAL
for Ca-Mg-Al-Si (CMAS) composition glasses by Halse (2014) [401]. While an edge intensity
reduction was seen to occur, such a modification was not accompanied by an alteration in the
overall XANES shape, that would have signified in these measurements, that a change in the
oxidation state of the sample upon exposure to the x-ray beam has occurred. In this synchrotron
analysis, the absorption spectrum remained completely unchanged over the total of 12 minutes
of data collection. Therefore, consistent with the results of Halse (2014) [401], the effects of any
beam-induced oxidation state changes associated with the U particles can be disregarded.
While the (IV) oxidation state of the U was determined, the analysis of the EXAFS that follow the
U-LIII absorption edge (detailing the atoms outwards co-ordination chemistry) was not possible.
This resulted from the considerable signal to noise ratio within the fluorescence spectrum, a
consequence of the large size of the incident beam (2 µm × 2 µm) in comparison the U particle
but principally the total interaction volume (thickness) of the sample. If a larger particle were
analysed, the x-ray beam would have interacted with a greater sample volume - resulting in a
greater fluorescence signal (at the selected energy) over the finely-detailed, yet highly-informative,
EXAFS region.
The application of synchrotron-based techniques for the analysis of Pu-containing material
has been reported extensively, including within the works of Jernstrom et al., (2004) [417], and
Salbu et al., (2001) [393]. In both works, a high (ng) detection sensitivity for Pu was reported
during XRF mapping. With this material of reactor-origin, an ingrown (radiogenic) Pu component
is likely to exist. However, as it (as well as other actinide elements) was not detected during this
SR analysis, it, therefore, occurs at a very low concentration - below the limit of detection for this
highly-sensitive and non-destructive technique.
10.4.3 Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometry
Isotopic analysis (advancing both the elemental and coordination chemistry analysis) of selected
regions within the sub-mm CF-01 ejecta particle was obtained via SIMS. The formerly identified
Cs and micron-scale U components of the material were considered the most characteristic of their
provenance, and hence were the specific target of this analysis. A number of electron microscope
images of the CF-01 particle following destructive SIMS analysis are shown in Figures 10.10 (a)
to (d) - illustrating the micron-scale trenches that resulted from depth profiling over 40 µm × 40
µm regions into either the samples virgin or prior ion beam prepared surface. This depth profile
milling was performed into either ion beam cut faces (Figure 10.10 (c)), and unprepared "virgin"
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Figure 10.11: Positive bias SIMS depth profile through the previously ion beam prepared region
of interest. The time (depth) variations in ion counts (concentration) for 16O, 28Si, 137Cs and 238U
are shown.
With a region of interest (identified through the previous non-destructive methods) having
been prepared (overlying material removed through ion beam milling), the first application of
SIMS was to record a depth profile - encroaching into the sides of the µm-scale U inclusion and
neighbouring Cs-rich region. The result of this positive-bias depth profile into the samples prior
cut face is shown in Figure 10.11. Whereas a considerable variation in the abundance of both O
and Si are observed over the duration of the depth profile, apparent is the transient fluctuation
in the concentration of 238U at the beginning of the analysis, alongside the more substantial
increase in 137Cs at the end of the scan. These compositional "spikes" hence confirm the results
of the earlier non-destructive analyses - with a small, isolated region rich in U and a large
Cs-rich region existing within the Si-based CF-01 ejecta particle. As marked on Figure 10.11, the
mirrored reductions in Si and O ion intensity are associated with the locations of voids (pores)
within the ejecta particle.
The difference in the measured intensities of the Cs and U masses results from the proportion
(and relative depth) of each region sputtered by the primary Ga+ ion beam. This is supported by
the SIMS map for both 137Cs and 238U shown in Figure 10.12, again using the positive-bias mode
of the SIMS instrument. With the U particle located in the wall of the trench, only the edge of the
particle was dissected by the incident ion beam. This is in contrast to the Cs composition particle
located at the base of the trench, therefore resulting in more of the particle being sputtered - with
the emission of a greater number of secondary (ejecta) ions. The size of the U inclusion imaged
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Figure 10.12: Positive-bias SIMS map detailing the location of U (238) and Cs (137), overlain
onto a secondary electron image of the resulting ion beam etched trench. The regions where the
spectrum presented in Figure 10.13 were obtained are additionally highlighted.
through SR-µ-XRF on the I13-1 beamline at the DLS is consistent with these SIMS results
detailing its micron length-scale. The sub-angular form of this U particle is further highlighted
in the SIMS map shown in Figure 10.12.
To determine the exact isotopic (atomic) composition of these two contrasting composition regions,
spectra were derived from both regions (shown in Figure 10.12) over applicable mass windows
comprising the various isotopes of interest. The resultant spectrum from the area comprising
the more diffuse Cs composition region is shown in Figure 10.13, using the previously applied
positive (left), as well as the negative (right) sample bias setup of the instrument. As shown
in Figure 10.13, a number of readily-discernible peaks (between 134 amu and 137 amu) exist
for the positive bias setting, however, no secondary ion peaks were detected within the same
mass window when a negative sample bias voltage was employed. From positive SIMS analysis,
prominent mass peaks are observed at mass units of 135 amu and 137 amu, with elevated ion
counts above background yielding smaller peaks at 134 amu and 136 amu. Additional spectra
using both positive (left) and negative (right) bias SIMS taken over an unprepared exterior
portion (40 µm × 40 µm) of the sample are shown in Figure 10.14. For a region shown through
earlier SR-µ-XRF analysis to contain no Cs component, no peaks across the Cs mass window
were observed.
With stable Cs monoisotopic (133Cs = 100% of natural abundance [52]), the other Cs isotopes are
all fissionogenic and result from a nuclear origin. The abundances, and therefore the isotopic
ratios at which these exist are dependent upon the degree of fuel burn-up. The largest mass peak
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in Figure 10.13 occurs at 137Cs. Decaying through the emission of a β- particle to 137Ba (via the
brief intermediary step at 137mBa), despite possessing a moderate half-life of 30.17 years, a small
component of ingrown (radiogenic) Ba will be present at 137 amu.
The other considerable Cs isotope contribution to the mass spectrum is from 135Cs. Possessing a
half-life of 2.3 million years [52], it is one of the longest-lived fission products [174]. The small
peak within the window at 136 amu would be attributable to the short-lived and low fission
product yield 136Cs if measured rapidly after the release, however, due to the isotope possessing
a half-life of only 13.16 days [52], the small yield produced would have subsequently decayed into
the stable, radiogenic 136Ba. The ingrowth of radiogenic 134Ba will also have resulted following
the β- decay of 134Cs (half-life = 2.065 years [52]) - with the peak at 134 amu therefore resulting
predominantly from Ba, rather than the original fission product radiocesium.
As well as decaying to various isotopes of Ba, a number of stable Ba isotopes with competing
masses to Cs are also encountered in nature (abundances shown in at.%): 130Ba (0.1058 at.%),
132Ba (0.1012 at.%), 134Ba (2.417 at.%), 135Ba (6.592 at.%), 136Ba (7.853 at.%), 137Ba (11.232
at.%) and 138Ba (71.699 at.%) [418]. It is well accepted that owing to these comparable masses,
both Cs and Ba are difficult to distinguish from one another in SIMS analysis [246]. However, the
absence of a mass peak at 138 amu strongly implies that no 138Ba was detected and therefore any
contribution from stable 138Ba (the most abundant of the Ba isotopes) as well as any radiogenically
ingrown 138Ba (from the rapid decay of the low fission yield 138Cs) in this instance is very small or
non-existent and therefore its contribution, can be neglected. The characteristic fission products
of 134Cs and 137Cs, however, irrefutably confirms the Cs provenance as anthropogenic, rather
than natural. This deficiency of natural Ba may represent its absence within the entire sample,
however, in-line with the recent study of Ono et al., (2017) [190], it may conversely exist outside
of the 40 µm × 40 µm region analysed in this instance.
Integration of the various peak areas from Figure 10.13 yields a number of distinct isotope ratios,
detailed in Table 10.2. These decay-corrected values (to March 2011) of 134(Cs+Ba*)/137(Cs+Ba*),
135Cs/137(Cs+Ba*) and 137(Cs+Ba*)/133Cs determined during this work were 0.032, 0.397 and
0.002 respectively. These values are shown alongside the comparable SIMS isotopic analysis
undertaken by Imoto et al., (2017) [371]. While the values for 134(Cs+Ba*)/137(Cs+Ba*) and
135Cs/137(Cs+Ba*) are consistent with those determined in this earlier work, the 137(Cs+Ba*)/133Cs
value, however, does not correlate with the work of Imoto et al., (2017). Confirming the species
distribution results of Section 9.4.5, this SIMS analysis corroborates the formerly implied near
complete absence of a natural Cs component (133Cs) contained in this CF-01 ejecta particulate.
The mass spectrum, across the 231 amu and 241 amu window, derived from positive bias SIMS
on one of the micron-scale U particles contained within the CF-01 sample (identified formerly
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Figure 10.13: Cs isotopic spectrum obtained from the location of the Cs-rich inclusion identified
in earlier depth profiling (Figure 10.11) and mapping (Figure 10.12), following ion beam
preparation. Both positive (left) and negative (right) sample biases were used.
Figure 10.14: Mass spectrum obtained from the exterior (uncut/"virgin") surface of the CF-01
particle over the Cs mass window. Both positive (left) and negative (right) sample biases were
used.
Isotopic ratio Imoto et al., (2017) [371] CF-01 (±2σ)
134(Cs+Ba*)/137(Cs+Ba*) 0.02488 - 0.03184 0.032±0.0096
135Cs/137(Cs+Ba*) 0.3929 - 0.4011 0.397±0.012
137(Cs+Ba*)/133Cs 0.9119 - 0.9914 0.002±0.0005
235U/238U 0.029341 - 0.029584 0.0351±0.002
Table 10.2: Cs and U SIMS analysis results (decay-corrected to March 2011) from the respective
regions of interest within the CF-01 ejecta particle, compared to those of Imoto et al., (2017) [371].
The inclusion of radiogenically-derived Ba species contributing to these values is shown (*).
261
CHAPTER 10. SPECTROSCOPY AND ISOTOPIC ANALYSIS OF EJECTA MATERIAL
Figure 10.15: Positive bias SIMS spectrum obtained from the location of the U inclusion
identified in earlier depth profiling (Figure 10.11) and mapping (Figure 10.12), following ion
beam preparation.
in Figure 10.12), is shown in Figure 10.15. Unlike the Cs spectrum of Figure 10.13, where a
number of mass peaks were detected, a single peak at 238 amu is dominant within this spectrum
alongside a smaller 235 amu mass peak.
In contrast to the monoisotopic Cs, naturally-occurring U is constituted by a number of differing
mass isotopes (abundances shown in atomic percent - at.%), consisting of; 234U (0.005 at.%), 235U
(0.720 at.%) and the most-abundant 238U (99.272 at.%) [365]. Alongside the raised abundances
of specific U isotopes (e.g. 232U, 233U, 234U, and 236U), the key indicator of an anthropogenic
(specifically reactor) source of U is its characteristic 235U/238U isotopic ratio. At any LWR facility,
an enrichment in the fissile 235U from approximately 0.7 wt%, to between 3 wt% and 5 wt% is
required within the fuel to maintain criticality [21]. In the case of Unit 1 at the FDNPP, the 235U
enrichment varied between 3.4 wt% and 3.6 wt% - dependent upon its location within the core
[25]. Apparent within the SIMS spectrum of Figure 10.15 is the larger magnitude 235U peak than
would otherwise be expected of a naturally-occurring U sample. Through integrating each peak
area, a 235U/238U atomic ratio of 3.51 wt% is derived - indicative of typical light water reactor
enrichment. This U isotopic ratio is comparable to that obtained by Imoto et al., (2017) [371],
shown in Table 10.2.
Alongside the two 235U and 238U mass peaks, marginally elevated counts are also observed
at 236 amu and 239 amu - likely representing U masses as hydride species (U-H). Across the
entire 10 amu window between 231 amu and 241 amu, no other peaks are discernible.
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Figure 10.16: Comparison of the Pu isotope ratios of two samples (Okuma Town and Iitate
Village) determined via ICP-MS, with core inventory values for reactor Units 1, 2 and 3 as well
as global (background) atmospheric fallout. Reference values from [50, 419].
As encountered previously with regards to SR-µ-XAS analysis, despite likely existing as a
(very small) component within the nuclear reactor sourced CF-01 ejecta particle sample, Pu
was also not detected during this SIMS analysis. While, like Ba, this may represent a spatial
inconsistency of the species within the particle, it could, however, be interpreted by the high
limit of detection (LoD) and poor sensitivity of SIMS for such higher-mass (heavier) elements
[246, 408]. It should be noted that while no Pu was detected in samples as part of this thesis,
the application of ICP-MS as part of the work by Dunne and Martin et al., (in preparation)
did conversely identify non-natural Pu signatures (240Pu/239Pu) in similar sample materials -
indicative of their likely Fukushima origin rather than as a result of global fallout (Figure 10.16).
10.4.4 FT-13
The results of similar SIMS depth profiling on the unprepared surface of the larger FT-13 ejecta
particle as was previously undertaken on the smaller, yet more angular CF-01 sample, are
presented in Figure 10.17. As no particulate of actinide composition was determined to exist
either on the surface or contained within this mm-scale radioactive material (Section 9.4.6),
unlike the CF-01 samples, this SIMS analysis focused on quantifying the exterior distribution of
fission product species.
From this surface, isotopic analysis (sputtering to a depth of 10 µm into the material), the
concentrations of stable isotopes including; 28Si, 40Ca, 56Fe, and 133Cs are all observed to be
uniform or non-existent in their concentration - although both Ca and Si display small depth-
related reductions in their abundance. In contrast, the concentrations of the fission products of
90Sr and 137Cs, both exhibit a surface enrichment down to a depth corresponding to approximately
1.5 µm. Beyond this depth, secondary ions of neither isotope are detected within the sample.
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Figure 10.17: Positive bias SIMS depth profile through the uppermost surface of the mm-scale
FT-13 ejecta particle. The time (depth) variations in ion counts (concentration) for 28Si, 40Ca,
56Fe, 90Sr, 133Cs, and 137Cs are shown. The position in the start of the depth profile at which the
Cs isotope (atomic) ratios were derived, is identified (blue shading).
When the decay-corrected 135Cs/137Cs isotopic ratio, as derived from the uppermost 0.8 µm
of the depth profile of Figure 10.17 is determined, a lesser value than that of the CF-01
material (0.397±0.0079), of 0.34±0.015 is derived. As determined for the CF-01 ejecta particle,
the 137Cs/133Cs isotope ratio similarly occurs with a value close to zero, resulting from the non-
detection and hence likely absence of naturally-occurring 133Cs. Despite representing only an
initial and rapid quantification of a small surface region of the FT-13 samples 135Cs/137Cs isotope
ratio, this value is consistent with that predicted for reactor Unit 2 in the work of Nishihara et
al., (2012) [50], having also been measured on micron-scale reactor Unit 2 derived material by
Imoto et al., (2017) [371].
10.5 Discussion
CF-01 (Unit 1)
With the prior laboratory-based tomography results of the CF-01 ejecta particulate (Section
9.4.3), detailing the occurrence of numerous high atomic number (Z) particles associated with the
sub-mm particles exterior-most circumference, synchrotron analysis on the I13-1 beamline at the
DLS confirmed these preliminary qualitative results; with the micron-sized material composed of
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U - located just below the surface of the sample. Complimentary analysis on the I18 beamline
(also at the DLS) was able to derive phase information following the application of SR-µ-XANES.
Identical to the individual sub-micron U-based atmospheric particulate material formerly analysed
in Section 8.4.3, this particle-included U was similarly shown to exist as UO2 - with U in the
chemically reduced IV oxidation state and therefore identical to that of the structure of nuclear
fuel. This represents strong evidence to support the current rationalisation that a breach of the
core containment had occurred [34], with the reactor building hydrogen explosion serving to
distribute actinide material into the environment. Based on the measured 134Cs/137Cs activity
ratio, this ejecta particulate is ascribed to have been sourced from reactor Unit 1 (when compared
to the values produced following the core inventory modelling work of Nishihara et al., (2012)
[50]). This sub-mm ejecta particulate was not derived from reactor Unit 2, however, in contrast to
the bulk samples from which the U composition atmospheric particulate was isolated.
Alongside the SR-µ-XRF results obtained on the I13-1 beamline (Section 9.4.5), the results
from this SR-µ-XRF mapping of the CF-01 ejecta particle from the I18 micro-focus spectroscopy
beamline, as shown in Figures 10.6 and 10.7, serve as further evidence of the materials reactor
provenance. These elemental maps highlight the co-existence of Cs in the sample with that of Fe,
which together occur within the larger, highly-angular central particle as well as the numerous
considerably smaller, yet similarly irregular, micron-scale inclusions. This fragmented form,
combined with their surface location and composition further supports the conclusions made in
Chapter 9, whereby such fragments were the result of material produced from a reactor-buildings
hydrogen explosion embedding both reactor and structural components into Si-based thermal
insulation materials that originally enclosed the RPV and had undergone a degree of melting.
With only four known mineral species containing both Cs and Fe [354] (none of which have been
found to exist within Japan), a natural origin of the Fe-Cs composition particulate can be near
certainly disregarded - with the provenance of these inclusions, therefore, being anthropogenic
and of reactor origin.
In addition to the Cs-containing Fe particles indicating a nuclear reactor source, the Sr-rich matrix
within which this particulate is contained further invokes the materials reactor provenance and
also a likely mechanism of formation. As detailed in the background discussions in Section 2.2.1,
like Cs - Sr is produced as a fission product in extensive yields during reactor operation [133].
Alongside other gaseous species, it too would have existed at elevated levels in the Unit 1 PCV
following the serious over-pressure venting of the RPV, that occurred shortly before the reactor
buildings hydrogen explosion on the 12th March 2011. The particle-wide distribution of Sr, over
the localised distribution of Cs (with Fe), is likely to result from the strong sorption of Cs onto
the surfaces of Fe composition materials (including steels) [389], in contrast to the absence of
such sorption behaviour shown by Sr.
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This formation of such "poorly-soluble Fe-Cs forms" as defined by Al Rayyes et al., (1993) [389],
would subsequently result in the environmental stability of Cs. Therefore, being strongly bound
onto the surfaces of Fe-bearing materials, akin to the sorption of Cs onto clay and mica-type
minerals [167, 168], the distribution of free and reactive Cs is, therefore, not of an environmental
concern. Like the nanometre-sized clay and mica-bound Cs, which themselves are highly mobile
in the environment, if this strongly Cs-bound Fe particulate were to be released from the surfaces
of (or from inside) this particle, then it would be similarly readily-transported in suspension.
Although not as determinative of a reactor origin as other elements, Cu (similarly dispersed as
micron-scale particles within the surface of the sub-mm CF-01 ejecta particle) occurs associated
with various applications/processes typical of a nuclear reactor facility [35]. Alongside inducing
embrittlement within RPV steels even under low radiation environments, Cu is more-extensively
utilised in portions of a reactors water transport and heat-exchanger network [20, 35].
Unlike the γ-ray emitting Cs, the sole fission product isotope of Br (81Br) is stable, with the fission
products of Se being either similarly stable (77Se, 78Se, 80Se and 82Se) or decaying through a
weak β- decay (79Se) into 79Br, with a half-life of 3.27×105 years. Contrasting to the angular form
of the Cs-containing Fe fragments - the Pb, Br and Se containing material is considerably more
rounded/diffuse and less well-defined in its shape. As discussed formerly in Chapter 9, owing
to its radiation shielding properties, but also its ductile nature, Pb was used extensively at the
FDNPP to enclose the insulation material that surrounded each PCV and Suppression Chamber.
A mechanism to account for the diffuse form of these numerous Pb-based fragments, in addition to
that of both Br and Se, can be ascribed to the volatilisation temperatures/boiling points of each of
these elements. Unlike Fe, which possesses a melting point of 1538°C, Pb exhibits a considerably
lower melting point of only 327.46°C [165]. As a consequence of this, at the elevated temperatures
experienced during the LOCI at the FDNPP reactor Unit 1, the Pb shielding material reached
temperatures sufficient to undergo significant melting. The large volume of Fe forming parts of
the reactor and also the surrounding building, however, did not. During the subsequent reactor
building hydrogen explosion, both Fe and Pb were fragmented and embedded into the fibrous
Si thermal insulation, which itself reached temperatures sufficient to induce melting. At these
reactor temperatures and pressures, both Br and Se would have existed in highly-mobile gaseous
states [165], and would have readily combined with the partially-molten Pb.
As well as the incorporation of reactor-sourced Cs-bound Fe particulate, gaseous Sr and irregular-
shaped Br-Se rich Pb material, there exists the aforementioned U fragments. Occurring in
addition to these fission product and reactor materials distributed around the exterior region
of the sub-mm ejecta particulate, this material is illustrative not only of elevated reactor
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temperatures (expected as part of a LOCI), but also the structural/mechanical failure of the
reactor cores fuel assemblies.
As part of the French-led VERCORS program [124], "significant" quantities of U were found
deposited in various parts of the experimental "reactor network" that had been at around 830°C
during a simulated LOCI scenario in the nearby reactor core. These results provided a crucial
indication of the fuel assemblies rapid structural failure, its fragmentation and the subsequent
mobility of U under accident/high temperature scenarios. The application of ICP-MS chemical
analysis of the various simulation-derived samples revealed release values ranging from 1%
to 10% for tests performed at the higher temperatures of 2330°C under differing (oxidising)
conditions.
Having been classified as possessing a release behaviour synonymous of fission products with
a "low volatility" in the work of Pontillon et al., (2010) [124], this VERCORS empirical study
concluded that unlike Pu, Am and Cm - U may be released following a LOCI with release fractions
of up to 10% in oxidising conditions. These oxidising, and high release conditions were experienced
where considerable volumes of steam existed, due to the formation of UO3 or various uranium
hydroxide species. In addition to the temperature and oxidising conditions, the VERCORS severe
accident program also concluded that factors such as burn-up, fuel-cladding interactions, nature
of the fuel (UO2 or MOX) and state of the fuel ("rod", "degraded rod" or "debris bed") served as
further physical parameters to influence total fission product and actinide release.
As detailed in the description of the accident scenario in Section 1.3, the reactor Unit 1 core
is believed to have reached temperatures in-excess of 2800°C by the early evening of the 11th
March, in a steam-rich environment due to the lack of adequate core coolant supply. According to
these VERCORS findings, under such high-temperature conditions, the U fuel would have begun
to structurally degrade - with the production of solid (fine-scale) U particulate as a result. With
core melting having reached completion by the morning of the 12th March and molten "corium"
material falling through the base of both the RPV and PCV before eroding into the underlying
concrete pedestal (Figure 1.3), a greater degree of this U particle volatilisation/fragment formation
would have resulted [124].
While highly-oxidising conditions (in the reactor environment) were reported in the VERCORS
study, the results of the U particulate from this thesis has shown the U to exist, however, as
UO2 - in the unoxidised and more chemically-reduced form. Rationalisations to account for this
reduced form of U could be attributed to; (i) the significant reducing atmospheric overpressure
resulting from the 130 kg of H2 gas within/surrounding the reactor assembly [387], or (ii) O2 gas
serving as the limiting reagent, whereby the total mass of U was greater than the volume of O
available to promote oxidation. The VERCORS project in contrast, utilised a single fuel assembly
267
CHAPTER 10. SPECTROSCOPY AND ISOTOPIC ANALYSIS OF EJECTA MATERIAL
within their experimental setup, therefore, issues concerning conclusions resulting from such
simulations scalability require further consideration.
Estimates specific to the FDNPP reactor Unit 1 (employing MELCOR computational modelling
combined with physical monitoring) by Sevon (2015) [420], determined that only 0.0004% of
the core inventory was released into the environment over the 96-hours since the initiation of
the LOCI. Assuming this release fraction (one significantly below that suggested through the
VERCORS experiments) only 15 kg of the 77,100 kg of UO2 (68,000 kg of U) originally located
within the reactor core [25], was fragmented (or volatilised) and subsequently ejected during the
reactor buildings hydrogen explosion. This work concluded that nearly all of the U, combined with
other reactor materials (e.g. Zircaloy-4™ fuel cladding, stainless steel structural components and
B4C control rods) formed a 164,000 kg highly-radioactive "corium" mass that corroded through
the base of the RPV and into the reactors underlying concrete pedestal. (N.B. the exact quantity
is likely never to ever be known due to the majority of this U existing as a once-molten corium
mass in various positions around the base of the reactor Unit 1 RPV/PCV [54]). The intense heat
generated by the LOCI was also responsible for the melting of the Si-based insulation material
located within close proximity to the reactor, into which the various species became combined.
In comparison to the SIMS analysis of "Cs micro-particles" (CMP’s) by Imoto et al., (2017)
[371], the results of which are shown alongside those determined during this work in Table 10.2,
the atomic ratios for fissionogenic Cs are all in close agreement (with the exception of those
ratios including 133Cs). While an anthropogenic (Fukushima) origin of this material is shown
by its radiocesium content, a specific reactor Unit origin can be further invoked based upon its
Cs atomic (isotope) ratio when compared to those derived by the reactor inventory ORIGEN
modelling of Nishihara et al., (2012) [50]. This atomic ratio based reactor Unit assignment
represents a further mechanism to ascribe the landward contamination to a specific source, in
addition to the radiocesium activity ratios described in Section 9.4.1.
One of these key "forensic" Cs isotope ratios is 135Cs/137Cs. As shown in Table 10.2 and also
graphically in Figure 10.18, a decay-corrected (to the time of the release) 135Cs/137Cs atomic
ratio of 0.397±0.012 determined in this work is consistent with the 135Cs/137Cs inventory value
for Unit 1, as derived via the reactor core inventory modelling work of Nishihara et al., (2012) [50].
Although not as illustrative of a particular reactor source than the various high-yield, rapidly
ingrown and short-lived fission product species (e.g. Cs, I, Ag, Sb and Te), the isotopic composition
of U across a UO2 fuel pellet and down the cores vertical length is considerably more consistent -
exhibiting much less isotopic variability. Whereas compositional homogeneity is observed across
the near-entire diameter of a standard 11 mm pressed and sintered fuel pellet post-irradiation -
some variation (elementally, isotopically as well as structurally), is associated with the sub-mm
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Figure 10.18: Comparison of the 135Cs/137Cs isotopic ratio of the Cs composition region in the
CF-01 particulate alongside the reactor core inventory modelling values as determined by
Nishihara et al., (2012) [50].
outermost region of its circumference. As detailed in the works of Buck et al., (2004) [23], and
Bruno and Ewing (2006) [174], owing to the elevated thermal neutron fluxes experienced by
the UO2 fuel located closest to the surrounding Zr-C based cladding during reactor operation,
(defined as the "rim-effect" by Spino and Papaioannou (2001) [421]), the degree of fuel burn-up is
greatest. A schematic representation of a conceptual irradiated UO2 fuel pellet, highlighting this
high burn-up "rim-effect" portion, is shown in Chapter 8 (Figure 8.9).
Alongside a degradation in the structural integrity and hence the serviceable lifespan of the fuel
as a result of its irradiation (associated with the pellets circumference), thermal neutrons are
efficiently absorbed by the fertile 238U in this high burn-up region. These optimised neutron
absorption conditions led to the production of fissile 239Pu [23]. This 239Pu may capture further
neutrons to yield other transuranic species (e.g. Am and Cm), or conversely undergo fission - with
the build-up of a comparable yet marginally different suite of fission products.
From the SIMS analysis of the embedded U particle - established formerly from the SR-µ-
XANES analysis to be U(IV) as UO2, no masses other than those at 235 amu and 238 amu were
detected. With a wt% 235U of 3.51 wt%, this U inclusion is illustrative of; (i) an LEU fuel material,
and also, (ii) this particulate having not originated from natural U (NU) contained within the
precursor basalt-sourced Rockwool™ insulation - having been shown by Morgan and Lovering
(1965) [390] to comprise approximately 0.2 ppm of the fibrous materials bulk composition.
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With no other mass peaks aside from those at 235 amu and 238 amu, the results can be further
invoked to attribute the material as originating from one of two potential sources. This particle
inclusions could either have arisen from; (i) the central portion of an irradiated fuel pellet -
where actinide species ingrowth had occurred (which would produce mass units other than 235
and 238) or, (ii) from the entire volume (including the pellets outermost circumference) of an
unirradiated fuel pellet, recently installed with the reactor having not been extensively irradiated.
A graphical comparison of the wt% 235U from reactor Units 1, 2 and 3, alongside this measured
wt% 235U within the CF-01 contained U micro-particle (as determined through SIMS analysis)
is shown in Figure 10.19. The 235U wt% values of the U contained within each of the three
reactors fuel assemblies were obtained from records published by the plant’s operator, TEPCO
[25], as detailed formerly in Table 1.2. With the low (1.1 wt% - 1.3 wt%) 235U of the 32 MOX fuel
assemblies contained within Unit 3 excluded, the difference in the operational enrichment (wt%
235U) between Unit 1 and Units 2 and 3 is apparent. From Figure 10.19, the micron-sized UO2
particle shows a wt% 235U value within the compositional range used in reactor Unit 1, distinct
from fuel enrichment for both reactor Units 2 and 3. Alongside the SIMS isotopic ratio of the
radiocesium contained within the particulate, this U signature serves as further evidence that
the CF-01 was derived from reactor Unit 1. The integrity of the core must, therefore, have been
sufficiently compromised for a component of the fuel to enter into the environment - with the
majority having formed a mass of "corium" at the base of the PCV [54].
As they do not possess the same activity level (owing to their considerably longer half-lives) and
therefore emit the intensity of characteristic and easily-detectable γ-rays, U, alongside many
of the other actinide elements (e.g. Pu, Am and Cm) are often termed the "frequently forgotten
radionuclides" [145] - with their existence and abundance quantifiable only through (destructive)
mass spectrometry techniques. Resultantly, U "regardless of its enrichment level, represents
a contrasting hazard owing to its chemotoxicity" [147, 422]. Such toxicity is apparent from its
NFPA 704 classification, grouped within "Class 4" for Health [423], alongside hydrogen cyanide
and hydrofluoric acid - whereby "very short exposure could cause death or major residual injury".
It was only in 1999 that the extent of the toxicity of uranium dioxide was first established -
absorbed through phagocytosis by the surfaces of the lungs [146].
Resulting from the SR-µ-XANES analysis of the CF-01 ejecta particulate, the U particles studied
were observed to exist in the U(IV) oxidation state - characterised by the highly distinctive,
symmetrical, absorption spectrum. Unlike the U(VI) oxidation state in which U also frequently
exists, the IV redox state exhibits a far greater thermodynamic stability and is insoluble under
environmental conditions [147]. It is this thermal stability and the relative insolubility of U(IV),
in the form of UO2, that allows for its use as the fuel within nuclear reactors.
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Figure 10.19: Comparison of the known FDNPP reactor Unit wt% 235U levels (black) with that
derived from the SIMS analysis of the U particle contained within the CF-01 sample (green). U
core inventory data of Units 1, 2 and 3 obtained from [25].
As a consequence of the insoluble nature of these U(IV) particles, their leaching into environmental
waters is considered to not represent an environmental hazard. A hazard would, however, result
if a considerable volume of these particles were to become inhaled. If these particles were to
additionally become oxidised to U(VI) (as U3O8), they would exist in a more soluble and hence
readily transported (dissolved) state. As this small volume of U, occurring as embedded U particles,
exists some microns below the surface of the Si-based ejecta particle, the risk of oxidation, release,
dispersion and biological uptake is effectively eliminated. This ejecta particulate could be viewed
as being analogous to a crude form of vitrified nuclear waste - whereby the nuclear material is
enclosed within an impermeable glass; serving to not only eliminate the release of radiation but
also prevent against species leaching and transportation over time [424].
FT-13
From the earlier laboratory-based XRT (confirmed through the application of Raman spectroscopy)
detailing the amorphous internal volume of the FT-13 particle alongside a small number of Fe-
based inclusions (Section 9.4.6), the analysis presented in this chapter conversely focused on
the particles exterior-most surface. From the resulting SIMS analysis of the 2 mm diameter
FT-13 ejecta particle, the primary fissionogenic isotope of Cs (137Cs) was observed to exist entirely
within an enriched outer "rind" - to a depth of circa. 1.5 µm. While this fission product isotope
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Figure 10.20: Cs EDS elemental mapping performed on micron-scale "Cs-ball" material. Modified
from [193] (left), and [194] (right). Scale bars = 0.5 µm.
was detected only during the very initial period of SIMS depth profiling, the existence of the
primordial (stable) isotope of Cs (133Cs) was not detected within the entire 10 µm section into
the sample - therefore invoking either its abundance below the ppm LoD for SIMS analysis, or
conversely its complete absence from the sample.
A comparison of the 135Cs/137Cs atomic ratio (determined from the outer surface) of this FT-13
ejecta particulate sample is plotted alongside the value derived from the CF-01 material, as well
as the reactor core inventory values (for reactor Units 1, 2 and 3) resulting from the modelling
work of Nishihara et al., (2012) [50], in Figure 10.18. Having been isolated from a site (Futaba
Town) located at the very base of the primary contamination plume previously attributed via; (i)
bulk isotopic analysis [48, 161, 162], (ii) regional mapping studies [69, 153] and more recently, (iii)
preliminary single-particle quantification [164], to the FDNPP reactor Unit 2 - the 135Cs/137Cs
isotopic ratio of this newly-discovered (yet significantly more sizeable) particle also aligns with
the predicted core inventory value of reactor Unit 2 [50]. This initial isotopic quantification
represents the very first analysis undertaken on such a mm-scale (Unit 2-derived) material, with
particulates investigated from this reactor having formerly only been observed to have existed
as micron-scale "Cs-balls" or similarly-sized, yet slightly angular material [191–194] - termed
"Type-A" in the work of Satou (2016) [164].
When compared to the Cs distribution observed within the micron-scale "Cs-balls" of prior studies
[193, 194], an analogous peripheral concentration is similarly evident (to 0.5 µm depths into
the average 2 µm diameter sample. As formerly invoked in the study of Kogure et al., (2016)
[194], the peripheral nature of the 137Cs can be implied to result from the gaseous diffusion of
the various Cs isotope species into the silicate glass particle after its solidification at a high
temperature within the gas-filled atmosphere surrounding the reactor. Unlike the spherical
micron-sized "Cs-balls", however, which were capable of being transported vast distances by
the entraining air-masses [191, 192], such mechanisms did not permit for this mm-scale ejecta
particulate to be carried far from the FDNPP site, resultantly deposited only 2 km from the site.
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While the associated sample preparation and individual particle isolation involved in this
highly-detailed isotopic analysis is considerably more extensive, time-consuming and inherently
more costly than the bulk sediment, lichen and dust isotopic analysis that has to-date been
widely undertaken [143, 161, 162, 327, 425], it does overcome issues when multiple isotopic
contributions exist. This isotopic "dilution" of the primary signal of interest was encountered
in the 235U/238U organic samples analysed by Shibahara et al., (2015) [141] - where naturally
occurring U saturated any Fukushima-derived signal that may have existed. The multiple FDNPP
reactor sources, combined with the residual global Pu background (from atmospheric weapons
testing), resulted in multiple instances of end-member mixing being recorded on Fukushima-
derived material in a number of studies [142, 143, 426]. Similar deconvolution of both reactor
and global background fallout signals was additionally performed in works on Cs isotope ratios
[163, 427], seeking to attribute sample contamination to a specific Fukushima reactor core source.
10.6 Conclusions and future work
The work described in this chapter represents an extension of the initial single particle analysis
described in Chapter 9, as well as the very first application of targeted SR-µ-XANES and
SIMS analysis of inclusions contained within the larger, Si-based, sub-mm representative ejecta
particulate. This multi-technique analysis of microscopic regions of interest within the sample
(analogous to searching for a "needle in a haystack") was only achieved through the accurate
stage (and resultantly sample) positioning that allowed for the efficient correlation of the various
techniques and their subsequent results. The following conclusions can, therefore, be drawn:
• Using cutting-edge materials analysis methods, it is possible to evaluate both the state
(phase) and isotopic composition of single particles of interest - despite existing within a
larger, enclosing, matrix.
• That the SIMS analysis of an isolated Cs-rich region supports earlier γ-ray spectroscopy
(134Cs/137Cs activity) results, with the complementary atomic ratio of 135Cs/137Cs being
similarly illustrative of a signature characteristic of the FDNPP reactor Unit 1 when
compared to estimates made in the work of Nishihara et al., (2012) [50].
• The U exists within the U(IV) oxidation state as uranium dioxide (UO2). This form not only
corresponds to the naturally-occurring Uraninite mineral but more notably is identical
to that used as the fuel material within all light water reactors - the type involved in the
numerous releases from the FDNPP.
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• SIMS quantification confirmed these microscopic U particle inclusions as derived from the
FDNPP - showing a wt% 235U enrichment level matching that of the fuel contained in
reactor Unit 1 of the FDNPP.
• The Unit 1 reactor core reached sufficiently high temperatures during the LOCI for its
structural integrity to be compromised. In addition to the U failing - producing a volume of
volatilised/fragmented fine-scale aerosol material, this heating resulted in the fuel material
relocating (melting) from its initial position in the core assembly to the base of the RPV/PCV
as a mass of "corium". This actinide material is believed, alongside the other gaseous fission
product species and reactor components, to have combined with the Si-based material that
insulated the PCV - which itself underwent significant melting as a result of the LOCI.
• As a result of the reactor building hydrogen explosion, structural components such as
Fe (steel) and concrete (Chapter 9), were embedded into the very exterior of the Si-based
particle - more peripherally than the U. This is believed to clearly define an event chronology
- with the hydrogen explosion serving to produce Fe and concrete fragments which were
then fused onto the surfaces of the Rockwool™ insulation sourced Si-based particulate.
• The micron-scale of the incorporated U fragments is consistent with the extensively studied
microstructural size of UO2 grains that combined constitutes nuclear fuel [23, 24]. As a
consequence, the structural failure/fragmentation of the actinide fuel assemblies is seen as
responsible for the observed existence of UO2 on the surfaces of particulate possessing a
Fukushima-derived radiocesium signature.
• The Cs content of the sample exists associated largely with the metallic Fe particulate (of
various sizes), contained within the larger Si-rich particle. This association is likely the
result of the known affinity that Cs shows for Fe [389].
• In contrast to the angular nature of the Fe particles; the Se and Br containing Pb regions
were considerably more irregular in their form, postulated here to represent the incorporation
of material (that unlike Fe) had undergone some degree of melting. The known lower melting
point of metallic Pb over Fe supports such differences in the materials form.
• The IV oxidation state of the U is indicative of its environmental stability - being insoluble
under typical conditions [147]. This form, therefore, implies that no U species leaching will
result while the material remains unoxidised (chemically reduced).
• While insoluble due to its oxidation state, the existence of U as micron-scale particulate
within the environment poses a notably health issue (if at total quantities greater than
the <50 µm3 in this instance) owing to its readily-inhalable nature [233], and absorption
through phagocytosis by the vast surfaces of the lungs [146]. If existing at concentrations
above the levels observed in this work (corresponding to hundreds of such micron-scale
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particles), internal α-particle radiation exposure could also result if a large volume of these
micron-scale actinide particles were inhaled.
• The enclosed nature of the U micro-particles, contained by the amorphous Si glass, will
serve as a mechanism to reduce the likelihood of the actinide material from entering the
environment. Any future fragmentation of such highly-porous particulate, analogous to
naturally-occurring pumice [388], may contribute to the U fragments entering into the
environment. However, the intact form of the ejecta particle analysed in this work would
suggest a moderate degree of structural integrity to the material to prevent against its
environmental breakup.
It should be noted that this high-resolution and multi-technique analysis has focused solely on
a single particle deemed representative, isolated from a locality 2 km north-west of the site’s
reactors - part of a suite of similar ejecta particles. Whereas this material was selected due to its
similarity (following electron microscope examination) to other such sub-mm particles - each of
which were obtained from the same bulk sample, care must be taken when using these results in
large-scale interpretations as they may not be wholly representative of the remainder of sub-mm
particulate distributed within the environment. However, the results arising from this work
have highlighted the occurrence of Fukushima-derived actinide material in the environment
surrounding the plant. In addition to these results, the methods devised and employed in this
chapter represent those that could be used during the further examination of Fukushima-derived
or other nuclear-sourced fallout material.
The estimate for the UO2 released from reactor Unit 1 provided by the MELCOR modelling
of Sevon et al., (2015) [420], totalled 15.0 kg - or 0.0004% of the total core inventory. Through
assuming the total UO2 in a standard Unit 1 ejecta particle is consistent with the ≈50 µm3
observed for this sample, before incorporating approximate particle depositional densities (from
personal communications with Dr. Y. Satou of JAEA) and the total land area contaminated - a
core release of approximately 12.9 kg of UO2 is predicted. This value lies within 14% of the value
predicted by Sevon et al., (2015), and serves to provide an initial (albeit approximate) validation
of their results. Although such a quantity only represents a volume of UO2 11 cm × 11 cm ×
11 cm in size, it is not only U but also the various fission product elements and other actinide
species that are contained within this release volume that represent a hazard [146, 147]. While a
Fukushima U signature was encountered, it should be noted that U (in air, water and foodstuffs)
occurs entirely naturally, with the United States Centre for Disease Control (CDC) summarising
in addition to quantifying the known potential effects of prolonged (chronic) exposure to the
actinide [311].
Following from this multi-technique analysis of a single ejecta particle - confirmed to have
been derived from the FDNPP (and specifically reactor Unit 1), future work will focus on the
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analysis of the other similarly-sourced particles to evaluate their consistency and therefore the
conclusions of this study. As well as examining additional ejecta particulate samples through the
same methods, the use of other analytical techniques is also planned including 3-Dimensional
Atom Probe Tomography (3D-APT), ICP-MS, nano-focus SR-XAS, SR-µ-x-ray diffraction (XRD)
and TIMS.
As proposed for the sub-µm U atmospheric particulate described in Chapter 8, one technique
employable for the nano-meter scale compositional/phase analysis of this Si-based material will
utilise the newly commissioned nano-focus spectroscopy beamline, I14, at the Diamond Light
Source synchrotron. Whereas the I18 beamline was capable of 2 µm × 2 µm spatial resolutions,
through the application of enhanced downstream optics, the I14 beamline can attain spatial
resolutions (pixel sizes) down to 50 nm × 50 nm [263]. Hence, it will be possible to perform
XRF mapping alongside XANES and potentially EXAFS point analysis at resolutions previously
unattainable and with considerably less spectral noise.
To evaluate the isotopic ratio of the U material with a greater accuracy than the surface sensitive
SIMS technique, the use of 3D-APT alongside solution or laser-ablation ICP-MS is also planned
on regions of the sample determined to contain actinide material.
In order to investigate the potential influence of particle fragmentation on the release and
dispersion of soluble or insoluble U into the environment, a number of environmental leaching
studies are additionally planned. After first using a diamond (Microtome) cutting system to
produce a number of particle sections, these slices will them be mounted onto the tips of glass
support needles or onto TEM support grids before being placed into solutions analogous to
environmentally observed fluids. Both SR-µ-XAS alongside subsequent solution nebulisation ICP-
MS will then follow to determine; (i) if a U phase change had occurred, and, (ii) if U concentrations










CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
11.1 Thesis summary
In the years since the accident, despite considerable progress having been made in repairing
the infrastructure and former reactor buildings on the FDNPP site by the plant’s operators
(TEPCO) - work to retrieve the previously molten corium material from inside each of the reactors
RPV/PCV has yet to commence. Commendable activities have also occurred off-site - associated
with the remediation of large areas of the less-highly contaminated Fukushima Prefecture. As
a consequence, formerly excluded areas are becoming classified as safe, and ready for rehabitation.
While large portions of this Special Decontamination Area have been declassified, allowing
citizens once displaced to return, a switch in focus to characterising the contamination across the
more topographically challenging and heavily contaminated regions (closer to the plant) is needed.
In addition to considering the human health implications associated with the dose received from
ionising radiation - the influence of the "frequently forgotten" (typically actinide) radionuclides
has been somewhat overlooked, with the assumption (from the onset) that extremely low actinide
volumes were released [155]. To ensure that an appropriate remediation and repopulation
strategy is constructed, a thorough understanding of not only the form/state, distribution and
concentration of the contamination but also its mobilisation and environmental longevity, is
required to determine its full radiological and toxicological impact.
In contrast to the large number studies undertaken by Japanese research institutions and
organisations, this work and the associated Fukushima-related publications represents that of a
single UK-based PhD student. The results and conclusions from each chapter are hereby detailed:
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Chapter 1
In this chapter, a background to the power generation operations and the infrastructure at
the FDNPP was provided, alongside an overview of wider nuclear energy production in Japan. A
description of the sequence of events and radiation releases that together constituted the accident
were additionally provided. A summary of the material release estimates made after the accident
was also detailed - these included extensive reactor core modelling in addition to evaluating the
post-accident conditions of each reactor and its associated fuel storage ponds.
Chapter 2
A description of the radiation monitoring response to the accident was described; comprising
initial high-altitude aerial surveys, leading to lower-altitude aerial platforms, foot-based, vehicular
and oceanic survey types with time. The extensive evacuation areas that were instigated as a
consequence of these surveys by the Government of Japan were also illustrated in this chapter in
addition to the large-scale remediation activities (which are currently ongoing). A discussion of
the various source attribution studies that have sought to delineate the landward contamination
into that resulting from each distinct reactor Unit release was also included. Central to this source
attribution was the forensic analysis of the particulate encountered within the environment as
well as the radiocesium ratios (both activity and atomic) - a review of the studies to-date was also
included in the final portion of this chapter.
Chapter 3
In addition to introducing the basic principles of radiation detection and the radiation detectors
used in this work, this chapter firstly described the ground-based monitoring systems devised
at the University of Bristol as part of this thesis as well as their calibration and initial testing.
Alongside these "traditional" monitoring systems, the setup and calibration of a low-altitude
unmanned aerial vehicle for radiation mapping, also produced at the University of Bristol, was
additionally detailed. Through the application of test-sites in the UK and Japan, the idealised
operational parameters and height normalisation processing to derive an on-ground dose-rate
were together determined.
Chapter 4
In this chapter, the geographical locations and sample characteristics of the bulk organic
material containing the micron/sub-micron atmospheric particulate was detailed. The same
sample specifics pertaining to the sub-mm ejecta particulate (obtained from localities much closer
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to the Fukushima facility) were also described as well as the multi-stage process employed to
identify and separate these particles from the surrounding bulk sediment, lichen, moss or dust
matrix.
Chapter 5
This chapter detailed the extensive suite of analytical instrumentation used throughout this
thesis - applied to both the atmospheric and ejecta type particulate material.
Chapter 6
The results of contamination monitoring at selected sites around Fukushima Prefecture were
presented. Through the use of ground-based, but more extensively from the low-altitude unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) surveys capable of mapping γ-radiation intensity, it was determined that
such Cs-containing fallout material was characterised by a high degree of environmental mobility.
This ephemeral nature of such γ-emitting contamination was best-evidenced at sites for which
previous remediation activities had occurred, prior to rapid re-contamination.
Radioactive "hot-spots" in each instance were associated where the solid material was trapped, or
fluids transporting material would lose sufficient energy to deposit any particulate they carried.
The application of this high-resolution site surveying permitted for the highly targeted collection
of sample material for later use in this study.
Results from other sites highlighted the significant influence of water on the redistribution
of radiocesium. This was attributed to; (i) the high clay/mica-type mineral content of Fukushima
soils, (ii) the high affinity of Cs for sorption to the highly-reactive frayed-edge sites of such
particles and, (iii) the ease of entrainment and transportation (mobility) of these fine-scale
particles in fluvial systems.
Although remediation activities (e.g. scrubbing, sweeping and high-pressure washing) were
observed to significantly reduce the overall contamination on horizontal (typically anthropogenic)
surfaces such as roads, walls and isolated agricultural fields, the topographically extensive nature
of Fukushima Prefecture was invoked to result in considerable and ongoing movement and
relocation of the fallout-containing material. As a consequence of the easily remediated features
being limited in their frequency (in comparison to the harder to decontaminate valleys, forests
and sloping fields) across the Fukushima Prefecture, remediation is likely to continue within the
contaminated regions for decades to come.
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Chapter 7
In this chapter, the spatial distribution of atmospheric particulate (micron and sub-micron in
maximum dimension, with a diverse elemental composition) sampled from across the Fukushima
fallout region was examined. It was observed that across all particle compositions, a linear
reduction in the average particle diameter occurred with increasing distance (along the length of
the plume) from the FDNPP site. While this same size vs. distance correlation was determined for
particulate of numerous compositions, the same linear decrease in average size was conversely
not observed for others.
Resulting from; (i) the lack of a positive distance vs. average particle diameter correlation
shown by potentially nuclear-sourced materials, (ii) a negative distance vs. average particle
diameter correlation for other potentially nuclear-sourced particulate, and (iii) a strong positive
distance vs. particle diameter correlation shown by similarly-sized particulate with a composition
unattributable to a nuclear origin - other anthropogenic source(s) contributed to the particle
populations observed. These non-nuclear derived anthropogenic particles (and their as yet
undetermined source) would dilute or otherwise obscure any forensic particle signature attributable
to a Fukushima release. However, irrespective of their source, the occurrence of micron-scale
particulate of the compositions encountered could represent a health hazard owing to both their
readily-inhalable nature and in some instances, their high level of chemotoxicity (e.g. Cd and U).
Chapter 8
Analysing the U-containing particulate formerly identified in Chapter 7, the work detailed in
this chapter represented the first study to-date on the micron-scale actinide containing particles
isolated from organic (substrate) materials. Despite being observed to exist at thirteen of the
fourteen sampling locations, the U-containing material analysed in this initial study was collected
from a single sampling site; the heavily-contaminated Iitate Village. To undertake this, a novel
method for their removal and characterisation was first developed.
It was determined that the U-containing particulate from Iitate Village was anthropogenic
in origin - and attributable to the release from the accident at the FDNPP. Isolated from an area
contaminated exclusively by reactor Unit 2; the existence of U demonstrated that the reactor
core and its surrounding containment had been compromised, despite the absence of an explosive
release event - experienced by the other (1 and 3) reactor Unit buildings.
This occurrence is believed to represent a considerable health risk as a consequence of U
chemotoxicity. Whereas the current "risk map", and therefore evacuation zones, are defined
by the distribution of radiocesium and the resulting dose-rate, a re-evaluation (of the location
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and extent of the various Fukushima evacuation zones) should be performed to incorporate the
existence of this highly-toxic actinide material. As material irrefutably derived from the core of
the FDNPP was observed to exist at a location 35 km for the site, it was suggested that more
significant (size and activity) core material was likely to exist at localities closer to the plant
boundary.
Chapter 9
In Chapter 9, a larger (sub-mm) ejecta particle attributed to have been derived for Unit 1 was
analysed using a suite of high-resolution techniques. The carefully selected representative CF-01
particulate was observed to exhibit a highly-textured exterior surface (fibrous in appearance),
with 24% of the particles total volume comprised of largely independent voids. Through the
application of synchrotron radiation analysis techniques, Cs was shown to be distributed with
considerable heterogeneity within the sample, concentrated as small, isolated regions around
its exterior - strongly associated in the most part with the location of Fe (steel). These results
correlated well with the very limited number of earlier Japanese x-ray based studies - each
detailing a compositional heterogeneity (albeit at lower spatial resolutions) for such Unit 1
sourced material.
The periphery of the material contained both Ca and Fe rich zones - determined to represent
the inclusion of both structural concrete (cement) and steel respectively. As a result also of
synchrotron radiation analysis, the CF-01 particulate was shown to contain µm-sized particles
of a high density material (believed U composition material) - similarly peripherally located
(the analysis of which was detailed in Chapter 10). The formation mechanism for this CF-01
ejecta material was believed to have resulted from the immense heat and pressures generated in
the PCV by the LOCI - alongside the rapid depressurisation of molten materials immediately
proceeding the reactor buildings highly-energetic hydrogen explosion that occurred on the 12th
March 2011.
As a consequence of the elevated temperatures that existed associated with the PCV at the
time of the incident, the surrounding Si-based thermal insulation material would have undergone
a degree of melting - exsolving volatile species to produce internal an gaseous volume. Existing
within a "softened" state, the high pressure and temperature reactor-sourced gases (namely Cs)
were coincidentally able to diffuse into (the periphery) of the material. The subsequent ignition of
the flammable hydrogen component of these gases then caused the explosive fragmentation and
dispersion of this insulation material, with the incorporation of similarly fragmented, structural
material - the Fe component of which (through known Fe-Cs sorption) contained a more significant
Cs content than had diffused (under pressure) into the particle volume.
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It was observed that the larger diameter FT-13 sample, in contrast, possessed few of the features
associated with the representative sub-mm CF-01 particulate. While similarly composed of a
Si matrix, this Unit 2 sourced particle was shown, however, to contain no discernible internal
porosity. As well as this void absence, no extensive surface or near-surface particulate existed
(aside from a small number of near-pure Fe composition material), occurring at greater depths
within the amorphous and structureless mm-sized particulate.
The different form of this FT-13 particle to the CF-01 material was invoked to have resulted
from their contrasting source and hence formation mechanisms. Produced as a consequence of a
PCV breach (and not a reactor building hydrogen explosion), this reactor Unit 2 sourced ejecta
particulate was believed to have resulted from the similar melting of the Si-based insulation that
surrounded the PCV (with the diffusion of gaseous and volatile Cs). However, following the more
extensive melting of the fibrous Rockwool™ than that associated with the CF-01 material, the
internal (fibrous) form, and porosity, were lost. The absence of extensive "embedded" fragments
was a consequence of the unexplosive nature of the release.
Chapter 10
Further analysis of the CF-01 ejecta particulate was performed using SR-µ-XRF, SR-µ-XANES
and SIMS isotopic analysis. The existence of Cs, associated with metallic Fe, was further shown.
This correlation increased the confidence in the earlier results, and was suggested to represent
the strong sorption of reactor-derived Cs onto the surfaces of Fe-based (steel) components. The
bulk of the sample was also shown to contain a near-homogeneous Sr content alongside isolated
Pb-based composition region, observed themselves to additionally contain both Br and Se.
The SR-µ-XANES analysis of the suspected micron-scale U particulate from Chapter 9 confirmed
this material to be U(IV) as UO2 - identical to that of nuclear fuel (but also the naturally-occurring
Uraninite mineral). From SIMS analysis on one of these U particles, a non-natural U ratio was
observed. This recorded U enrichment (3.51 wt% 235U) was ascribed to result from material
derived from Unit 1 at the FDNPP. The accompanying SIMS analysis of a Cs-rich region was
similarly attributed to the FDNPP Unit 1, reinforcing this conclusion. Additional SIMS analysis
of the FT-13 particle observed the distribution of radiocesium associated exclusively with the
particles outermost circumference.
The U containing material was concluded to not represent a significant environmental hazard
in its current glass encased form and insoluble oxidation state. However, the fragmentation of
this particulate in the environment was invoked as a mechanism through which a release of this
readily-inhalable and chemotoxic U could possibly (though not likely) occur. Although not directly
detected due to limitations in instrument sensitivity, the occurrence of reactor-sourced U was
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believed to illustrate the likely co-existence of other (toxic) actinide species (e.g. Pu, Am or Cm),
themselves presenting far greater environmental implications.
11.2 Conclusions and implications for Fukushima
Examination of localities using an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) radiation survey system was
illustrated - validated using comparable ground-based surveys. The platform was shown to be
capable of examining regions of interest with metre-scale spatial resolution, comparable to the
best resolutions otherwise attainable (on-ground). Alongside little or no dose exposure to an
operator, the platform was proven to permit for the study of difficult or previously inaccessible
locations.
The application of principally low-altitude UAV systems alongside on-ground radiological mapping
of contamination has correlated with the findings of earlier speciation studies on the form and
behaviour of fallout radiocesium. As a consequence of it’s micron-scale grain size, this Cs-bound
particulate was observed to be readily-mobilised under meteoric and fluvial conditions. This work
has shown that whilst ionic (solution) Cs was immobilised through its binding onto solid surfaces,
the readily transported nature of this fine-scale material (onto which it binds) represents a
significant issue (and challenge) to the remediation effort. This material mobility can be viewed
as highly-beneficial when associated with localities close to fluvial bodies, serving to reduce the
overall contamination - whereby material was shown in this study (in support of other previous
works) to be transported outwards into the Pacific Ocean, before being rapidly diluted [277].
This mobile particulate, however, was found to exhibit two specific behavioural caveats as
part of this study. Firstly, at locations whereby fluids carrying the fine-scale Cs-bound particulate
lost sufficient energy, the suspended materials they contained were deposited. The results
obtained using the UAV highlighted significant radionuclide pre-concentrations (from an initially
uniform contaminant distribution) at positions on a moderately-inclined site, containing a
substantial irrigation network (typical of most crop producing sites of this type). The second,
similar, behavioural anomaly was associated with the small number of buildings that exist, all
surrounded by forested hillsides. Resulting from the significant surface features/textures shown
by these buildings, fine-scale particulate-bound Cs was shown to have blown from these trees
and become entrapped within gutters, tiles or in the roof-mounted solar panels.
This occurrence of particulate Cs represents a significant challenge in the large area remediation
activities that are currently on-going across the Special Decontamination Area to reach the
targeted dose-rates. Being highly-mobile, the re-contamination of previously remediated lower
portions of hillsides as a consequence of downslope migration (slope instability) will invoke
the dilemma of requiring the repetition of the costly and operator intensive decontamination
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exercise. This will produce further volumes of LLW requiring adequate long-term disposal. As an
additional consequence of its mobility, and as observed in this work, significant attention will be
required when assessing contamination associated with buildings and other anthropogenic sinks
for radioactive material (e.g. the sewage network).
Examination of particulate samples described in this work has demonstrated that they can be
classified into either one of two distinct groupings; the smaller (µm to sub-µm sized) atmospheric
particulate and the considerably larger (100’s of µm in maximum dimension) ejecta particulate.
The smaller (and generally more angular) material was characterised by a limited elemental
composition, constituted by up to three (but more commonly a single) transition metal, post-
transition metal, metalloid, lanthanide or actinide element - alongside various non-metals (O, P, S
and Cl) and alkali/alkali earth elements (Na, K, Mg and Ca), believed to represent a background
introduced by the sediments/organic matter within which it was contained and analysed. Whilst
this work has shown a distance versus particle diameter relationship for material with certain
compositions, the same trend was not, however, associated with atmospheric particulate of other
compositions. This variance was attributed to contribution from one or more anthropogenic
sources, unrelated to the FDNPP accident.
Subsequent work, examining a number of these U-containing atmospheric particles, through
SR-µ-XANES, highlighted that each was formed of U(IV) as UO2. This material was analogous
in its structure not only to the naturally-occurring Uraninite mineral, but also that of nuclear
fuel, and as such was invoked to have likely resulted from the FDNPP. These synchrotron results,
suggesting a potential nuclear provenance, were validated by the observed existence of Cs -
distributed homogeneously within a U-containing particle. The presence of these nano-scale
U-Cs fragments confirmed that Fukushima-derived material exists within the environment
as a consequence of a breach of the core-containing RPV and also the surrounding PCV. This
observation correlated with the limited prior studies on the sub-µm U sourced from Unit 2
[192, 371] - although this work represented the first observation of such actinide material not
enclosed within the centres of the now infamous "Cs-balls".
The larger ejecta particulate was in contrast, found to be more complex, both compositionally and
structurally, than the smaller atmospheric particulate. Using non-destructive SEM, EDS, XRT,
XRF and SR-µ-XANES alongside destructive FIB and SIMS analysis, various attributes of the
representative CF-01 particle were shown - including the bulk of the particle being constituted
of fibrous glassy Si-based material. This sub-mm particle had a complex internal structure
comprised of a bimodal pore volume (constituting 24% of the total particle), while the particles
exterior circumference was shown to contain fragments of both cement and steel. As well as other
fission product species, the particle was additionally found (via SR-µ-XRF) to contain isolated
(micron-sized) regions of Cs - associated with not only the smaller sized voids but also at the same
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positions as the Fe composition inclusion particulate, together distributed around the largely
Si-based particles perimeter.
Alongside Cs, using SR-µ-XRF, particles of U were observed to exist around the particles
circumference. The additional application of SR-µ-XANES analysis on this U particulate found
it existed in the U(IV) oxidation state, as UO2. The wt% 235U enrichment within one of these
particles supported the 135Cs/137Cs atomic ratio and illustrated the material was sourced from
the FDNPP reactor Unit 1.
This work has shown that it is possible to detect and extract individual micron-scale and sub-
micron U particles within environmental media, even when such material was either enclosed
within larger particulate or dispersed widely amongst sediment, dust or various organic bulk
samples. The existence of radiocesium, bound to the surfaces of microscopic solid particles, will
present a challenge to the large-scale remediation of the Special Decontamination Area. This
materials mobility, combined with the topography of the region, will require repeated remediation
activities be conducted at sites across Fukushima Prefecture, generating further volumes of
contaminated surface-derived wastes.
Unlike the radioactivity hazard resulting from the existence of radiocesium in the environment,
the presence of U represents a contrasting toxicology hazard, exacerbated by its readily-inhalable
and ingestible particle size. Owing to the current evacuation and hence "risk map" being defined
by the radiocesium dose-rate - whereby repopulation is permitted once permissible dose-rates are
achieved (<20 mSv per annum [155]), this existence of chemotoxic U and a possible coexistence
of other actinides, should warrant a redefinition of this "risk map" and the continuation or
implementation of evacuation/restricted access areas.
It should be noted, however, that although dose-rates encountered across large regions of eastern
Japan are now elevated above those before the FDNPP accident, locations with greater levels of
naturally-occurring radioactivity exist. One such example is Cornwall in the south-west United
Kingdom, which shows an elevated radioactive background across the entire region. Despite
localities such as Tolgarrick Mill (employed as a calibration site in this thesis) exhibiting average
dose-rates of >15 µSv h-1 (and a maximum of 215 µSv h-1) from the decay of U-series elements,
no evacuation orders or restrictions on habitation exist. With the majority of the plume region
exhibiting dose-rates less than those measured in Cornwall, (as of November 2017), a repopulation
of regions of Fukushima Prefecture contaminated exclusively by radiocesium (and not actinide
species) represents a logical step in the regions recovery. This not only allows for citizens once
displaced from their homes to return, but for the considerable financial cost associated with the
remediation to be saved.
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The mathematical assessment of the relocation measures employed following the FDNPP accident
were examined (and compared to those which occurred in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident)
in the works of Waddington et al., (2017) [158], and Thomas et al., (2017) [428]. This Judgement
or "J-value" evaluated any benefits to human life as a consequence of the evacuation against any
detrimental health effects (on the population demographics) of such a mass-relocation. These
studies concluded that based upon the current radiation distribution (solely of radiocesium)
within Fukushima Prefecture, that the mass-evacuation of citizens should not have occurred -
with the "life enhancement" brought about by such an evacuation being considerably less than the
"life detraction" resulting from the stress of the relocation process. However, as this assessment
does not consider the existence of actinide species within the environment - a reassessment of
these conclusions is required with this new, crucial insight.
There are, however, limitations to the results presented in this thesis with respect to both
the meter-scale and single-particle analysis. One limitation pertinent to the high-resolution
(meter/sub-meter) mapping of radiation using the low altitude UAV, resulted from the innovative
nature of the platform. Due to the UAV-mounted detection system performing surveys at altitudes
not formerly employed, it was necessary to derive appropriate height normalisation algorithm(s).
While ground-validated corrections were derived (and successfully applied in this study) for
scenarios exhibiting either planer or point source geometries (or combinations of both), some
divergence from predicted values was associated for a number of more complex radiation fields.
Therefore, applying the current height normalisation procedures, to more intricate distribution
scenarios would yield considerable uncertainty until further calibrations and modelling can be
undertaken.
The limitation of the particulate analysis component of this study was the small number of
particles, of both types, from which these conclusions were based. The U composition atmospheric
particulate from the Iitate Village area was selected; (i) as a site known to have been contaminated
exclusively by reactor Unit 2, and (ii) the bulk samples collected from the locality were found to
contain a large volume of U composition fragments. To permit for the efficient and sequential
multi-technique analytical process to be developed and subsequently performed, a decision was
made to focus exclusively on a single representative "large" ejecta particle (CF-01) throughout this
study. However, this single CF-01 sample was selected as it was representative of the entire suite
of particulate isolated from the locality bordering the FDNPP site following initial pre-screening.
11.3 Future work
This thesis has presented an analysis of the March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Plant accident at two contrasting length-scales - highlighting, amongst other results, the complex
form and composition of the ejecta particulate material. It also successfully demonstrated the
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development and application of a multi-technique methodology (and necessary sample-handling
procedure) for investigating such sub-mm material. There are limitations in this work, however,
which are discussed above, some of these are overcome in the suggested future work:
1. Apply additional UAV calibration studies across multiple sites at a range of survey altitudes
- each exhibiting differing radiation distributions. This is to provide additional data to
validate/compound the height versus intensity calibration(s) described in this thesis.
2. Apply the low-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle to further characterise the transport and
environmental mobility of radiocesium. This assessment is centred on determining the
radiation intensity across agricultural sites, buildings and forests, otherwise inaccessible
and therefore not readily assessed.
3. Extend the analysis of the micron-sized U composition material, from the one site in
this work to the numerous other sites where this study observed similar U-containing
material to exist, along the length of the main north-west trending (Unit 2) plume. This
is to determine if the particulate (shown to increase in diameter with proximity to the
FDNPP) can be attributed entirely to the power plant release, or from an alternate source.
4. Apply the analytical techniques described in this thesis to further similar samples that have
been obtained from the Cambridge Filter Company (CF designation). This is to principally
identify if any consistency exists in both the structure and composition of this particulate,
collected from a single sampling location, attributed to the FDNPP reactor Unit 1.
5. Apply these same techniques to the similar sub-mm material, obtained from additional sites,
likewise contaminated by the reactor building explosion that occurred from the FDNPP
reactor Unit 1.
6. Undertake a solubility characterisation of the fallout particulate to determine the extent of
any actinide (and other species) leaching should such ejecta particulate become fragmented.
7. With a sample of Unit 1 sourced material now analysed in addition to material attributed to
Unit 2; apply analysis techniques developed and implemented in this thesis to any material
subsequently isolated and attributed to the FDNPP reactor Unit 3. As this reactor core was
operating with 32 MOX fuel assemblies, a discernible Pu signature, distinct from each of
the other reactor Units, would likely be observed.
8. Apply these sample preparation and analysis techniques to "hot particles" from other
worldwide sites. This could include materials from; (i) Windscale and Sellafield (assessing
contributions from both Windscale fallout trapped in the Ravenglass (Seascale) Salt Marsh
and effluent derived from both modern and historic activities at the Sellafield Ltd. nuclear
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reprocessing site), (ii) Palomares - Spain and Thule - Greenland (aircraft crashes involving
the transportation of thermonuclear weapons), and (iii) Canadian Shield (failed and crushed
Russian Cosmos 954 satellite that widely-dispersed its Pu composition nuclear fuel-cell).
9. Utilise the I14 nano-focus XAS beamline at the Diamond Light Source to produce EXAFS
data to determine the Fe-Cs co-ordination chemistry associated with the Fe-based fragment











RADIATION SURVEY METHOD COMPARISON
All values presented in this appendix are typical for each of the systems cited.
Manned Airborne
System mass (kg): >5,000
Example platforms: C12 (plane) and UH-1 (helicopter)
Flight duration (minutes): 120 - 300
Flight altitude (m): >150 (by law)
Survey length (m): >200,000
Velocity (m/s): 0 (hover) - 125
Detector payload (kg): >100
Spatial resolution (m2): >250,000
Advantages: large survey areas, long flight durations, high-volume detector, extensive prior
system applications, terrain independent, weather independent.
Limitations: expensive upkeep and operational costs, manual operation, strictly controlled by
aviation law, radiation exposure to crew, requirement for trained pilots, poor spatial resolution.
References: [85, 86]
Unmanned Helicopter and Fixed-Wing
System mass (kg): 70
Example platform: Yamaha R-MAX
Flight duration (minutes): 90 - 360
Flight altitude (m): 50 - 100
Survey length (m): 3,000 - 5,000
Velocity (m/s): 0 (hover) - 15
289
APPENDIX A. RADIATION SURVEY METHOD COMPARISON
Detector payload (kg): 10
Spatial resolution (m2): 25
Advantages: no operator dose, fully-autonomous, terrain independent, low(er) cost of purchase
and uptake than manned platform, prior agricultural applications, moderately sized detector.
Limitations: Operator training still required, greater operational altitude than UAV platform,
adherence to aviation guidelines still required.
References: [93–95]
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
System mass (kg): <7
Example platforms: University of Bristol AARM UAV and Virtual Robotics Italia UAV
Flight duration (minutes): approximately 45
Flight altitude (m): <15
Survey length (m): 1,000
Velocity (m/s): 0 (hover) - 8
Detector payload (kg): <1
Spatial resolution (m2): <5
Advantages: no operator dose, fully-autonomous, low operational altitude, terrain independent,
low-cost, simple operation, lightweight, minimal user training, rapid deployment, high spatial
resolution.
Limitations: Small detector volumes (lower sensitivity/total count rates), limited flight durations,
limited spatial coverage, young technology, highly weather dependent.
References: [100, 101, 429]
Ground-Based
System mass (kg): N/A (must be transportable)
Example platforms: Safecast [105]
Flight duration (minutes): N/A
Flight altitude (m): N/A
Survey length (m): N/A
Velocity (m/s): N/A
Detector payload (kg): typically <1
Spatial resolution (m2): <1
Advantages: very low cost, no requirement for "carrier" vehicle, readily deployable, extensive
prior applications, little or no prior training required for application.
Limitations: Small detector volumes (lower sensitivity/total count rates), potentially significant
radiation exposure to operators, bodily influence of radiation shielding upon results, slow rate of












SOFTWARE USED IN THE PRODUCTION OF THIS THESIS
The software used during the analysis and associated visualisation of the data obtained during
this thesis is hereby detailed.
FEI Amira-Avizo™ (version: 9.2) - Interactive visualisation and manipulation of 3-Dimensional
data sets using a combination of visual programming (flows) and conventional scripted language.
Demeter (version: 0.9.26) - A suite of opnen-source software programmes (ATHENA, ARTEMIS
and HEPHAESTUS) based around an further open-sourced set of perl modules with a user front-
end using the IFEFFIT graphical environment. The combined suite allows for the representation,
interrogation and quantification of x-ray absorption spectroscopy (XAS) data.
EDAX TEAM™ (version: 7.4) - An Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy (EDS) system for detector
control, analysis and subsequent quantification of characteristic x-ray results from a scanning
electron microscope. Corrections to data based upon the ZAF/eZAF algorithms are automatically
undertaken within the software.
GEANT4 (version: 10.4) - Geant4 is an open-source toolkit for the simulation of the passage of
particles through matter. Its areas of application include high energy, nuclear and accelerator
physics, as well as studies in medical and space science.
ImageJ (version: 1.51w) - An open-sourced Java-based image processing program with architecture
allowing for both software library-obtained as well as bespoke user-written macros and plugins
to be utilised to manipulate various data and image formats.
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KSpect™ (version: 18.4.201) - A multichannel analyser software application that acquires
and displays the data from Kromek™ branded USB-based gamma-ray spectroscopy devices (e.g.
SIGMA-50 and GR1).
LabVIEW™ (version: 2015 SP1) - A proprietary system design platform and development
environment allowing for the visual (opposed to command-line based) programming language
developed by National Instruments (NI). The environment features a large number of downloadable
plugins to permit for the ready signal integration from a number of input software or hardware
platforms.
OriginLab™ (version: 2018b) - A proprietary program for interactive scientific graphing, data
manipulation and analysis. Capable of producing both 2D and 3D graphical representations, the
software also includes a scripting language based upon the C/C++ compiled language (Origin C).
PyMCA (version: 5.3.1) - A stand-alone open-source graphical user interface (GUI) application
and associated Python scripted tools developed at the European Synchrotron Radiation Facility
(ESRF) used for the batch-processing, deconvolution and quantification of synchrotron x-ray
fluorescence (XRF) data.
XM3D-Viewer™ (version: 2017.2) - Proprietary software from Zeiss Ltd. for the reconstruction,
presentation and manipulation of large tomographic dataset obtained using the Zeiss Xradia
Versa 520 X-ray Microscope (XRM).
Zeiss ZEN - Blue (version: 2.0) - Automated graphical analysis software for images obtained
on Zeiss electron and optical microscopes. Size, volume and area analysis is automatically and
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NUCLEAR SECURITY REVIEW - ENERGY POLICY
The following review article was published within the journal, Energy Policy (ISSN: 0301-4215). It
provides a commentary on the likely future of global nuclear security and the impacts that various
fields of technology will have on the topic - with respect to both short and long-term opportunities
as well as the associated threats.
The Future of Nuclear Security: Commitments and Actions - Power Generation and
Stewardship in the 21st Century.
P.G. Martin, N.G. Tomkinson and T.B. Scott
Energy Policy, vol. 100, pp. 325 - 330, 2017.
Abstract
Since the terrorist events of the 11th September 2001, the world as it was once known was
changed forever. It was these catastrophic terrorist actions over fifteen years ago that saw the
dawn of a new era with heightened security across many everyday areas of society that had
not previously witnessed such scrutiny or control. Coupling this elevated risk of physical and
technical aggression with the ever-increasing global per capita energy demand - there has been
witnessed a continually growing reliance on nuclear energy for baseline power generation, a form
of electricity production that requires both the necessary international safeguards and controls
for its safe use. As more and more of the global energy budget is provided by low-carbon sources
(over polluting fossil fuels), the volume of nuclear material in existence will grow substantially -
requiring considerable attention and policy to ensure its long-term safety and security.
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This commentary describes the vast range of policy challenges faced by the nuclear industry
resulting from the rapid technological advancements being made across society, and how these
directly (and indirectly) affect global nuclear security, as well as providing a thorough discussion
on how best these challenges may be overcome.
1.0 Introduction - A change in the global energy budget
With 2011 marking the year in which the world population first exceeded 7 billion , current
estimates place 2021 as the year when 8 billion people will inhabit our planet [430, 431]. It
may seem logical to conceive that the global energy requirement is a direct consequence of
the total global population - with more people requiring access to electricity. Whilst the global
population explosion is in-part responsible for our total energy requirement, it is the total energy
consumption per capita (Figure D.1 (a)), that is the ultimate driver behind our total power
requirements globally. Whereas at the beginning of the 1980’s where the average person did not
own a computer, several televisions and games consoles or large air-conditioning units, such items
are now commonplace and have resulted in a near two-fold increase in the amount of energy used
per person between 1980 and 2017 (Figure D.1 (a)).
Resulting from the considerable environmental impacts brought about by the burning of traditional
fossil-fuels (coal, oil and natural gas), combined with their ever-declining availability (physically,
and also through various geo-political circumstances) as well as considerable technological drivers,
has led to a divestment in power produced through these means, and what is viewed by many
as a "renaissance" in nuclear power [434–436]. Because of this increasing drive to liberate the
vast quantities of energy stored within the atom, after a brief recession from 2010, the per capita
proportion of nuclear power contributing to the global energy budget is increasing (Figure D.1
(b)). This resurgence in nuclear energy (albeit later that many foresaw) is similarly paired with a
corresponding reduction in the proportion of fossil fuels consumed. As shown graphically within
Figure D.1 (c), global fossil fuel consumption (per capita) has begun to decline - with this reduction
enhanced further if China (the largest consumer of fossil fuels) is excluded (Figure D.1 (d)) [432].
However, despite this observed growth within the sector, is it the opinion of many that such a
renaissance has not occurred and that any upturn in nuclear growth is considerably smaller than
was once envisaged (or widely-sold). This is often ascribed to the fact that the building of new
nuclear power plants is not economically viable via private investment, given the vast initial
facility construction costs and the extended time for payback on such investment [437–439].
Works including these also cite the lack of large-scale facilities globally to deal with the wastes
that are produced by the nuclear fuel cycle, in spite of the technological progress and new facilities
witnessed in northern Europe (Sweden and Finland) [440].
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Figure D.1: Per-capita: (a) Global Energy Consumption, (b) Global Nuclear Power Production, (c)
Global Fossil Fuel Production, and (d) Global Fossil Fuel Production - excluding China (energy
statistics and population). Data obtained from [430, 432, 433].
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Figure D.2: Breakdown of global reactor inventory over time, an increase across all categories is
observed. The following definitions are used in each case: "In Operation" - first connection to
power distribution grid, "Under Construction" - first concrete poured at site, "Planned" - final
approvals and funding in place and likely operational within 8-10 years and "Proposed" - initial
plans made public and site selected for suitability studies. Data obtained from [353, 433].
Such resurgence in nuclear is further demonstrated by not only the total number of nuclear
facilities operating globally, but also the total number of plants undergoing construction as well
as those at the planning or initial design (proposal) stage, as shown graphically within Figure D.2.
Following the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident in Japan, several countries
elected to halt their nuclear programs, including Japan and Germany. Whilst this represented a
significant number of facilities to enter shutdown - as is shown in Figure D.2, this was balanced
by many reactors entering service in other countries. It is estimated that by 2035, approximately
130 reactors will enter retirement, however these will be replaced by nearly 300 new units - many
of which will provide a considerably larger power-generating capacity [8, 353].
2.0 More material, more risk?
Consequently, with more nuclear reactors located in ever more countries, there exists (and
will rise still further), a record amount of nuclear material of varying types (e.g. enrichment, form
and radioactivity) distributed globally [353]. This presents considerable security, transport and
health risks associated with all stages of the materials lifecycle; from fuel precursors through
to spent fuel reprocessing, to wastes and final disposal. A plot illustrating the global uranium
production directed into the fabrication of fresh nuclear fuel for use in reactors is shown within
Figure D.3. Despite annual fluctuations in the volume of material entering fabrication, there is
still evident a steady increase in material entering the nuclear fuel cycle.
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Figure D.3: Global uranium production (tons) directed to the production of new nuclear fuel
assembles. Data obtained from [353].
Recent advancements in nuclear fission technology towards Small Modular Reactor (SMR)
systems, arising principally from their lower projected construction costs and reduced proliferation
risk makes them (for the first time) viable for private investment (World Nuclear Association,
2017b). These perceived benefits of SMR technology have led many to speculate that the number
of such units will increase rapidly, to constitute a considerable component of many countries total
nuclear reactor inventory (Figure D.4).
Unlike "traditional" fission reactors which generate power in the order of 1000 Mega Watt Electric
(MWe), these off-site manufactured reactors are designed to be brought on-site fully-constructed
and produce an electrical output of less than 300 MWe during peak operation. Whilst it may be
the viewpoint of many that the wider distribution of smaller volumes of radiological material
represents an improvement for safeguarding material from those wishing harm - with any
potential attack yielding access to only a comparatively small volume of nuclear material, these
reactors will still need to be kept highly-secure and therefore require an effective Nuclear Site
Security Plan, following INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 recommendations [442], as for any other nuclear
installation.
Accentuated by this portended rapid and extensive growth in SMR‚Äôs around the world due in
no small part to the differing systems produced by a large number of vendors detailed in a recent
publication by the National Nuclear Laboratory [441], several key challenges and threats to
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Figure D.4: Anticipated SMR growth forming part of global nuclear portfolio. Despite the
apparent large uptake of small modular reactor technology to the year 2035, its share of the
global nuclear energy generation market is small (world nuclear production in 2014 = 2.417×106
GWe). Data obtained from [441].
current (as well as future) nuclear security are apparent. As previously alluded to - the possibility
of direct violent physical terrorism on nuclear infrastructure is considered the most obvious risk,
and in the aftermath of recent global events, the threat of nuclear terrorism is now viewed by
many international organisations to be as great as ever, as detailed in a number of summative
works such as that of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), [443]. This "nuclear terrorism" can
occur through actions such as direct physical attacks on nuclear power facilities, its transport
network or the sites in which material is stored, potentially alongside coordinated cyber-attacks
on the networks and systems that are utilised in the sector. Despite intense screening, the
additional threat posed by insiders within these facilities cannot also be excluded. With terrorism
defined not only as the use of violence, but also the threat of its use, suitable fear and anxiety
exists even without any such acts ever occurring [444].
3.0 Keeping stock is keeping safe
Due to greater volumes of radiological material disseminated worldwide across the entire nuclear
fuel cycle (from initial mining through to final waste reprocessing and storage), it becomes
imperative for countries as well as regulatory organisations (such as the IAEA and Euratom) to
accurately monitor radiological material, its location, form and enrichment state. Two related, yet
contrasting aspects arising from this to impact future nuclear security are (i) smuggling: the act
of moving material for monetary gain to criminal gangs and terrorist groups and (ii) proliferation:
the spreading on nuclear material for weapons (typically clandestine) programmes.
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The IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) [445], has reported a total of 2889 confirmed
unauthorised possession and criminal activity incidents between 1993 and 2015 where material
had been moved without authorisation and was intercepted by controlling authorities. Incidences
where material has successfully been trafficked are obviously unreported, but it is highly likely
that international policing efforts to prevent or intercept illicit trafficking of nuclear materials
are not always successful. Such is evidenced by the regional variation in reported incidents made
within the ITDB [445]. Whilst despite containing less nuclear material as a region [8], the total
incidents of theft and loss within Asia is one-fiftieth of that of the USA, a disproportionality low
amount.
With such growing risks associated with our future divestment in fossil fuel power; a central aim
for the future of global nuclear security will be a strong commitment and requirement for (i) the
physical and technical protection of nuclear materials, (ii) the meticulous accounting of nuclear
materials, and (iii) the highly-accurate monitoring of nuclear sites and borders - incorporating
a strong focus on evolving technologies, automation, robotics and the Internet of Things (IoT).
However, whilst representing a key opportunity for improved safeguarding and monitoring,
there lies a range of potential threats from each of these technologies (as is the case with any
such system) if not employed for the correct means by those wishing harm through coordinated
terrorist acts.
4.0 Threats and opportunities posed by new technologies
The rapid development of small but computationally powerful devices for a variety of industrial,
domestic and recreational uses provides a rapidly evolving opportunity and threat register for
nuclear facilities worldwide. As such, the topic of nuclear security is rarely out of the global media
spotlight [446].
One such opportunity, but also a potential threat in the future of global nuclear security, is
the rapidly evolving field of drone or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology. Accelerated
markedly by the events at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan, lightweight
systems have been developed by a number of authors [95, 96, 226], each capable of achieving
substantial flight durations and distances (>30 min and 10’s of km). When combined with the
range of existing available detection options, UAVs represent a means by which to gather large
volumes of valuable data over nuclear sites or in response to radiological incidents. However,
the availability of these systems to the public, coupled with the ease at which they are operated
(using a combination of conventional hand-held remote controls and GPS way-points) has already
been seen to impact upon operations surrounding airports - with numerous reports of unidentified
aircraft or airspace incursions around the world [447].
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The potential use of these systems for physical attacks (not only on nuclear institutions) has
been viewed as significant by a UK think-tank [448], with a number of media articles also
documenting recent global events [449, 450]. Possible scenarios range from (i) utilising drones
to carry explosive materials into a nuclear site, potentially producing a criticality incident with
the accurate targeting of key on-site facilities, and (ii) following the acquisition of radioactive
material - using unmanned aerial systems to disperse this contaminant material over a wide
area, or population centre.
Considerable recent advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) technology could prove beneficial
for improving site monitoring using these UAVs and without the need for operator input and
guidance. Conversely UAVs could also be employed in physical attacks [451]. In these cases,
the UAV operator need not be in direct communication with the system during the attack
with the drone targeting pre-defined positions on the ground. Whilst a lone, well targeted UAV
system could cause moderate disruption and damage to a single item of nuclear infrastructure, a
coordinated "swarm" could pose a much more substantial threat. The term "swarm" technology,
was a concept introduced by Beni and Wang, (1993) [452], whereby multiple robotic systems can
operate as a group independent of a human operator. UAV "swarms" could facilitate simultaneous
coordinated attacks of a site/sites, using a significant number of airborne systems inbound from
different heights, directions and at different speeds; in sufficient numbers such that existing
defences would be overwhelmed.
The last ten years has also seen the accelerated advancement of battery technology with which to
power these unmanned aerial platforms. As a result of considerable research effort from both
industry and academia, the amount of electrical charge that can be stored within the same
physical volume and weight has increased enormously [453]. Because of this, the typical survey
duration possible with a UAV has grown, and hence accordingly, the distance from which attacks
can take place has also increased.
4.1 Development of dynamic monitoring networks for nuclear monitoring
In addition to this remotely operated airborne technology, the use of other robotic systems,
within advanced monitoring capabilities, contributes positively to the wider field of dynamic
radiation monitoring. As a direct result of the extensive advancements that have occurred
in radiation detectors and their miniaturisation, a powerful suite of technology now exists to
enhance the current strength of nuclear security. This enhanced detection capability has enabled
the production of "dynamic sensor networks", whereby a range of sensors can be deployed using
a range of mobile platforms, all feeding back autonomously in near real-time to produce an
extensive data network of a site or incident. The use of AI to process the numerous coincident
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data streams, much like the human brain manages inputs from the body‚Äôs nervous system,
means that temporal anomalies recorded by the sensors in the network representing a divergence
from a known and calibrated baseline for the site can be rapidly verified and enacted upon.
As well as UAVs, mobile platforms able to carry these increasingly more capable radiation
detection devices include humans and cars, however other (less mainstream) systems for dynamically
monitoring radiation include hovercraft [454] and pipe-crawlers [455]. Current work to advance
the scope of dynamic monitoring networks for nuclear security is investigating other remotely
operated vehicles (ROVs) such as inflatable airships and miniaturised underwater submersibles.
Whereas dynamic sensor networks represent a means to actively "search" for radiation anomalies,
their inherent complexity, with the required upkeep of the physical carrier platform, as well as
the potential challenges in referencing their position over the duration of their survey means
that static (fixed position) systems will always exist as a backbone within the future of nuclear
site security onto which dynamic ones are incorporated. Again, with the recent progression in
detector technology, numerous static systems that can be placed strategically around nuclear
sites or dispersed within a public setting, for continual monitoring - typically based on gamma-
ray detection [456, 457]. Typical examples of such systems include "portals" (typically large
archways) and "pads" (everyday objects such as road cones, speed-humps and safety barriers)
within both large arrays of highly-sensitive gamma-ray detectors can be installed to monitor for
activity above normal background levels. Stemming from work at CERN (Large Hadron Collider),
the application of muon tomography and scattering (utilising naturally occurring sub-atomic
particles incident from space) for the detection as well as determination of the type of any
radioactive source material, is a further detection method that now exists as part of the global
nuclear security portfolio, most commonly for the scanning of entire shipping containers or large
transport vehicles [458–460].
All of the detectors employed as part of dynamic systems are hence required to be both small
and highly-portable, being widely dispersed via the aforementioned range of potential carriers to
provide a wide spatial coverage. This distribution of hundreds, if not thousands (or hypothetically
tens of thousands), of various sensor types and their real-time feedback to a single command
point from where all of the information converges, is dependent on mass-network connectivity,
the ability to stream (securely) data wirelessly at a sufficient rate and subsequently reprocess
it efficiently [461]. Data acquired from static sensors presents less of an issue with regards to
data transmission due to their fixed position over time, and hence less of a need for high-end
data infrastructure and extensive coverage in the case of continually moving, dynamic systems.
Through deploying this wide range of sensor options for monitoring, a "hub" from which all the
platforms are capable from being dispersed and collating incoming data steam is required. This
hub would typically act as a "node" via which data acquired by the systems would be collated
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before transmission to a central data facility. There is also the potential for this technology to be
used in a more covert method, to deliver a counter-proliferation capability, in identifying illicit
nuclear weapons sites and materials.
4.2 Deployment of passive versus active sensors
Each of the detectors mentioned in the previous section may be referred to as "passive", whereby
there is no external input of energy in order to stimulate the detection of any potential radioactive
material [206, 462]. The contrasting type of system is what is termed "active". Unlike the
smaller, cheaper and more readily transportable passive detectors, active type detectors require
the production of highly penetrating beams to determine the internal structure of a large
volume. Such systems include the use of neutrons, electron/neutron-induced gamma-flash or laser
scanning to examine the contents of objects such as barrels and large containers [463, 464].
Like any electronic device; to enable it to function even for short periods it is required to receive
power. For large, "active" devices this demand is considerable - with vast quantities needed for
their operation, supplied through dedicated power networks. On the other hand, smaller "passive"
devices which do not need to produce an activating source to detect radioactive material, call for
markedly less power. As a result, potential exists for such low-power (static) devices (that remain
stationary indefinitely) to benefit from advancements in long-term power supply for applications
such as radiation store monitoring. Using natural radioactive decay; such as that associated
with 238Pu, 241Am or more recently the β-decay of 14C, a small but sufficient current can be
produced to provide power to devices - acting as a "nuclear battery" to trickle-charge systems
[465] (Patent Applications 17074485.6 and 62/504,012). The system (shown schematically within
Figure D.5), using a diamond "tri-layer" surrounded by metallic contacts, has been invoked to
be able to provide thousands of hours of current from materials otherwise considered as costly
waste following power generation.
Current detector technology and the mechanisms by which to deploy it for continued nuclear
security into the future have witnessed extensive progression over recent years, with great
advancements in detector crystal production, miniaturisation and spectral resolution [466, 467].
With the explosion in the number of these detectors and limitless potential locations where
they could be installed, the future will likely not lie in the detection hardware itself, but in
their connectivity, automation, combined sensitivity and ultimately how best to utilise the "big
data" generated by such a network of assorted sensor technology. Additional sensors can be
incorporated alongside the radiation sensor in order to provide greater situational awareness
around any detection incident. This enables a more detailed understand of what was in the area
at the time of detection to help focus appropriate responses.
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Figure D.5: Schematic of the proposed diamond battery, consisting of the multi-layer setup with
differing forms of diamond (radioactive and stable) encased within metallic contacts. Modified
from [465].
5.0 Data security and access
One of the fundamental questions to arise whenever nuclear site data is accumulated is how
securely it is held, and who maintains a responsibility for its long-term security (stewardship).
There are also additional issues centred on the correct data access and its presentation; making
sure that those who require the data at varying levels are given the best and most complete
access to it.
To produce high spatial resolution radiation monitoring with the greatest coverage achievable,
data will be sourced from a range of not only different sensor types, but also different organisations
and bodies. These organisations would typically include private companies such as power plants,
reprocessing facilities and the operators of large indoor/outdoor event spaces in addition to
public and law-enforcement groups. Whilst the data derived from these sources would constitute
part of a combined data-map; certain data obtained from specific sites or found to constitute
"interesting" or "abnormal" results may not be fully disclosed, representing issues surrounding
data ownership and how information pertinent to nuclear security should be shared. To provide
data into this combined system, complications arise surrounding its transmission and processing.
Whilst the Internet of Things (IoT) is beginning to facilitate greater connectivity than ever before
- revolutionising the data demand, questions need to be asked of how securely the considerable
quantity of data originating from the extensive sensor network will be communicated back
to locations where it is collected and monitored. Recent high-profile data hacks and system
infiltrations of large companies have highlighted the vulnerability of many of what were assumed
to be highly secure and well defended systems - comprising high-end encryption and cutting-edge
software [468, 469]. With the production of a shared repository into which different groups and
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organisations deposit their data as part of a larger collective, issues regarding the responsibility
to protect and manage this data need be addressed. Through "Quantum Encryption" over
traditionally employed mathematical encryption forms, this future form of data-handling will
permit large data volumes to be transmitted securely with clear knowledge of whether any
data had been intercepted on route [470, 471]. Attacks on computer networks as a result of the
connected system are only a small portion of the negatives, however, that result from the IoT -
with the 2015 Dell Annual Threat Report concluding that the number of attacks on corporate
and industrial networks has been increasing by 100% year-on-year from 2013 [469].
Due to the range of differing sensors and carrier platforms that exist in addition to its transfer
via the IoT, the data that is produced will vary considerably in its resolution and granularity.
Relating back to the issue of data access and roles in future safeguarding; whereas the data
may be collected at high resolution in many areas (and lower, more commonly at others), there
represents the need to control (and streamline) what data is either seen by certain individuals and
groups as well as the resolution at which they it. For example, those interested in the continual
routine monitoring of buildings and individual sites such as plant operators will demand data at
increased resolution than emergency response groups such as the UK’s Cabinet Office Briefing
Rooms (COBR) - where a wider overview of the data is demanded.
Indeed, The Sendai Framework argues that to "understand disaster risk" it is necessary to
"promote real time access to reliable data, make use of spatial and local sensors, including
geographic information systems (GIS), and use information and communications technology
innovations to enhance measurement tools and the collection, analysis and dissemination of
data". Risk mitigation must be built upon an empirically grounded understanding of the nature of
the hazards, requiring an improvement of the integration of scientific knowledge into government
and community decision-making [472].
6.0 Conclusion
In conclusion, whilst future risks to national and international nuclear security will still be
posed by groups or individuals wanting to undertake direct physical violence or destruction,
there will be a growing threat posed directly or in conjunction with physical attacks by more
technologically-advanced methods. Whilst there still exists a credible threat from physical
attacks on nuclear infrastructure or from groups dispersing acquired radioactive material within
populated environments, the likelihood of an attack is considered to be low and the threat level
remains relatively constant. However, as a deterrent and a representative illustration of capacity
to prevent such attacks, a traditional armed and physical security presence will continue to be
required on nuclear sites.
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By contrast, the global evolution of smart technologies is unabated, with the world having
evolved unrecognisably over the past half a century, mostly for good - with the invention and
accessibility of the internet recognised as pivotal in our history. Despite the immense benefits that
these technologies have brought to society, including quantifiable benefits for the nuclear sector,
the IoT and smart technologies more widely may also be viewed as one of the greatest potential
threats to global nuclear security over the foreseeable future. A comprehensive and joined up
physical and cyber security plan (both covering the threat from an insider) is essential to counter
the current threats to the global nuclear sector. Some arising technologies will present both a
threat and an opportunity, e.g. the application of UAVs in routine nuclear/security monitoring
and emergency/security assessment are of considerable promise, but at the same time present
a security threat, as many nuclear sites are not currently fully prepared for the detection or
prevention of coordinated incursions.
Ultimately, organisations responsible for nuclear safety and security must be obliged to stay up
to date with both emerging physical and digital technologies that could enhance or pose a threat
with respect to nuclear monitoring, security and safeguards. The further development of outcome
based security regulation, placing the onus on the nuclear site to demonstrate security/system
effectiveness, should encourage a more innovative approach to tackling the threat. Instead
of the historical prescriptive approach to security regulation, a change in this methodology
will encourage a stronger uptake of emerging beneficial technologies and stimulate the faster
development of countermeasures against those which pose a threat. This will likely necessitate
close liaison and resource sharing between defence and intelligence agencies, delivering further
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